Transcript for:
Lecture on Heidegger's Analysis of Temporality and Everydayness

section 71 the temporal meaning of darzan's everydayness we have given an interpretation of some structures which are essential to darzan's state of being and we have done so before exhibiting temporality but with the aim of leading up to this our analysis of the temporality of concern has shown that these structures must be taken back into temporality existentially at the very start of our analytic we did not choose as our theme any definite and distinctive possibility of design's existence our analytic was oriented rather by the average way of existing which is nothing conspicuous about it we call that kind of being in which design maintains itself proximally and for the most part everydayness what this expression signifies at bottom when delimited ontologically remains obscure at the beginning of our study moreover we could not see any way of even making the existential ontological meaning of everydayness a problem by now however some light has been cast on the meaning of darzan's being as temporality can there still be any doubt as to the existential temporal signification of the term everydayness all the same we are far removed from an ontological conception of this phenomenon it even remains questionable whether the explication of temporality which we have so far carried through is sufficient to delimit the existential meaning of everydayness everydayness manifestly stands for that way of existing in which design maintains itself every day a lethargo and yet this every day does not signify the sum of those days which have been allotted to diazine in its lifetime though this every day is not to be understood calendrically there is still an overtone of some such temporal character in the signification of the everyday i'll tag but what we have primarily in mind in the expression everydayness is a definite how of existence by which design is dominated through and through for life cycles in our analyses we've often used the expression proximally and for the most part proximally signifies the way in which design is manifest in the with one another of publicness even if at bottom everydayness is precisely something which in an existential manner it has surmounted for the most part signifies the way in which design shows itself for every man not always but as a rule everydayness means the how in accordance with which darzan lives unto the day in the entire canine lived whether in all its ways of behaving or only in certain ones which have been prescribed by being with one another to this how they belongs further the comfortableness of the accustomed even if it forces one to do something burdensome and repugnant that which will come tomorrow and this is what everyday concern keeps awaiting is eternally yesterday's in everydayness everything is all one and the same but whatever the day may bring is taken as diversification everydayness is determinative for diazine even when it has not chosen that they for its hero these manifold characteristics of everydayness however by no means designated as a mere aspect afforded by design when one looks at the things men do everydayness is a way to be to which of course that which is publicly manifest belongs but it is more or less familiar to any individual design as a way of existing which it may have as its own and it is familiar to it through that state of mind which consists of a pallid lack of mood in everydayness design can undergo dull suffering sink away in the dullness of it and evade it by seeking new ways in which its dispersion in its affairs may be further dispersed in the moment of vision indeed and often just for that moment existence can even gain the mastery over the everyday but it can never extinguish it that which is ontarically so familiar in the way darzine has been practically interpreted that we never pay any heed to it hides enigma after enigma existential ontologically the natural horizon for starting the existential analytical design is only seemingly self-evident but after the interpretation of temporality which we have given thus far do we find ourselves in any more promising a situation with regard to delimiting the structure of everydayness existentially or does this bewildering phenomenon make the inadequacy of our explication of temporality all too patent have we not either to been constantly immobilizing darzyne in certain situations while we have consistently with this been disregarding the fact that in living unto its days design stretches itself along temporarily in the sequence of those days the it's all one and the same the accustomed the like yesterday so today and tomorrow and for the most part these are not to be grasped without records to this temporal stretching along of design and is it not also a fact of existing design that in spending its time it takes time into its reckoning from day to day and regulates this reckoning astronomically and calendrically only if both designs everyday hysterizing and the reckoning with time with which it concerns itself in this historizing are included in our interpretation of designs temporality will our orientation be embracing enough to enable us to make a problem of the ontological meaning of everydayness as such but because at bottom we mean by the term everydayness nothing else than temporality while temporality is made possible by darzein's being an adequate conceptual delimitation of everydayness can succeed only in a framework in which the meaning of being in general and its possible variations are discussed in principle chapter 5 temporality and historicality section 72 existential ontological exposition of the problem of history all our efforts in the existential analytics serve the one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of being in general to work out this question we need to delimit that very phenomenon in which something like being becomes accessible the phenomenon of the understanding of being but this phenomenon is one that belongs to darzan's state of being only after this entity has been interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial can we have a conception of the understanding of being which is included in its very state of being only on this basis can we formulate the question of the being which is understood in this understanding and the question of what such understanding presupposes even though many structures of design when taken singly are still obscure it seems that by casting light upon temporality is the primordial condition for the possibility of care we have reached the primordial interpretation of design which we require we have exhibited temporality with a view to design's authentic potentiality for being a whole we have then confirmed the temporal interpretation of care by demonstrating the temporality of concern for being in the world our analysis of the authentic potentiality for being a whole has revealed that in care is rooted in equi-primordial connectedness of death guilt and conscience can design be understood in a way that is more primordial than in the projection of its authentic existence although up till now we have seen no possibility of a more radical approach to the existential analytic yet if we have regard for the preceding discussion of the ontological meaning of everydayness a difficult consideration comes to light have we indeed brought the whole of darzyne as regards its authentically being a whole into the for having of our existential analysis it may be that a formulation of the question as related to darzine's totality possesses a genuinely unequivocal character ontologically it may be that as regards being towards the end the question itself may even have found its answer but death is only the end of darzyne and taken formally it is just one of the ends by which darzan's totality is closed round the other end however is the beginning the birth only that entity which is between birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking accordingly the orientation of our analytic has so far remained one-sided in spite of all its tendencies towards a consideration of existent being a whole and in spite of the genuineness with which authentic and inauthentic being towards death have been explicated design has been our theme only in the way in which it exists facing forward as it were leaving behind it all that has been not only has been towards the beginning remained unnoticed but so too and above all has the way in which darshan stretches along between birth and death the connectedness of life in which design somehow maintains itself constantly is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of being a whole we have regarded temporality as the meaning of the being of darzan's totality must we not now take this back even if what we have described as the connectedness between birth and death is ontologically quite obscure or does temporality as we have exhibited it first of all give us the basis on which to provide an unequivocal direction for the existential ontological question of this connectedness in the field of these investigations it is perhaps already again when we learn not to take problems too lightly what seems simpler than to characterize the connectedness of life between birth and death it consists of a sequence of experiences in time but if one makes a more penetrating study of this way of characterizing the connectedness in question and especially of the ontological assumptions behind it the remarkable upshot is that in this sequence of experiences what is really actual is in each case just that experience which is present at hand in the current now while those experiences which are passed away or are only coming along either are no longer or are not yet actual design traverses the span of time granted to it between the two boundaries and it does so in such a way that in each case it is actual only in the now and hops as it were through the sequence of now's of its own time thus it is said that design is temporal in spite of the constant changing of these experiences the self maintains itself throughout with a certain self sameness opinions diverge as to how that which thus persists is to be defined and how one is to determine what relation it may possibly have to the changing experiences the being of this perseveringly changing connectedness of experiences remains indefinite but at bottom whether one likes it or not in this way of characterizing the connectedness of life one has posited something present at hand in time though something that is obviously um thing like if we have regard for what we have worked out under the title of temporality as the meaning of the being of care we find that while the ordinary interpretation of design within its own limits has its justification and is sufficient we cannot carry through a genuine ontological analysis of the way diazine stretches along between birth and death if we take this interpretation as our clue nor can we even fix upon such an analysis as a problem design does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities of experiences which come along successively and disappear nor is there a sort of framework which this succession gradually fills up for how is such a framework to be present at hand where in each case only the experience one is having right now is actual and the boundaries of the framework the birth which is past and the death which is only on coming lack actuality at bottom even in the ordinary way of taking the connectedness of life one does not think of this as a framework drawn tense outside of design and spanning it around but one rightly seeks this connectedness in darzan itself when however one tacitly regards this entity ontologically as something present at hand in time any attempt at an ontological characterization of the being between birth and death will break down design does not fill up a track or stretch of life one which is somehow present at hand with the phases of its momentary actualities it stretches itself along in such a way that its own being is constituted in advance as a stretching along the between which relates to birth and death already lies in the being of darzan on the other hand it is by no means the case that design is actual in a point of time and that apart from this it is surrounded by the non-actuality of its birth and death understood existentially birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present at hand and death is just as far from having the kind of being of something still outstanding not yet present at hand but coming along design exists as born and as born it is already dying in the sense of being towards death as long as design practically exists both the ends and their between are and they are in the only way which is possible on the basis of designs being as care thrownness and that being towards death in which one either flees it or anticipates it form a unity and in this unity birth and death are connected in a manner characteristic of diazine as care design is the between in temporality however the constitutive totality of care has a possible basis for its unity accordingly it is within the horizon of darzan's temporal constitution that we must approach the ontological clarification of the connectedness of life that is to say the stretching along the movement and the persistence which are specific for design the movement the vague height of existence is not the motion the vague of something present at hand it is definable in terms of the way diazine stretches along the specific movement in which design is stretched along and stretches itself along we call its historizing the question of darzyne's connectedness is the ontological problem of darzan's historizing to lay there the structure of historizing and the existential temporal conditions of its possibility signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicality with the analysis of the specific movement and persistence which belonged to darzine's historizing we come back in our investigation to the problem which we touched upon immediately before exposing temporality to view the question of the constancy of the self which we defined as the who of darzan self constancy is a way of being of darzine and is therefore grounded in a specific temporalizing of temporality the analysis of historizing will lead us face to face with the problems of a thematical investigation of temporalizing as such if the question of historicality leads us back to these sources then the locus of the problem of history has already been decided this locus is not to be sought in historiology as the science of history even if the problem of history is treated in accordance with the theory of science not only aiming at the epistemological clarification of the historiological way of grasping things zimmer or at the logic with which the concepts of historiological presentation are formed they cut but doing so with an orientation towards the side of the object then as long as the question is formulated this way history becomes in principle accessibly only as the object of a science thus the basic phenomenon of history which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it has been irretrievably put aside how history can become a possible object for historiology is something that may be gathered only from the kind of being which belongs to the historical from historicality and from the way it is rooted in temporality if we are to cast light on historicality itself in terms of temporality and primordially in terms of temporality that is authentic then it is essential to this task that we can carry it out only by construing it phenomenologically the existential ontological constitution of historicality has been covered up by the way darzein's history is ordinarily interpreted we must get hold of it in spite of all this the existential way of construing historicality has its definite supports in the ordinary understanding of design and is guided by those existential structures at which we have hitherto arrived we shall first describe the ordinary ways in which history is conceived so that we may give our investigation an orientation as to those items which are commonly held to be essential for history here it must be made plain what is primordially considered as historical the point of attack for expounding the ontological problem of historicality will thus be designated our interpretation of designs authentic potentiality for being a whole and our analysis of care as temporality analysis which has arisen from this interpretation offer us the clue for construing historicality existentially the existential projection of dizziness historicality merely reveals what already lies enveloped in the temporalizing of temporality in accordance with the way in which historicality is rooted in care design exists in each case as authentically or inauthentically historical it becomes plain that darzin's in authentic historicality lies in that which under the title of everydayness we have looked upon in the existential analytic of design as the horizon that is closest to us disclosing and interpreting belong essentially to designs historizing out of this kind of being of the entity which exists historically there arises the existential possibility of disclosing history explicitly and getting it in our grasp the fact that we can make history our theme that is to say disclose it historiologically is the presupposition for the possibility of the way one builds up the historical world in the humane sciences the existential interpretation of historiology as a science aims solely at demonstrating its ontological derivation from darzan's historicality only from here can we stake out the boundaries within which any theory of science that is oriented to the practical workings of science may expose itself to the accidental factors in its way of formulating questions in analyzing the historicality of design we shall try to show that this entity is not temporal because it stands in history but that on the contrary it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its being nevertheless design must also be called temporal in the sense of being in time even without a developed historiology phactical design needs and uses a calendar and a clock whatever may happen to design it experiences it as happening in time in the same way the processes of nature whether living or lifeless are encountered in time they are within time so while our analysis of how the time of within timeness has its source in temporality will be deferred until the next chapter it would be easy to put this before our discussion of the connection between historicality and temporality the historical is ordinarily characterized with the help of the time of within timeness but if this ordinary characterization is to be stripped of its seeming self-evidence and exclusiveness historicality must first be deduced purely in terms of designs primordial temporality this is demanded even by the way these are objectively connected since however time as within timeless also stems from the temporality of design historicality and within timeness turn out to be equi-primordial thus within its limits the ordinary interpretation of the temporal character of history is justified after this first characterization of the course of the ontological exposition of historicality in terms of temporality do we still need explicit assurance that the following investigation does not rest upon a belief that the problem of history is to be solved by a kudu the poverty of the categorial means at our disposal and the unsureness of the primary ontological horizons become the more obtrusive the more the problem of history is traced to its primordial roots in the following study we shall content ourselves with indicating the ontological locus of the problem of historicality the researchers of dilfey were for their part pioneering work but today's generation has not as yet made them its own in the following analysis the issue is solely one of furthering their adoption our exposition of the existential problem of historicality an exposition which is necessarily limited moreover in that its goal is one of fundamental ontology is divided up as follows the ordinary understanding of history and designs historizing section 73 the basic constitution of historicality section 74 designs historicality and world history section 75 the existential source of historiology and darzan's historicality section 76 the connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicality with the researchers of dilfey and the ideas of count york section 77 section 73 the ordinary understanding of history and designs historizing our next aim is to find the right position for attacking the primordial question of the essence of history that is to say for construing historicality existentially this position is designated by that which is primordially historical we shall begin our study therefore by characterizing what one has in view in using the expressions history and historical in the ordinary interpretation of design these expressions get used in several ways the most obvious ambiguity of the term history is one that has often been noticed and there is nothing fuzzy about it it convinces itself in that this term may mean the historical actuality as well as the possible science of it we shall provisionally eliminate the signification of history in the sense of a science of history historiology the expression history has various