In life, there are lots of paradoxical truths. One of the paradoxical truths that has been true for 2 ,000 years. If you want to enjoy peace, prepare for war. It is very easy for us in Asia to become infected by Western pessimism. What do you wish from the incoming leadership of Indonesia for purposes of strengthening the centrality of ASEAN? Well, and I'll be very blunt here. The biggest mistake we are making is that we can see the West creating an angry dragon. We know that this angry dragon will be a problem for us, but we keep absolutely quiet while the West is making the dragon angry. Peace, as in Southeast Asia, reflects geopolitical competence. Wars, as in Ukraine and Gaza, reflect geopolitical incompetence. So we in Asia should consciously and forcefully reject Western pessimism and instead project Asian optimism. you Thank you so much for watching. If you enjoyed this video, please like, comment and subscribe! If you want to see more of the endgame, please like, comment and subscribe! and I am very happy to be with you today. I am very happy to be with you today. I am very happy to be with you today. Thank you very much. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. This is the endgame. my pleasure for coming again to our show i'm glad this time in person i know i know since since the last time we talked in front of a camera uh the world has changed what what would be your take on how the world has changed in the last two to three years uh well i mean firstly we've had two big wars that were a big surprise the first was the Ukraine war and the second was the Gaza war and yet paradoxically looking back while they were surprises when it happened you could also see very clearly the structural forces that were building up towards these two wars secondly of course the u .s china contest has accelerated and sadly will get worse uh over the next 10 years the the contradictions within the two are being baked into the system you know and thirdly since it's always good to throw in a bit of good news that while you see many troubled parts of the world southeese asia overall it's got challenges mianma south china sea asian and southeese asia by and large are sort of quietly moving forward and many of the countries within asia and continue to look very promising good i want to touch on the situation in Ukraine right it seems on the surface and by way of some of the conversations i've had with you know other public intellectuals But it seems to be making China and Russia closer to each other. And that seems to around counter what perhaps some of the early thinkers in US foreign policy would have been advocating for, as for perhaps the United States to be closer to one of the two so that they could contain the third. What has happened in the thinking of the US foreign policy? Well, I hope you don't mind if I'm somewhat provocative and blunt in my reply. The Ukraine war is a disaster that is a result of European geopolitical incompetence. And I think we must call a spade a spade. Peace, as in Southeast Asia, reflects geopolitical competence. Wars, as in Ukraine and Gaza, reflect geopolitical incompetence. And the Europeans at the end of the Cold War had a golden opportunity to complete this centuries -long quest to bring Russia and the West closer together. If the European leaders had been wise, they should have found ways and means of engaging Russia wisely and integrating it into the fabric of Europe. But unfortunately, after the Cold War ended, the Europeans haven't had those kinds of long -range thinkers. They have progressively alienated Russia by supporting a NATO's expansion, which they must know would have angered Russia. And why anger an important neighbor of yours when the neighbor is going to be around for 1000 years is bizarre. And it shows that the Europeans don't understand that the world has changed and they have to adjust to a different world. Now, I have to add that paradoxically, on the Ukraine issue, the United States has been geopolitically very shrewd because the Ukraine war has been nothing but a positive for the United States. Because here was China trying very hard to work with Europe as a strategic autonomy. actor to counterbalance the US but all the European hopes and aspirations for strategic autonomy disappeared as soon as the Ukraine war began because the Europeans realized oh my god we can't defend ourselves without the United States they have become far more dependent on the United States for their security and as a quid pro quo United States is saying excuse me if I'm with you on Russia where are you with me on China so the Ukraine war has been clearly a setback for Europe a setback for Russia a setback for China but a plus for the United States of America interesting how how is that also a plus for the US in the context of what's happening in Gaza Or it's probably the other way around. I would say the Ukraine war is a plus for the United States. The Gaza war is a minus for the United States. Because I don't think if you've had a war like the Gaza war happen in a long time because we've never had a situation where people can see in real time innocent civilians being killed. By the way, both the innocent Israeli civilians who were killed by Hamas, terrorists, and subsequently the Palestinian civilians who were then killed in the Israeli retaliation against Hamas. And it's such a tragedy for Israel because Israel always had a certain reservoir of goodwill in the world towards a state that they thought was, you know, in one way or another, isolated or in danger. Now I think survey after survey will show that the standing of Israel has gone down and Israel has to deal with international judicial bodies like the ICJ and the ICC. And certainly, as even surveys in Southeast Asia have shown, the standing of the United States has gone down because it's not been seen to play a constructive, mediative role. on Gaza. Would this be a an event or a phenomenon where you think there's scarcity of long -term thinking on both the Israelis and the US because there is this apparent you know juxtaposition of the declining moral value in terms of what's happening in Israel with respect to the continuing support by the US towards Israel and and it's not I just I just don't think it's it's a good thing for both Israel and the US. I mean on top of the fact that it's much worse for the civilians you know more on the Palestinian side. I think what is missing in Israel and the US is any kind of serious long -range strategic thinking you on what would be the ultimate solution to the Israel -Palestine issue. Now, in theory, Israel and the US are in favor of a two -state solution. In practice, Israel has been undermining the prospects of a two -state solution partly by the isolation of Gaza, but even