Transcript for:
Deregulation and the Financial Crisis Overview

Iceland is a stable democracy with a high standard of living and until recently extremely low unemployment and government debt. We had the complete infrastructure of a modern society. clean energy, food production, fisheries, with a quota system to manage them.

Good health care, good education, you know, clean air, not much crime. It's a good place for families to live. We had almost an end-of-history status.

But in 2000, Iceland's government began a broad policy of deregulation that would have disastrous consequences. First for the environment, and then for the economy. They started by allowing multinational corporations like Al-Qaeda to build giant aluminum smelting plants and exploit Iceland's natural geothermal and hydroelectric energy sources. Many of the most beautiful areas in the highlands with the most spectacular colors are geothermal.

So nothing comes without consequence. At the same time, the government privatized Iceland's three largest banks. The result was one of the purest experiments in financial deregulation ever conducted.

Finance took over and more or less wrecked the place. In a five-year period, these three tiny banks, which had never operated outside of Iceland, borrowed $120 billion, ten times the size of Iceland's economy. The bankers showered money on themselves, each other, and their friends. There was a massive bubble. Stock prices went up by a factor of nine.

House prices more than doubled. Iceland's bubble gave rise to people like Jan Asger John. He borrowed billions from the banks to buy up high-end retail businesses in London.

He also bought a pinstriped private jet, a $40 million yacht, and a Manhattan penthouse. Newspapers always had the headline, this millionaire bought this company, in the UK or in Finland or in France or wherever. Instead of saying this millionaire took a billion dollar loan to buy this company and he took it from your local bank.

The banks set up money market funds and the banks advised deposit holders to withdraw money and put them in the money market funds. The Ponzi scheme needed everything it could. American accounting firms like KPMG audited the Icelandic banks and investment firms and found nothing wrong.

And American credit rating agencies said Iceland was wonderful. In February 2007, the rating agency decided to upgrade the banks to the highest possible rate, AA. It went so far as the government here, traveling with the bankers as a... as a PR show. When Iceland's banks collapsed at the end of 2008, unemployment tripled in six months.

There is nobody unaffected in Iceland. So a lot of people here lost their savings? Yes, that's the case.

The government regulators who should have been protecting the citizens of Iceland had done nothing. You have two lawyers from the regulator going down to a bank to talk about some issue. When they approached the bank, they would see 19 SUVs outside the bank.

So you enter the bank and you have the 19 lawyers sitting in front of you, very well prepared. Ready to kill any argument you make. And then, if you do really well, they'll offer you a job. One third of Iceland's financial regulators went to work for the banks. But this is a universal problem.

In New You you have the same problem, right? They are making it Make it show So much larger than life What do you think of Wall Street incomes these days? Excessive. I've been told it's extremely difficult for the IMF to criticize the United States.

I won't say that. We deeply regret our breaches of US law. They're amazed at how much cocaine these Wall Streeters can use and get up and go to work the next day.

I didn't know what credit default swaps are. I'm a little bit old fashioned. I'm stretching my mouth to let those feet Has Larry Summers ever expressed remorse?

Um, I don't hear confessions. I'm hurting up, I'm getting out To the city, BBC I'll be a The government's just writing checks. That's plan A, that's plan B, and that's plan C. Would you support legal controls on executive pay? I would not.

Big time. I'll move my way. I'll make it. Are you comfortable with the level of compensation in the financial services industry?

If they've earned it, then yes, I am. Do you think they've earned it? I think they've earned it. Oh, yeah. Big time.

And so you help these people blow the world up. Oh, you could say that. So much larger than life.

Big time. They were having massive private gains at public loss. When you start thinking that you can create something out of nothing, it's very difficult to resist. I'm concerned that a lot of people want to go back to the old way, the way they were operating prior to the crisis. I was getting a lot of anonymous emails from bankers saying you can't quote me but I'm really concerned Why do you think there isn't a more systematic investigation being undertaken.

Because then you'll find the culprits. Show your big time. Do you think that Columbia Business School has any significant conflict of interest problem? Don't say that we do. The regulators didn't do their job.

They had the power to do every case that I made when I was State Attorney General. They just didn't want to. Big time! On the phone tonight!

The weekend Lehman Brothers, one of the most venerable and biggest investment banks, was forced to declare itself bankrupt. Another, Merrill Lynch, was forced to sell itself. Today, crisis talks are underway. Rural financial markets are way down today following dramatic developments.

At present, Lehman Brothers has entered a bankruptcy. In September 2008, the bankruptcy of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers and the collapse of the world's largest insurance company, AIG. triggered a global financial crisis....gripped markets overnight with Asian stocks slammed... Stocks fell off a cliff, the largest single point drop in history... Share prices continued to tumble in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse.

The result was a global recession, which cost the world tens of trillions of dollars, rendered 30 million people unemployed, and doubled the national debt of the United States. If you look at the cost of it, destruction of equity wealth, of housing wealth, the destruction of income, of jobs, 15 million people globally could end up below the poverty line again. This is just a hugely, hugely expensive crisis. This crisis was not an accident. It was caused by an out-of-control industry.

Since the 1980s, the rise of the U.S. financial sector has led to a series of increasingly severe financial crises. Each crisis has caused more damage, while the industry has made more and more money. After the Great Depression, the United States had 40 years of economic growth without a single financial crisis.

The financial industry was tightly regulated. Most regular banks were local businesses and they were prohibited from speculating with depositors'savings. Investment banks, which handled stock and bond trading, were small private partnerships.

In the traditional investment banking partnership model, the partners put the money up, and obviously the partners watched that money very carefully. They wanted to live well, but they didn't want to bet the ranch on anything. Paulson Volk. served in the Treasury Department and was chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987. Before going into government, he was a financial economist at Chase Manhattan Bank.

When I left Chase to go in the Treasury... In 1969, I think my income was in the neighborhood of $45,000. $45,000 a year.

Morgan Stanleyley, in 1972, had approximately 110 total personnel, one office, and capital of $12 million. Now, Morgan Stanleyley has 50,000 workers and has capital of several billion. Thank you. and has offices all over the world.

In the 1980s, the financial industry exploded. The investment banks went public, giving them huge amounts of stockholder money. People on Wall Street started getting rich. I had a friend who was a bond trader at Merrill Lynch in the 1970s. He had a job as a train conductor at night because he had three kids and couldn't support.

than what a bond trader made. By 1986, he was making millions of dollars and thought it was because he was smart. The highest order of business before the nation is to restore our economic prosperity. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan chose as Treasury Secretary the CEO of the investment bank Merrill Lynch, Ronald Reagan.

Wall Street and the President do see eye to eye. I've talked to many leaders of Wall Street. They all say we're behind the President 100%. The Reagan administration, supported by economists and financial lobbyists, Started a 30-year period of financial deregulation. In 1982, the Reagan administration deregulated savings and loan companies, allowing them to make risky investments with their depositors'money.

By the end of the decade, hundreds of savings and loan companies had failed. This crisis cost taxpayers $124 billion and cost many people their life savings. It may be the biggest bank heist in our history. Thousands of savings and loan executives went to jail for looting their companies. One of the most extreme cases was Charles Keating.

Mr. Keating, you got a word? In 1985, when federal regulators began investigating him, Keating hired an economist named Alan Greenspan. In this letter to regulators, Greenspan praised Keating's sound business plans and expertise and said he saw no risk in allowing Keating to invest his customers'money. Keating... reportedly paid Greenspan $40,000.

Charles Keating went to prison shortly afterwards. As for Alan Greenspan, President Reagan appointed him chairman of America's central bank, the Federal Reserve. Greenspan was reappointed by President Clinton and George W. Bush.

