mr.anand Goenka my ministerial colleague would lead orangy excellencies ladies gentlemen friends it's a great privilege to deliver the fourth Ramnath Goenka lecture and as you all just heard he had a well deserved reputation for saying what needed to be said so it is in that spirit that I address you all today Albert Einstein is best known for his theory of relativity now had he opted for a career in political science he could have actually easily been known for a theory of insanity his definition of that State of Mind was doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results a corollary of that is to expect to is to do the same thing in different situations and then expect the same results this is important to recognize at the moment in world politics when many of our long-held assumptions no longer hold true if the world is different we need to think talk and engage accordingly falling back on the past is unlikely to help with the future now the world is not just different the very structure of the International order is undergoing a profound transformation American nationalism the rise of China the saga of brexit and the rebalancing of the global economy are often cited as the more dramatic examples of change in fact the phenomenon is far more pervasive than just these illustrations we have seen the return of old empires like Russia Iran or turkey the Middle East is in ferment even by its exceptionally volatile standards the centrality of ASEAN to Asia is not what it used to be demographic and economic trends in Africa are giving that continent a greater salience South America is again a battleground for ideas but we are also talking beyond geographies and Orthodox politics what defines power and determines national standing is also no longer the same technology connectivity and trade are at the heart of new contestations in a more constrained and interdependent world competition has to be pursued perforce more intelligently the global Commons is also more in disputation as multilateralism weakens even climate change is a factor contributing to geopolitics amongst others by the opening of an Arctic passage in short changes upon us as never before now if the landscape looks very different today so do India's partners the relevance of the US or China is far more than any time earlier the Russian relationship has defied odds by remaining incredibly steady Japan has become an important factor in our calculations the rediscovery of Europe is again underway with France now as a critical strategic partner the Gulf has been breached in an extraordinarily effective manner ASEAN has grown closer and Australia's relevance is more apparent Africa is today the focus of both Development Assistance and the opening of new embassies and as you would have noted from the UN General Assembly our outreach extends from South America and the Caribbean to the South Pacific and the Baltics closer home there is an unprecedented investment in the neighborhood whose consequences are becoming apparent put together the scale and intensity of our global engagement would be difficult to recognize for someone dealing with it even a few years ago now if the issues and relationships are different so too is the argumentation so the first caution is to avoid obsessing about consistency because it makes little sense in such changing circumstances there's certainly a place for constants but not to the extent of elevating them to immutable concepts on the contrary it is only by recognizing change that we are in a position to exploit opportunities the purposeful pursuit of national interest in shifting global dynamics may not be easy but it must be done and the real obstacle to the rise of India is not anymore the barriers of the world but the dogmas of Delhi an ability to respond to a variety of situations is part of any nation's rise but most agents of change encounter the accumulated wisdom of the entrenched or the passionate argument argumentation of the polarized in India we also meet an obsession with words form and process are often deemed more important than outcomes fortunately discontinuous politics is helpful today in challenging past practices and frozen narratives it does so taking into account the steady elements of any policy in India's case a persistent striving to expand space and options not an end in itself that that is meant to ensure greater prosperity at home peace on the borders protection of our people and enhancing influence abroad now obviously our national strategy to realize even the more constant goals cannot be static in an evolving world we know that well having seen the world move from bipolar polarity to uni polarity then to multipolarity but changes in strategy also need to cater for greater capabilities ambitions and responsibilities and most of all for changed circumstances in approaching such a world in transformation we must recognize that assumptions need to be regularly revisited and calculations frequently revised to do that an accurate reading of recent history is essential that exercise by itself can encourage appreciating the compulsions of responding to the environment rather than mechanically applying doctrines and concepts now evidence strongly supports the view that India has advanced its interests effectively when it has made hard-headed assessments of contemporary geopolitics and even more so when it did not hesitate to break with its past the 1971 Bangladesh war the 1992 economic and political repositioning the 1998 nuclear test or the 2005 India u.s. nuclear deal are instructive examples indeed it is only through a series of disruptions that India was able to bring about