more dangerously by having 600 ,000 to 700 ,000 settlers in the West Bank. if indeed you're going to have a two -state solution, I don't see how any democratically elected Israeli government can remove 700 ,000 Israeli settlers. I cannot see the Israeli army going in to shoot at Israeli settlers in the West Bank. So, in a sense, Israel has created a situation which has prevented a two -state solution. And yet, by preventing a two -state solution, Israel is condemning itself to constant warfare in one way or another with several of his neighbors. And, you know, Singapore, as you know, has been a long -standing friend of Israel. Be one to see Israel do well. And if you, as a friend, see a friend of yours walking towards a cliff, do you say keep on walking, or do you say stop? And personally, you see Israel walking towards a cliff if it carries on with its current policies. Because its current policies are based on the assumption that Israel and its strongest backer United States will always remain stronger than all the powers in the rest of the world. And that is certainly true for now, but that cannot be true forever. And remember that in the Cold War, Israel was very careful about how it handled the Palestinian issue, because he knew that states had an alternative. So, if we move from a unipolar world to a multipolar world, and I have absolutely no doubt that we're moving into a multipolar world. it is not the same unipolar world in which Israel would have licensed to do everything it had to do. So Israel therefore should start doing its long -term strategic calculations on what its place will be in a multi -polar world and what adjustments it needs to make. And if it does those calculations it will inevitably come to the conclusion that unless Israel works with the 140 countries that have recognized Palestine as an independent state, it will find itself progressively isolated in the world. So in terms, I'm not arguing in terms of higher ethical values, I'm not arguing in terms of altruism, I'm arguing on the basis of hardcore selfish national interests of Israel. And these hardcore selfish national interests of Israel means that Israel must work for a two -state solution honestly and realistically. Israel's walking or a parent or seeming walking towards the cliff. Is that also a manifestation of the fact that it's not willing to listen to multilateral institutions and perhaps the declining capacity of multilateral institutions to enforce certain things or to reinforce certain things? I think in many geopolitical issues it's very important to understand that there are layers and layers of complexity. So when you say that Israel doesn't want to listen to multilateral institutions, it'd be more accurate to say that it is the current Israeli prime minister, VBNet, and now who doesn't want to listen to multilateral institutions or frankly, anybody else, because he has a personal interest that may overwrite the country's national interests. It may be in the country's national interests, let's say, to have a ceasefire and maybe prolonged truce in the war, in the hope you can get some Israeli hostages back, in the hope that you can save Palestinian lives, in the hope that you can bring calm to the region. But if that happens, it's possible that Bibi Netanyahu may lose his job as Prime Minister, and if he loses his job as Prime Minister, according to Tom Friedman of New York Times, he may end up getting charged in court and he may go to jail. So because of his personal interest in not going to jail, I predict that the war will definitely carry on, at least until the presidential elections in the US in November, because I believe Bibi wants to see Donald Trump being elected as president, and to see, even though he calls Joe Biden his friend, he wants to see Joe Biden defeated in the November elections. So you can see, therefore, what is an ostensibly a straightforward issue of war and peace. It's complicated by one person's personal interests, complicated by the US presidential elections, and these are the factors that are also at play. But in the question of multilateral institutions, I belong to an endangered species called the true believers in multilateralism. And even though it's conventional wisdom in today's world to rubbish multilateralism, I believe in the long run, there's absolutely no other way of managing our world, except through universal multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations. You're sure you've written 10 books, and you've talked a lot about your views about rejigging the UN, rejigging the Security Council, rejigging the way we see multilateralization going forward. Talk about that. Well, you know, while it may appear that the solutions to strengthening multilateral institutions may appear difficult, there is actually one silver bullet we have that can rescue the UN immediately. And paradoxically, that silver bullet solution has been provided by a former American president called Bill Clinton. Because Bill Clinton is, even though his record as president, as you know, was mixed partly because of personal reasons, is actually a very wise thinker. And in a speech in Yale he gave after stepping down as president in 2003, he said, if America is going to be number one forever, then fine. America can come doing whatever it wants to do. But then he added a but. He said, but if we can conceive of a world where America is no longer the dominant political, military, economic, cultural superpower in the world. then surely it is in America's national interest to strengthen multilateral institutions, multilateral processes, multilateral rules, multilateral norms. And he didn't say this, but what he was implying is that then these multilateral rules and norms would then constrain the next number one power, which of course will be China. So it was a very wise prescription. And by doing so, he was actually admitting what we all know to be the truth. The reason why multilateral institutions have been weak, especially since the end of the Cold War in a unipolar world, is because it has been American policy to weaken multilateral institutions. In fact, in my book, The Great Convergence, I actually cite a former director of the National Intelligence Council of the US telling me face to face, one on one, that, OK, Singapore may need strong multilateral institutions because they enhance the voice of small states like Singapore. For the United States, multilateral institutions constrain the United States. So he admitted that the United States wants to weaken multilateral institutions. And so just imagine a world in which the United States realizes that it's in its interest to strengthen multilateral institutions. And once it comes to that realization, everything changes. Because right now, we