During the Clinton administration, deregulation continued under Greenspan, and Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin The former CEO of the investment bank, Goldman Sachs, and Larry Summers, a Harvard economics professor. The financial sector, Wall Street, being powerful, having lobbies, having lots of money, step by step captured the political system, you know, both on the Democratic and the Republican side. By the late 1990s, the financial sector had consolidated into a few gigantic firms, each of them so large that their failure could threaten the whole system.

and the Clinton administration helped them grow even larger. In 1998, Citicorp and Travelers merged to form Citigroup, the largest financial services company in the world. The merger violated the Glass-Steagall Act, a law passed after the Great Depression, which prevented banks with consumer deposits from engaging in risky investment banking activities. It was illegal to acquire Travelers. Greenspan said nothing.

The Federal Reserve gave them an exemption for a year, and then they got the law passed. In 1999, at the urging of Summers and Rubin, Congress passed the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, known to some as the Citigroup Relief Act. It overturned Glass-Steagall and cleared the way for future mergers.

Why do you have big banks? Well, because banks like monopoly power. Because banks like lobbying power. Because banks know that when they're too big, they will be bailed. Maryets are inherently unstable, or at least potentially unstable.

And appropriate metaphor is the oil tankers. They're very big, and therefore you have to put in compartments to prevent the sloshing around of oil from... capsizing the boat. The design of the boat has to take that into account. And after the depression, the regulations actually introduced these very watertight compartments.

And deregulation has led to the end of compartmentalization. The next crisis came at the end of the 90s. The investment banks fueled a massive bubble in internet stocks. Which was followed by a crash in 2001 that caused $5 trillion in investment losses. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the federal agency which had been created during the Depression to regulate investment banking, had done nothing.

In the absence of meaningful federal action, and there has been none, and given the clear failure of self-regulation, it has become necessary for others to step in and adopt the protections needed. Elliot Spitzer's investigation. revealed that the investment banks had promoted internet companies they knew would fail. Stock analysts were being paid based on how much business they brought in, and what they said publicly was quite different from what they said privately.

Infospace, given the highest possible rating, dismissed by an analyst as a piece of junk. Excite, also highly rated, called such a piece of crap. The defense that was proffered by many of the investment banks...

Was not, you're wrong. It was, everybody's doing it and everybody knows it's going on and therefore nobody should rely on these analysts anyway. In December 2002, ten investment banks settled the case for a total of $1.4 billion and promised to change their ways.

Scott Talbot is the chief lobbyist for the Financial Services Roundtable, one of the most powerful groups in Washington. which represents nearly all of the world's largest financial companies. Are you comfortable with the fact that several of your member companies have engaged in large-scale criminal activity? You'll have to be specific. Okay.

First of all, criminal activity shouldn't be accepted, period. Since deregulation began... The world's biggest financial firms have been caught laundering money, defrauding customers, and cooking their books again and again and again.

I've been taking care of business every day. Taking care of business every way. I've been taking care of business.

Credit Suisse helped funnel money for Iran's nuclear program and for the Aerospace Industries Organization of Iran. which builds ballistic missiles. Any information that would identify it as Iranian would be removed.

The bank was fined $536 million. Citibank helped funnel $100 million of drug money out of Mexico. Did you comment that she should, quote, lose any documents connected with the account?

I said that in a kidding manner. It was at the early stages of this. I did not mean it seriously.

Between 1998 and 2003, Fannie Mae overstated its earnings by more than $10 billion. These accounting standards are highly complex and require determinations over which experts often disagree. CEO Franklin Raines, who used to be President Clinton's budget director, received over $52 million in bonuses. When UBS was caught helping wealthy Americans evade taxes, they refused to cooperate with the U.S. government. Would you be willing to...

supply the names. If there's a treaty framework... No treaty framework.

You've agreed you participated in a fraud. But while the companies face unprecedented fines, the investment firms do not have to admit any wrongdoing. When you're this large and you're dealing with this many products and this many customers, mistakes happen.

The financial services industry seems to have a level of criminality that is, you know, somewhat distinctive. You know, when was the last time that Cisco or Intel or George or Apple or IBM, you know... I totally agree with you about high-tech versus financial services, but high-tech... So how come? Well, high-tech is a fundamentally creative business where the value generation and the income derives from actually creating something new and different.

Beginning in the 1990s... Deregulation and advances in technology led to an explosion of complex financial products called derivatives. Economists and bankers claimed they made markets safer, but instead they made them unstable. Since the end of the Cold War, a lot of former physicists and mathematicians decided to apply their skills not on Cold War technology, but on financial markets. And together with investment bankers and hedge funds...

Creating different weapons. Absolutely. You know, as Warren Buffett said, you know, weapons of mass destruction.

Regulators, politicians, and business people did not take seriously the threat of financial innovation on the stability of the financial system. Using derivatives, bankers could gamble on virtually anything. They could bet on the rise or fall of oil prices, the bankruptcy of a company, even the weather. By the late 1990s, derivatives were a $50 trillion unregulated market. In 1998, someone tried to regulate them.

Brooksley Bourne graduated first in her class at Stanleyford Law School and was the first woman to edit a major law review. After running the derivatives practice at Arnold & Porter, Bourne was appointed by President Clinton to chair the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which oversaw the derivatives market. Brooksley Bourne asked me if I would come work with her. We decided that this was a serious, potentially destabilizing market. In May of 1998, the CFTC issued a proposal to regulate derivatives.

Clinton's Treasury Department had an immediate response. I happened to go into Brooksley's office, and she was just putting down the receiver on her telephone. And the blood had drained from her face. And she looked at me and said, that was Larry Summers. He had 13 bankers in his office.

He conveyed it in a very bullying fashion, sort of directing her to stop. The banks were now heavily relied for earnings on these types of activities, and that led to a titanic battle. to prevent this set of instruments from being regulated.

Shortly after the phone call from Summers, Greenspan, Rubin, and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt issued a joint statement condemning Bourne and recommending legislation... to keep derivatives unregulated. Regulation of derivatives transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary. She was overruled, unfortunately, first by the Clinton administration and then by the Congress. In 2000, Senator Phil Graham took a major role in getting a bill passed that pretty much exempted derivatives from regulation.

They are unifying markets. They're reducing regulatory burden. I believe that we need to do it.

It is our very great hope that it will be possible to move this year on legislation that in a suitable way goes to create legal certainty for OTC derivatives. I wish to associate myself with all of the remarks of Secretary Summers. In December of 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. Written with the help of financial industry lobbyists, it banned the regulation of derivatives.

Once that was done, it was off to the races. And the use of derivatives and financial innovation exploded dramatically after 2000. So help me God. So help me God.

By the time George W. Bush took office in 2001, the U.S. financial sector was vastly more profitable, concentrated, and powerful than ever before. Dominating this industry were five investment banks, two financial conglomerates, and the U.S. economy. three securities insurance companies, and three rating agencies.

And linking them all together was the securitization food chain, a new system which connected trillions of dollars in mortgages and other loans with investors all over the world. 30 years ago, if you went to get a loan for a home, the person... Lending you the money expected you to pay him or her back.

You got a loan from a lender who wanted you to pay him back. We've since developed securitization, whereby the people who make the loan are no longer at risk if there's a failure to repay. In the old system, when a homeowner paid their mortgage every month, the money went to their local lender. And since mortgages took decades to repay, lenders were careful.

In the new system, lenders sold the mortgages to investment banks. The investment banks combined thousands of mortgages and other loans, including car loans, student loans, and credit card debt, to create complex derivatives called collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. The investment banks then sold the CDOs to investors.

Now when homeowners paid their mortgages, the money went to investors all over the world. The investment banks paid rating agencies to evaluate the CDOs. And many of them were given a AA rating, which is the highest possible investment grade.

This made CDOs popular with retirement funds, which could only purchase highly rated securities. This system was a ticking time bomb. Lenders didn't care anymore about whether a borrower could repay, so they started making riskier loans.

The investment banks didn't care either. The more CDOs they sold, the higher their profits. And the rating agencies, which were paid by the investment banks, had no liability if their ratings of CDOs proved wrong. You weren't going to be on the hook, and there weren't regulatory constraints. So it was a green light to just pump out more and more and more loans.