decisive shifts in its favor in contrast the pursuit of apparently consistent course despite changing circumstances often led us to lose the plot this was the case with engaging China in the 1950s as part of a larger post-colonial front even as political differences sharpened over a boundary dispute and a Tibet complication the experience with Pakistan was similar despite that country moving to greater reliance on terrorism to some extent this is a debate about realism and hard security what it really suggests is the need for an unsentimental audit of Indian foreign policy India's record includes dark moments like the 1962 defeat against China or tense ones like the 1965 war with Pakistan where the outcome hung in balance till the very end and more triumphal ones such as the 1971 victory which created Bangladesh there are enough dichotomies in our past to generate a spirited debate on successes and failures a misreading of geopolitics and economics up to 1991 stands out in contrast to the reformist policies there after two decades of nuclear indecision and dramatically with the tests of 1998 the lack of response to 26/11 is so different from the Ori and Bala code operations whether it be events or trends they all bear scrutiny for the lessons they hold if we look back at this journey of independent India the growth in its capabilities and influence should not conceal the mischances and shortcomings the roads not taken may often be an exercise in imagination but equally they are a sign of honest introspection a power that is serious about self-improvement should not I am convinced shrink from such an undertaking how has Indian foreign policy evolved since independence understanding that is best done by dividing it into six broad phases each response to a very different strategic environment the first phase from 1946 to 62 could be characterized as an era of optimistic non-alignment it's setting was very much of a bipolar world with camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union India's objectives were to resist the constraining of his choices and the dilution of its sovereignty as it rebuilt its economy and consolidated its integrity it's parallel goal as the first of the decolonized Nations was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable World Order this was the heyday of bonding and Belgrade the peak of third world solidarity it saw energetic Indian diplomacy from Korea and Vietnam to the Suez and Hungary for a few years our position on the world stage seemed a short but the 1962 conflict with China not only brought this period to an end but in a manner that significantly damaged India standing the second phase from 1962 to 71 is a decade of realism and recovery India made pragmatic choices on security and political challenges despite a paucity of resources it looked beyond non-alignment in the interests of national security concluding a now largely forgotten defense agreement with the United States in 1964 external pressures on Kashmir mounted in this period of vulnerability the global context remained bipolar but it now saw the emergence of limited cooperation between the US and USSR South Asia happened to be a particular area of convergence and Indian diplomacy had to face the superpowers together as they did in Tashkent in 1965 it was also a period when domestic challenges were particularly acute ranging from political turbulence to economic distress but for our purposes what is important is that even though the stress levels were very high we came through an anxious period without too much damage the third phase from 1971 to 1991 was one of Greater Indian regional assertion it started with the decisive dismantlement of the India Pakistan equivalence through the creation of Bangladesh but ended with the IP KF misadventure in Sri Lanka the larger environment by now was dramatically different with this sino-us reproach ma of 1971 appending the global strategic landscape the Indus Oviatt treaty and the adoption of more pro-soviet positions on international issues where India's response to this challenge it was a particularly complex phase as the US China Pakistan axis which came into being at this time seriously threatened India's prospects while they had many long term consequences the shift India's posture came more from other factors the collapse of the USSR its close ally and the not unconnected economic crisis in 1991 compelled us to look once again at the first principles of both domestic and foreign policy the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of a unipolar world characterized the fourth phase it encouraged a radical rethink in India on a broad range of issues and it shifted focus to safeguarding strategic autonomy if India opened up economically more to the world its reflection was also evident in new diplomatic priorities and approaches the Lukey's policy summarized the change Indian approach to world affairs which also saw adjustments in its positions on Israel this is a period where India reached out to engage the u.s. more intensively yet did so while protecting its equity in critical areas this quest for strategic autonomy was particularly focused on securing its nuclear weapon option but also was visible in trade negotiations by the turn of the century enough had happened for India to shift gear again and move to a higher level after 1998 it was now a declared nuclear weapon power had fended off Pakistan's military adventurism again in Kargil in 1999 generated enough economic growth to be of global interest and managed well the United States that was focusing more on developments in Asia and consequences of Islamic fundamentalism