significations with which one has in view neither the science of history nor even history as an object but this very entity itself not necessarily objectified among such significations that in which this entity is understood as something past may well be the pre-eminent usage this signification is evinced in the kind of talk in which we say that something or other already belongs to history here past means no longer present at hand or even still present at hand indeed but without having any effect on the present of course the historical as that which is past has also the opposite signification when we say one cannot get away from history here by history we have in view that which is past but which nevertheless is still having effects however the historical as that which is past is understood to be related to the present in the sense of what is actual now and today and to be related to it either positively or privatively in such a way as to have effects upon it thus the past has a remarkable double meaning the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time it belonged to the events of that time and in spite of that it can still be present at hand now for instance the remains of a greek temple with the temple a bit of the past is still in the present what we next have in mind with the term history is not so much the past in the sense of that which is past but rather derivation hercult from such a past anything that has a history stands in the context of a becoming in such becoming development is sometimes arise sometimes a fall what has a history in this way can at the same time make such history as epoch making it determines a future in the present here history signifies a context of events and effects which draws on through the past the present and the future on this view the past has no special priority further history signifies the totality of those entities which change in time and indeed the transformations and vicissitudes of men of human groupings and their cultures as distinguished from nature which likewise operates in time here what one has in view is not so much a kind of being historizing as it is that realm of entities which one distinguishes from nature by having regard for the way in which man's existence is essentially determined by spirit and culture even though in a certain manner nature too belongs to history as thus understood finally whatever has been handed down to us is as such held to be historical whether it is something which we know historiologically or something that has been taken over as self-evident with its derivation hidden if we take these four significations together the upshot is that history is that specific historizing of existent design which comes to pass in time so that the hysterizing which is past in our being with one another and which at the same time has been handed down to us and is continuingly effective is regarded as history in the sense that gets emphasized the four significations are connected in that they relate to man as the subject of events how is the historizing character of such events to be defined is historizing a sequence of processes an ever-changing emergence and disappearance of events in what way does this historizing of history belong to design is design already practically present at hand to begin with so that on occasion it can get into a history does darzan first become historical by getting intertwined with events and circumstances or is the being of design constituted first of all by historizing so that anything like circumstances events and specifics is ontologically possible only because design is historical in its being why is it that the function of the past gets particularly stressed when the design which historizes in time is characterized temporally if history belongs to darzan's being and this being is based on temporality then it would be easy to begin the existential analysis of historicality with those characteristics of the historical which obviously have a temporal meaning therefore by characterizing more precisely the remarkable privileged position of the past in the concept of history we shall prepare the way for expanding the basic constitution of historicality the antiquities preserved in museums household gear for example belong to a time which is past yet they are still present at hand in the present how far is such equipment historical when it is not yet passed is it historical let us say only because it has become an object of historiological interest of antiquarian study or national law but such equipment can be a historiological object only because it is in itself somehow historical we repeat the question by what right do we call this entity historical when it is not yet passed or do these things have in themselves something past even though they are still present at hand today then are these which are present at hand still what they were manifestly these things have altered the gear has become fragile or worm eaten in the course of time but that specific character of the past which makes it something historical does not lie in this transience which continues even during the being present at hand of the equipment in the museum what then is passed in this equipment what were these things which today they are no longer they are still definite items of equipment for use but they are out of use suppose however that they were still in use today like many a household heirloom would they then be not yet historical all the same whether they are in use or out of use they are no longer what they were what is past nothing else than that the world within which they belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered as ready to hand and used by a concern for design who was in the world that world is no longer but what was formerly within the world with respect to that world is still present at hand as equipment belonging to a world that which is now still present at hand can belong nevertheless to the past but what do we signify by saying of a world that it is no longer a world is only in the manner of existing design which practically is as being in the world thus the historical character of the antiquities that are still preserved is grounded in the past of that design to whose world they belonged but according to this only past design would be historical not design in the present however can design be passed at all if we define past as now no longer either present at hand or ready to end manifestly design can never be passed not because design is non-transient but because it essentially can never be present at hand rather if it is it exists a design which no longer exists however is not passed in the ontologically strict sense it is rather having been there dargavison the antiquities which are still present at hand have a character of the past and of history by reason of the fact that they have belonged as equipment to a world that has been the world of a design that has been there and that they have been derived from that world this design is what is primarily historical but does design first become historical in that it is no longer there or is it not historical precisely insofar as it practically exists is designed just something that has been in the sense of having been there or has it been as something futural which is making present that is to say in the temporalizing of its temporality from this provisional analysis of equipment which belongs to history and which is still present at hand though somehow passed it becomes plain that such entities are historical only by reason of their belonging to the world but the world has an historical kind of being because it makes up an ontological attribute of darzan it may be shown further that when one designates a time as the past the meaning of this is not unequivocal but the past is manifestly distinct from one's having been with which we have become acquainted as something constitutive for the ecstatical unity of darzine's temporality this however only makes the enigma ultimately more acute why is it that the historical is determined predominantly by the past or to speak more appropriately by the character of having been when that character is one that temporalizes itself equity primordially with the present and the future we contend that what is primarily historical is design that which is secondarily historical however is what we encounter within the world not only equipment ready to hand in the widest sense but also the environing nature as the very soil of history entities other than design which are historical by reason of belonging to the world are what we call world historical it can be shown that the ordinary conception of world history arises precisely from our orientation to what is thus secondarily historical world historical entities do not first get their historical character let us say by reason of an historiological objectification they get it rather as those entities which they are in themselves when they are encountered within the world in analyzing the historical character of equipment which is still present at hand we have not only been led back to darzin as that which is primarily historical but at the same time we have been made to doubt whether the temporal characterization of the historical in general may be oriented primarily to the being in time of anything present at hand entities do not become more historical by being moved off into a past which is always farther and farther away so that the oldest of them would be the most authentically historical on the other hand if the temporal distance from now and today is of no primary constitutive significance for the historicality of entities that are authentically historical this is not because these entities are not in time and are timeless but because they exist temporarily in so primordial manner that nothing present at hand in time whether passing away or still coming along could ever by its ontological essence be temporal in such a way it will be said that these deliberations have been rather petty no one denies that bottom human design is the primary subject of history and the ordinary conception of history which we have cited says so plainly enough but with the thesis that darzein is historical one has in view not just the optical fact that in man we are presented with a more or less important atom in the workings of world history and that he remains the play thing of circumstances and events this thesis raises the problem to what extent and on the basis of what ontological conditions does historicality belong as an essential constitutive state to the subjectivity of the historical subject section 74 the basic constitution of historicality design practically has its history and it can have something of the sort because the being of this entity is constituted by historicality we must now justify this thesis with the aim of expounding the ontological problem of history as an existential one the being of design has been defined as care care is grounded in temporality within the range of temporality therefore the kind of historizing which gives existence its definitely historical character must be sought thus the interpretation of darzan's historicality will prove to be at bottom just a more concrete working out of temporality we first revealed temporality with regard to that way of existing authentically which we characterized as anticipatory resoluteness how far does this imply an authentic historizing of darzyne we have defined resoluteness as a projecting of oneself upon one's own being guilty a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety resoluteness gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness in this diazine understands itself with regard to its potentiality for being and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of death in order thus to take over in its own throneness that entity which it is itself and to take it over wholly the resolute taking over of one spectacle there signifies at the same time that the situation is one which has been resolved upon in the existential analysis we could not in principle discuss what design practically resolves in any particular case our investigation excludes even the existential projection of the practical possibilities of existence nevertheless we must ask whence in general darzan can draw those possibilities upon which it practically projects itself one's anticipatory projection of oneself on that possibility of existence which is not to be outstripped on death guarantees only the totality and authenticity of one's resoluteness but those possibilities of existence which have been practically disclosed are not to be gathered from death and this is still less the case when one's anticipation of this possibility does not signify that one is speculating about it but signifies precisely that one is coming back to one spectacle there will taking over the throneness of the self into its world perhaps disclosing horizon from which existence snatches its practical possibilities away have we not said in addition that design never comes back behind its throneness before we decide too quickly whether darzein draws its authentic possibilities of existence from throneness or not we must assure ourselves that we have a full conception of throneness as a basic attribute of care as thrown design has indeed been delivered over to itself and to its potentiality for being but as being in the world as thrown it has been submitted to a world and exists practically with others proximity and for the most part the self is lost in the day it understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which circulate in the average public way of interpreting design today these possibilities have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity yet they are well known to us the authentic existential understanding is so far from extricating itself from the way of interpreting design which has come down to us that in each case it is in terms of this interpretation against it and yet again for it but any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one's resolution the resolution which design comes back to itself discloses current practical possibilities of authentic existence and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness as throne takes over in once coming back resolutely to one's throneness there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one but not necessarily as having thus come down if everything good is a heritage and the character of goodness lies in making authentic existence possible then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness the more authentically designed resolves and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its own most distinctive possibility the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence and the less does it do so by accident only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and provisional possibility driven out only being free for death gives design its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one those of comfortableness shirking and taking things lightly and brings design into the simplicity of its fate exiles this is how we designate design's primordial historizing which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which design hands itself down to itself free for death in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen darzan can be reached by the blows of fate only because in the depths of its being is fate in the sense we have described existing fatefully in the resoluteness which hands itself down design has been disclosed as being in the world both for the fortunate circumstances which come its way and for the cruelty of accidents fate does not first arise from the clashing together of events and circumstances even one who is irresolute gets driven about by these more so than one who is chosen and yet he can have no fate if design by anticipation lets death become powerful in itself then as free for death does ein understands itself in its own superior power the power of its finite freedom so that in this freedom which is only in its having chosen to make such a choice it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so and can thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the situation that has been disclosed but if fateful design as being in the world exists essentially in being with others its historizing is a co-hysterizing and is determinative for it as destiny this is how we designate the historizing of the community of a people destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates any more than being with one another can be conceived as the occurring together of several subjects our fates have already been guided in advance in our being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free darzine's fateful destiny in and with its generation goes to make up the full authentic historizing is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities the power of projecting oneself upon one's own being guilty and of doing so reticently with readiness for anxiety as such fate requires as the ontological condition for its possibility the state of being of care that is to say temporality only of death guilt conscience freedom and finitude reside together equi primordially in the being of an entity as they do in care can that entity exist in the mode of fate that is to say only then can it be historical in the very depths of its existence only an entity which in its being is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factacle there by shattering itself against death that is to say only an entity which as future is equi primordially in the process of having been can by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited take over its own throneness and be in the moment of vision for its time only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite makes possible something like fate that is to say authentic historicality it is not necessary that in resoluteness one should explicitly know the origin of the possibilities upon which that resoluteness projects itself it is rather in designs temporality and there only that there lies any possibility that the existential potentiality for being upon which it projects itself can be gleaned explicitly from the way in which darzan has been traditionally understood the resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us repeating is handing down explicitly that is to say going back into the possibilities of the design that has been there the authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been the possibility that design may choose its hero is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated but when one has by repetition handed down to oneself a possibility that has been the design that has been there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again the repeating of that which is possible does not bring again vida bring in something that is passed nor does it bind the present back to that which has already been outstripped arising as it does from a resolute projection of oneself repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is past just in order that this as something which was formally actual may recur rather the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has been there but when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution it is made in a moment of vision and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the today is working itself out as the past repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past nor does it aim at progress in the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives we characterize repetition as a mode of that resoluteness which hands itself down the mode by which darzyne exists explicitly as fate but if fate constitutes the primordial historicality of darzan then history has its essential importance neither in what is past nor in the today and its connection with what is past but in that authentic historizing of existence which arises from darzan's future as a way of being for diazine history has its roots so essentially in the future the death as that possibility of design which we have already characterized throws anticipatory existence back upon its tactical throneness and so for the first time in parts to having been its peculiarly privileged position in the historical authentic being towards death that is to say the finitude of temporality is the hidden basis of darzan's historicality design does not first become historical in repetition but because it is historical as temporal it can take itself over in its history by repeating for this no historiology is as yet needed resoluteness implies handing oneself down by anticipation to the there of the moment of vision and this handing down we call fate this is also the ground for destiny by which we understand diazines historizing in being with others in repetition fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us by repetition design first has its own history made manifest historizing is itself grounded existentially in the fact that design as temporal is open ecstatically so too is the discloseness which belongs to historizing or rather so too is the way in which we make this discloseness our own that which we have hitherto been characterizing as historicality to conform with the kind of historizing which lies in anticipatory resoluteness we now designate as designs authentic historicality from the phenomena of