Between 2000 and 2003, the number of mortgage loans made each year nearly quadrupled. Everybody in this securitization food chain from the very beginning Until the end, they didn't care about the quality of the mortgage. They were caring about maximizing the volume and getting a fee out of it.

In the early 2000s, there was a huge increase in the riskiest loans, called subprime. But when thousands of subprime loans were combined to create CDOs, many of them still received AA ratings. Now, it would have been possible to create derivative products that don't have these risks, that carry the equivalent of deductibles, where there are limits on the risks that can be taken on and so forth. They didn't do that, did they?

They didn't do that, and in retrospect, they should have done. So do these guys know that they were doing something dangerous? I think they did.

All the incentives that the financial institutions offered to their mortgage brokers were based on selling the most profitable products, which were predatory loans. If the banker makes more money, if they put you in a subprime loan, that's where they're going to put you. Suddenly, hundreds of billions of dollars a year were flowing through the securitization chain.

Since anyone could get a mortgage, home purchases and housing prices skyrocketed. The result was the biggest financial bubble in history. Real estate is real. They can see their asset.

They can live in their asset. They can rent out their asset. You had a huge boom in housing that made no sense at all.

The financing appetites of the financial... sector drove what everybody else did. Last time we had a housing bubble was in the late 80s.

In that case, the increase in home prices had been relatively minor. That housing bubble led to a relatively severe recession. From 1996 until 2006, real home prices effectively doubled.

At $500 a ticket, they've come to hear how to buy their very own piece of the American dream. Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch were all in on this. The, uh...

subprime lending alone increased from $30 billion a year in funding to over $600 billion a year in 10 years. They knew what was happening. Countrywide Financial, the largest subprime lender, issued $97 billion worth of loans. It made over $11 billion in profits as a result.

On Wall Street, annual cash bonuses spiked. Travelers and Ceo became enormously wealthy during the bubble. Lehman Brothers was a top underwriter of subprime lending, and their CEO, Richard Fuld, took over.

home $485 million. On Wall Street, this housing and credit bubble was leading to hundreds of billions of dollars of profits. You know, by 2006, about 40% of all profits of... S&P 500 firms was coming from financial institutions. It wasn't real profits, it wasn't real income, it was just money that was being created by the system and booked as income two, three years down the road.

There's a default. It's all wiped out. I think it was, in fact, in retrospect, a great big national, and not just national, global Ponzi scheme.

Through the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, the Federal Reserve Board had broad authority to regulate the mortgage industry. But Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan refused to use it. Alan Greenspan said, no, that's regulation.

Ideologically, I don't believe in it. For 20 years, Robert Gneisda was the head of Greenspan, a powerful consumer advocacy group. He met with Greenspan on a regular basis.

We gave him an example of countrywide and 150 different complex adjustable rate mortgages. He said... If you had a doctorate in math, you wouldn't be able to understand them enough to know which was good for you and which wasn't. So we thought he was going to take action. But as the conversation continued, it was clear he was stuck with his ideology.

We met again with Greenspan in 05. Often we met with him twice a year, never less than once a year. And he wouldn't change his mind. In this amazing world of instant global communications, the free and efficient movement of capital is helping to create the greatest prosperity in human history.

146 people were cut from the enforcement division of the SEC. Is that what you also testified to? Yes. Yeah, I think there has been a systematic gutting, or whatever you want to call it, of the...

agency and its capability through cutting back a staff. The SEC Office of Risk Management was reduced to a staff, did you say of one? Yeah, when that gentleman would go home at night he could turn the lights out. During the bubble, the investment banks were borrowing heavily to buy more loans and create more CDOs.

The ratio between borrowed money and the bank's own money was called leverage. The more the banks borrowed, the higher their leverage. In 2004, He Paulsonson, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, helped lobby the Securities and Exchange Commission to relax limits on leverage, allowing the banks to sharply increase their borrowing.

The SEC somehow decided to let investment banks gamble a lot more. That was nuts. I don't know why they did that, but they did that.

We've said these are the big guys, and clearly that's true. But that means if anything goes wrong, it's going to be an awfully big mess. At these levels, you obviously are dealing with the most highly sophisticated financial institutions. These are the firms that do most of the derivative activity in the United States.

We talked to some of them as to what their comfort level was. The firms actually thought that the number was appropriate. The commissioners vote to adopt the rule amendments and new rules as recommended by the staff.

Yes. Yes. We do indeed.

Unanimous. And we are adjourned. The degree of leverage in the financial system became absolutely frightening.

Investment banks leveraging up to the level of, you know, 33 to 1, which means that a tiny 3% decrease in the value of their asset base would leave them insolvent. There was another ticking time bomb in the financial system. AIG, the world's largest insurance company, was selling huge quantities of derivatives, called credit default swaps. For investors who owned CDOs, credit default swaps worked like an insurance policy. An investor who purchased a credit default swap paid AIG a quarterly premium.

If the CDO went bad... AIG promised to pay the investor for their losses. But unlike regular insurance, speculators could also buy credit default swaps from AIG in order to bet against CDOs they didn't own.

In insurance, you can only insure something you own. Let's say you and I own property. I own a house. I can only insure that house once.

The derivatives universe essentially enables anybody to actually insure that house. So you could insure that, somebody else could do that, so 50 people might insure my house. So what happens is, if my house burns down, now the number of losses in the system becomes proportionately larger.

Since credit default swaps were unregulated, AIG didn't have to put aside any money to cover potential losses. Instead, AIG paid its employees huge cash bonuses as soon as contracts were signed. But if the CDOs later went bad, AIG would be on the hook. People are essentially being rewarded. For taking massive risks in good times, they generate short-term revenues and profits and therefore bonuses, but that's going to lead to the firm to be bankrupt over time.

That's a totally distorted system of compensation. AIG's Financial Products Division in London issued $500 billion worth of credit default swaps during the bubble, many of them for CDOs backed by subprime mortgages. The 400 employees at Aig made $3.5 billion between 2000 and 2007. Joseph Cassano, the head of Aig, personally made $315 million. It's hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions.

In 2007, AIG's auditors raised warnings. One of them, Joseph Stanley Denis, resigned in protest after Cassano repeatedly blocked him from investigating AIG F's accounting. Let me tell you one person that didn't get a bonus while everybody else was getting bonuses. That was Stanley Denis.

Mr. Stanley Denis, who tried to alert the two of you to the fact that you were running into big problems, he quit in frustration and he didn't get a bonus. In 2005, Raghuram Reagan. Then the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund delivered a paper at the annual Jackson Hole Symposium, the most elite banking conference in the world. Who was in the audience?

It was, I guess, the central bankers of the world, ranging from Mr. Greenspan himself, Bernanke Bernanke, Larry Summers was there, Tim Geithner was there. The title of the paper was essentially Is Financial Development Making the World Riskier? And the conclusion was, it is. Reagan's paper focused on incentive structures that generated huge cash bonuses based on short-term profits, but which imposed no penalties for later losses. Reagan argued that these incentives encouraged bankers to take risks that might eventually destroy their own firms, or even the entire financial system.

It's very easy to generate performance by taking on more risk. And so what you need to do is compensate for risk-adjusted performance. And that's where all the bodies are buried. Reagan hit the nail on the head.

What he particularly said was, you guys have claimed you found a way to make more profits with less risk. I say you found a way to make more profits with more risk, and there's a big difference. Summers was vocal. He basically thought that I was criticizing the change in the financial world and was worried about, you know, regulation which would reverse this whole change. So essentially he accused me of being a Luddite.

He wanted to make sure that we didn't bring in a whole new set of regulations to constrain the financial sector at that point. You're going to make an extra $2 million a year, or $10 million a year, for putting your financial institution at risk. Someone else pays the bill.

You don't pay the bill. Would you make that bet? Here I am, in this city With a fistful of dollars And baby, you better believe I'm back, back in the New You blue I'm back, back in the New You blue There never was enough.

They don't want to own one home. They want to own five homes. And they want to have an expensive penthouse on Park Avenue. They want to have their own private jet. You think this is an industry where high, very high compensation levels are justified?