still have a window because China is not yet number one. And the Chinese do believe that multilateral institutions are good. So if you can imagine a world in which the United States and China agree that they should have strong multilateral institutions, then voila, the problem has been solved. What about the Security Council? Well, the Security Council clearly is by far, most people are not aware of this. The most part, powerful organization in the world. Because only the Security Council can make decisions that are binding and mandatory on all UN member states. So the United Nations Security Council imposes sanctions on Iraq, for example. We have to comply. You have no choice, because it's a decision of the UN Security Council. But the only way for the UN Security Council to survive is if it's in its permanent members, it includes the great powers of today, or the great powers of tomorrow, but not the great powers of yesterday. And even though 80 years ago, or 79 years ago, When the UN was founded, clearly the five most powerful countries were United States, Soviet Union, China, UK and France. But 80 years have passed. And I think neither UK nor France can be called world powers today. And UK is no longer the top five economies in the world, neither is France. And UK sadly will not be among the top 10 economies in the world very soon. So clearly, it will be wiser for the British to acknowledge that times have changed. And perhaps the best thing they can do to make up for the colonisation of India is to acknowledge that India is now clearly, comprehensively, the third most powerful country in the world after the United States and China. Makes sense. So why not give up its seat to India? And believe me, it would be a win -win situation because India is strong enough, powerful enough to deserve a seat on the UN Security Council. And the UK once is freed of its, how do you say, of having his hands tied in the UN Security Council. Now what do I mean by having his hands tied in the UN Security Council? The British could never do anything independent of the United States. So why put handcuffs on yourselves? By leaving this UN Security Council, the British are giving up their handcuffs and saying, okay, I'm now a free and independent nation. I will pursue my own policies. And frankly, the world is losing. looking for countries to provide independent voices in this world because they're just tired of listening only to the great powers. Do you see the UK as having the necessary humility and realism to do that in our lifetime? The British, it's hard to believe this, but at one stage, they could effortlessly run the world. Exactly a hundred years ago, in 1924, a hundred thousand Englishmen could effortlessly rule over 300 million of my ancestors in India. Amazingly. It's quite shocking. But that frankly requires a lot of political and strategic acumen to be able to do that. And of course, it's inconceivable for the British to send 100 ,000 Englishmen to run India today. I think they'd be massacred if they arrived in India today. But at the same time, there's still some of that old acumen within the British intellectual traditions. And it's still a country that has, you know, produced great writers, whether it's Shakespeare, whether it's Jane Austen, whether it's Chaucer or J .K. Rowling. So they do have a tremendous amount of intellectual capacity which they now should utilize to create an independent British voice in the world and not a subservient British voice, which no one will respect. You know, the Cold War and post -Cold War international order would have been somewhat thick with militarism. And this is kind of manifested in the fact that if you take a look at the total defense budget of the world, it would have been about $2 .75 trillion of which the United States, NATO, and their friends make up about $2 .15 trillion. And you compare all these with the single multilateral institution, which we call the UN, which is only with a budget of about $4 billion. What's the hope for ushering this multilateral narrative going forward when everybody else is just piling up with defense capabilities, And this one only sits with about $4 billion worth of budget. Well, you know, in life there are lots of paradoxical truths. And one of the paradoxical truths that has been true for 2 ,000 years is that if you want to enjoy peace, prepare for war. So in some ways, having lots of military expenditures doesn't necessarily mean that there'll be war. If you have two very well -armed states facing each other, like, for example, the United States and China today, when both sides realized that war is not a win -lose proposition, that a nuclear war between the United States and China would be a lose -lose proposition because even if the Chinese lose, 30 to 40 cities, the United States would still lose 5 to 10 cities, and I can't imagine the United States sacrificing New York and Washington, LA and San Francisco, Chicago and Minneapolis to trying to win a war against China. It's one thing to send soldiers to fight in the field, it's another thing to have your cities obliterated. So I think having those nuclear weapons creates a certain degree of reality. But however, I have to add that in the Cold War, most American leaders and Russian leaders and Chinese leaders were very aware of the dangers of nuclear war. Today, unfortunately, after 30 years of a unipolar world, American leaders and strategic thinkers have forgotten about the dangers of a nuclear war. Because I think that while President Joe Biden was very wise at the beginning of the Ukraine War in insisting that American weapons should not be used to hit the territory of Russia, because it could accidentally trigger a nuclear war. But therefore, I'm actually quite shocked by the latest American decision to allow American weapons to be used by the Ukrainians to hit Russian soil, because then you are moving one step closer towards nuclear retaliation. At the end of the day, given the dangers of nuclear war, nuclear war. You know there's a famous clock, doomsday clock. We are either two or three minutes away from doomsday once a nuclear war begins. So why not move that clock hand backwards rather than forwards. But to move that clock hand backwards you need wise long -term strategic leaders. And the West doesn't have wise long -term strategic leaders today. And that makes the world more dangerous. So therefore it's not just a question of how many weapons you have. You also need to understand the dangers of these weapons and what they can do to your societies. What explains the fact that the policy thinkers or makers in the West right now don't seem to have the kind of long -term strategic thinking that we were used to seeing in the old days. Well I must emphasize that the absence