handing down and repeating which are rooted in the future it has become plain why the historizing of authentic history lies preponderantly in having been but it remains all the more enigmatic in what way this historizing as fate is to constitute the whole connectedness of darzine from its birth to its death how can recourse to resoluteness bring us any enlightenment is not each resolution just one more single experience in the sequence of the whole connectedness of our experiences is the connectedness of authentic historizing to consist let us say of an uninterrupted sequence of resolutions why is it that the question of how the connectedness of life is constituted finds no adequate and satisfying answer is not our investigation over hasty does it not in the end hang too much on the answer without first having tested the legitimacy of the question nothing is so plain from the course of the existential analytics so far as the fact that the ontology of design is always falling back upon the allurements of the way in which being is ordinarily understood the only way of encountering this fact methodologically is by studying the source of the question of how darzan's connectedness is constituted no matter how obvious this question may be and by determining within what ontological horizon it moves if historicality belongs to the being of design then even inauthentic existing must be historical what if it is darzan's inauthentic historicality that has directed our questioning to the connectedness of life and has blocked off our access to authentic historicality and its own peculiar connectedness however this may be treated we cannot do without a study of darzine's inauthentic historicality if our exposition of the ontological problem of history is to be adequate and complete section 75 darsein's historicality and world history approximately and for the most part darzein understands itself in terms of that which it encounters in the environment and that with which it is circumspectively concerned this understanding is not just a bear taking cognizance of itself such as accompanies all designs ways of behaving understanding signifies one's projecting oneself upon one's current possibility of being in the world that is to say it signifies existing as this possibility thus understanding as common sense constitutes even the in authentic existence of the they when we are with one another in public our everyday concern does not encounter just equipment and work it likewise encounters what is given along with these affairs undertakings incidents mishaps the world belongs to everyday trade and traffic as the soil from which they grow and the arena where they are displayed when we are with one another in public the others are encountered in activity of such a kind that one is in the swim with it oneself one is acquainted with it discusses it encourages it combats it retains it and forgets it but one always does so primarily with regard to what is getting done and what is going to come of it we compute the progress which the individual design has made his stoppages readjustments and output and we do so proximally in terms of that with which he is concerned its course its status its changes its availability no matter how trivial it may be to a due to the way in which design is understood in everyday common sense ontologically this understanding is by no means transparent but in that case why should not designs connectedness be defined in terms of what it is concerned with and what it experiences do not equipment and work and everything which design dwells alongside belong to history too if not is the historizing of history just the isolated running off of streams of experience in individual subjects indeed history is neither the connectedness of motions in the alterations of objects nor a free-floating sequence of experiences which subjects have had does the historizing of history then pertain to the way subject and object are linked together even if one assigns through vice historizing to the subject object relation we then have to ask what kind of being belongs to this linkage as such if this is what basically hysterizes the thesis of darzan's historicality does not say that the worldless subject is historical but that what is historical is the entity that exists as being in the world the historizing of history is the historizing of being in the world darzin's historicality is essentially the historicality of the world which on the basis of ecstatico horizontal temporality belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality insofar as design exists practically it already encounters that which has been discovered within the world with the existence of historical being in the world what is ready to hand and what is present at hand have already in every case been incorporated into the history of the world equipment and work for instance books have their fates buildings and institutions have their history and even nature is historical it is not historical to be sure in so far as we speak of natural history but nature is historical as a countryside as an area that has been colonized or exploited as a battlefield or as the site of a cult these entities within the world are historical as such and the history does not signify something external which merely accompanies the inner history of the soul we call such entities the world historical here we must notice that the expression world history which we have chosen and which is here understood ontologically has a double signification the expression signifies for one thing the historizing of the world in its essential existent unity with design at the same time we have here in view the historizing within the world of what is ready to hand and present at hand insofar as entities within the world are in every case discovered with the practically existent world the historical world is practical only as the world of entities within the world that which happens with equipment and work as such has its own character of movement and this character has been completely obscure up until now when for instance a ring gets handed over to someone and worn this is a kind of being in which it does not simply suffer changes of location the movement of historizing in which something happens to something is not to be grasped in terms of motion as change of location this holds for all world historical processes and events and even in a certain manner for natural catastrophes quite apart from the fact that if we were to follow up the problem of the ontological structure of world historical historizing we would necessarily be transgressing the limits of our theme we can refrain from this all the more because the very aim of this exposition is to lead us face to face with the ontological enigma of the movement of historizing in general we need only delimit that phenomenal range which we necessarily must also have in view onto logically when we talk of designs historicality the transcendence of the world has a temporal foundation and by reason of this the world historical is in every case already objectively there in the historizing of existing being in the world without being grasped historiologically and because practical design in falling is absorbed in that with which it concerns itself it understands its history world historically in the first instance and because further the ordinary understanding of being understands being as presence at hand without further differentiation the being of the world historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present at hand which comes along has presence and then disappears and finally because the meaning of being in general is held to be something simply self-evident the question about the kind of being of the world historical and about the movement of historizing in general has really just the barren circumstantiality of a verbal sophistry everyday design has been dispersed into the many kinds of things which daily come to pass the opportunities and circumstances which concern keeps tactically awaiting in advance have faith as their outcome in terms of that with which inauthentically existing design concerns itself it first computes its history in so doing it is driven about by its affairs so if it wants to come to itself it must first pull itself together from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the very things that have come to pass and because of this it is only then that there at last arises from the horizon of the understanding which belongs to inauthentic historicality the question of how one is to establish a connectedness of design if one does so in the sense of experiences of a subject experiences which are also present at hand the possibility that this horizon for the question should be the dominant one is grounded in the irresoluteness which goes to make up the essence of the self's in constancy we have as pointed out the source of the question of the connectedness of design in the sense of the unity with which experiences are linked together between birth and death at the same time the origin of this question betrays that it is an inappropriate one if we are aiming at a primordial existential interpretation of designs totality of historizing on the other hand despite the predominance of this natural horizon for such questions it becomes explicable why darzyne's authentic historicality fate and repetition looks as if it least of all could supply the phenomenal basis for bringing into the shape of an ontologically grounded problem what is it bottom intended in the question of the connectedness of life this question does not ask how does ein gains such a unity of connectedness that the sequence of experiences which has ensued and is still ensuing can subsequently be linked together it asks rather in which of its own kinds of being darzine loses itself in such a manner that it must as it were only subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal and think up for itself a unity in which that together is embraced our lostness in the day and in the world historical has earlier been revealed as a fleeing in the face of death such fleeing makes manifest that being towards death is a basic attribute of care anticipatory resoluteness brings this being towards death into authentic existence the historizing of this resoluteness however is the repetition of the heritage of possibilities by handing these down to oneself in anticipation and we have interpreted this historizing as authentic historicality is perhaps the whole of existence stretched along in this historicality in a way which is primordial and not lost and which has no need of connectedness the self's resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along the steadiness with which dizziness fate incorporates into its existence birth and death and their between and holds them as thus incorporated so that in such constancy design is indeed in a moment of vision for what is world historical in its current situation in the fateful repetition of possibilities that have been designed brings itself back immediately that is to say in a way that is temporarily ecstatical to what already has been before it but when its heritage is thus handed down to itself its birth is caught up into its existence in coming back from the possibility of death the possibility which is not to be outstripped if only so that this existence may accept the throneness of its own there in a way which is more free from illusion resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own self as resoluteness which is ready for anxiety this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the soul authority which a free existing can have of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose that it would be actual as experience only as long as the act of resolving lasts in resoluteness lies the existence yell constancy which by its very essence has already anticipated for vaguenoman every possible moment of vision that may arise from it as fate resoluteness is freedom to give up some definite resolution and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible situation or other the steadiness of existence is not interrupted thereby but confirmed in the moment of vision this steadiness is not first formed either through or by the adjoining of moments one to another but these arise from the temporality of that repetition which is futurally in the process of having been a temporality which has already been stretched along in inauthentic historicality on the other hand the way in which fate has been primordially stretched along has been hidden with the inconstancy of the they self design makes present it's today in awaiting the next new thing it has already forgotten the old one that they evades choice blind for possibilities it cannot repeat what has been but only retains and receives the actual that is left over the world historical that has been the leavings and the information about them that is present at hand lost in the making present of the today it understands the past in terms of the present on the other hand the temporality of authentic historicality as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition deprives the today of its character as present and weans one from the conventionalities of the they when however one's existence is inauthentically historical it is loaded down with the legacy of the past which has become unrecognizable and it seeks the modern but when historicality is authentic it understands history as the recurrence of the possible and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it faithfully in a moment of vision in resolute repetition the existential interpretation of darzan's historicality is constantly getting eclipsed unawares the obscurities are all the harder to dispel when we have not disentangled the possible dimensions of the appropriate inquiry and when everything is haunted by the enigma of being and as has now been made plain by that of motion nevertheless we may venture a projection of the ontological genesis of historiology as a science in terms of dizziness historicality this projection will serve to prepare us for the clarification of the task of destroying the history of philosophy historiologically a clarification which is to be accomplished in what follows section 76 the existential source of historiology in darzan's historicality we need not discuss the fact that historiology like any science is as a kind of being of design practically dependent at any time on the prevailing world view beyond this we must inquire into the ontological possibility of how the sciences have their source in design state of being this source is still not very transparent in the context which lies before us our analysis will acquaint us in outline with the existential source of historiology only to the extent of bringing still more plainly to light the historicality of darzyne and the fact that this historicality is rooted in temporality if darzan's being is in principle historical then every practical science is always manifestly in the grip of this historizing but historiology still has darzan's historicality as its presupposition in its own quite special way this can be made plain in the first instance by the suggestion that historiology as the science of dazzling's history must presuppose as its possible object the entity which is primordially historical but history must not only be in order that a historiological object may become accessible and historiological cognition is not only historical as a historizing way in which design comports itself whether the historiological disclosure of history is factually accomplished or not its ontological structure is such that in itself this disclosure has its roots in the historicality of design this is the connection we have in view when we talk of darzan's historicality as the existential source of historiology to cast light upon this connection signifies methodologically that the idea of historiology must be projected onto logically in terms of design's historicality the issue here is not one of abstracting the concept of historiology from the way something is practically done in the sciences today nor is it one of assimilating it to anything of this sort for what guarantee do we have in principle that such a practical procedure will indeed be properly representative of historiology and its primordial and authentic possibilities and even if this should turn out to be the case we shall hold back from any decision about this then the concept could be discovered in the fact only by using the clue provided by the idea of historiology as one which we have already understood on the other hand the existential idea of historiology is not given a higher justification by having the historian affirm that his practical behavior is in agreement with it nor does the idea become false if he disputes any such agreement the idea of historiology as a science implies that the disclosure of historical entities is what it has seized upon as its own task every science is constituted primarily by thematizing that which is familiar pre-scientifically in design as disclosed being in the world gets projected upon the being which is specific to it with this projection the realm of entities is bounded off the ways of access to them get managed methodologically and the conceptual structure for interpreting them is outlined if we may postpone the question of whether a history of the present is possible and assign to historiology the task of disclosing the past then the historiological thematizing of history is possible only if in general the past has in each case already been disclosed quite apart from the question of whether sufficient sources are available for the historiological envisagement of the past the way to it must in general be open if we are to go back to it historiologically it is by no means patent that anything of the sort is the case or how this is possible but insofar as darzan's being is historical that is to say in so far as by reason of its ecstatico horizon or temporality it is open in its character of having been the ways in general prepared for such thematizing of the past as can be accomplished in existence and because design and only design is primordially historical that which historiological thematizing presents as a possible object for research must have the kind of being of design which has been there along with any practical design as being in the world there is also in each case world history if darzan is there no longer then the world too is something that has been there this is not in conflict with the fact that all the same what was formerly ready to hand within the world does not yet pass away but becomes something that one can in a present come across historiologically as something which has not passed away and which belongs to the world that has been there remains monuments and records that are still present at hand are possible material for the concrete disclosure of the design which has been there such things can turn into historiological material only because in accordance with their own kind of being they have a world historical character and they become such material only when they have been understood in advance with regard to their within the worldness the world that has already been projected is given a definite character by way of an interpretation of the world historical material we have received our going back to the past does not first get its start from the acquisition sifting and securing of such material these activities presuppose historical being towards the design that has been there that is to say they presuppose the historicality of the historian's existence this is the existential foundation for historiology as a science even for its most trivial and mechanical procedures if historiology is rooted in historicality in this manner then it is from here that we must determine what the object of historiology really is the delimitation of the primordial theme of historiology will have to be carried through in conformity with the character of authentic historicality and its disclosure of what has been there that is to say in conformity with repetition as this disclosure in repetition the design which has been there is understood in its authentic possibility which has been the birth of historiology from authentic historicality therefore signifies that in taking as our primary theme the historiological object we are projecting the design which has been there upon its own most possibility of existence is historiology thus to have the possible for its theme does not its whole meaning point solely to the facts to how something has factually been but what does it signify to say that design is factual if darzyne is really actual only in existence then its factuality is constituted precisely by its resolute projection of itself upon a chosen potentiality for being but if so that which authentically has been there factually is the existential possibility in which fate destiny and world history have been practically determined because in each case existence is only as practically thrown historiology will disclose the quiet force of the possible with greater penetration the more simply and the more concretely having been in the world is understood in terms of its possibility and only presented as such if historiology which itself arises from authentic historicality reveals by repetition the design which has been there and reveals it in its