State and Tribal Jurisdiction Doctrines

Overview

• Focus: State and tribal jurisdiction conflicts in Indian Country under modern federal Indian law.
• Key themes:
  • Limits on state power in Indian Country.
  • Roles of inherent tribal sovereignty and federal supremacy/preemption.
  • Congressional delegation of state authority (especially Public Law 280).
  • Major Supreme Court cases shaping modern doctrine.

Indian Country and Basic Jurisdictional Principles

• Indian Country is the core jurisdictional area where special rules of federal Indian law apply.
• Outside Indian Country, ordinary federal and state law generally applies to Indians and non-Indians alike, with a few exceptions.
• States have no inherent authority in Indian Country (Worcester v. Georgia, 1832).
  • State power is preempted by inherent tribal sovereignty.
  • State power is preempted by federal supremacy.
• Congress holds plenary authority over Indian affairs and can delegate some powers to states (e.g., Public Law 280).
• Since around 1980, the Supreme Court has allowed some state jurisdiction in Indian Country even without explicit congressional authorization, but state power remains limited.

Key Modern Precedent Cases: Overview

Williams v. Lee (1959): Infringement Test

• Facts:

  • Mr. Lee, a non-Indian, was a federally licensed Indian trader on the Navajo Reservation.
  • Sold goods on credit to Navajo tribal members, including Mr. and Mrs. Williams.
  • When they did not pay, Lee sued them in Arizona state court.
  • Arizona Supreme Court: state courts had jurisdiction unless Congress expressly forbade it.

• U.S. Supreme Court Decision:

  • Reversed Arizona Supreme Court.
  • Reaffirmed historical exclusion of state jurisdiction in Indian Country.
  • Introduced new articulation: the “infringement test.”

• Infringement Test (Williams rule):

  • Absent governing acts of Congress, the key question:
    • Does the state action infringe on reservation Indians’ rights to make their own laws and be ruled by them?
  • Application:
    • Allowing state jurisdiction here would undermine tribal court authority over reservation affairs.
    • Thus, it would infringe tribal self-government.
    • It was immaterial that Lee was not Indian; conduct occurred on reservation in transaction with an Indian.

• Significance:

  • Reached same bottom line as Worcester (state jurisdiction barred).
  • Changed doctrinal language, creating space for later courts to narrow tribal authority incrementally.

Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission

• Facts:

  • Arizona attempted to impose a 2% tax on gross proceeds or income of Warren Trading Post Co.
  • Warren Trading Post was a licensed Indian trader operating on the Navajo Reservation.
  • Arizona Supreme Court upheld the tax.

• U.S. Supreme Court Decision:

  • Reversed; state tax was preempted by federal law.
  • Federal Indian Trader statutes (beginning with the 1790 Indian Trade and Non-Intercourse Act) created comprehensive federal regulation.
  • Congress intended that trade in Indian Country not be burdened by additional non-federal restrictions.

• Reasoning:

  • State tax would burden and frustrate congressional policy controlling Indian trade.
  • State provided no services to justify the tax:
    • Roads and education supplied by federal government or tribe.

• Principle:

  • Where federal regulation is comprehensive, state taxation or regulation of Indian traders is preempted.

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (1973)

• Facts:

  • Arizona imposed an income tax on Navajo citizens whose income was derived wholly from activities on the reservation.
  • Arizona appellate court approved the tax.
  • State court misapplied Williams infringement test and ignored treaties and statutes.

• Supreme Court’s Historical and Doctrinal Analysis:

  • Traced history of exclusion of state authority from Indian Country.
  • Identified two bases for exclusion:
    • Inherent tribal sovereignty.
    • Federal preemption (federal supremacy).
  • Noted trend: reliance shifting from inherent sovereignty toward federal supremacy.

• Use of Tribal Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy:

  • Tribal sovereignty is a “backdrop” against which federal statutes and regulations must be read.
  • When interpreting whether statutes preempt state authority, tribal sovereignty informs the analysis.

• Indian Canons of Construction:

  • Ambiguities in treaties and statutes must be resolved in favor of Indians.
  • Applied to:
    • Relevant treaties and statutes.
    • Arizona Enabling Act, which expressly disclaimed state authority over Indian lands.
  • Congress intended to maintain tax-exempt status of reservation lands.

• Application to McClanahan:

  • Arizona taxed an individual Indian rather than tribal government, but:
    • Her activities were entirely within the federal–tribal sphere.
    • She was a tribal member earning income on tribal lands.
    • No non-Indian interests, unlike in Williams.

• Holding and Principle:

  • Absent explicit congressional authorization, a state may not impose a tax on Indians within Indian Country.

Congressional Authorization of State Jurisdiction: Public Law 280

Background and Scope of Public Law 280

• Public Law 280 (PL 280), passed in 1953, is the primary example of Congress authorizing state jurisdiction in Indian Country.
• Reflects termination era policies (approximately 1946–1970), which aimed to reduce federal-tribal relationship and increase state control.
• Before PL 280, Congress had delegated authority regionally, but PL 280 was broader:
  • Withdrew federal criminal jurisdiction on reservations in six states.
  • Granted those states criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
  • Allowed those states to hear civil cases arising against Indians in Indian Country.