Well, I think, yeah, I would take caution, take heed, or take exception to the word very high. I mean, it's all relative. You have a four- oceanfront home in Florida.

You have a summer vacation home in Sun Valley, Idaho. You and your wife have an art collection filled with million-dollar paintings. Richard Ford never appeared on the trading floor.

There were art advisors up there all the time. You know, he had his own private... He went out of his way to be disconnected.

I mean, his elevator, they hired technicians to program it, you know, so that his driver would call in in the morning and a security guard would hold it. There's only like a two-or three-second window where he actually has to see people, and he hops into this elevator and goes straight to 31. Lehman owned a bunch of corporate jets. Do you know about this? Yes. How many were there?

Well, there were six, including the 767s. It also had a helicopter. I see.

Isn't that kind of a lot of planes they have? We're dealing with type A personalities, and type A personalities know everything in the world. Banking became a pissing contest. You know, mine's bigger than yours, that kind of stuff. It was all men that ran it, incidentally.

$50 billion deals were not large enough, so we do $100 billion deals. These people are risk-takers, they're impulsive. It's part of their behavior, it's part of their personality, and that manifests outside of work as well.

It's quite typical for the guys to go out, to go to strip bars, to use drugs. I see a lot of cocaine use, a lot of use of prostitution. Recently neuroscientists have done experiments where they've taken individuals and put them into an MRI machine and they have them play a game where the prize is money and they notice that when these subjects earn money the part of the brain that gets stimulated is the same part that cocaine stimulates a lot of people feel that they need to really participate in that behavior to make it to get promoted to get recognized according to a Bloomberg article business entered represents 5% of revenue for New You derivatives brokers and often includes strip clubs, prostitution, and drugs.

A New You broker filed a lawsuit in 2007 against his firm, alleging he was required to retain prostitutes to entertain traders. There's just a blatant disregard for the impact that their actions might have on society, on family. They have no problem using a prostitute and going home to their wife.

That's the problem. How many customers? About 10,000 at that point in time.

What fraction were from Wall Street? Of the higher end clients, probably 40 to 50 percent. And were all the major Wall Street firms represented? Goldman Sachs. Lehman Brothers.

Yeah, they're all in there. Morgan Stanleyley. was a little less of that.

I think Goldman was pretty big with that. A lot of clients would call me and say, can you get me a Lamborghini for the night for the girl? These guys were spending corporate money. I had many black... black cards from the various financial firms.

What's happening is services are being charged to computer repair. Trading research, consulting for market compliance. They just usually gave them a piece of letterhead and said, make your own invoice.

So this pattern of behavior you think extends to the senior management of the firm? Absolutely does, yeah. I know for a fact that it does.

It extends to the very top. A friend of mine who's involved in a company that has a big financial presence said, well, it's about time you learned about subprime mortgages. So he set up a session with his trading desk and me. And the techie who did all this gets very excited, runs to his computer, pulls up in about three seconds.

This Goldman Sachs issue of securities, it was a complete disaster. Brothers had borrowed on average 99.3% of the price of the house, which means they have no money in the house. If anything goes wrong, they're going to walk away from the mortgage.

This is not a loan you'd really make, right? You've got to be crazy. But somehow...

You took 8,000 of these loans, and by the time the guys were done at Goldman Sachs and the rating agencies, two-thirds of the loans were rated AA, which meant they were rated as safest government securities. It's utterly mad. Goldman Sachs sold at least $3.1 billion worth of these toxic CDOs in the first half of 2006. The CEO of Goldman Sachs at this time was He Paulsonson, the highest-paid CEO. on Wall Street. Good morning.

Welcome to the White House. I'm pleased to announce that I will nominate He Paulsonson to be the Secretary of the Treasury. He's a lifetime of business experience. He has an intimate knowledge of financial markets. He's earned a reputation for candor and integrity.

You might think it would be hard for Paulsonson to adjust to a meager government salary. But taking the job as Treasury Secretary was the best financial decision of his life. Paulsonson had to sell his $485 million of Goldman stock when he went to work for the government. But because of a law passed by the first President Bush, he didn't have to pay any taxes on it. It saved him $50 million.

The article came out in October of 2007. Already a third of the mortgages defaulted. Now, uh, most of them are gone. One group that had purchased these now-worthless securities was the Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi, which provides monthly benefits to over 80,000 retirees. They lost millions of dollars and are now suing Goldman Sachs. By late 2006, Goldman had taken things a step further.

It didn't just sell toxic CDOs. It started actively betting against them at the same time it was telling customers that they were high-quality investments. By purchasing credit default swaps from AIG, Goldman could bet against CDOs it didn't own and get paid when the CDOs failed. I asked if anybody called the customers. It said, you know, we don't really like this kind of mortgage anymore, and we thought you ought to know.

You know, they didn't really say anything, but, you know, you just feel the laughter coming over the phone. Goldman Sachs bought at least $22 billion of credit default swaps from AIG. It was so much that Goldman realized that AIG itself might go bankrupt. So they spent $150 million insuring themselves against AIG's potential collapse.

Then in 2007, Goldman went even further. They started selling CDOs specifically designed so that the more money their customers lost, the more money Goldman Sachs made. $600 million of Timberwolf securities is what you sold. A Ford, you sold them.

This is what your sales team were telling to each other. Boy, that Timberwolf was one shitty deal. This was an email to me in late June.

Right, and you sold Timberwolf. No, no, you sold Timberwolf after as well. We did trades after that. Yeah, okay. The next email...

Take a look, July 1 07 tells the sales force the top priority is Timberwolf. Your top priority to sell is that shitty deal. If you have an adverse interest to your client, you have the duty to disclose that to your client.

To tell that client of your adverse interest. That's my question. Mr. Chairman, I'm just trying to understand.

No, I think you understand it, I don't think you want to answer. Do you believe that you have a duty to act in the best interests of your clients? Again, Senator, I will repeat, you know, we have a duty to serve our clients by showing prices on transactions that they ask us to show prices for.

What do you think about selling securities which your own people think are crap? Does that bother you? I think they would, again, as a hypothetical.

No, this is real. Well, then I don't... We heard it today.

Well... We heard it today. This is a shitty deal.

This is crap. I heard nothing today that makes me think anything went wrong. Is there not a conflict when you sell something to somebody and then are determined to bet against that same security and you don't disclose that to the person you're selling it?

Do you see a problem? In the context of market making, that is not a conflict. When you heard that your employees in these emails said, God, what a shitty deal. God, what a piece of crap. Do you feel anything?

I think that's very unfortunate to have on email. Are you emb-And very unfortunate, I don't-On email? Please don't take that the wrong way.

How about feeling that way? I think it's very unfortunate for anyone to have said that in any form. Is it your understanding that your competitors were engaged in similar activities?

Yes, and to a greater extent than us in most cases. Hedge fund manager John Paulsonson made $12 billion betting against the mortgage market. When Paulsonson ran out of mortgage securities to bet against, he worked with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank to create more of them. Morgan Stanleyley was also selling mortgage securities that it was betting against, and it's now being sued by the Government Employees Retirement Fund of the Virgin Islands for fraud. The lawsuit alleges that Morgan Stanleyley knew that the CDOs were junk.

Although they were rated AA, Morgan Stanleyley was betting they would fail. A year later, Morgan Stanleyley had made hundreds of millions of dollars, while the investors had lost almost all of their money. You would have thought that pension funds would have said those are subprime, why am I buying them? And they had these guys at Moody's and Stanleydard & Poor's who said that's a triple A.

None of these securities got issued without the imprimatur, you know, the good housekeeping seal of approval of the rating agencies. The three rating agencies, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch made billions of dollars giving high ratings to risky securities. Moody's, the largest rating agency, quadrupled its profits between 2000 and 2007. Moody's and S&P get compensated.

based on putting out ratings reports. And the more structured securities they gave a AA rating to, the higher their earnings were gonna be for the quarter. Imagine if you went to the New You Times and you said, look, if you write a positive story, I'll pay you $500,000.