possibility then historiology has already made manifest the universal in the once for all the question of whether the object of historiology is just to put once for all individual events into a series or whether it also has laws as its objects is one that is radically mistaken the theme of historiology is neither that which has happened just once for all nor something universal that floats above it but the possibility which has been practically existent this possibility does not get repeated as such that is to say understood in an authentically historiological way if it becomes perverted into the colourlessness of a supratemporal model only by historicality which is practical and authentic can the history of what has been there as a resolute fate be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the force of the possible gets struck home into one's practical existence in other words that it comes towards that existence in its futural character the historicality of unhistoriological design does not take its departure from the present and from what is actual only today in order to grope its way back from there to something that is past and neither does historiology even historiological disclosure temporalizes itself in terms of the future the selection of what is to become a possible object for historiology has already been met with in the practical existential choice of darzan's historicality in which historiology first of all arises and in which alone it is the historiological disclosure of the past is based on fateful repetition and is so far from subjective that it alone guarantees the objectivity of historiology for the objectivity of a science is regulated primarily in terms of whether that science can confront us with the entity which belongs to it as its theme and can bring it uncovered in the primordiality of its being to our understanding in those science are the universal validity of standards and their claims to universality which the they and its common sense demand less possible as criteria of truth than in authentic historiology only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has been there and because the latter exists practically in a way which is world historical can it demand of itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from the facts accordingly this research as practical has many branches and takes for its object the history of equipment of work of culture of the spirit and of ideas as handing itself down history is in itself at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it and which has a history of its own so for the most part it is only through traditional history that historiology penetrates to what has been there itself this is why concrete historiological research can in each case maintain itself in varying closeness to its authentic theme if the historian throws himself straight away into the world view of an era he has not thus proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical way and not just aesthetically and on the other hand the existence of a historian who only edits sources may be characterized by historicality which is authentic thus the very prevalence of a differentiated interest even in the most remote and primitive cultures is in itself no proof of the authentic historicality of a time in the end the emergence of a problem of historicism is the clearest symptom that historiology endeavors to alienate diozyne from its authentic historicality such historicality does not necessarily require historiology it is not the case that uni historiological eras as such are unhistorical also the possibility that historiology in general can either be used for one's own life or abused in it is grounded on the fact that one's life is historical in the roots of its being and that therefore as practically existing one has in each case made one's decision for authentic or inauthentic historicality nietzsche recognized what was essential as to the use and abuse of historiology for life in the second of his studies out of season 1874 and said it unequivocally and penetratingly he distinguished three kinds of historiology the monumental the antiquarian and the critical without explicitly pointing out the necessity of this triad or the ground of its unity the threefold character of historiology is adam rated in the historicality of darzan at the same time this historicality enables us to understand to what extent these three possibilities must be united practically and concretely in any historiology which is authentic nietzsche's division is not accidental the beginning of his study allows us to suppose that he understood more than he has made known to us as historical darzine is possible only by reason of its temporality and temporality temporalizes itself in the ecstatico horizonal unity of its raptures design exists authentically as future in resolutely disclosing a possibility which it has chosen coming back resolutely to itself it is by repetition open for the monumental possibilities of human existence historiology which arises from such historicality is monumental as in the process of having been design has been delivered over to its throneness when the possible is made one's own by repetition there is adam rated at the same time the possibility of reverently preserving the existence that has been there in which the possibility seized upon has become manifest thus authentic historiology as monumental is antiquarian too design temporalizes itself in the way the future and having been are united in the present the present discloses that today authentically and of course as the moment of vision but insofar as this today has been interpreted in terms of understanding the possibility of existence which has been seized upon an understanding which is repetitive in a futural manner authentic historiology becomes a way in which the today gets deprived of its character as present in other words it becomes a way of painfully detaching oneself from the falling publicness of the today as authentic the historiology which is both monumental and antiquarian is necessarily a critique of the present authentic historicality is the foundation for the possibility of uniting these three ways of historiology but the ground on which authentic historiology is founded is temporality as the existential meaning of the being of care the existential historical source of historiology may be presented concretely by analyzing the thematization which is constitutive for this science in historiological thematizing the main point is the cultivation of the hermeneutical situation which once the historically existent design has made its resolution opens itself to the repetitive disclosure of what has been there the possibility and the structure of historiological truth are to be expounded in terms of the authentic disclosedness truth of historical existence but since the basic concepts of the historiological sciences whether they pertain to the objects of these sciences or to the way in which these are treated are concepts of existence the theory of the humane science presupposes an existential interpretation which has as its theme the historicality of such an interpretation is the constant goal to which the researchers of wilhelm dilfey seek to bring us closer and which gets illumined in a more penetrating fashion by the ideas of count york von bartenberg work work section 77 the connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicality with the researchers of wilhelm dilfay and the ideas of count york the analysis of the problem of history which we have just carried through has arisen in the process of appropriating the labours of dilfey it has been corroborated and at the same time strengthened by the theses of count york which are found scattered through his letters to him the image of dilfey which is still widely disseminated today is that of the sensitive interpreter of the history of the spirit especially the history of literature who also endeavors to distinguish between the natural and the humane sciences thereby assigning suvist a distinctive role to the history of the latter group and likewise to psychology then allowing the whole to merge together in a relativistic philosophy of life considered superficially this sketch is correct but the substance eludes it and it covers up more than it reveals we may divide dill phase researchers schematically into three domains studies on the theory of the humane sciences and the distinction between these and the natural sciences researchers into the history of the sciences of man society and the state endeavors towards a psychology in which the whole fact of man is to be presented investigations in the theory of science in historical science and in psychological hermeneutics are constantly permeating and intersecting each other where any one point of view predominates the others are the motives and the means what looks like this unity and an unsure haphazard way of trying things out is an elemental restlessness the one goal of which is to understand life philosophically and to secure for this understanding hermeneutical foundation in terms of life itself everything centers in psychology in which life is to be understood in the historical context of its development and its effects and understood as the way in which man as the possible object of the humane sciences and especially as the root of these sciences is hermeneutics is the way this understanding enlightens itself it is also the methodology of historiology though only in a derivative form in the contemporaneous discussions delfa's own researches for laying the basis for the humane sciences were forced one-sidedly into the field of the theory of science and it was of course with a regard for such discussions that his publications were often oriented in this direction but the logic of the humane sciences was by no means central for him no more than he was striving in his psychology merely to make improvements in the positive science of the psychical dilphae's friend count york gives an ambiguous expression to dilfey's own most philosophical tendency in the communications between them when he alludes to our common interest in understanding historicality bill phase researchers are only now becoming accessible in their full scope if we are to make them our own we need the steadiness and concreteness of coming to terms with them in principle this is not the place ought for discussing in detail the problems which moved him or how he was moved by them we shall however describe in a provisional way some of count york's central ideas by selecting characteristic passages from the letters in these communications york's own tendency is brought to life by the labors of dilfey and his ways of formulating questions and it shows itself when york takes his stand as to the tasks of the discipline which is to lay the basis analytical psychology on delphi's academy paper idiom 1894 he writes it gets firmly laid down that the consideration of the self is the primary means of knowing and that the primary procedure of knowing is analysis from this standpoint principles get formulated which are verified by their own findings no progress is made towards critically breaking down constructive psychology and its assumptions all towards explaining it and thus refuting it from within brief vexil page 177 your disregard for breaking things down critically that is for demonstrating their provenance psychologically and carrying this out transiently in detail is connected in my opinion with your conception of the theory of knowledge and with the position which you assign suicide to it page 177 only a theory of knowledge gives the explanation for this inapplicability the fact of it has been laid down and made plain it has to render account for the adequacy of scientific methods it has to provide the grounds for a doctrine of method instead of having its methods taken at a venture i must say from particular areas page 179 and the following pages at bottom york is demanding a logic that shall stride ahead of the sciences and guide them as did the logic of plato and aristotle and this demand includes the task of working out positively and radically the different categorial structures of those entities which are nature and of those which are history does ein york finds that dil phase investigations put too little stress on differentiation generically between the optical and the historical in particular the procedure of comparison is claimed to be the method for the humane sciences here i disagree with you comparison is always aesthetic and always adheres to the pattern of things vindalband assigns veist to patterns to history your concept of the type is an entirely inward one here it is a matter of characteristics not of patterns for vindleband history is a series of pictures of individual patterns and aesthetic demand to the natural scientist the remains beside his science as a kind of human tranquilizer only aesthetic enjoyment but your conception of history as that of a nexus of forces of unities of force to which the category of pattern is to be applicable only by a kind of transference page 193 in terms of his sure instinct for differentiating between the article and the historical york knew how strongly traditional historical research still maintains itself in purely ocular ways of ascertaining page 192 which are aimed at the corporeal and at that which has pattern ranker is a great ocularist for whom things that have vanished can never become actualities iranco's whole tribe also provides the explanation for the way the material of history has been restricted to the political only the political is dramatic page 60 the modifications which the course of time has brought appear unessential to me and i should like to appraise this very differently for instance i regard the so-called historical school as a mere side stream within the same riverbed and is representing only one branch of an old and thorough going opposition the name is somewhat deceptive that school was by no means a historical one but an antiquarian one considering things aesthetically while the great dominating activity was one of mechanical construction hence what it contributed methodologically to the method of rationality was only a general feeling page 68 in the following pages the genuine philologus he conceives of history as a cabinet of antiquities where nothing is palpable whether one has been guided only by a living psychical transposition these gentlemen never come at heart they are natural scientists and they become skeptics all the more because experimentation is lacking we must keep holy aloof from all such rubbish for instance is how often plato was in magna grisha or syracuse on this nothing vital depends this superficial affectation which i've seen through critically winds up at last with a big question mark and is put to shame by the great realities of homer plato and the new testament everything that is actually real becomes a mere phantom when one considers it as a thing in itself when it does not get experienced page 61 these scientists stand over against the powers of the times like the over-refined french society of the revolutionary period here as their formalism the cult of the form the defining of relationship is the last word in wisdom naturally thought which runs in this direction has its own history which i suppose is still unwritten the groundlessness of such thinking and of any belief in it and such thinking epistemologically considered is a metaphysical attitude is a historical product page 39 it seems to me that the ground swells evoked by the principle of eccentricity which led to a new era more than 400 years ago have become exceedingly broad and flat but our knowledge has progressed to the point of cancelling itself out but man has withdrawn so far from himself that he no longer sees himself at all the modern man that is to say the post-renaissance man is ready for burial page 83 on the other hand all history that is truly alive and not just reflecting a tinge of life is a critique page 19. but historical knowledge is for the best part knowledge of the hidden sources page 109 with history what makes a spectacle and catches the eye is not the main thing the nerves are invisible just as the essentials in general are invisible while it is said that if you were quiet you would be strong the variant is also true that if you are quiet you will perceive that is understand page 26 and then i enjoy the quietude of soliloquizing and communing with the spirit of history this spirit is one who did not appear to faust in his study or to master goethe either but they would have felt no alarm in making way for him however grave and compelling such an apparition might be for he is brotherly akin to us in another and deeper sense than are the denizens of bush and field these exertions are like jacob's wrestling a sure gain for the wrestler himself indeed this is what matters first of all page 133 york gained his clear insight into the basic character of history as virtuality from his knowledge of the character of the being which human design itself possesses not from the objects of historical study as a theory of science with demand the entire psychophysical datum is not one that is here being equals the being present at hand of nature but one that lives this is the germinal point of historicality and if the consideration of the self is directed not at an abstract eye but at the fullness of myself it will find me historically determined just as physics knows me as cosmically determined just as i am nature so i am history page 71 and york who saw through all bogus defining of relationships and groundless relativisms did not hesitate to draw the final conclusion from his insight into the historicality of darzan but on the other hand in view of the inward historicality of self-consciousness a systematic that is divorced from history is methodologically inadequate just as physiology cannot be studied in abstraction from physics neither can philosophy from historicality especially if it is a critical philosophy behavior and historicality are like breathing and atmospheric pressure and this may sound rather paradoxical it seems to me methodologically like a residue from metaphysics not to historicize one's philosophizing page 69 because to philosophize is to live there is in my opinion do not be alarmed a philosophy of history but who would be able to write it certainly it is not the sort of thing it has hitherto been taken to be or the sort that has so far been attempted you've declared yourself incontrovertibly against all that up till now the question has been formulated in a way which is false even impossible but this is not the only way of formulating it thus there is no longer any actual philosophizing which would not be historical the separation between systematic philosophy and historical presentation is essentially incorrect page 251 that a science can become practical is now of course the real basis for its justification but the mathematical practice is not the only one the practical aim of our standpoint is one that is pedagogical in the broadest and deepest sense of the word such a name is the soul of all true philosophy and the truth of plato and aristotle page 42 in the following pages you know my views on the possibility of ethics as a science in spite of that this can always be done a little better for whom are such books really written registries about registries the only thing worthy of notice is what drives them to come from physics to ethics age 73 if philosophy is conceived as a manifestation of life and not as the coughing up of a baseless kind of thinking and such thinking appears baseless because one's glance gets turned away from the basis of consciousness then one's task is as meager in its results as it is complicated and arduous in the obtaining of them freedom from prejudice is what it presupposes and such freedom is hard to gain page 250 it is plain from york's allusion to the kind of difficulty met with in such investigations that he himself was already on the way to bringing within our grasp categorically the historical as opposed to the optical ocular and to raising up life into the kind of scientific understanding that is appropriate to it the aesthetico mechanistic way of thinking finds verbal expression more easily than does an analysis that goes behind intuition and this can be explained by the wide extent to which words have their convenience in the ocular on the other hand that which penetrates into the basis of vitality eludes an exoteric presentation hence all its terminology is symbolic and inelectable not intelligible to all because philosophical thinking is of a special kind its linguistic expression has a special character page 70 in the following pages but you are acquainted with my liking for paradox which i justify by saying that paradoxicality is a mark of truth and that the communist pineal is nowhere in the truth but is like an elemental precipitate of a halfway understanding which makes generalizations in its relationship to truth it is like the sulfurous fumes which the lightning leaves behind truth is never an element to dissolve elemental public opinion and as far as possible to make possible the molding of individuality in seeing and looking would be a pedagogical task for the state then instead of a so-called public conscience instead of this radical externalization individual consciences that is to say consciences would again become