of long -term strategic thinking was confirmed to me by one of America's greatest living strategic thinkers, Henry Kissinger. And you know I saw him I think about eight months before he died and I saw him in October 22 and he's clearly one -on -one was very worried about this incapacity of the West at large to understand that you've got to deal with a very different world and that the West has got to make some adjustments in this world. But the other reason why there's this absence of long -term strategic thinking because the generation of people like Kissinger or Richard Nixon, they had experienced World War II. They knew the horrors of war but once you stop experiencing the horrors of war and once you assume that you'll be superior forever then you begin to do dangerous, reckless things. And the sad part you know again I say this is a friend of the United States, it's a bit tragic that when you go to United States you see a crumbling infrastructure. You see bridges collapsing in Pittsburgh, you see bridges collapsing in Baltimore, and you wonder why are you spending so much money on aircraft carriers fighting unnecessary wars like Iraq when you have much more pressing needs at home. And indeed surprisingly a relatively conservative American thinker like Niall Ferguson has set in in a recent article that we Americans are the Soviets now. And he's right, because if you look at it, in the old Soviet Union, what was striking was declining life expectancy. In the United States today, declining life expectancy. In the old Soviet Union, rising infant mortality. In the United States, rising infant mortality. In the old Soviet Union, stagnant living standards for the bottom 50%. In the United States, stagnant living standards for the bottom 50%, it's actually quite striking. So in a country that has so many domestic challenges, why not spend the time and effort to rebuild your own society? Because at the end of the day, as George Kennan said, in talking about the Cold War, and I mentioned this in my book as China won, remember. that the outcome of the war with them is not by military weapons, but by the spiritual vitality of your own society. An American society is clearly a very deeply troubled society. Only a deeply troubled society would re -elect a man like Donald Trump as president. And then by contrast, if you look at China, if you go to China, you'll be stunned by the infrastructure that you see there. And the living standards of the Chinese people have improved more in the past 30 years than they have in the past 3000 years. So that's the real battle. So if the United States could focus more on improving the living standards of its people, less on projecting power overseas, it'd be better for the United States and maybe even better for the world. You've alluded to the fact that the last couple of hundred years of Western domination would have been an historical aberration. To what extent do you think this will be short -lived or long -lived on the back of China's rise? Well, I think to give the West credit where it's due, it's actually quite stunning that there's very small populations in the West, first of all, succeeded so spectacularly. I mean, delivering the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, the scientific revolutions. I mean, frankly, if the West hadn't modernized the world, you and I wouldn't be sitting in this room, in this incredibly modern environment all around us, with this technology that all came in many ways from the West, right? So the West gifted the world with modernization. And the world clearly has benefited a lot from the gift of modernization. But once that gift of modernization was shared with the world, then it was very clear that once the rest of the world could do exactly everything that the West does, a share of Western power of the world would shrink. It's inevitable. And therefore be wiser for the West to adapt itself to a world in which Western power has shrunk, but adapt intelligently, preemptively. instead of trying to resist it and refusing change. To give you a very simple example, just to illustrate my point, it made sense in the 1940s for the Europeans to insist that the head of the IMF should be European and the head of World Bank should be American. That made sense in the 1940s because the United States alone had 50% of the world's GNP and the Europeans were obviously going to recover and do very well. But now, eight decades later, when the most dynamic, fastest -growing economies are in Asia, how can you deny Asians from running the IMF or the World Bank? But that's an example of how the mindsets of Western domination are so deeply embedded in the minds of Western leaders that they cannot do the obvious, commonsensical thing make way for somebody else. This stickiness with respect to the old paradigm that would have dated back to the 40s can only be unlocked through a number of means, one of which is the continuation of China's rise, right? China is just going to be much more dominant going forward, right? And they're going to be able to insist upon revising the pre -existing order. Or secondly, it could take again the humility or the realization by the West that perhaps some of these multilateral institutions should be headed up by an Indian, by a Chinese, by a Southeast Asian, by an African, or whatever. Are we likely to witness the ann of India? Engagement between China and the U .S.? Well, I think nowadays no American leader dares to use the word engagement. Sadly, I mean, engagement, by the way, is a positive human relationship. Like just like you and I are engaging each other now, which is the most civilized thing to do. And the normal position within two great powers, any two great powers should be engagement. But if you use the word in the United States, if any American politician says, I'm in favor of engagement with China, he's dead. He's finished. I mean, that's how bad the situation is. Now, your bigger question was, where is China hitting? Is it going to disrupt the world order? Or is it going to become, in a sense, a supporter of the current world order? And my answer to you is that that will depend on how we treat China as it is rising. Now, China is clearly, you know, Napoleon famously said, don't wake up the sleeping dragon, China, because if you do, it's going to shake the world. Now, you and I know that there are two ways of waking up a human being. Either you wake up the person very gently, whisper soft things into his or her ear, nudge him gently, then he or she will wake up relatively happy. Or you could take a bucket of water and splash it on the person and say, wake up. You can imagine how angry that person's going to be. And paradoxically, while the United States, to be fair, engaged China very well in the Cold War, and