this more competitive environment opened up new windows of opportunity for India especially as the u.s. found it difficult to maintain the same degree of unipolarity as a consequence India discovered the benefits of working with different powers on different issues this fifth phase is one where India gradually acquires the attributes of a balancing power it is reflected in the India u.s. nuclear deal as well as a better understanding with the West at large at the same time India could also make common cause with China on climate change in trade and consolidate further ties with Russia while helping to fashion BRICS into a major forum this was in some senses a period of opportunity where India moved the global needle by taking new positions a number of developments came together to change calculations by 2014 initiating the sixth phase to begin with China gathered more momentum and the terms of engagement it offered to the world progressively hardened balancing works best during a period of transition and was therefore inevitably mitigated as new realities to croute at the other extreme the American trumpet sounded increasingly uncertain u.s. resource limitation was aggravated by risk aversion in the aftermath of the Iraq war declaring an Afghan withdrawal and displaying tepid et in the asia-pacific sent messages well beyond the immediate issues for its part Europe too turned increasingly inwards not appreciating that political ignore decision would have its own cost Japan's effort to acquire a greater say continued to unfold only gradually the full impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the global economic rebalancing all made itself felt in a variety of ways as the world saw a wider dispersal of power and more localized equations it was evident that multipolarity was now seriously upon us clearly this call for a very different approach than practicing politics with a limited set of dominant players faced with all these developments and assisting the state of global regimes and coalition's India chose to turn to more energetic diplomacy it did so recognizing that we are entering a world of convergences and issue based arrangements this awareness was accompanied by a growing sense of its own capabilities what it brought out was not just the limitations of others but the expectations that the world has of India that we have emerged among the major economies of the world is one factor admittedly the most important but the relevance of our talent to global technologies another one likely to grow in time our ability to shoulder greater responsibilities at a time when the world is more reticent is also evident equally significant is a willingness to shape key global negotiations such as in Paris on global change on climate change the investment of greater resources in development partnerships with countries of the salt was also noteworthy and not least the manner in which we have approached our own region and the extended neighborhood has resonated beyond India's diplomatic agenda has broadened considerably as indeed have its partners in those endeavors we share with the international community the objective that a multipolar world should have a multipolar Asia as its core and to ensure that India needs to follow an approach of working with multiple partners on different agendas obviously they would each have their own importance and priority but sabka saath sabka Vikas sabka vishwas is today as relevant in foreign policy it is the nation's who have an optimal mix of capabilities relationships and positioning who can aspire to occupy the multiple poles of the emerging international order and it is the confidence of being able to forge ahead in this looser architecture that can inspire us to emerge as a leading power in the future now each of these six phases have had their highs and lows in fact the ending of one could well be the beginning of another the 1971 Bangladesh war or the 1998 nuclear test standout in the positive category but it is actually the negative ones that perhaps are more directly responsible for substantial changes of course the 1962 reverse visa by China was one such example the combination of events as diverse at the Gulf War the breakup of the USSR economic stagnation and domestic turbulence coming together in 1991 was another therefore while not being dogmatic about the past it is just as important not to be dismissive about it this is crucial to appreciate because there are both strains of continuity and change in our policy conceptually each period could be visualized as an overlay on the previous one rather than either a negation or just an extrapolation thus the independent mindset that drove non-alignment and then protected our strategic equities can today be better expressed in multiple partnerships so what does the past teach us seven decades of foreign policy certainly offer a lot of lessons especially if we contemplate the challenging road ahead they span a very broad spectrum both in time and in outcomes a dispassionate assessment of our performance would note that while we have done well in some respects many competitors have done much better overcoming many challenges India consolidated its national unity and integrity that was not a given noting that other diverse societies like the USSR and Yugoslavia did not make it in the same period a modern economy with industrial capacities was developed over time even as our reliance on nature was mitigated in agriculture defense preparedness was improved and one of the key accomplishments of diplomacy in fact was to enable access to multiple sources of equipment and technology ha ba ba-ba-ba-ba the fact