powerful page 249 and the following pages if one has an interest in understanding historicality one is brought to the task of working out a generic differentiation between the article and the historical the fundamental aim of the philosophy of life is tied up with this nevertheless the formulation of the question needs to be radicalized in principle how are we to get historicality into our grasp philosophically as distinguished from the article and conceive it categorically except by bringing both the article and the historical into a more primordial unity so that they can be compared and distinguished but that is possible only if we attain the following insights one that the question of historicality is an ontological question about the state of being of historical entities two the question of the article is the ontological question of the state of being of entities other than darzine of what is present at hand in the widest sense three that the obstacle is only one domain of entities the idea of being embraces both the article and the historical it is this idea which must let itself be generically differentiated it is not by chance that york calls those entities which are not historical simply the optical this just reflects the unbroken dominion of the traditional ontology which as derived from the ancient way of formulating the question of being narrows down the ontological problematic in principle and holds it fact the problem of differentiating between the article and the historical cannot be worked out as a problem for research unless we've made sure in advance what is the clue to it by clarifying through fundamental ontology the question of the meaning of being in general thus it becomes plain in what sense the preparatory existential temporal analytic of design is resolved to foster the spirit of count york in the service of dilfey's work chapter 6 temporality and within timeless as the source of the ordinary conception of time section 78 the incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of diazine to demonstrate that temporality is constitutive for darzan's being and how it is thus constitutive we have shown that historicality as a state of being which belongs to existence is at bottom temporality we have carried through our interpretation of the temporal character of history without regard for the fact that all historizing runs its course in time practically in the everyday understanding of design all history is known merely as that which happens within time but throughout the course of our existential temporal analysis of historicality this understanding has been ruled out of order if the existential analytic is to make diazine ontologically transparent in its very facticity then the practical ontyco temporal interpretation of history must also be explicitly given its due it is all the more necessary that the time in which entities are encountered should be analyzed in principle since not only history but natural processes too are determined by time but still more elemental than the circumstance that the time factor is one that occurs in the sciences of history and nature is the fact that before design does any thematical research it reckons with time and regulate itself according to it and here again what remains decisive is design's way of reckoning with its time a way of reckoning which precedes any use of measuring equipment by which time can be determined the reckoning is prior to such equipment and is what makes anything like the use of clocks possible at all in its practical existence any particular design either has the time or does not have it it either takes time for something or cannot allow any time for it why does design take time and why can it lose it where does it take time from how is this time related to designs temporality into its reckoning without any existential understanding of temporality reckoning with time is an elemental kind of behavior which must be clarified before we turn to the question of what it means to say that entities are in time all darzan's behavior is to be interpreted in terms of its being that is in terms of its temporality we must show how darzan as temporality temporalizes a kind of behavior which relates itself to time by taking it into its reckoning thus our previous characterization of temporality is not only quite incomplete in that we have not paid attention to all the dimensions of this phenomenon it also is defective in principle because something like world time in the rigorous sense of the existential temporal conception of the world belongs to temporality itself we must come to understand how this is possible and why it is necessary that's the time which is familiar to us in the ordinary way the time in which entities occur will be illuminated and so will the within timeness of these entities everyday design the design which takes time comes across time proximally in what it encounters within the world as ready to hand and present at hand the time which it has thus experienced is understood within the horizon of that way of understanding being which is the closest for design that is it is understood as something which is itself somehow present at hand how and why design comes to develop the ordinary conception of time must be clarified in terms of its state of being as concerning itself with time a state of being with a temporal foundation the ordinary conception of time owes its origin to a way in which primordial time has been leveled off by demonstrating that this is the source of the ordinary conception we shall justify our earlier interpretation of temporality as primordial time in the development of this ordinary conception there is a remarkable vacillation as to whether the character to be attributed to time is subjective or objective where time is taken as being in itself it gets allotted preeminently to the soul notwithstanding and where it has the kind of character which belongs to consciousness it still functions objectively in hegel's interpretation of time both possibilities are brought to the point where in a certain manner they cancel each other out hegel tries to define the connection between time and spirit in such a manner as to make intelligible why the spirit as history falls into time we seem to be in accord with hegel in the results of the interpretation we have given for darzein's temporality and for the way world time belongs to it but because our analysis differs in principle from his in its approach and because its orientation is precisely the opposite of his in that it aims at fundamental ontology a short presentation of hegel's way of taking the relationship between time and spirit may serve to make plain our existential ontological interpretation of darzan's temporality of world time and of the source of the ordinary conception of time and may settle this in a provisional manner the question of whether and how time has any being and of why and in what sense be designated as being cannot be answered until we have shown to what extent temporality itself in the totality of its temporalizing makes it possible for us somehow to have an understanding of being and address ourselves to entities our chapter will be divided as follows designs temporality and our concern with time section 79 the time with which we concern ourselves and within timeless section 80 within timeless and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time section 81 a comparison of the existential ontological connection of temporality design and world time with hegel's way of taking the relation between time and spirit section 82 the existential temporal analytic of diazine and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of being in general section 83 section 79 designs temporality and our concern with time design exists as an entity for which in its being that being is itself an issue essentially ahead of itself it has projected itself upon its potentiality for being before going on to any mere consideration of itself in its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown it has been thrownly abandoned to the world and falls into it concernfully as care that is as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown this entity has been disclosed as a there as being with others it maintains itself in an average way of interpreting a way which has been articulated in discourse and expressed in language being in the world has always expressed itself and as being alongside entities encountered within the world it constantly expresses itself in addressing itself to the very object of its concern and discussing it the concern of circumspective common sense is grounded in temporality indeed in the mode of a making present which retains and awaits such concern as concerning reckoning up planning preventing or taking precautions always says whether audibly or not that something is to happen then that something else is to be attended to beforehand that what has failed or eluded us on that former occasion is something that we must now make up for in the then concern expresses itself as awaiting in the on that former occasion as retaining in the now as making present in the then but mostly unexpressed lies the now not yet that is to say this is spoken in a making present which is either awaitingly retentive or awaitingly forgetful in the on that former occasion lurks the now no longer with this retaining expresses itself as a making present which awaits the then and the on that former occasion are understood with regard to a now that is to say making present has a peculiar importance of course it always temporalizes itself in a unity with the waiting and retaining even if these may take the modified form of a forgetting which does not await anything in the mode of such forgetting temporality ensnares itself in the present which in making presence says preeminently now now that which concern awaits as what is closest to it gets addressed in the 4 in the on that former occasion is the earlier the horizon for the then is the later on that which is to come the horizon for the now is the today every then however is as such as then when every on that former occasion isn't on that former occasion when every now is a now that the now the then and the on that former occasion thus have a seemingly obvious relational structure which we call datability databackite whether this dating is practically done with respect to a date on the calendar must still be completely disregarded even without dates of this sort the now the then and the on that former occasion have been dated more or less definitely and even if the dating is not made more definite this does not mean that the structure of datability is missing or that it is just a matter of chance wherein is such datability grounded and what does it essentially belong can any more superfluous question indeed be raised it is well known that what we have in mind with the now that is a point of time the now is time incondesably the now that the then when and the on that former occasion are things that we understand and we also understand in a certain way that these are all connected with time but that with this sort of thing one has time itself in mind and how this is possible and what time signifies these are matters of which we have no conception in our natural understanding of the now and so forth is it indeed obvious then that something like the then the now and the on that former occasion is something we understand without further ado and quite naturally bring to expression where do we get this now that have we found this sort of thing among entities within the world among those that are present at hand manifestly not then have we found it at all have we ever set ourselves to search for this and establish its character we avail ourselves of it at any time without having taken it over explicitly and we constantly make use of it even though we do not always make utterances about it even in the most trivial of hand kind of everyday talk it's cold for instance we also have in mind a now that why is it that when design addresses itself to the objects of its concern it also expresses a now that a then when or an on that former occasion when even though it does so mostly without uttering it first because in addressing itself to something interpretatively it expresses itself to that is to say it expresses its being alongside the ready to hand a being which understands circumspectively and which uncovers the ready to hand and lets it be encountered and secondly because this very addressing and discussing which interprets itself also is based upon a making present and is possible only as such the making present which awaits and retains interprets itself and this in turn is possible only because as something which in itself is ecstatically open it has in each case been disclosed to itself already and can be articulated in the kind of interpretation which is accompanied by understanding and discourse because temporality is ecstatic horizontally constitutive for the clearedness of the their temporality is always primordially interpretable in the there and is accordingly familiar to us the making present which interprets itself in other words that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the now is what we call time this simply makes known to us that temporality which as ecstatically open is recognizable it's familiar proximally and for the most part only as interpreted in this concernful manner but while time is immediately intelligible and recognizable this does not preclude the possibility that primordial temporality as such may remain unknown and unconceived and that this is also the case with the source of the time which has been expressed a source which temporalizes itself in that temporality the fact that the structure of datability belongs essentially to what has been interpreted with the now the then and the on that former occasion becomes the most elemental proof that what has thus been interpreted has originated in the temporality which interprets itself when we say now we always understand now that so and so though we do not say all this why because the now interprets a making present of entities in the now that lies the ecstatical character of the present the date ability of the now the then and the on that former occasion reflects the ecstatical constitution of temporality and is therefore essential for the time itself that has been expressed the structure of the date ability of the now the then and the on that former occasion is evidence that these stemming from temporality are themselves time the interpretative expressing of the now the then and the on that former occasion is the most primordial way of assigning a time in the ecstatical unity of temporality which gets understood along with datability but un-thematically and without being recognizable as such daisy has already been disclosed to itself as being in the world and entities within the world have been discovered along with it because of this interpreted time has already been given a dating in terms of those entities which are encountered in the disclosedness of the there now that the door slams now that my book is missing and so forth the horizons which belong to the now the then and the on that former occasion all have their source of ecstatical temporality by reason of this these horizons too have the character of date ability as today when later on when and earlier when if awaiting understands itself in the then and interpret itself and thereby as making present understands that which it awaits and understands this in terms of its now then the and now not yet is already implied when we assign a then the awaiting which makes present understands the until then this until then is articulated by interpretation it has its time as the in between which likewise has a relationship of datability this relationship gets expressed in the during this or meanwhile varentdessen the during can itself be articulated awaitingly by concern by assigning some more thens the until then gets divided up by a number of from then till thens which however have been embraced beforehand in awaitingly projecting the primary then enduring gets articulated and the understanding one has of the during when one awaits and makes present this lasting darwin in turn is the time which is manifest in temporality's interpretation of itself in our concern this time thus gets currently but unthematically understood as a span the making present which awaits and retains lays out a during with a span only because it has thereby disclosed itself as the way in which its historical temporality has been ecstatically stretched along even though it does not know itself as this but here a further peculiarity of the time which has been assigned shows itself not only does the during have a span but every now then and on that former occasion has with its datability structure its own spanned character with the width of the span varying now in the intermission while one is eating in the evening in summer then at breakfast when one is taking a climb and so forth the concern which awaits retains and makes present is one which allows itself so much time and it assigns itself this time concernfully even without determining the time by any specific reckoning and before any such reckoning has been done here time dates itself in one's current mode of allowing oneself time concernfully and it does so in terms of those very matters with which one concerns oneself environmentally and which have been disclosed in the understanding with its accompanying state of mind in terms of what one does all day long the more design is awaitingly absorbed in the object of its concern and forgets itself in not awaiting itself the more does even the time which it allows itself remain covered up by this way of allowing when darzan is living along in an everyday concernful manner it just never understands itself as running along in a continuously enduring sequence of pure nows by reason of this covering up the time which design allows itself has gaps in it as it were often we do not bring a day together again when we come back to the time which we have used at the time which has gaps in it does not go to pieces in this lack of togetherness which is rather a mode of that temporality which has already been disclosed and stretched along ecstatically the manner in which the time we have allowed runs its course and the way in which concern more or less explicitly assigns itself that time can be properly explained as phenomena only if on the one hand we avoid the theoretical representation of a continuous stream of nows and if on the other hand the possible ways in which design assigns itself time and allows itself time are to be conceived of as determined primarily in terms of how design in a manner corresponding to its current existence has its time in an earlier passage authentic and inauthentic existing have been characterized with regard to those modes of the temporalizing of temporality upon which such existing is founded according to that characterization the irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalizes itself in the mode of a making present which does not await but forgets he who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and befallings which he encounters in such a making present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways busily losing himself in the object of his concern he loses his time in it too hence his characteristic way of talking i have no time but just as he who exists inauthentically is constantly losing time and never has any the temporality of authentic existence remains distinctive in that such existence in its resoluteness never loses time and always has time for the temporality of resoluteness has with relation to its present the character of a moment of vision when such a moment makes the situation authentically present this making present does not itself take the lead but is held in that future which is in the process of having been one's existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical constancy of the self this kind of temporal existence has its time for what the situation demands of it and it has it constantly but resoluteness discloses that there in this way only as a situation so if he who is resolute encounters anything that has been disclosed he can never do so in such a way as to lose his time on it irresolutely the there is disclosed in a way which is grounded in darzan's own temporality as ecstatically stretched along and with this disclosure a time is allotted to design only because of this can design as tactically thrown take its time and lose it as something disclosed design exists practically in the way of being with others it maintains itself in an intelligibility which is public and average when the now that and the then when have been interpreted and expressed in our everyday being with one another they will be understood in principle even though their dating is unequivocal only within certain limits in the most intimate being with one another of several people they can say now and say it together though each of them gives a different date to the now which he is saying now that this or that has come to pass the now which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of being in the world with one another thus the time which any design has currently interpreted and expressed has as such already been given a public character on the basis of that designs ecstatical