I would say the whole period from Kissinger's visit in 1971, due roughly to the end of the Obama era in 2016. So for 45 years, roughly, the United States did engage China quite well. And actually, at the end of the day, created a China that had stakes in the current world order, and also became a responsible stakeholder of the world in many ways. But since then, the United States has now decided to do the opposite and use all kinds of measures to stop the rise of China. And in the case of United States today, even though the United States is bitterly divided as a society and Trump and Biden don't agree on anything, but they only agree on one thing, it's time to stop China, which I think by the way is an unwise policy because it ain't gonna work. You can't stop China's rise. China's rise or demise will be determined by internal forces inside China. You from outside, you cannot influence it. And so if the United States is now going to take measure after measure against China, tariffs, chips, sanctions, clearly China is going to emerge as a very angry dragon. And so I wonder whether the West has thought about this and say, is this what we want to see happen in the world. Now for us in Asia, the biggest mistake we are making is that we can see the West creating an angry dragon. We know that this angry dragon will be a problem for us, but we keep absolutely quiet while the West is making the dragon angry. That's so unwise of us Asians. The trouble about Asians, as you know, is that we are too polite. And when the angry dragon is woken up, the United States may one day sail home and say, okay, I'm going to go home. I don't care what happens. Who's left to deal with the angry dragon? We are. So why aren't we speaking out? Why aren't we saying the most logical and most obvious thing that hey, what are you doing? What are you trying to achieve? So we should be the ones acting to temper the forces that are trying to create an unnecessary conflict. Because our own interests will be endangered by doing so. But we haven't, there's been no leader who's been willing to do so, so far. But I do hope that maybe your next president, General Prabhu will speak out and express what is in the minds of many South Asians. Well, he has that instinct for internationalism, in my view. I think he's going to be able to try to project, you know, Indonesia's internationalism in whatever context possible, regionally or internationally. Well, he has a massive opportunity in the year 2025, next year, because he'll be the 60th anniversary of the Bandung conference. And I know you've had many conferences, post -Bandung conference. But now, I think, in the year 2025, we really need a big bang Bandung Conference because I can tell you, as someone who travels around the world, many countries in the global south are very upset by this unnecessary emphasis on the zero -sum game between US and China because they feel that their own interests are being damaged by this geopolitical contest. So, the global south is looking for a way of sending a big message to both US and China that if you want to carry on this contest, you go ahead, don't get us involved. Don't ask us to pick sides. Don't tell us don't buy Huawei. We will do what we need to do, right? And so, since this voice needs to be expressed, it needs a launching pad for it to be expressed. So a second Big Bang Bandung will be a way of sending a very strong message that the majority of the people who live in the global south don't want to take sides in this US -China contest. And in fact, would like the US and China to try and moderate their contests, and keep it with their certain guardrails, and ensure that other global priorities like climate change, like the next pandemic, now I see that bird flu may come back, like another financial crisis, let's focus on the problems that are most important for humanity and not put this zero -sum game about who's number one power in the world to be the defining force in world events. If you presented this argument very compellingly in the past, many times about the fact that not just Southeast Asia, but the global south would have been very much used to, multi -polarity. And when it is specifically about Southeast Asia, I think people tend to underestimate the degree of agency that we have, and we've been able to show for the past thousands of years. But in this tension between the US and China, what would be your prediction about what could or would happen with Taiwan? First, let me say a quick word about Southeast Asia, since you mentioned it, because it's one of the biggest ideas that most leading Western minds cannot see, is that the world of tomorrow will be very different from the world of yesterday where the West dominated the world. They cannot see this new world. So let me give everyone a shorthand view of understanding the world of tomorrow. And I'm going to call it the 3M world. The 3Ms that will define the world of you said, 3 multilateral. Because in the world that is a small global village, you need multilateral institutions. Now guess what? Which is the one region in the world that intuitively understands the 3Ms. Multi -civilizational, multi -polar, multilateral, that's ASEAN. And so ASEAN therefore is a living laboratory of how the world can cope with this new world of tomorrow and I think the rest of the world should pay greater attention to what ASEAN does and again I hope that President Prabhu will make an effort to explain ASEAN better to the rest of the world because we have an amazing ASEAN story that hasn't been sold to the world but on your question of Taiwan it's very important to start off with a key point here. Taiwan is not an international problem. Taiwan is an internal problem and remember even the United States has officially acknowledged a one China policy. A one China policy means that both Taiwan and China are part of one China. It doesn't mean one China, one Taiwan. So this is a basic point that people keep forgetting and so the if the United States says I must say I'm very glad that the Biden administration, one of the best things the Biden administration has done after especially after the very disruptive visits of Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan is to emphasize that the United States has not backed away from its one China policy and you notice how relations between the US and China stabilized a bit after San Francisco because I think the United States gave a categorical assurance. My hope is that if Donald Trump is elected president that he will also reiterate the one China policy. But unfortunately, some of his advisors may dangerously move away from that. And I'm not exaggerating here because his former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, after he stepped down as