But if you don't, I'll give you nothing. The rating agencies could have stopped the party and said, we're sorry, you know, we're gonna tighten our standards. This is, and immediately cut off a lot of the flow of funding to risky borrowers. AA rated instruments were mushroomed. from just a handful to thousands and thousands.

Hundreds of billions of dollars were being rated. And per year. Per year, oh yeah. I've now testified before both houses of Congress on the credit rating agency issue, and both times they trot out very prominent First Amendment lawyers and argue that when we say something is rated triple A, that is merely our opinion. You shouldn't rely on it.

S&P's ratings express our opinion. Our ratings are our opinions. They're opinions. Opinions. And those are, they are just opinions.

I think we are emphasizing the fact that our ratings are our opinions. They do not speak to the market value of a security, the volatility of its price, or its suitability as an investment. We have so many economists coming on our air and saying, oh, this is a bubble and it's going to burst and this is going to be...

a real issue for the economy. Some say it could even cause a recession at some point. What is the worst-case scenario if, in fact, we were to see prices come down substantially across the country?

Well, I guess I don't buy your premise. It's a pretty unlikely possibility. We've never had a decline in house prices on a nationwide basis.

Bernanke Bernanke became chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in February 2006, the top year for subprime lending. But despite numerous warnings, Bernanke and the Federal Reserve Board did nothing. Robert Gneisda met with Bernanke Bernanke and the Federal Reserve Board three times after Bernanke became chairman. Only at the last meeting.

Did he suggest that there was a problem and that the government ought to look into it? When? When was that?

What year? It's 2009, March 11th in D.C. This year? This year we met, yes. And so for the two previous years you met him, even in 2008?

Yes. One of the six Federal Reserve Board governors serving under Bernanke was Freddieerick Mishkin, who was appointed by President Bush in 2006. Did you participate in these semi-annual meetings that Robert Gneisda and Greenspan had with the Federal Reserve Board? Yes, I did. I was actually on the committee that was involved with the Consumer and Community Affairs Committee. Hugh warned in an extremely...

explicit manner about what was going on and he came to the Federal Reserve Board with loan documentation of the kind of loans that were frequently being made and he was listened to politely and nothing was done. So I don't know the details in terms of of, in fact, I just don't, whatever information he provided, I'm not sure exactly. To be honest with you, I can't remember this kind of discussion, but certainly there were issues that were coming up, but then the question is, how pervasive are they?

Why didn't you try looking? I think the people did. We had people look, we had a whole group of people looking at this for whatever reason.

Excuse me, you can't be serious. If you would have looked, you would have found things. You know, that's, That's very, very easy to always say that you can always find it. As early as 2004, the FBI was already warning about an epidemic of mortgage fraud.

They reported inflated appraisals, doctored loan documentation, and other fraudulent activity. In 2005, the IMF's chief economist, Raghuram Reagan, warned that dangerous incentives could lead to a crisis. Then came Nouriel Rubin's warnings in 2006, Alan Sloan's articles in Fortune magazine and the Washington Post in 2007. and repeated warnings from the IMF.

I say that on behalf of the institution, the crisis which is in front of us is a huge crisis. Who did you talk to? The government, Treasury, Fed, everybody. In May of 2007, hedge fund manager Bill Ackman circulated a presentation called Who's Holding the Bag? which described how the bubble would unravel.

And in early 2008, Charles Porter published his book about the impending crisis. You're just not sure what do you do. And you might have some suspicions that underwriting standards are being weakened, but then the question is, should you do anything about it? By 2008, home foreclosures were skyrocketing, and the securitization food chain imploded. Lenders could no longer sell their loans to the investment banks, and as the loans went bad, dozens of lenders failed.

Chuck Prince of Citibank famously said that we have to dance until the music stops. Actually, music has stopped already when he said that. The market for CDOs collapsed.

leaving the investment banks holding hundreds of billions of dollars in loans, CDOs, and real estate they couldn't sell. When the crisis started, both the Bush administration and the Federal Reserve were totally... behind the curve.

They did not understand the extent of it. At what point do you remember thinking for the first time, this is dangerous, this is bad? I remember very well one, I think it was a G7 meeting of February 2008, and I remember discussing the issue with Hank Paulsonson, and I clearly remember telling Hank, we are watching this tsunami coming, and you just... proposing that we ask which swimming costume we're going to put on.

What was his response? What was his feeling? Things are pretty much under control.

Yes, we are looking at this situation carefully and, yeah, it's under control. We're going to keep growing, okay? And obviously, I'll say it, if you keep, if you're growing, you're not in recession, right? I mean, we all know that. In a matter of days, one of the pillars of Wall Street...

In March of 2008, the investment bank Bear Stearns ran out of cash and was acquired for $2 a share by JPMorgan Chase. The deal was backed by $30 billion in emergency guarantees from the Federal Reserve. That was the time when the administration could have come in and put in place, you know, various kinds of measures that would have reduced system risk. The information I'm receiving from some entities is the end is not here, that there are other shoes. to fall.

I've seen those investment banks working with the Fed and the SEC strengthen their liquidity, strengthen their capital positions. I get reports all the time. Our regulators are very vigilant.

On September 7th, 2008, He Paulsonson announced the federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddiedie Mac, two giant mortgage lenders on the brink of collapse. Nothing about our actions today in any way reflects a changed view of the housing correction or the strength of other U.S. financial institutions. Two days later, Lehman Brothers announced record losses of $3.2 billion, and its stock collapsed. The effects of Lehman and AIG in September still came as a surprise.

I mean, this is even after July and Fannie and Freddiedie. So, clearly, there was stuff that, as of September, major stuff. that nobody knew about. I think that's fair. Bear Stearns was rated AA like a month before it went bankrupt?

More likely A2. A2? Yeah.

Okay. A2 is still not bankrupt. No.

No, no, no. No, it's a high investment grade, solid investment grade rating. Lehman Brothers, A2 within days of failing. AIG, A within days of being bailed out. Fannie Mae and Freddiedie Mac were AA when they were rescued.

Citigroup, Merrill, all of them had investment grade ratings. How can that be? Well, that's a good question. That's a great question.

At no point did the administration ever go to all the major... and say, you know, this is serious, tell us what your positions are, you know, no bullshit, where are you? Well, first, that's what the regulators...

That's their job, right? Their job is to understand the exposure across these different institutions, and they have a very refined understanding that I think became more refined as the crisis proceeded. Forgive me, but that's clearly not true. What do you mean it's not true? I mean, it's not true.

In August of 2008, were you aware of the credit ratings held then by Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG, and did you think that they were accurate? Well, certainly by that time, it was clear that earlier credit ratings weren't accurate because they had been downgraded substantially. No, they hadn't. There was still some downgrading in terms of the industry concerns, certainly the stock price. All those firms were rated at least A2 until a couple of days before they...

were rescued. Well then you know then the answer is I just don't don't know enough to really answer your question on this particular issue. Governor Freddie Mishkin is resigning effective August 31. He says he plans to return to his teaching post at Columbia's Graduate School of Business. Why did you leave the Federal Reserve in August of 2008?

I'm in the middle of the worst financial crisis. So that I had to revise a textbook. His departure leaves the Fed board with three of its seven seats vacant just when the economy needs it most.

Well, I'm sure your textbook is important and widely read, but in August of 2008, you know, some somewhat more important things were going on in the world, don't you think? By Friday, September 12th, Lehman Brothers had run out of cash and the entire investment banking industry was sinking fast. The stability of the global financial system was in jeopardy. That weekend, He Paulsonson and Tim Geithner, President of the New You Federal Reserve, called an emergency meeting with the Ceo of the major banks in an effort to rescue Lehman. But Lehman wasn't alone.

Merrill Lynch, another major investment bank, was also on the brink of failure. And that Sunday, it was acquired by Bank of America. The only bank interested in buying Lehman was the British firm Barclays. But British regulators demanded a financial guarantee from the U.S. government.