being in the world in so far then as everyday concern understands itself in terms of the world of its concern and takes its time it does not know this time as its own but consentfully utilizes the time which there is escaped the time with which they reckon indeed the publicness of time is all the more compelling the more explicitly practical design concerns itself with time in specifically taking it into its reckoning section 80 the time with which we concern ourselves and within timeness so far we have only had to understand provisionally how darzan as grounded in temporality is in its very existing concerned with times and how in such interpretative concern time makes itself public for being in the world but the sense in which time is if it is of the kind which is public and has been expressed remains completely undefined if indeed such time can be considered as being at all before we can make any decision as to whether public time is merely subjective or objectively actual or neither of these its phenomenal character must first be determined more precisely when time is made public this does not happen just occasionally and subsequently on the contrary because design as something ecstatic oh temporal is already disclosed and because understanding and interpretation both belong to existence time has already made itself public in concern one directs oneself according to it so that it must somehow be the sort of thing which every man can come across although one can concern oneself with time in the manner which we have characterized namely by dating in terms of environmental events this always happens basically within the horizon of that kind of concern with time which we know as astronomical and calendrical time reckoning such reckoning does not occur by accident but has its existential ontological necessity in the basic state of design as care because it is essential to design that it exists fallingly as something thrown it interprets its time concernfully by way of time reckoning in this the real making public of time gets temporalized so that we must say that darzein's throneness is the reason why there is time publicly if we are to demonstrate that public time has its source in practical temporality and if we are to assure ourselves that this demonstration is as intelligible as possible the time which has been interpreted in the temporality of concern must first be characterized if only in order to make clear that the essence of concern with time does not lie in the application of numerical procedures in dating thus in time reckoning what is decisive from an existential ontological standpoint is not to be seen in the quantification of time but must be conceived more primordially in terms of the temporality of the design which reckons with time public time turns out to be the kind of time in which the ready to hand and the present at hand within the world are encountered this requires that these entities which are not of the character of design shall be called entities within time the interpretation of within timeless gives us a more primordial insight into the essence of public time and likewise makes it possible to define its being the being of design is care this entity exists fawningly as something that has been thrown abandoned to the world which is discovered with its facticle there and concernfully submitted to it design awaits its potentiality for being in the world it awaits it in such a manner that it reckons on and reckons with whatever has an involvement for the sake of this potentiality for being an involvement which in the end is a distinctive one every day circumspective being in the world needs the possibility of sight and this means that it needs brightness if it is to deal concernfully with what is ready to hand within the present at hand with the practical discloseness of darzein's world nature has been uncovered for darzyne in its throneness darzine has been surrendered to the changes of day and night day with its brightness gives it the possibility of sight night takes this away design awaits with circumspective concern the possibility of sight and it understands itself in terms of its daily work indus awaiting and understanding it gives its time with the then when it dawns the then with which darzan concerns itself gets dated in terms of something which is connected with getting bright and which is connected with it in the closest kind of environmental involvement namely the rising of the sun then when the sun rises it is time for so and so thus design dates the time which it must take and dates it in terms of something it encounters within the world and within the horizon of its abandonment to the world in terms of something encountered as having a distinctive involvement for its circumspective potentiality for being in the world concern makes use of the being ready to hand of the sun which sheds forth light and warmth the sun dates the time which is interpreted in concern in terms of this dating arises the most natural measure of time the day and because the temporality of that design which must take its time is finite its days are already numbered concern for waiting takes precaution to define the thens with which it is to concern itself that is to divide up the day and that during the day time makes this possible this dividing up in turn is done with regard to that by which time is dated the journeying sun sunset and midday like the sunrise itself are distinctive places which this heavenly body occupies its regularly recurring passage is something which darzine has thrown into the world and giving itself time temporalizingly takes into its reckoning design historizes from day to day by reason of its way of interpreting time by dating it a way which is adam rated in its throneness into the there this dating of things in terms of the heavenly body which sheds forth light and warmth and in terms of its distinctive places in the sky is a way of assigning time which can be done in our being with one another under the same sky and which can be done for every man at any time in the same way so that within certain limits everyone is proximally agreed upon it that by which things are thus dated is available environmentally and yet not restricted to the world of equipment with which one currently concerns oneself it is rather the case that in the world the environing nature the public environment are always discovered along with it this public dating in which everyone assigns himself his time is one which everyone can reckon on simultaneously it uses a publicly available measure this dating reckons with time in the sense of a measuring of time and such measuring requires something by which time is to be measured namely a clock this implies that along with the temporality of design as thrown abandoned to the world and giving itself time something like a clock is also discovered that is something ready to hand which in its regular recurrence has become accessible in one's making present awaitingly the being which has been thrown and is alongside the ready to hand is grounded in temporality temporality is the reason for the clock as the condition for the possibility that the clock is practically necessary temporality is likewise the condition for its discoverability for while the course of the sun is encountered along with the discoveredness of entities within the world it is only by making it present in a waitingly retaining and by doing so in a way which interprets itself the dating in terms of what is ready to hand environmentally in a public way is made possible and is also required tarzan has its basis in temporality and the natural clock which has already been discovered along with darzein's phactical throneness furnishes the first motivation for the production and use of clocks which will be somewhat more handy it also makes this possible indeed it does this in such a manner that these artificial clocks must be adjusted to that natural one if the time which is primarily discoverable in the natural clock is to be made accessible in its turn before describing the chief features in the development of time reckoning and the use of clocks in their existential ontological meaning we must first characterize more completely the time with which we are concerned when we measure it if the time with which we concern ourselves is really made public only when it gets measured then if public time is to be accessible in a way which has been phenomenally unveiled we must have access to it by following up the way in which that which has been dated shows itself when dated in this reckoning manner when the then which interprets itself in concern for the waiting gets dated this dating includes some such statement as then when it dawns it is time for one's daily work the time which is interpreted in concern is already understood as a time for something the current now that so-and-so is as such either appropriate or inappropriate not only is the now and so too any mode of interpreted time and now that which is essentially dateable but as such it has essentially at the same time the structure of appropriateness or inappropriateness time which has been interpreted has by its very nature the character of the time for something or the wrong time for something when concern makes present by awaiting and retaining time is understood in relation to a for which and this in turn is ultimately tied up with a for the sake of which of designs potentiality for being with this in order to relation the time which has been made public makes manifest that structure with which we have earlier become acquainted as significance and which constitutes the world hood of the world as the time for something the time which has been made public as essentially a world character hence the time which makes itself public in the temporalizing of temporality is what we designate as world time and we designate it thus not because it is present at hand as an entity within the world which it can never be but because it belongs to the world surveilled in the sense which we have interpreted existential ontologically in the following pages we must show how the essential relations of the world structure the in order to for example are connected with public time the then when for example by reason of the ecstatico horizonal constitution of temporality only now in any case can the time with which we can son ourselves be completely characterized as to its structure it is dateable spanned and public and as having this structure it belongs to the world itself every now for instance which is expressed in a natural everyday manner has this kind of structure and is understood as such though preconceptually and unthematically when darzan concernfully allows itself time the discloseness of the natural clock belongs to the design which exists as throne and falling and in this discloseness tactical design has at the same time already given a distinctive public character to the time with which it concerns itself as time reckoning is perfected and the use of clocks becomes more refined this making public gets enhanced and strengthened we shall not give here a historiological presentation of the historical evolution of time reckoning and the use of clocks with all its possible variations we must rather ask in an existential ontological way what mode of the temporalizing of darzine's temporality becomes manifest in the direction which the development of time reckoning and clock using has taken when this question is answered there must arise a more primordial understanding of the fact that the measurement of time and this means also the explicit making public of time as an object of concern is grounded in the temporality of diazine and indeed in a quite definite temporalizing of that temporality comparison shows that for the advanced design the day and the presence of sunlight no longer have such a special function as they have for the primitive design on which our analysis of natural time reckoning has been based but the advanced design has the advantage of even being able to turn night into day similarly we no longer need to glance explicitly and immediately at the sun and its position to ascertain the time the manufacture and use of measuring equipment of one's own permits one to read off the time directly by a clock produced especially for this purpose the what o'clock is it is the what time is it because the clock in the sense of that which makes possible a public way of time reckoning must be regulated by the natural clock even the use of clocks as equipment is based upon diazine's temporality which with the discloseness of the there first makes possible a dating of the time with which we concern ourselves this is a fact even if it is covered up when the time is read off our understanding of the natural clock develops with the advancing discovery of nature and instructs us as to new possibilities for a kind of time measurement which is relatively independent of the day and of any explicit observation of the sky but in a certain manner even primitive design makes itself independent of reading off the time directly from the sky when instead of ascertaining the sun's position it measures the shadow cast by some entity available at any time this can happen in the first instance in the simplest form of the ancient peasant's clock every man is constantly accompanied by a shadow and in the shadow the sun is encountered with respect to its changing presence at different places in the day time shadows have different lengths which can be paced off at any time even if individuals differ in the lengths of their bodies and feet the relationship between them remains constant within certain limits of accuracy thus for example when one is concerned with making an appointment one designates the time publicly by saying when the shadow is so many feet long then we shall meet yonder here in being with one another within the rather narrow boundaries of an environment which is very close to us it is tacitly presupposed that the locations at which the shadow gets placed off are at the same latitude this clock is one which design does not have to carry around with it in a certain manner design itself is the clog the public sundial in which the line of a shadow is counterposed to the course of the sun and moves along a numbered track needs no further description but why is it that at the position which the shadow occupies on the dial we always find something like time neither the shadow nor the divided track is time itself nor is the spatial relationship between them where then is the time which we thus read off directly not only on the sundial but also on any pocket watch what does reading of the time signify looking at the clock does indeed amount to more than observing the changes in some item of equipment which is ready to hand and following the positions of a pointer when we use a clock in ascertaining what o'clock it is we say whether explicitly or not it is now such and such an hour and so many minutes now is the time for or there is still time enough now until looking at the clock is based on taking our time and is guided by it what has already shown itself in the most elementary time reckoning here becomes planar when we look at the clock and regulate ourselves according to the time we are essentially saying now here the now has in each case already been understood and interpreted in its full structural content update ability spannedness publicness and worldhood this is so obvious that we take no note of it whatsoever still less do we know anything about it explicitly saying now however is the discursive articulation of a making present which temporalizes itself in a unity with the retentive awaiting the dating which is performed when one uses a clock turns out to be a distinctive way in which something present at hand is made present dating does not simply relate to something present at hand this kind of relating has itself the character of measuring of course the number which we get by measuring can be read off immediately but this implies that when a stretch is to be measured we understand that our standard is in a way contained in it that is we determine the frequency of its presence in that stretch measuring is constituted temporally when a standard which has presence is made present in a stretch which has presence the idea of a standard implies unchangingness this means that for everyone at any time the standard in its stability must be present at hand when the time with which one concerns oneself is dated by measuring when interpreted by looking at something present at hand and making it present something which would not become accessible as a standard or as something measured except by our making it present in this distinctive manner because the making present of something having presence has a special priority in dating by measuring the measurement in which one reads off the time by the clock also expresses itself with special emphasis in the now thus when time is measured it is made public in such a way that it is encountered on each occasion and at any time for everyone as now and now and now this time which is universally accessible in clocks is something that we come across as a present at hand multiplicity of now's so to speak though the measuring of time is not directed thematically towards time as such the temporality of practical being in the world is what primordially makes the disclosure of space possible and in each case spatial design has out of the yonder which has been discovered allotted itself a here which is of the character of design because of all this the time with which design concerns itself in its temporality is as regards its state ability always bound up with some location of that design time itself does not get linked to a location but temporality is the condition for the possibility that dating may be bound up with the spatially local in such a way that this may be binding for everyone as a measure does not first get coupled with space but the space which one might supposed to be coupled with it is encountered only on the basis of the temporality which concerns itself with time in as much as both time reckoning and the clock are founded upon the temporality of darzine which is constitutive for this entity is historical it may be shown to what extent ontologically the use of clocks is itself historical and to what extent every clock as such has a history the time which is made public by our measuring it does not by any means turn into space because we date it in terms of spatial measurement relations still less is what is existential onto logically essential in the measuring of time to be sought in the fact that dated time is determined numerically in terms of spatial stretches and in changes in the location of some special thing what is ontologically decisive lies rather in the specific kind of making present which makes measurement possible dating in terms of what is spatially present at hand is so far from a spatializing of time that this supposed spatialization signifies nothing else than that an entity which is present at hand for everyone in every now is made present in its own presence measuring time is essentially such that it is necessary to say now but in obtaining the measurement we as it were forget what has been measured as such so that nothing is to be found except a number and a stretch when design concerns itself with time then the less time it has to lose the more precious does that time become and the handier the clock must be not only should we be able to assign the time more precisely but the very determining of the time should claim as little time as possible they must still agree with the ways in which others assign time provisionally it was enough for us to point out the general connection of the use of clocks with that temporality which takes its time just as the concrete analysis of astronomical time reckoning in its full development belongs to the existential ontological interpretation of how nature is discovered the foundations of historiological and calendrical chronology can be laid bare only within the orbit of the tasks of analyzing historiological cognition existentially the measurement of time gives it a marked public character so that only in this way does what we generally call the time become well known in concern everything has its time attributed to it it has it and like every entity within the world it can have it only because after all it is in time that time wherein entities within the world are encountered we know as world time by reason of the ecstatico horizontal constitution of the temporality which belongs to it this has the same transcendence as the world itself with the discloseness of the world world time has been made public so that every temporary concern for being alongside entities within the world understands these entities circumspectively as encountered in time the time in which the present at hand is in motion or at rest is not objective if what we mean by that is the being present at hand in itself of entities encountered within the world but just as little is time subjective if by this we understand being present at hand and occurring in a subject world time is more objective than any possible object because with the discloseness of the world it already becomes objectified in an ecstatico horizonal manner as the condition for the possibility of entities within the world thus contrary to kant's opinion one comes across world time just as