remains that even after seven decades of independence many of our borders remain unsettled in the economic sphere we may look good when benchmarked against our own past it seems a little different when compared to China or Southeast Asia so what really matters is to develop a sharp awareness about our own performance and the lessons of that exercise can be captured in five baskets of issues the first relates to the need for greater realism in policy international relations are very much a test of will Swami Vivekanand perceptively noted perceptively described the world as a gymnasium where nations come to make themselves strong particularly in the face of optimistic non-alignment perhaps even later a focus on diplomatic visibility sometimes led to overlooking the harsher realities of hard security the early misreading of Pakistan's intentions can perhaps be explained the way by a lack of experience but the reluctance to attach overriding priority to securing borders even a decade later is much more difficult to justify it is not just that the challenges of 1962 were unanticipated it was more that a diplomacy focused on world politics did not give it the primacy it deserved somewhere there was an implicit but deeply entrenched belief that India's high standing in world affairs was protection enough against global turbulence and competitive politics it was therefore at some cost we discovered that outcomes can be decided as much on the field as at conferences this is a relevant take away even now despite having entered a more constrained world interestingly it is not that India always shrank from the from applications of force when required Hyderabad in 1948 and Goa in 1961 are illustrative examples as indeed is Kashmir when it was attacked by Pakistan but having so strongly built up an image of a reluctant power we also ended up influenced by our own narrative due to that we rarely prepared for security situations with the sense of mission that many of our competitors displayed discomfort with hard power was reflected in lack of adequate consultation with the military most notably during the 1962 conflict the creation of the post of chief of Defense staff half a century later shows a very different mindset judgments of the past that overlooks security implications are also worth studying and over emphasis on diplomacy led to a lack of understanding of the behavior of other polities the Cold War for example was seen more as an argumentation when the reality was a ruthless exercise of power there was also little awareness in the 1950s that we were dealing with a battle-hardened neighbor to the north or indeed of the strategic significance of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir this approach to the world of s continued even thereafter thus in 1972 at Shimla India shows to bet on an optimistic outlook on Kashmir on Pakistan at the end of the day it resulted in both a revanchist Pakistan and a continuing problem in Jammu and Kashmir that it has taken us so long to link talks with Pakistan to cessation of terrorism speaks for itself without overstating the argument a case can certainly be made for a more grounded Indian approach to international relations the economic counterpart of these concerns constitute the second basket if one considers all the major growth stories since 1945 a common feature was the extraordinary focus that they put on leveraging the global environment China did that with great effect initially with the USSR and then with the United States and the West the Asian tiger economies practiced it as well using Japan the US and then China successively to build themselves that is how India 2 approached its various relationships in the last 7 years 7 decades but not always with the same single mindedness nevertheless much of India's industrialization and capacities in other domains where direct achievements of collaborations enabled by diplomacy steel nuclear industry higher education and computing are among the examples this held true even more for the post 1991 reform period and the shift eastward of India's center of gravity the interconnection between diplomacy strategy and economic capabilities is hey Baba not self-evident as in security it is important to distinguish between cause and effect the economy drives diplomacy not the other way around few would argue that the reforms of the 1990s and greater openness have served as well but as we then extrapolated it into free trade arrangements with Southeast Asia and East Asia the proposition has become more challenging blame it on structural rigidity limited competitiveness inadequate exploitation of opportunities or just plain unfair practices the growing deficit numbers in trade are today a stark reality more importantly their negative impact on industry at home is impossible to deny and China of course poses a special trade challenge even without an FTA in this background the recent debate about the AR SEP the regional comprehensive economic partnership offers lessons in foreign policy as much as in the trade domain on the one hand we should not go back to the old dogmas old dogmas of economic autarky and import substitution but at the same time embracing the new dogma of globalization without a cost-benefit analysis is equally dangerous what we saw in Bangkok recently was a clear-eyed calculation of the gains and costs of entering a new arrangement we negotiated till the very end as indeed we should but then knowing what was on offer we took a call and that call was that no agreement at this time was better than a bad agreement it is also important to recognize what the our SEP is not it is not about stepping