Lecture Notes: The Sinking of El Faro and Its History

Introduction & History of El Faro

Originally known as: MV "Puerto Rico"
Hull Number: 670
Completed: 1975 by Sun Ship, Chester, Pennsylvania
Ownership changes: Multiple, becoming part of Tote Maritime out of Jacksonville, Florida
1991: Renamed to "Northern Lights"
2006: Renamed to "El Faro" (Spanish for "The Lighthouse")
Operated by: Sea Star Line, a subsidiary of TOTE Maritime
Registered in: San Juan, Puerto Rico

Length: 790 ft (241 m)
Beam: 92 ft (28 m)
Draft: 20-29 ft
Height: ~157 ft (47.8 m) above the water line
Powerplant: GE Steam Turbine, generating 30,000 Shaft Horsepower to a single screw
Top Speed (original): ~25 knots
Crew Capacity: 30-35
Gross tonnage: 17,500 (International 31,515)
Net Capacity: 11,400 tons (International 21,473)
Replacement value: $36M USD

Primary Usage: Roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) cargo, mainly semi-trailers on the main deck
Issues with Ro-Ro vessels: Crew inexperience, lack of maintenance, vessel instability

Shipyard: Atlantic Marine Shipyard, Mobile Alabama
Changes: Install a large mid-body insert, more cargo on Deck 2, added a spar deck
Ballast: 1,830 tons of fixed ballast as iron ore
Usage: This configuration until approximately 2006

Intermodal Transportation Popularity: Essential for quick movement between ship, rail, and road
Military Usage: Assisted in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003
2006 Conversion: Shipyard: Atlantic Marine Shipyard, converted to a Ro-Con (Roll on/Roll off - Container Ship Hybrid)
Modifications: Removed mezzanine platform, made compatible with general-purpose containers, especially refrigerated
Additional Ballast: 4,875 tons of iron ore
Result: Increased cargo capacity, substantial stability changes but not labeled "Major Conversion" by the Coast Guard

Stiff Ship vs Tender Ship:
- Stiff Ship: Difficult to heel, returns to upright quickly and violently
- Tender Ship: Easier to incline, doesn't quickly return to upright—undesirable
Former Master Testimony: Handling a tender ship is challenging in rough weather

Laid Up: Mainly dormant, brief use in Philadelphia in 2010, returned to mothball status
Crew Composition: 27 Sea Star Line personnel + 6 Polish riding crew (contract workers)

Initial Response: Caution with route changes during Tropical Storm Erika in August 2015
Final Voyage Dates: Departed Jacksonville on September 29, 2015, bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico
Cargo: Fully loaded with containers, vehicles, trailers, and more
Captain Michael Davidson: Under pressure to deliver on time amidst reorganization and vying for a position on new LNG-powered Marlin class ships
Weather Warning: Encounters increasing hurricane warnings
Decision Making: Continued usual route despite warnings; crew concerns dismissed

Delayed and conflicting weather information
Insufficient real-time weather data onboard (faulty anemometer)
Lacking Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and hierarchical communication
Adverse Conditions Escalate: Severe listing, cargo movement, flooding
Engineering Challenges: Machinery issues due to improper maintenance and operational stresses
Emergency Mishandling: Late general alarm, inadequate evacuation preparations

Immediate Rescue Limitations: Hurricane conditions impede rescue operations
Search and Recovery: Various Coast Guard and Navy assets used, no survivors found
El Faro's Wreckage: Located at 15,000 feet depth; VDR recovered after multiple missions

Results of Investigations: Uncover systemic issues in ship management, safety practices, and emergency response procedures

El Faro’s Legacy: A culmination of operational, management, and decision-making failures led to the tragedy during Hurricane Joaquin. The loss signaled an urgent need for updated maritime safety practices and regulations.