immediately in the physical as in the psychical and not just roundabout by way of the cyclical time first shows itself in the sky precisely where one comes across it when one regulates oneself naturally according to it so that time even becomes identified with the sky world time moreover is also more subjective than any possible subject for it is what first makes possible the being of the practically existing self that being which as is now well understood is the meaning of care time is present at hand neither in the subject nor in the object neither inside nor outside and it is earlier than any subjectivity or objectivity because it presents the condition for the very possibility of this earlier has it then any being and if not is it done a mere phantom or is it something that has more being zienda than any possible entity any investigation which goes further in the direction of questions such as these will come up against the same boundary which has already set itself up to our provisional discussion of the connection between truth and being in whatever way these questions may be answered in what follows or in whatever way they may first of all get primordially formulated we must first understand that temporality as ecstatico horizonal temporalizes something like world time which constitutes a within timeless of the ready to hand and the present at hand but in that case such entities can never be designated as temporal in the strict sense like every entity with the character other than that of design they are non-temporal whether they really occur arise and pass away or subsist ideally if world time thus belongs to the temporalizing of temporality then it can neither be volatilized subjectivistically nor reified by a vicious objectification these two possibilities can be avoided with a clear insight not just by wavering insecurely between them only if we can understand how everyday design conceives of time theoretically in terms of an understanding of time in the way which is closest to it and if we can also understand to what extent this conception of time and the prevalence of this concept obstruct the possibility of our understanding in terms of primordial time what is meant by this conception that is the possibility of understanding it as temporality the everyday concern which gives itself time finds the time in those entities within the world which are encountered in time so if we are to cast any light on the genesis of the ordinary conception of time we must take within timeness as our point of departure section 81 within timeless and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time how does something like time first show itself for everyday circumspective concern in what kind of concern for equipment using dealings does it become explicitly accessible if it has been made public with the discloseness of the world if it has always been already a matter of concern with the discoveredness of entities within the world a discoverness which belongs to the world's discloseness and if it has been a matter of such concern insofar as darzyne calculates time in reckoning with itself then the kind of behavior in which one explicitly regulates oneself according to time lies in the use of clocks the existential temporal meaning of this turns out to be a making present of the traveling pointer by following the positions of the pointer in a way which makes present one counts them this making present temporalizes itself in the ecstatical unity of a retention which awaits to retain the on that former occasion and to retain it by making it present signifies that in saying now one is open for the horizon of the earlier that is of the now no longer to await the then by making it present means that in saying now one is open for the horizon of the later that is of the now not yet time is what shows itself in such a making present how then are we to define the time which is manifest within the horizon of the circumspective concern for clock using in which one takes one's time this time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the traveling pointer counting and making present in such a way that this making present temporalizes itself in an ecstatical unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizontally open according to the earlier and later this however is nothing else than an existential ontological interpretation of aristotle's definition of time for this is time that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later this definition may seem strange at first glance but if one defines the existential ontological horizon from which aristotle has taken it one sees that it is as obvious as it first seems strange and has been genuinely derived the source of the time which is thus manifest does not become a problem for aristotle his interpretation of time moves rather in the direction of the natural way of understanding being yet because this very understanding and the being which is thus understood have in principle been made a problem for the investigation which lies before us it is only after we have found a solution for the question of being that the aristotelian analysis of time can be interpreted thematically in such a way that it may indeed gain some signification in principle if the formulation of this question in ancient ontology with all its critical limitations is to be appropriated in a positive manner ever since aristotle all discussions of the concept of time have plunged in principle to the aristotelian definitions that is in taking time as their theme they have taken it as it shows itself in circumspective concern time is what is counted that is to say it is what is expressed and what we have in view even if unthematically when the traveling pointer or the shadow is made present when one makes present that which is moved in its movement one says now here now here and so on the nows are what get counted and these show themselves in every now as now's which will forthwith be no longer now and now's which have just been not yet now the world's time which is cited in this manner in the use of clocks we call the now time yest site when the concern which gives itself time reckons with time the more naturally it does so the less it dwells at the express time as such on the contrary it is lost in the equipment with which it concerns itself which in each case has a time of its own when concern determines the time and assigns it the more naturally it does so that is the less it is directed towards treating time as such thematically all the more does the being which is alongside the object of concern the being which falls as it makes present say unhesitatingly whether or not anything is uttered now or then or on that former occasion thus for the ordinary understanding of time time shows itself as a sequence of nows which are constantly present at hand simultaneously passing away and coming along time is understood as a succession as a flowing stream of nows as the course of time what is implied by such an interpretation of the world time with which we concern ourselves we get the answer if we go back to the full essential structure of world time and compare this with that with which the ordinary understanding of time is acquainted we have exhibited dateability as the first essential item in the time with which we concern ourselves this is grounded in the ecstatical constitution of temporality the now is essentially a now that the data will now which is understood in concern even if we cannot grasp it as such is in each case one which is either appropriate or inappropriate significance belongs to the structure of the now we have accordingly called the time with which we concern ourselves world time in the ordinary interpretations of time as a sequence of nows both datability and significance are missing these two structures are not permitted to come to the fore when time is characterized as a pure succession the ordinary interpretation of time covers them up when these are covered up the ecstatic horizon or constitution of temporality in which the date ability and the significance of the now are grounded gets leveled off the nows get shorn of these relations as it were and as thus shawn they simply range themselves along after one another so as to make up the succession it is no accident that world time thus gets leveled off and covered up by the way time is ordinarily understood but just because the everyday interpretation of time maintains itself by looking solely in the direction of concern for common sense and understands only what shows itself within the common sense horizon these structures must escape it that which gets counted when one measures time concernfully the now gets co-understood in one's concern with the present at hand and the ready-to-end now so far as this concern with time comes back to the time itself which has been co-understood and insofar as it considers that time it sees the nows which indeed are also somehow there within the horizon of that understanding of being by which this concern is itself constantly guided thus the nows are in a certain manner co-present at hand that is entities are encountered and so too is the now although it is not said explicitly that the nows are present at hand in the same way as things they still get seen onto logically within the horizon of the idea of presence at hand the nows pass away and those which have passed away make up the past the now's come along and those which are coming along define the future the ordinary interpretation of world time as now time never avails itself of the horizon by which such things as world significance and dateability can be made accessible these structures necessarily remain covered up all the more so because this covering up is reinforced by the way in which the ordinary interpretation develops its characterization of time conceptually the sequence of now's is taken as something that is somehow present at hand for it even moves into time we say in every now is now in every now it is already vanishing in every now the now is now and therefore it constantly has presence as something self-same even though in every now another may be vanishing as it comes along yet as this thing which changes it simultaneously shows its own constant presence thus even plato who directed his glance in this manner at time as a sequence of now's arising and passing away had to call time the image of eternity but he decided to make a kind of moving image of the eternal and while setting the heaven in order he made an eternal image moving according to number an image of that eternity which abides in oneness it is to this image that we have given the name of time the sequence of nows is uninterrupted and has no gaps no matter how far we proceed in dividing up the now it is always now the continuity of time is seen within the horizon of something which is indissolubly present at hand when one takes one's ontological orientation from something that is constantly present at hand one either looks for the problem of the continuity of time or one leaves this impasse alone in either case the specific structure of world time must remain covered up together with datability which has an ecstatical foundation it has been spanned the spannedness of time is not to be understood in terms of the horizontal stretching along of the ecstatical unity of that temporality which has made itself public in one's concern with time the fact that in every now no matter how momentary it is in each case already now must be conceived in terms of something which is earlier still and from which every now stems that is to say it must be conceived in terms of the ecstatical stretching along of that temporality which is alien to any continuity of something present at hand but which for its part presents the condition for the possibility of access to anything continuous that is present at hand the principal thesis of the ordinary way of interpreting time namely that time is infinite makes manifest most impressively the way in which world time and accordingly temporality in general have been leveled off and covered up by such an interpretation it is held that time presents itself proximally as an uninterrupted sequence of nows every now moreover is already either a just now or a fourth with if in characterizing time we stick primarily and exclusively to such a sequence then in principle neither beginning nor end can be found in it every last now as now is always already a fourth with that is no longer answer thus it is time in the sense of the no longer now in the sense of the past every first now is a just now that is not yet thus it is time in the sense of the not yet now in the sense of the future hence time is endless on both sides this thesis becomes possible only on the basis of an orientation towards a free floating in itself of a course of nows which is present at hand an orientation in which the full phenomenon of the now has been covered up with regard to its state ability its world hood its spannedness and its character of having a location of the same kind as designs so that it has dwindled to an unrecognizable fragment if one directs one's glance towards being present at hand and not being present at hand and thus thinks the sequence of now's through to the end then an end can never be found in this way of thinking time through to the end one must always think more time from this one in first the time is infinite but wherein are grounded this leveling off of well time and this covering up of temporality in the being of design itself which we have in a preparatory manner interpreted as care thrown and falling diazine is proximally and for the most part lost in that with which it concerns itself in this lostness however darzan's fleeing in the face of that authentic existence which has been characterized as anticipatory resoluteness has made itself known and this is a fleeing which covers up in this concern for fleeing lies are fleeing in the face of death that is looking away from the end of being in the world this looking away from it is in itself a mode of that being towards the end which is ecstatically futural the inauthentic temporality of everyday design as it falls must as such looking away from finitude failed to recognize authentic futurity and therewith temporality in general and if indeed the way in which diazine is ordinarily understood is guided by the day only so can the self-forgetful representation of the infinity of public time be strengthened that they never dies because it cannot die for death is in each case mine and only in anticipatory resoluteness does it get authentically understood in an existential manner nevertheless the they which never dies and which misunderstands being towards the end gives a characteristic interpretation to fleeing in the face of death to the very end it always has more time here a way of having time in the sense that one can lose it makes itself known right now this then that and that is barely over when here it is not as if the finite of time were getting understood quite the contrary for concern sets out to snatch as much as possible from the time which still keeps coming and goes on publicly time is something which everyone takes and can take in the everyday way in which we are with one another the leveled off sequence of nows remains completely unrecognizable as regards its origin in the temporality of the individual design how is time in its course to be touched even the least bit when a man who has been present at hand in time no longer exists time goes on just as indeed it already was when a man came into life the only time one knows is the public time which has been leveled off and which belongs to everyone and that means to nobody but just as he who flees in the face of death is pursued by it even as he evades it and just as in turning away from it he must see it nonetheless even the innocuous infinite sequence of nows which simply runs its course imposes itself on design in a remarkably enigmatical way why do we say that time passes away when we do not say with just as much emphasis that it arises yet with regard to the pure sequence of nouns we have as much right to say one as the other when design talks at times passing away it understands in the end more of time than it wants to admit that is to say the temporality in which world time temporalizes itself has not been completely closed off no matter how much it may get covered up our talk about times passing away gives expression to this experience time does not let itself be halted this experience in turn is possible only because the halting of time is something that we want herein lies an inauthentic awaiting of moments and a waiting in which these are already forgotten as they glide by the awaiting of inauthentic existence the awaiting which forgets as it makes present is the condition for the possibility of the ordinary experience of times passing away because design is futural in the ahead of itself it must in a waiting understand the sequence of nows as one which glides by as it passes away does i knows fugitive time in terms of its fugitive knowledge about its death in the kind of talk which emphasizes times passing away the finite futurity of darzan's temporality is publicly reflected and because even in talk about times passing away death can remain covered up time shows itself as a passing away in itself but even in this pure sequence of nows which passes away in itself primordial time still manifests itself throughout all this leveling off and covering up in the ordinary interpretation the stream of time is defined as an irreversible succession why cannot time be reversed especially if one looks exclusively at the stream of nouns it is incomprehensible in itself why this sequence should not present itself in the reverse direction the impossibility of this reversal has its basis in the way public time originates in temporality the temporalizing of which is primarily future and goes to its end ecstatically in such a way that it is already towards its end the ordinary way of characterizing time as an endless irreversible sequence of nouns which passes away arises from the temporality of falling design the ordinary representation of time has its natural justification it belongs to darzan's average kind of being and to that understanding of being which proximally prevails thus proximally and for the most part even history gets understood publicly as happening within time this interpretation of time loses its exclusive and preeminent justification only if it claims to convey the true conception of time and to be able to prescribe the sole possible horizon within which time is to be interpreted on the contrary it has emerged that why and how world time belongs to darzan's temporality is intelligible only in terms of that temporality and its temporalizing from temporality the full structure of world time has been drawn and only the interpretation of this structure gives us the clue for seeing at all that in the ordinary conception of time something has been covered up and for estimating how much the ecstatico horizonal constitution of temporality has been leveled off this orientation by darzin's temporality indeed makes it possible to exhibit the origin and the practical necessity of this leveling off and covering up and at the same time to test the arguments for the ordinary theses about time on the other hand within the horizon of the way time is ordinarily understood temporality is inaccessible in the reverse direction not only must the now time be oriented primarily by temporality in the order of possible interpretation but it temporalizes itself only in the in authentic temporality of darzan so if one has regard for the way the now time is derived from temporality one is justified in considering temporality is the time which is primordial ecstatico horizonal temporality temporalizes itself primarily in terms of the future in the way time is ordinarily understood however the basic phenomenon of time is seen in the now and indeed in that pure now which has been shown in its full structure that which they call the present one can gather from this that there is in principle no prospect that in terms of this kind of now one can clarify the ecstatico horizontal phenomenon of the moment of vision which belongs to temporality or even that one can derive it thus correspondingly the future as ecstatically understood the dateable and significant then does not coincide with the ordinary conception of the future in the sense of a pure now which has not yet come along but is only coming along and the concept of the past in the sense of the pure now which has passed away is just as far from coinciding with the ecstatical having been the dateable and significant on a former occasion the now is not pregnant with that not yet now but the present arises from the future in the primordial ecstatical unity of the temporalizing of temporality although proxima and for the most part the ordinary experience of time is one that knows only world time it always gives it a distinctive relationship to soul and spirit even if this is still a far cry from a philosophical inquiry oriented explicitly and primarily towards the subject as evidence for this two characteristic passages will suffice aristotle says but if nothing other than the soul or the soul's mind were naturally equipped for numbering then if there were no soul time would be impossible and saint augustine writes hence it seemed to me that time is nothing