Mandatory and Optional States under PL 280

• PL 280 reworked core assumptions of federal Indian law by allowing states, historically viewed as tribes’ “deadliest enemies” (Kagama), to assume jurisdiction in Indian Country.
• Congress did not provide federal funds to states for increased policing on Indian lands: an unfunded mandate.

Interpretive Questions for PL 280

• How should Indian canons of construction apply to PL 280 and similar statutes?
  • Narrowly, to protect tribal interests despite termination-era intent?
  • Broadly, reflecting termination Congress’s goals?
• Did PL 280 confer state taxing authority to fund state activities on Indian lands?
  • This question was central in Bryan v. Itasca County.

Bryan v. Itasca County (1976): Limits on State Civil Power under PL 280

• Question:

  • Did PL 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction include state power to tax Indians in Indian Country, except where expressly excluded?

• Facts:

  • Russell Bryan, citizen of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, challenged a Minnesota tax on his mobile home.
  • Mobile home classified as personal property because it was movable, not affixed to land.
  • Real property on the reservation (land and items affixed) was explicitly tax exempt.
  • Minnesota Supreme Court: tax valid; reasoned that excluding real property taxes implied permission for other state taxes.

• U.S. Supreme Court Decision:

  • Reversed the state court.
  • Cited McClanahan: state taxes on Indians in Indian Country are presumptively invalid without clear congressional approval.
  • PL 280 did not supply that approval.

• Legislative History and Policy Context:

  • Legislative history showed main congressional concern was lawlessness in Indian Country.
  • No mention of delegating taxing authority to states, a significant silence given the radical nature of such a change.
  • By 1976, Indian policy had shifted away from termination toward self-determination (“self-determination without termination,” per President Nixon).
  • Indian canons of construction require explicit abrogation of tribal reserved rights and immunities; such abrogation was absent.

• Holding and Rule from Bryan:

  • PL 280:
    • Grants state criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
    • Grants state civil adjudicatory authority (power of state courts to hear certain cases).
    • Does not grant general state taxing power over Indians.
    • Does not grant general state civil regulatory authority over Indians in Indian Country.

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians: Criminal vs Civil Regulatory Power under PL 280

• Central Question:

  • If PL 280 grants states criminal jurisdiction but not general civil regulatory jurisdiction, how do we distinguish criminal from civil regulatory laws?

• Facts:

  • California attempted to apply penal code provisions to tribal bingo and card game operations open to the public.
  • California law did not outright ban bingo; it restricted it:
    • Permitted charitable organizations to conduct bingo for their members.
    • Conditions included no wages or profits and limited prizes.

• Analysis of Criminal vs Civil Regulatory:

  • Distinction does not depend on the type of penalty (fines, etc.), since some civil laws also use fines.
  • Court adopted the “criminal prohibitory vs civil regulatory” test, building on Bryan:
    • If the underlying conduct is completely prohibited by the state, the law is criminal prohibitory.
      • Such laws can be enforced by PL 280 states in Indian Country.
    • If the conduct is generally permitted but subject to regulation, the law is civil regulatory.
      • Such laws are not within PL 280’s grant of authority over Indians in Indian Country.

• Application to California’s Gambling Laws:

  • California itself conducted a state lottery.
  • Allowed pari-mutuel horse race gambling.
  • Allowed charitable bingo.
  • Because California broadly permitted gambling in regulated forms, its bingo laws were civil regulatory, not purely criminal prohibitory.

• Holding and Consequences:

  • Even in a PL 280 state like California, tribal gaming operations were allowed to proceed.
  • Outside PL 280 states, states would have even less basis to intrude on tribal gaming operations.
  • Cabazon prompted enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA):
    • Limited and structured tribal gaming.
    • Created a federal regulatory regime under which gaming has flourished for many, though not all, tribes.

Key Terms and Doctrines

• Indian Country:

  • Jurisdictional term designating areas where special federal Indian law rules apply.

• Inherent Tribal Sovereignty:

  • Tribes’ inherent authority to govern themselves, preempting state law within Indian Country unless clearly limited by Congress.

• Federal Supremacy / Federal Preemption:

  • Federal authority and statutes override conflicting state law in Indian affairs.

• Infringement Test (Williams v. Lee):

  • State action barred if it infringes reservation Indians’ rights to make their own laws and be ruled by them.

• Indian Canons of Construction:

  • Ambiguities in statutes and treaties are resolved in favor of Indians.
  • Reserved rights and immunities cannot be abrogated without explicit congressional intent.

• PL 280 Criminal Prohibitory vs Civil Regulatory Test (Cabazon):

  • Criminal prohibitory laws: completely ban certain conduct; enforceable under PL 280 in Indian Country.
  • Civil regulatory laws: permit conduct subject to regulation; not generally enforceable under PL 280 against tribes.

Action Items / Next Steps (Course Context)

• Next topic in the course:
  • State jurisdiction in Indian Country without congressional authorization.
  • Will include discussion of additional aspects of Cabazon and other cases.