Lecture on the Euthyphro Dilemma

Introduction

• The Euthyphro Dilemma questions the relationship between morality and divine preferences.
• Originates from Plato's dialogue "Euthyphro" but delves deeper than Plato's original discussion.
• Central question: Are good things good because the gods prefer them, or do the gods prefer them because they are already good?

The Nature of the Dilemma

• Often dismissed as mere semantics, but involves substantive questions about causation and correlation.
• Perfect correlation between divine preferences and goodness doesn't clarify which causes the other.
• Analogy with a perfect thermometer to explain correlation without causation.

Theories Addressed

Divine Independence Theory

• Gods prefer kindness since it's intrinsically good.
• Goodness is independent of divine preferences; gods recognize pre-existing goodness.
• Aligned with Plato's view: God sees and acknowledges independently defined good and bad.

Divine Command Theory

• Kindness is good because the gods prefer it.
• Divine preferences create standards of good and bad.
• Raises the issue of arbitrariness in divine preferences; prior to preferences, nothing is inherently good or bad.

Circularity and Non-Circular Views

• Both theories avoid internal circularity but cannot non-circularly claim mutual causation between divine preference and goodness.
• Divine Independence Theory sees an independent goodness, whereas Divine Command Theory may face arbitrariness.

The Problem of Arbitrariness

• Divine Command Theory suggests preferences might be arbitrary without recognizing inherent goodness.
• Example given: choosing between identical glasses of water—no reason to prefer one without a difference.
• Arbitrariness Problem: Without good reasons, divine preferences are considered arbitrary.

Addressing Objections

• An objection states humans may not understand all divine reasons due to limited perception.
• Argument counters that knowing all reasons isn't necessary to acknowledge the potential arbitrariness of divine preferences.

Rephrasing the Dilemma

• Either divine preferences don't define goodness (independence)
• Or the preferences are arbitrary if they define goodness (command theory).
• Arbitrariness detracts from God's praiseworthiness: Leibniz argues against arbitrary divine will.

Conclusion

• The dilemma presents two paths: independence of goodness from divine will or acceptance of arbitrary divine preferences.
• Challenges the basis of divine command theory, focusing on the implications for divine praiseworthiness and morality.