else than an extendedness but of what sort of thing it is an extendedness i do not know and it would be surprising if it were not an extendedness of the soul itself thus in principle even the interpretation of diazine as temporality does not lie beyond the horizon of the ordinary conception of time and hegel has made an explicit attempt to set forth the way in which time as ordinarily understood is connected with spirit in kant on the other hand while time is indeed subjective it stands beside the i think and is not bound up with it the grounds which hegel has explicitly provided for the connection between time and spirit are well suited to elucidate indirectly the foregoing interpretation of design as temporality and our exhibition of temporality as the source of world time section 82 a comparison of the existential ontological connection of temporality design and world time with hegel's way of taking the relation between time and spirit history which is essentially the history of spirit runs its course in time thus the development of history falls into time hegel is not satisfied however with the bearing that the within timeness of spirit is a fact but seeks to understand how it is possible for spirit to fall into time which is the non-sensuous sensuous time must be able as it were to take in spirit and spirit in turn must be akin to time and its essence accordingly two points come up for discussion one how does hegel define the essence of time to what belongs to the essence of spirit which makes it possible for it to fall into time our answer to these questions will serve merely to elucidate our interpretation of dizziness temporality and to do so by way of a comparison we shall make no claim to give even a relatively full treatment of the allied problems in hegel especially since criticizing him will not help us because hegel's conception of time presents the most radical way in which the ordinary understanding of time has been given form conceptually and one which has received too little attention a comparison of this conception with the idea of temporality which we have expounded is one that especially suggests itself a hegel's conception of time when a philosophical interpretation of time is carried out it gets a locus in a system this locus may be considered as criterial for the basic way of treating time by which such an interpretation is guided in the physics of aristotle that is in the context of an ontology of nature the ordinary way of understanding time has received its first thematically detailed traditional interpretation time location and movement stand together true to tradition hegel's analysis of time has its locus in the second part of his encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences which is entitled philosophy of nature the first portion of this treats of mechanics and of this the first division is devoted to the discussion of space and time he calls these the abstract outside of one another though hegel put space and time together this does not happen simply because he has arranged them superficially one after the other space and time also philosophy combats such an also the transition from space to time does not signify that these are treated in adjoining paragraphs rather it is space itself that makes the transition space is time that is time is the truth of space if space is thought dialectically in that which it is then according to hegel this being of space unveils itself as time how must space be thought space is the unmediated indifference of nature's being outside of itself this is a way of saying that space is the abstract multiplicity field height of the points which are differentiable in it space is not interrupted by these but neither does it arise from them by way of joining them together though it is differentiated by differentiable points which are space themselves space remains for its part without any differences the differences themselves are of the same character as that which they differentiate nevertheless the point insofar as it differentiates anything in space is the negation of space though in such a manner that as this negation it itself remains in space a point is space after all the point does not lift itself out of space as if it was something of another character space is the outside of one another of the multiplicity of points and it is without any differences but it is not as if space for a point space is rather as hegel says punctuality punctuality this is the basis for the sentence in which hegel thinks of space in its truth that is as time negativity which relates itself as point to space and which develops in space its determinations as line and surface is however just as much for itself in the sphere of being outside itself and so are its determinations therein though while it is positive as in the sphere of being outside of itself it appears indifferent as regards the things that are tranquilly side by side as thus posited for itself it is time if space gets represented that is if it gets intuitive immediately in the indifferent subsistence of its differences then the negations are as it were simply given but by such a representation space does not get grasped in its being only in thinking is it possible for this to be done in thinking as the synthesis which has gone through thesis and antithesis and transmuted them only if the negations do not simply remain subsisting in their indifference but get transmuted that is only if they themselves get negated does space get thought and thus grasped in its being in the negation of the negation that is a punctuality the point posits itself for itself and thus emerges from the indifference of subsisting as that which is posited for itself it differentiates itself from this one and from that one it is no longer this and not yet that in positing itself for itself it posits the succession in which it stands the sphere of being outside of itself which is by now the sphere of the negated negation when punctuality is indifference gets transmuted this signifies that it no longer remains lying in the paralyzed tranquility of space the point gives itself errors before all the other points according to hegel this negation of the negation as punctuality is time if this discussion has any demonstrable meaning it can mean nothing else than that depositing of itself for itself of every point is a now here now here and so on every point is positive for itself as a now point in time the point thus has actuality that through which each point as this one here composite itself for itself is in each case and now the now is the condition for the possibility of the points positing itself for itself this possibility condition makes up the being of the point and being is the same as having been thought as in each case the pure thinking of punctuality that is of space thinks the now and the being outside of itself of the now because of this space is time how is time itself defined time as the negative unity of being outside of itself is likewise something simply abstract ideal it is that being which in that it is is not and which in that it is not is it is intuited becoming this means that those differences which to be sure are simply momentary transmuting themselves immediately are defined as external yet as external to themselves for this interpretation time reveals itself as intuited becoming according to hegel this signifies a transition from being to nothing or from nothing to being the coming is both arising and passing away either being makes the transition or not being does so what does this mean with regard to time the being of time is the now every now however either now is no longer or now is not yet so it can be taken also as not being time is intuited becoming that is to say it is the transition which does not get thought but which simply tenders itself in the sequence of now's if the essence of time is defined as intuitive becoming then it becomes manifest that time is primarily understood in terms of the now and indeed in the very manner in which one comes across such and now in pure intuition no detailed discussion is needed to make plain that in hegel's interpretation of time he is moving wholly in the direction of the way time is ordinarily understood when he characterizes time in terms of the now this presupposes that in its full structure the now remains leveled off and covered up so that it can be intuited as something present at hand though present at hand only ideally that hegel interprets time in terms of this primary orientation by the now which has been leveled off is evidenced by the following sentences the now is monstrously privileged it is nothing but the individual now but in giving itself heirs this thing which is so exclusive has already been dissolved diffused and pulverized even while i am expressing it in nature moreover where time is now no stable the difference between these dimensions past and future ever comes about thus in a positive sense one can say of time that only the present is the before and after are not but the concrete present is the result of the past and is pregnant with the future thus the true present is eternity if hegel calls time intuited becoming then neither arising nor passing away has any priority in time nevertheless on occasion he characterizes time as the abstraction of consuming abstractions the most radical formula for the way in which time is ordinarily experienced and interpreted on the other hand when hegel really defines time he is consistent enough to grant no such priority to consuming and passing away as that which the everyday way of experiencing time rightly adheres to for hegel can no more provide dialectical grounds for such a priority than he can for the circumstance which he has introduced as self-evident that the now turns up precisely in the way the point posits itself for itself so even when he characterizes time as becoming hegel understands this becoming in an abstract sense which goes well beyond the representation of the stream of time thus the most appropriate expression which the hegelian treatment of time receives lies in his defining it as the negation of a negation that is a punctuality here the sequence of nouns has been formalized in the most extreme sense and leveled off in such a way that one can hardly go any farther only from the standpoint of this formal dialectical conception of time can hegel produce any connection between time and spirit b hegel's interpretation of the connection between time and spirit if hegel can say that when spirit gets actualized it accords with it to fall into time with time defined as a negation of a negation how has spirit itself been understood the essence of spirit is the concept by this hegel understands not the universal which is intuited in a genus as the form of something thought but rather the form of the very thinking which thinks itself the conceiving of oneself as the grasping of the not i in as much as the grasping of the not i presents a differentiation there lies in the pure concept as the grasping of this differentiation a differentiation of the difference thus hegel can define the essence of the spirit formally and epiphanically as the negation of a negation this absolute negativity gives a logically formalized interpretation of dick out cogito me cogitare rem wherein he sees the essence of the conscientia the concept is accordingly a self-conceiving way in which the self has been conceived as thus conceived the self is authentically as it can be that is free the i is the pure concept itself which as concept has come into design the i however is this initially pure unity which relates itself to itself not immediately but in that it abstracts from all determinateness and content and goes back to the freedom of its unrestricted self-equality thus the i is universality but it is individuality just as immediately this negating of the negation is both that which is absolutely restless in the spirit and also its self manifestation which belongs to its essence the progression of the spirit which actualizes itself in history carries with it a principle of exclusion in this exclusion however that which is excluded does not get detached from the spirit it gets surmounted the kind of making itself free which overcomes and at the same time tolerates is characteristic of the freedom of the spirit thus progress never signifies a merely quantitative more but is essentially qualitative and indeed has the quality of spirit progression is done knowingly and knows itself in its goal in every step of its progress spirit has to overcome itself as the truly malignant obstacle to that goal in its development spirit aims to reach its own concept the development itself is a hard unending battle against itself because the restlessness with which spirit develops in bringing itself to its concept is the negation of a negation it accords with spirit as it actualizes itself to fall into time as the immediate negation of a negation for time is the concept itself which is their da ist and which represents itself to the consciousness as an empty intuition because of this spirit necessarily appears in time and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp its pure concept that is as long as time is not annulled by it time is the pure self external intuited not grasped by the self the concept which is merely intuited thus by its very essence spirit necessarily appears in time world history is therefore above all the interpretation of spirit in time just as in space the idea interprets itself as nature the exclusion which belongs to the movement of development harbors in itself a relationship to not being this is time understood in terms of the now which gives itself heirs time is abstract negativity as intuited becoming it is the differentiated self differentiation which one comes across immediately it is the concept which is there does i under but this means present at hand as something present at hand and thus external to spirit time has no power over the concept but the concept is rather the power of time by going back to the self-sameness of the formal structure which both spirit and time possess as the negation of a negation hegel shows how it is possible for spirit to be actualized historically in time spirit and time get disposed of with the very emptiest of formal ontological and formal epiphanical abstractions and this makes it possible to produce a kinship between them but because time simultaneously gets conceived in the sense of a world time which has been utterly leveled off so that its origin remains completely concealed it simply gets contrasted with spirit contrast it is something that is present at hand because of this spirit must first of all fall into time it remains obscure what indeed is signified onto logically by this falling or by the actualizing of a spirit which has power over time and really is zion outside of it just as hegel casts little light on the source of the time which has thus been leveled off he leaves totally unexamined the question of whether the way in which spirit is essentially constituted as the negating of a negation is possible in any other manner than on the basis of primordial temporality we cannot as yet discuss whether hegel's interpretation of time and spirit and the connection between them is correct and rests on foundations which are ontologically primordial but the very fact that a formal dialectical construction of this connection can be ventured at all makes manifest that these are primordially akin hegel's construction was prompted by his arduous struggle to conceive the concretion of the spirit he makes this known in the following sentence from the concluding chapter of his phenomenology of the spirit thus time appears as the very fate and necessity which spirit has when it is not in itself complete the necessity of its giving self-consciousness a richer share in consciousness of its setting in motion the immediacy of the in itself the form in which substances in consciousness all conversely of its realizing and making manifest the in itself taken as the inward and this is what first is inward that is of vindicating it for its certainty of itself our existential analytic of design on the contrary starts with the concretion of practically thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes such existence possible spirit does not first fall into time but it exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality temporality temporalizes world time within the horizon of which history can appear as historizing within time spirit does not fall into time but practical existence falls as falling from primordial authentic temporality this falling fallon however has itself its existential possibility in a mode of its temporalizing a mode which belongs to temporality section 83 the existential temporal analytic of design and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of being in general in our considerations hitherto our task has been to interpret the primordial whole of phactical design with regard to its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic existing and to do so in an existential ontological manner in terms of its very basis temporality has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the being of care so that which our preparatory existential analytic of design contributed before temporality was laid bare has now been taken back into temporality as the primordial structure of darzin's totality of being in terms of the possible ways in which primordial time can temporalize itself we have provided the grounds for those structures which were just pointed out in our earlier treatment nevertheless our way of exhibiting the constitution of darzan's being remains only one way which we may take our aim is to work out the question of being in general the thematic analysis of existence however first needs the light of the idea of being in general which must be clarified beforehand this holds particularly if we adhere to the principle which we expressed in our introduction as one by which any philosophical investigation may be gauged that philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of design which as an analytic of existence has made fast the guiding line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns this thesis of course is to be regarded not as a dogma but rather as a formulation of a problem of principle which still remains veiled can one provide ontological grounds for ontology or does it also require an optical foundation and which entity must take over the function of providing this foundation the distinction between the being of existing design and the being of entities such as reality which do not have the character of darzyne may appear very illuminating but it is still only the point of departure for the ontological problematic it is nothing with which philosophy may tranquilize itself it has long been known that ancient ontology works with thing concepts and that there is a danger of rarifying consciousness but what does this rarefying signify where does it arise why does being get conceived proximally in terms of the present at hand and not in terms of the ready to hand which indeed lies closer to us why does this rarefying always keep coming back to exercise its dominion what positive structure does the being of consciousness have if rarification remains inappropriate to it is the distinction between consciousness and thing sufficient for tackling the ontological problematic in a primordial manner do the answers to these questions lie along our way and can we even seek the answer as long as the question of the meaning of being remains unformulated and unclarified one can never carry on researchers into the source and the possibility of the idea of being in general simply by means of the abstractions of formal logic that is without any secure horizon for question and answer one must seek a way of casting light on the fundamental question of ontology and this is the way one must go whether this is the only way or even the right one at all can be decided only after one has gone along it the conflict as to the interpretation of being cannot be allayed because it has not yet been in kindled and in the end this is not the kind of conflict one can bluster into it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the way and where does this investigation stand something like being has been disclosed in the understanding of being which belongs to existent design as a way in which it understands being has been disclosed in a preliminary way though non-conceptually and this makes it possible for diazine as existent being in the world to comport itself towards entities towards those which it encounters within the world as well as towards itself as existent how is this disclosive understanding of being at all possible for darzan can this question be answered by going back to the primordial constitution of being of that design by which being is understood the existential ontological constitution of darzan's totality is grounded in temporality hence the ecstatical projection of being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes how is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of being does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of being being untimed by martin heidegger was read by martin swain for ukemi audio books for full details of ukemi recordings go to ukemiaudiobooks.com audible hopes you've enjoyed this program oops you