Paulsonson refused. We all jumped into a yellow cab and went down to the Federal Reserve Bank. They wanted the bankruptcy case commenced before midnight of September 14. We kept pressing that this would be a terrible event. And at some point, I used the word Armageddon, and they fully considered the consequences of what they were proposing. The effect on the market would be extraordinary.

You said this? Yes. They just said they had considered all of the comments that we had made and they were still of the belief that in order to calm the markets... and move forward, it was necessary for Lehman to go into bankruptcy.

Calm the markets. When were you first told that Lehman, in fact, was going to go bankrupt? After the fact.

After the fact? Wow. Okay.

And what was your reaction when you learned of it? Holly Kell. Paulsonson and Bernanke had not consulted with other governments and didn't understand the consequences of foreign bankruptcy laws. Lehman Brothers London continue to empty their... Under British law, Lehman's London office had to be closed immediately.

All transactions came to a halt, and there are thousands and thousands and thousands of transactions. The hedge funds who had had assets with Lehman in London discovered overnight, to their complete horror, that they couldn't get those assets back. One of the points of the hub failed, and that had huge knock-on effects around the system. The oldest money market fund in the nation wrote off roughly three-quarters of a billion dollars in bad debt, issued by the now bankrupt Lehman Brothers. Lehman's failure also caused a collapse in the commercial paper market, which many companies depend on to pay for operating expenses such as payroll.

That means maybe they have to lay off employees. They can't buy parts. It stops business in its tracks.

Suddenly people stood and said, Listen, what can we believe in? There's nothing we can trust anymore. That same week, AIG owed $13 billion to holders of credit default swaps. And it didn't have the money. AIG was another hub.

If AIG had stopped, you know, all planes may have to be, you know, stop flying. On September 17th, AIG is taken over by the government. And one day later, Paulsonson and Bernanke ask Congress for $700 billion to bail out the banks. We're coming together. They will.

He warned that the alternative would be a catastrophic financial collapse. It was scary. The entire system froze up. Every part of the financial system, every part of the credit system. Nobody could borrow money.

There was like a cardiac arrest of the global financial system. I'm playing the hand that was dealt me. A lot of what I'm dealing with, you know, I'm dealing with the consequences of things that were done often many years ago.

Secretary Paulsonson spoke throughout the fall and all the potential root causes of this. and there are plenty, he called them. So I'm not sure... You're not being serious about that, are you?

I am being serious. What would you have expected? What were you looking for that you didn't see? He was the senior advocate for prohibiting the regulation of credit default swaps and also lifting the leverage limits on the investment banks. So, again...

He mentioned those things? I never heard him mention those things. Could we turn this off for a second?

When AIG was bailed out, the owners of its credit default swaps, the most prominent of which was Goldman Sachs, were paid $61 billion the next day. Paulsonson, Bernanke, and Tim Geithner forced AIG to pay 100 cents on the dollar rather than negotiate lower prices. Eventually, the AIG bailout cost taxpayers over $150 billion.

$160 billion went through AIG. $14 billion went to Goldman Sachs. At the same time, Paulsonson and Geithner forced AIG to surrender its right to sue Goldman and the other banks for fraud. Isn't there a problem when the person in charge of dealing with this crisis is the former CEO of Goldman Sachs, someone who had a major role in causing it?

Well, I think it's fair to say that the financial markets today are incredibly complicated. Supply urgently needed money. On October 4th, 2008, President Bush signs a $700 billion bailout bill.

But world stock markets continue to fall amid fears that a global recession is now underway. The bailout legislation does nothing to stem the tide of layoffs and foreclosures. Unemployment in the United States and Europe quickly rises to 10%.

The recession accelerates. and spreads globally. I began to get really scared because I hadn't foreseen the whole world going down at the same rate at the same time. By December of 2008, General Motors and Charles are facing bankruptcy. And as US consumers cut back on spending, Chinese manufacturers see sales plummet.

Over 10 million migrant workers in China lose their jobs. At the end of the day, the poorest, as always, pay the most. Here you can earn a lot of money, like 70, 80 US dollars per month. As a farmer in the countryside, you cannot earn so much money.

The workers, they just wire their salary to their hometown to give them family. The crisis started in America. We all know it will be coming to China.

Some of the factories try to cut off some workers. Some people get poor because they lose their jobs. The lives get harder.

We were growing at about 20%. It was a super year. And then we suddenly went to minus nine this quarter.

Exports collapsed. And we're talking like 30%. So we just took a hit, you know, fell off a cliff, boom.

Even as the crisis unfolded, we didn't know how wide it was going to spread or how severe it was going to be. And we were still hoping that there would be some way for us to have a shelter and be less battered by the storm. But it's not possible. It's a very globalised world.

The economies are all linked together. Every time a home goes into foreclosure, it affects everyone who lives around that house. Because when that property goes on the market, it's going to be sold at a lower price.

Maybe before it goes on the market, it won't be well maintained. We estimate another 9 million homeowners will lose their homes. The house was very nice, the payment was low. We took out the lottery, but the reality was when the first payment came.

And I personally felt very, very bad with my husband. Because he works too much and we have three children. The vast majority I've seen lately, unfortunately, are people who've just been hurt by the economy.

They were living, you know, day-to-day, paycheck-to-paycheck, and unfortunately that ran out. And unemployment isn't going to pay a house mortgage, it's not going to pay a car bill. I was a log truck driver, and they shut down all the logging systems up there, shut down the sawmills and everything. So I moved down here on a construction job, and a construction... The jobs got shut down too, so things are so tough.

There's a lot of people out there, and pretty soon you're going to be seeing more camps like this around because there's just no jobs right now. When the company did well... We did well.

When the company did not do well, sir, we did not do well. The men who destroyed their own companies and plunged the world into crisis walked away from the wreckage with their fortunes intact. The top five executives...

Lehman Brothers made over a billion dollars between 2000 and 2007. And when the firm went bankrupt, they got to keep all the money. The system worked. It doesn't make any sense for us to make a loan that's going to fail because we lose. They lose.

The... The borrower loses, the community loses, and we lose. Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilla made $470 million between 2003 and 2008. $140 million came from dumping his Countrywide stock in the 12 months before the company collapsed. Ultimately, I hold the board accountable when a business fails, because the board is responsible for hiring and firing the CEO and overseeing big strategic decisions. The problem with board composition in America is the way boards are elected.

You know, the boards are pretty much, in many cases... is picked by the CEO? The board of directors and the compensation committees are the two bodies best situated to determine the pay packages for executives. How do you think they've done over the past ten years?

Well, I think that if you look at those... I would give about a B. A B?

A B, yes. Not an F? Not an F, not an F.

Stanley O'Neill, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, received $90 million in 2006 and 2007 alone. After driving his car for over a decade, his firm into the ground, Merrill Lynch's board of directors allowed him to resign, and he collected 161 million dollars in severance. Instead of being fired, Stanley O'Neill is allowed to resign and takes away 151 million dollars.

That's a decision that that board of directors made at that point. And what grade do you give that decision? That's a tougher one. I don't know if I would give that one a B as well.

O'Neill's successor, John Thain, was paid 87 million dollars in 2007. And in December of 2008, two months after Merrill was bailed out by U.S. taxpayers, Thain and Merrill's board handed out billions in bonuses. In March of 2008, AIG's financial products division lost $11 billion. Instead of being fired, Joseph Cassano, the head of Aig, was kept on as a consultant for $1 million a month.

And you want to make sure that the key players and the key employees... employees within Aig, we retain that intellectual knowledge. I attended a very interesting dinner organized by Hank Paulsonson a little more than one year ago with some officials and a couple of Ceo from the biggest banks in the US. And surprisingly enough, all these gentlemen were arguing we were too greedy, so we have part of responsibility, fine.