Secretary of State, went to Taiwan and gave a speech in which he recommended that the US should recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Now, Mike Pompeo is an incredibly intelligent, sophisticated person. He knows that if the United States recognizes Taiwan as an independent country, he's calling for a declaration of war by China against Taiwan. So that's why it's very important that the advisors who advise Trump on China issues emphasize that he should reiterate that the United States remains committed to its one China policy. Okay, sure. You've been a very big proponent of China, right? What would be one thing that you could perhaps be critical of with China? Well, I would say the one of the biggest, and I'll be very blunt here, one of the biggest mistakes that China has made is in strongly endorsing the Nine Dash Line. Now, we all don't know where the Nine Dash Line came from. Professor Wang Gangwu, the greatest Asian historian in the world today, has said that the Nine Dash Line was probably created by the Japanese when they controlled China and Taiwan, as you know. And the trouble with the Nine Dash Line is that no one knows what it means. I mean, many people think that with the Nine Dash Line, China is claiming all of South China Sea at its territorial waters. Now, clearly it isn't. Every day, thousands of ships go through the South China Sea without asking for permission from China. If it is territorial waters, they have to ask for permission from China. And so it is a mistake to have a Nine Dash Line, whose meaning no one knows. And frankly, looking back now, one of the biggest mistakes that was made by some Chinese officials, I don't think that the decision was made by Chinese leaders to put the Nine Dash Line on the passport of the Chinese. Now, once you put the Nine Dash Line on the passport of the Chinese, the Chinese government's hands are tied. Now the reason why I say the hands are tied is because it is not in China's national interests to see the nine dashed lines succeed because China today is a global naval power. There are more Chinese goods traveling around the world than American goods traveling around the world. How can Chinese goods travel around the world? They need open seas. They need countries to adhere to a 12 -mile territorial limit, right? It's in China's interests. So why grab this small body of water in the South China Sea and endanger your global interests, not the global. The South China Sea is about 2% or 3% of the world's oceans, maybe 1%. I give up 99% of the world's oceans were 1%. So the Nine Dash Line, as I said in my book, The New Ancient Hemisphere, has become an albatross around the necks of the Chinese. And I think the Chinese have got to figure out how to handle this carefully and sensitively because at the end of the day, they need good ties with the ASEAN countries. And the Nine Dash Line creates a point of friction between China and the ASEAN countries. And since this point of friction was created by China, China has got to remove that point of friction. As a fellow Southeast Asian, are you code of conduct optimistic with regards to resolving this quagmire? I think more important than the code of conduct, I don't know whether it'll come about. Is a clear understanding between China and especially the four ASEAN claimant states, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, that even while they have differences on the South China Sea, they will manage these differences peacefully and not allow it to ever come to blows. And so far, touch wood, we have done a relatively good job. We've had moments of tension, we've had dangerous moments that happens, but we've managed to resolve them. And so if you can get an explicit understanding within China and the four claimant states that the differences will always be resolved peacefully, then I think we'll be okay. In your famous recent session in New York, you alluded to how the Vietnamese see China. You know, anybody that wants to be the leader of China, I mean Vietnam, you got to be able to stand up to China, but you also got to be able to deal with it. Is that the kind of attitude that the other Southeast Asians ought to be with, or it's just peculiar with Vietnam? Well, I think you're referring to my session with Orville Shell, the Asia Society in New York, which, as you indicated, seems to have traveled well around the world. I would say some aspects of the China -Vietnam relationship can also apply to other Southeast Asians, and certainly we in Southeast Asia must be able to stand up to China, because China will become our biggest neighbors, but we must also be able to get along. with China. But at the same time, what is unique about the China Vietnam relationship, which doesn't apply to the other nine Southeast Asian states, is that the other nine Southeast Asian states have an Indic cultural base. Vietnam is the only one that has a cynic cultural base. So there's a kind of intimacy between Vietnam and China that is very deep and goes back thousands of years because Vietnam is the only state in Southeast Asia that's occupied by China for 1000 years. And at the same time, the Vietnamese and Chinese have a very complicated relationship. And I'll tell you one story, which I told at Columbia University, no way back in the 1980s, when ASEAN and Vietnam was still fighting over Cambodia, I gave a speech at Columbia University. And what surprised me was that in the front row were some Vietnamese diplomats at times in Singapore and Vietnam were quarreling with each other. So I said, Vietnam and China have been fighting wars for 2000 years. And I said it's not surprising that sometimes the Vietnamese armies defeat the invading Chinese armies. So in 1979, the Vietnamese army fought well against the Chinese army. But in the past, whenever a Vietnamese army defeated an invading Chinese army, the first thing the Vietnamese emperor would do would be to send tribute to Beijing and say, I'm very sorry that I defeated your army. Please accept my apologies. And I say in 1979, Vietnam forgot to send the apologies. And you know what? The three Vietnamese diplomats went like this. So, you know, there are some at the end of the day, ancient relationships, especially in Asia. Another example is China and Japan, right? And fortunately, you know, Ezra Bogle points out in his book on China and Japan. China and Japan have had the longest recorded bilateral diplomatic history, you know, countries know each other very well. And for the past, out of the past 1500 years, they lived at peace for 1450 years. So it's important, therefore, for us in Asia to nudge China and Japan back to the 1450 peaceful year relationship, rather than trying to push them towards an antagonistic relationship. Because this is where we in