back from the act East policy which in any case is deeply rooted in distant and contemporary history our cooperation spans so many domains that this one decision does not really undermine the basics even in trade India already has FTAs in Arma of FTAs with 12 out of the 15 are sub partners nor is there really a connection with our Indo Pacific approach as that goes well beyond the our sub membership there can be a legitimate debate on the merits of joining our SEP or any other FTA for that matter just don't confuse it for grant strategy any quest to maximize options and expand space naturally required engaging multiple players conceptually this third basket is a given in Indian foreign policy since there is a basic consensus about nurturing our independence while it has served us very well in the first decade of a bipolar world we also discovered The Associated dangers of being left short on all accounts as India saw in 1962 the best of both worlds is easier imagined than realized in the periods thereafter the distance from one pole was also not automatically compensated by the other sometimes global circumstances required us as in 1971 to lean on one side just as China did in 1950 and 1971 as a general rule extracting more from the international system depends on the bigger picture and a zero-sum game cannot be an assumption indeed a particularly disturbing scenario that nations like India and China faced in the 1960s was the prospect of the superpowers finding common ground that is why the talk of a g2 even decades later creates such deep unease again in so many quarters hedging hedging is a delicate exercise whether it is non-alignment strategic or toner or and strategic autonomy of earlier periods or multiple engagements of the future but there's no getting away from it in a multipolar world this is a game best played on the front foot appreciating the progress on any one front strengthens one's hand on all others in that sense it is like having many balls up in the air and displaying the confidence and the dexterity to drop none to the uninitiated or the anachronistic the pursuit of apparently con trajectory objectives and approaches may seem baffling how do you reconcile how d Modi Amalapuram and a Vladivostok of the Rick Russia India China with the Jay Japan America India or the quad with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or an Iran with a Saudi Arabia or in Israel with a Palestine the answer is in a willingness to look beyond dogma and enter the real world of convergences think of it not as a rhythmatic but as calculus this new game is a challenge for practitioners and analysts alike but one that must be mastered to forge ahead now risk-taking is an inherent aspect of diplomacy and most policy judgments revolved around its mechanics it is also a natural accompaniment to hedging when we look at this fourth basket it is evident that the low-risk foreign policy is only likely to produce limited reports on occasions when India departed from this mode some risks paid off and some did not we had laid out a broad foreign policy approach as early as 1946 and developed that framework as time went on although India came under pressure in 1962 and 1971 it limited the compromise it had to make and sought to revert to an earlier posture as soon as it could over the course of its ties it introduced new concepts and terms to deal with emerging issues but without necessarily abandoning the earlier ones the cumulative impression of this was therefore of a steady and middle-of-the-road approach that gathered greater substance as India's influence grew but having noted that the truth is also that ascending up the global ladder did require taking big balls big balls that were conventional or nuclear political or economic not all risks are necessarily dramatic many just require the confident and determine follow-up of day-to-day management but that aggregate impact can result in quantum jump in global positioning to a certain degree we see that happening today now the fifth basket is actually a return to the diplomatic primer reading the global tea leaves right the foreign policy of all nations is set against the backdrop of global contradictions they reflect an assessment of opportunities and compulsions and of risks and rewards even if you are to get our immediate situation right a misreading of the larger landscape can prove costly in our own case going to the United Nations on Jammu and Kashmir clearly misread the intent of the anglo-american alliance then and of the seriousness of the Cold War years later our early awareness of the sino-soviet differences did not mature on our expected timelines but and in the 1960s the 1980s and again after 2001 we grossly underestimated the relevance of Pakistan to American and Chinese global strategy this is not to suggest that India has not had its successes in those Soviet and later Indo Russian relations are a direct product of our global strategizing after 1991 so too has been the adjustment of our policy towards the United States both the Indo Soviet treaty and the India u.s. nuclear deal where outcomes of a larger reading of the world that is the case with correctives introduced in respect of the u.s. in 1973 and China in 1976 to overcome the polarization that had been created by the 1971 situation identifying opportunities thrown out by the structure of all politics can also help mitigate risks we saw that for example in respect of France after the 1998 nuclear tests today an appreciation of world politics must include a proper understanding of sino-us contradictions of growing multipolarity weaker multilateralism of larger economic and