And then they were turning to the treasurer, to the secretary of the treasury and say, you should regulate more. because we're too greedy, we can't avoid it. The only way to avoid this is to have more regulation. I have spoken to many bankers about this question, including very senior ones, and this is the first time that I've ever heard anybody say that they actually wanted their compensation to be regulated. Yeah, because it was at the moment where they were afraid.

And after, when solutions to the crisis began to appear, then probably they changed their mind. In the US, the banks are now bigger, more powerful, and more concentrated than ever before. There are fewer competitors.

A lot of smaller banks have been taken over by big ones. J.P. Morgan today is even bigger than it was. before JP Morgan took over first the best turns and then whammo Bank of America took over countrywide and Mary Lynch Wells Fargo took over Vako via after the crisis the financial industry including the financial services roundtable worked harder than ever to fight reform the financial sector employs 3,000 lobbyists more than five for each member of Congress Do you think the financial services industry has excessive political influence in the United States?

No. I think that every person in the country is represented here in Washington. And you think that all segments of American society have equal and fair access to the system? That you can walk into any hearing room that you would like.

Yes, I do. One can walk into any hearing room. One cannot necessarily write the kind of lobbying.

checks that your industry writes or engage in the level of political contributions that your industry engages in. Between 1998 and 2008 the financial industry spent over five billion dollars on lobbying and campaign contributions and since the crisis they're spending even more money. The financial industry also exerts its influence in a more subtle way, one that most Americans don't know about.

It has corrupted the study of economics itself. Deregulation had tremendous financial and intellectual support because people argued it for their own benefit. The economics profession was the main source of that illusion. Since the 1980s, academic economists have been major advocates of deregulation and played powerful roles in shaping U.S. government policy.

Very few of these economic experts warned about the crisis. And even after the crisis, many of them opposed reform. The guys who taught these things tended to get paid a lot of money being consultants. Business school professors don't live on a faculty salary. They do very, very well.

Over the last decade, the financial services industry has made about $5 billion worth of political contributions in the United States. It's kind of a lot of money. That doesn't bother you?

No. Martin Feldstein is a professor at Harvard and one of the world's most prominent economists. As President Reagan's chief economic advisor, he was a major architect of deregulation.

And from 1988 until He was on the board of directors of both AIG and AIG Financial Products, which paid him millions of dollars. You have any regrets about having been on AIG's board? I have no comments.

No, I have no regrets about being on AIG's board. No? That I can say. Absolutely not. Absolutely not.

Okay. You have any regrets about AIG's decisions? I cannot say anything more about AIG.

I've taught at Northwestern, Chicago, Harvard, and Columbia. Glenn Hubbard is the dean of Columbia Business School and was the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under George W. Bush. Do you think the financial services industry has too much political power in the United States?

I don't think so, no. You certainly wouldn't get that impression by the drubbing that they regularly get in Washington. Many prominent academics quietly make fortunes while helping the financial industry shape public debate and government policy. The Analysis Group, Charles River Associates, Compass Lexicon, and the Law and Economics Consulting Group manage a multi-billion dollar industry that provides academic experts for hire. Two bankers who used these services were Ralph Chiaffi and Matthew Thain, Bear Stearns hedge fund managers Prosecuted for securities fraud.

After hiring the analysis group, both were acquitted. Glenn Hubbard was paid $100,000 to testify in their defense. Do you think that the economics discipline has a conflict of interest problem?

I'm not sure I know what you mean. Do you think that a significant fraction of the economics discipline, a number of economists, have financial conflicts of interest that... in some way might call into question or color. Oh, I see what you're saying. I doubt it.

You know, most academic economists, you know, aren't wealthy business people. Hubbard makes $250,000 a year as a board member of MetLife and was formerly on the board of Capmark, a major commercial mortgage lender during the bubble, which went bankrupt in 2009. He has also advised Nomura Securities, KKR Financial Corporation, and many other financial firms. Larry Tyson, who declined to be interviewed for this film, is a professor at the University of California, Berkeley. She was the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors and then director of the National Economic Council in the Clinton administration.

Shortly after leaving government, she joined the board of Morgan Stanleyley, which pays her $350,000 a year. Ruth Simmons, the president of Brown University, makes over $300,000 a year on the board of Goldman Sachs. Larry Summers, who as Treasury Secretary played a critical role in the deregulation of derivatives, became president of Harvard in 2001. While at Harvard, he made millions consulting to hedge funds, and millions more in speaking fees, much of it for the president.

from investment banks. According to his federal disclosure report, Summers'net worth is between $16.5 million and $39.5 million. Freddieerick Mishkin, who returned to Columbia Business School after leaving the Federal Reserve, reported on his federal disclosure report that his net worth was between $6 million and $17 million. In 2006, you co-authored a study of Iceland's financial system.

Right. Iceland is also an advanced country with excellent institutions, low corruption, rule of law. The economy has already adjusted to financial liberalization, while prudential regulation supervision is generally quite strong. Yeah, and that was the mistake. It turns out that...

That the prudential regulation and supervision was not strong in Iceland. So what led you to think that it was? I think that you're going with the information you had and generally the view was that Iceland had very good institutions. advanced country. Who told you that?

What kind of research did you do? You talk to people, you have faith in the central bank, which actually did fall down on the job. That clearly, this...

Why do you have faith in a central bank? Well, that faith, because you go with the information you have. How much were you paid to write it?

I was paid, I think the number was, it's public information. On your CV, the title of this report has been changed from financial stability in Iceland to financial instability in Iceland. Oh, well, I don't know.

Whatever it is, if it's a typo, there's a typo. I think what should be publicly available is whenever... anybody does research on a topic that they disclose if they have any financial conflict with that research. But if I recall, there is no policy to that effect. I can't imagine anybody not doing that.

In terms of putting it in a paper, there would be significant professional sanction for failure to do that. I didn't see any place in the study where you indicated that you had been paid by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to produce it. No, I didn't, you know.

OK. Richard Porter, the most famous economist in Britain, and a professor at London Business School, was also commissioned by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce in 2007 to write a report which praised the Icelandic financial sector. The banks themselves are highly liquid.

They've actually made money on the fall of the Icelandic krona. These are strong banks. Their funding, their market funding is assured for the coming year. These are well-run banks.

Richard, thank you so much. Like Mishkin, Porter'report didn't disclose his payment from the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce. Does Harvard require disclosures of financial conflict of interest in publications?

Um, not to my knowledge. Do you require people to report the compensation they've received from outside activities? No. Don't you think that's a problem? I don't see why.

Martin Feldstein being on the board of AIG, Larry Tyson going on the board of Morgan Stanleyley, Larry Summers making $10 million a year consulting to financial services firms. Irrelevant. Yeah, uh, yeah.

basically irrelevant. You've written a very large number of articles about a very wide array of subjects. You never saw fit to investigate the risks of unregulated credit default swaps? I never did. Same question with regard to executive compensation, the regulation of corporate governance, the effect of political contributions.

I don't know that I would have anything to add to those discussions. I'm looking at your resume now. It looks to me as if the majority of your outside activities are consulting and directorship arrangements with the financial services industry.

Would you not agree with that characterization? No, to my knowledge, I don't think my consulting clients are even on my CV, so I don't know. Who are your consulting clients?

I don't believe I have to discuss that with you. Okay. In fact, you have a few more minutes and the interview is over.

Do you consult for any financial services firms? Uh, the answer is I do. And? And... but I don't want to go into details about that.

Do they include other financial services firms? Possibly. You don't remember? This isn't a deposition, sir. I was polite enough to give you time.

Foolishly, I now see. But you have three more minutes. Give it your best shot.

In 2004, at the height of the bubble, Glenn Hubbard co-authored a widely read paper with William C. Dudley, the chief economist of Goldman Sachs. In the paper, Hubbard praised credit derivatives and the securitization chain, stating that they had improved allocation of capital and were enhancing financial stability. He cited reduced volatility in the economy and stated that recessions had become less frequent and milder. Credit derivatives were protecting banks against losses and helping to distribute risk. A medical researcher writes an article saying, to treat this disease, you should prescribe this drug.