Asia, certainly in Saudi, we are too passive. We don't proactively go out and make a difference. And by the way, that's why, frankly, one of the things I have done is to launch the Asian Peace Program at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore. Because it is puzzling in our world that even though peace is so important, we spend so much more time and resources on wars and almost nothing on peace. So I hope that programs like yours will also help to encourage peace in Asia. For sure. As a Southeast Asian, are you concerned with the formation of some of these blocks called the quad, nakas, and what have you? Well, in your view, would that have erode the centrality of ASEAN or strengthened rather? Well, I mean, I have to emphasize that if countries choose to form or create an organization, they have a sovereign right to do so. So when India, China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa create bricks, that's okay. They have a sovereign right to do so. And countries have a sovereign right to join or not join. So they should have a right to do so. But at the same time, sometimes these organizations send a signal. And I must say, I was very puzzled by the Australian decision to form AUKUS because the UK has withdrawn several times from East Asia. They promise to defend in Singapore, killed the death, and they surrendered. They promised us they would keep the naval base in Singapore forever, and then they ran out of money, and they left. So the British today have such enormous domestic challenges. I was in Oxford a couple of months ago, and unfortunately I fell sick. And I realized to my horror that one of the worst places in the world to fall sick is the United Kingdom, because you cannot get a doctor right away. And I'm not exaggerating. And after I hung on the phone with the National Health Service, and I must have answered 500 questions, the final advice to me was go and see a pharmacist. And I thought, this is bizarre. This is the modern developed country like the UK. And it can't provide basic medical services to its population as bizarre. And then you want to go around the world and get involved in strategic challenges around the world. And symbolically, it was bad for Australia because at the end of the day, Australia's destiny, Australia's cultural destiny lies with the West. Its geopolitical destiny lies with Asia. And, you know, I published a 5 ,000 word essay on Australia's destiny in the Asian century. And one of the most obvious things that Australia needs to do is to understand its Asian neighbors better and work with its Asian neighbors better and understand that many of his Asian neighbors have been very kind to Australia. So for example, ASEAN is a very valuable geopolitical buffer for Australia to cushion it from the rising China. In fact, ASEAN is like a pillow protecting Australia from China. But instead of appreciating this pillow and acknowledging that ASEAN is a valuable geopolitical buffer, some of the Australian governments have treated ASEAN with incredible condescension and even contempt. That shows very short sighted thinking on the part of several Australian governments, not the present one, I must say. I would say the Prime Minister Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have been done a good job of rebuilding their ties, you know, with Asia. But something like AUKUS is a signal that Australia is trying to sail backwards into history when the West dominated the world and not forwards into the 21st century. has got to adjust and adapt to its Asian neighbors. What do we have to do to dispel that perspective, that there's not adequate centrality within ASEAN? Or should we just ignore what the others think about ASEAN? I would say that ASEAN, the best thing that ASEAN can do is to sell its record not through words but through deeds. So we've managed to have 33 plus 24, 57 years of peace, of no wars among any two ASEAN member states. Let's have another 57 years. of no wars among any two ASEAN states. And more importantly, let us continue to strengthen the ASEAN free trade area, continue to enhance areas of cooperation in ASEAN, and as I was studying a former Indonesian ambassador, Dino Jalal, earlier today, enhanced the strategic trust among the ASEAN countries. So if we can provide to the rest of the world a model of strategic harmony in a very diverse region of the world, that's the model that people should look at. Look at it on a day -to -day basis and ask yourself, why is it that, you know, Malaysia and Singapore can separate and become two countries and now have a close functional relationship? India and Pakistan separated much long ago, they'd have a dysfunctional relationship. How is it that Southeast Asia, which in economic terms is much poorer than Northeast Asia, has had a successful association of Southeast Asian nations? And Northeast Asia still doesn't have an association of Northeast Asian nations. Why not? Why didn't they learn from ASEAN? And frankly, the easiest thing, you know, we have a five ASEAN founding states, right? Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, five. Why don't we take the five in Northeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, say why don't you form an association of Northeast Asian states? Just talk to each other, just meet each other, just have regular meetings, play golf with each other. And guess what? The place would be a much better place. So these are the sort of lessons that ASEAN can teach. It gets under narrated and it gets lost in translation. Or it just gets underestimated. Yes. And in fact, I can tell you, I'm glad you mentioned the word under -estimated. Because at a time, there was a time in the past when Condoleezza Rice was the Secretary of State of the United States. And she had to make a decision of whether or not to visit ASEAN or go once again to the Middle East to solve a problem. And one of her ambassadors in Southeast Asia called me up and said, Kishore, help me. I've got to make a case to Condoleezza Rice to ask her to come to Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, she didn't. And you can see. The United States Secretaries of State have paid far more visits to the Middle East. What's the result? Look at Southeast Asia. With American Secretaries of State have skipped so many ASEAN meetings. And what's the result? Very simple. So let our record speak for itself. More peace, more stability. More prosperity. And you know the ASEAN countries, it's important for your listeners to know this, within the years 2010 and 2020, ASEAN added more to global economic growth than all of the European Union combined. Isn't that stunning? Yeah. What do you wish from the incoming leadership of Indonesia for purposes of strengthening the centrality of ASEAN? Well, you