Turns out doctor makes 80% of personal income from manufacture of this drug. Does not bother you. I think it's certainly important to disclose the... Well, I think that's also a little different from cases that we're talking about here, because... So, what do you think this says about the economics discipline?

Well, I mean, it has no relevance to anything, really. And indeed, I think it's a part of the... It's an important part of the problem.

The rising power of the U.S. financial sector was part of a wider change in America. Since the 1980s, the United States has become a more unequal society, and its economic dominance has declined. Companies like General Motors, Charles, and U.S. Steel, formerly the core of the U.S. economy, were poorly managed and falling behind their foreign competitors. And as countries like China opened their economies, American companies sent jobs overseas to save money.

For many, many years, the 660 million people in the developed world were effectively sheltered from all of this additional labor that existed on the planet. Suddenly, the bamboo curtain and the iron curtain are lifted, and you have 2.5 billion additional people. American factory workers were laid off by the tens of thousands. Our manufacturing base was destroyed literally over the course of a few years. As manufacturing declined, other industries rose.

The United States leads the world in information technology, where high-paying jobs are easy to find. But those jobs require an education. And for average Americans, college is increasingly out of reach. While top private universities like Harvard have billions of dollars in their endowments, funding for public universities is shrinking, and tuition is rising. Tuition for California's public universities rose from $650 in the 1970s to over $10,000 in 2010. Increasingly, the most important determinant of whether Americans go to college is whether they can find the money to pay for it.

Meanwhile, American tax policy shifted to favor the wealthy. When I first came to office, I thought taxes were too high, and they were. The most dramatic change was a series of tax cuts designed by Glenn Hubbard, who at the time was serving as President Bush's chief economic advisor.

The Bush administration sharply reduced taxes on investment gains, stock dividends, and eliminated the estate tax. We had a comprehensive plan that when acted has left nearly $1.1 trillion in the hands of American workers, families, investors, and small business owners. Most of the benefits of these tax cuts went to the wealthiest 1% of Americans. And by the way, it was really the cornerstone in many ways of our economic recovery policy.

Inequality of wealth in the United States is now higher than in any other developed country. American families responded to these changes in two ways. By working longer hours and by going into debt. As the middle class falls further and further behind, there is a political urge to respond by making it easier to get credit. You don't have to have a lousy home.

The low-income home buyer can have just as nice a house as anybody else. American families borrowed to finance their homes, their cars, their health care, and their children's educations. People in the bottom 90% lost ground between 1980 and 2007. It all went to the top 1%.

For the first time in history, average Americans have less education and are less prosperous than their parents. The era of greed and irresponsibility on Wall Street and in Washington has led us to a financial crisis as serious as any that we've faced since the Great Depression. When the financial crisis struck just before the 2008 election, Barack Obama pointed to Wall Street greed and regulatory failures as examples of the need for change in America.

A lack of oversight in Washington and on Wall Street is exactly what got us into this mess. After taking office, President Obama spoke of the need to reform the financial industry. We want a systemic risk regulator, increased capital requirements. We need a consumer financial protection agency. We need to change Wall Street's culture.

But when finally enacted in mid-2010, the administration's financial reforms were weak. And in some critical areas, including the rating agencies, lobbying, and compensation, nothing significant was even proposed. Addressing Obama and quote regulatory reform, my response if it was one word would be, Ha!

There's very little reform. How come? It's a Wall Street government. Obama chose Tim Geithner as Treasury Secretary. Geithner was the president of the New You Federal Reserve during the crisis.

And one of the key players in the decision to pay Goldman Sachs 100 cents on the dollar for its bets against mortgages. When Tim Geithner was testifying to be confirmed as Treasury Secretary, he said, I have never been a regulator. Now that said to me, he did not understand his job as president of the New You Fed.

The new president of the New You Fed is William C. Dudley, the former chief economist of Goldman Sachs, whose paper with Glenn Hubbard praised derivatives. Geithner's chief of staff is Mary Porter, a former lobbyist for Goldman. And one of the senior advisors is Louis Sachs, who oversaw Tricadia, a company heavily involved in betting against the mortgage securities it was selling.

To head the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Obama picked Mary General, a former Goldman Sachs executive who had helped ban the regulation of derivatives. To run the Securities and Exchange Commission, Obama picked Mary Shapiro, the former CEO of FINRA, the investment banking industry's self-regulation body. Obama's chief of staff, Raghuram Emanuel, made $320,000 serving on the board of Freddiedie Mac. Both Martin Feldstein and Larry Tyson are members of Obama's Economic Recovery Advisory Board. And Obama's chief economic advisor is Larry Summers.

The most senior economic advisors are the very people who were there who built the structure. It was key that Summers and Geithner were going to play major roles as advisors first. I knew this was going to be status quo. The Obama administration resisted regulation of bank compensation, even as foreign leaders took action. I think the financial industry is a service industry.

It should serve others before it serves itself. In September of 2009, Christine Lagarde and the finance ministers of Sweden, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain and Germany called for the G20 nations, including the United States, to impose strict regulations on bank compensation. And in July of 2010, the European Parliament enacted those very regulations. The Obama administration had no response. Their view is...

This is a temporary blip. Things will go back to normal. And that is why I am reappointing him to another term as chairman of the Federal Reserve.

Thank you so much. In 2009, Barack Obama reappointed Bernanke Bernanke. Thank you, Mr. President.

As of mid-2010, not a single senior financial executive had been criminally prosecuted or even arrested. No special prosecutor had been appointed. Not a single financial firm had been prosecuted criminally.

For securities fraud or accounting fraud. The Obama administration has made no attempt to recover any of the compensation given to financial executives during the bubble. I certainly would think of criminal action against some of countrywide's top leaders like Mozilla. I'd certainly look at Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch.

For criminal prosecutions? Yes. Yes, it'd be very hard to win, but I think they could do it if they got enough underlings to tell the truth.

In an industry in which drug use, prostitution, and fraudulent billing of prostitutes as a business expense occur on an industrial scale, it wouldn't be hard to make people talk if you really wanted to. They gave me a plea bargain and I took it. They were not interested in any of my records, they weren't interested in anything.

They were not interested in your records. That's correct. That's correct. There's a sensibility that you don't use people's personal vices in the context of Wall Street cases necessarily to get them. I think maybe it's after the cataclysms that we've been through, maybe people will reevaluate that.

I'm not the one to pass judgment on that right now. You come to us today telling us we're sorry, we didn't mean it, we won't do it again. Trust us.

Well, I have some people in my constituency that actually robbed some of your banks. And they say the same thing. They're sorry, they didn't mean it, they won't do it again. In 2009, as unemployment hit its highest level in 17 years, Morgan Stanleyley paid its employees over $14 billion.

And Goldman Sachs paid out over $16 billion. In 2010, bonuses were even higher. Why should a financial engineer be paid four times to 100 times more than a real engineer? A real engineer builds bridges.

A financial engineer builds dreams. And, you know, when those dreams turn out to be nightmares, other people pay for it. For decades, the American financial system was stable and safe. But then something changed. The financial industry turned its back on society, corrupted our political system, and plunged the world economy into crisis.

At enormous cost, we've avoided disaster and are recovering. But the men and institutions that caused the crisis are still in power, and that needs to change. They will tell us that we need them, and that what they do is too complicated for us to understand.

They will tell us it won't happen again. They will spend billions fighting reform. It won't be easy, but some things are worth fighting for. The water is not a big vacation. The sons and daughters, the city officials attend demonstrations.

It's hardly a single smell when all is well at the ticket sales. Remember. It's not a place of glory, you look down from the temple, as people endeavor to make it a story.

And chisel a marble world, but all is lost, it's never heard. Someone to make a great voice And tell me how my money's spent To book my stays and draw my plans So I can tell what's really there And all I need's a great big congratulations Dream, pay attention for me The strangest seems I'd rather dissolve than have you ignore me The ground may be moving fast But I tied my boots to a broken mast His friends, they keep on calling back their smiles I saved my face with half-