know, Indonesia has always played a very special role within ASEAN because at the end of the day, to be very candid, the reason why, let me give you an example, the reason why the Organization of American States, which has been around longer than ASEAN, is a dysfunctional organization. It's because the largest member state, the United States, wants to control the OAS, right? And says, if I don't like it, the OAS will not do it. The wisest thing that Indonesia has done, as the largest member state of ASEAN, they said, no, we will not control it. Let everyone, let all of us run it together. And at the same time, At the same time, you know, you've also injected some of your values into ASEAN, the principles of mushawara, mufaka, consultation and consensus, and they have work. So I think it's very important first for Indonesia to take ownership of the ASEAN success story. And once Indonesia feels that this ASEAN success story is in many ways a gift from Indonesia to South East Asian to the world, then Indonesia should become the chief spokesman of ASEAN. And since Indonesia has got embassies in more countries around the world than any South East Asian country, I think Indonesia should be actively marketing the ASEAN story. And certainly the year 2027. When we celebrate the 60th anniversary of ASEAN, we should make sure that everybody in the world understands and appreciates ASEAN and celebrates the 60th birthday. Kishore, you've been a great product of intellectual curiosity. And that goes with Singapore also. Hmm. How do you make sure that the other Southeast Asians become as intellectually curious as you are or as the Singaporeans are? Well, I'm pleased to report that, you know, I travel around the Southeast Asia a lot. For some strange reason, I love Southeast Asia. You can see I dress like a Southeast Asian. And as I travel around to Kuala Lumpur, to Bangkok, to Jakarta, to Manila, to Hanoi, and these are all places I've been to this year. You know, 20, 24. And I can see that there is a growing awareness of how special we are in Southeast Asia. You know, I attended a couple of months ago a one -day conference organized in Vietnam called the ASEAN Future Forum, I think. It was so well done. And what touched me is that Vietnam is probably one of the newest members of ASEAN, right? It's amazing. One of the newest members of ASEAN. Hasn't been a member that long and the deep appreciation of ASEAN in Vietnam really touched me a great deal. And remember that Vietnam was an adversary of the founding member states of ASEAN until 1990, 34 years ago. And look at the difference between European Union and Russia. Why couldn't the European Union deal with Russia in the way that ASEAN dealt with Vietnam, right? We had been quarreling for a long time too. So, I mean, it shows there's a certain lack of wisdom in the European Union. Its founding fathers had a lot of wisdom. But the current generation... Don't understand that in a different world, a multi -civilizational, multi -polar, multi -lateral world, that the European Union must make U -turns in some of its policies and not go by the tired old formulas of the past. And they should also look for leaders who can think long -term and look over the horizon and the new challenges coming, and not just repeat the old formulas of the past again. So the European Union, sadly, I predict, is going to have a miserable decade ahead of itself because of its incapacity to adjust strategically to a different world. Whereas I think ASEAN is going to have overall a wonderful decade ahead because we have shown that we can adapt to a very different world. I want to test this hypothesis with you. If we were all going to be able to speak English the way you do in Southeast Asia, I mean, at the moment, it's the Singaporeans and many Malaysians and many Filipinos. The rest don't articulate our stories. Instead of 60 to 70 million people in Southeast Asia, we have 300 to 400 million people that speak English. Instead of 10 million Indonesians, we have 100 million Indonesians who can speak English. We'd be able to tell the story to the world much better. Is that something that you think is worth trying? Well, I've got some very good news for you. I've already solved your problem. I must say, I'd be very honest with you, I'm not an expert on artificial intelligence, but I am confident that with the advent of artificial intelligence, it should be quite possible. And as you know, nowadays, I just gave a speech on... What day is it today? Today is Thursday. I gave a speech on Sunday in Singapore to an audience, half of whom spoke English, the other half only spoke Chinese, right? And behind me were two large screens. Simultaneous translation. And even as I spoke, no human being did it. AI translated my words into Chinese immediately. And according to a friend of mine who spoke Chinese, it was about 85% accurate. I bet you will get the 95 to 99 percent accurate. It's very easy for an Indonesian to explain his views on ASEAN very soon. I'm sure it'll be as small as a phone and speak to it in Bahasa, Indonesia. There'll be a very fluent translation coming out. So explain to an Argentinian, for example, if there are countries that have exceeded their potential, they are in Southeast Asia, if there are countries that have performed way below their potential, like Argentina. Remember, Argentina was one of the top 10 most prosperous countries in the year 1900. And look where Argentina is today. So I think Argentina should learn a bit about ASEAN. So the Indonesian should speak to an Argentinian in Bahasa, Indonesia, and not have it translated into English, but into Spanish simultaneously using Spanish idioms to explain, hey, if Argentina had been in Southeast Asia, your economy would be 10 times larger. Well, Kishore, we've covered the world. Any final messages for us? Well, I think it's very easy to become pessimistic in today's world. And certainly, when I go to Europe, all I encounter is doom and gloom. And to be honest with you, sadly, like you, I visited the United States four times in 2024, in the first six months. There's also doom and gloom in the United States, sadly. Even though, by the way, the United States is an amazingly successful society. It would be a huge mistake for anybody to underestimate the United States of America. I have enormous respect for the US as a country, but sadly, many of the people are not happy. So it is very easy for us in Asia to become infected by Western pessimism. So we in Asia should consciously and forcefully reject Western pessimism and project Asian optimism. Because the 21st century will be the Asian century. Amen. I'm with you on that one. Thank you. Thank you so much, Kishore. Thank you. That was Professor Kishore Mobubani. Thank you. Inilla, endgame.