political rebalancing of greater space for regional powers and of the world of convergences each of them is a factor in driving the policy initiatives of the present era whether it is our outreach to the Gulf the advocacy of indo-pacific or the more rigorous engagement with Europe they represent a facet of a larger repositioning so what are the prospects of the sixth phase that is now underway a changing world is clearly a more actionable one for those who do not wish to get left behind as rabindranath tagore declared you cannot cross the sea merely by standing and staring at the water for a beginning it requires a thinking that keeps up with the times a clearer definition of interests is the next step and the determined pursuit of that the one they're after we see that today for example in a better appreciation of a maritime geography and the sagar doctrine when confronted by security challenges this india has also responded with a new grid its enthusiasm for shaping global conversations on climate change terrorism connectivity and maritime security is already having an impact the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations undertaken in Yemen Nepal Iraq Sri Lanka Maldives Fiji and Mozambique are statements of capability as much as of responsibility its election winning record in international organizations is another important statement expanded offers of development assistance have been accompanied by an improved record of project execution the neighborhood our Africa will surely testify to that change India's branding has become much stronger including the International Day of yoga the International solar Alliance and most recently the initiative for a coalition of the disaster resilient infrastructure so while the previous phases of foreign policy each have a neat description how do we categorize the current one part of the challenges that we are still in the early phase of a major transition the contours of even the near future are not yet clear one solution is to anchor it on Indian aspirations and speak of a goal of emerging as a leading power now the problem with that is that others tend to think of it as a statement of arrival rather than a goal on the horizon taking off from non-alignment we could perhaps speak today of multi alignment it appears energetic it appears participative and compared to an earlier posture of abstention or non involvement it certainly sounds very much more vigorous but the difficulty is it also appears very opportunistic whereas India is really seeking strategic convergence rather than tactical convenience putting India first India first may be another way of capturing a strong and pragmatic policy outlook but this also suffers from a comparison with other nations some of whom have chosen to be very self-centered in India's case nationalism has in fact led to greater internationalism advancing prosperity and influence maybe a fair description but is not exactly a catch word so perhaps we need to accept the reality that a single phrase may elude us for some time in the midst of global uncertainty now as we stand poised to move to the next level we could also ask ourselves did we lose valuable time in doing so such queries are often a product of hindsight and may lack context but nevertheless there are issues that could be pondered about especially if we speak of outcomes of judgment rather than of circumstances our ties with China are a natural beginning for such a discussion should India for example have brought the boundary issue to head in 1950 itself could the border conflict of 1962 have been avoided by a compromise in 1960 when John like came to India with the United States did our cultural antipathy in the initial years aggravate the sense of distance on economic issues perhaps there is more consensus that India should have followed the example of the ASEAN and China and opened up a decade earlier than it did but on the strategic side the delay in a self declaration as a nuclear weapon power from 1974 to 1998 may well have been the worst of all worlds very prisoners to paper a trait that came close to wrecking the 2005 nuclear deal as well a past handling of Pakistan a society which we are supposed to know well also raises many questions these are not exactly hypothetical situations and are cited to underline the contention that emergence is a leading power requires great pragmatism that can be further strengthened by more sophisticated narratives that can help reconcile divergences after all our emphasis on sovereignty has not prevented us from responding to human rights situations in our neighborhood and not indeed have steps that India has taken to ensure its integrity and promoted security whether in Hyderabad Goa or abroad in Sri Lanka or Maldives made us less multilateral now this stock is about dogma and entrenched views are naturally strongest on the most perennial challenges in the case of India it will come as no surprise to any of you that this relates to Pakistan changes in thinking will trigger a debate and that has been the case for the past few years the fact is that we have allowed the narrative to focus mainly on a dial when the real issue was stopping cross-border terrorism dogma treats every new approach as an unjustified deviation in the last five years huh Baba a different normal has developed and global conversations on cross-border terrorism have become more serious just look at the F ATF as proof of that assertion as we move decisively to combat separatism in Jammu and Kashmir there is some talk today of its internationalization and hyphenation of our ties with Pakistan this is thinking from the past reflecting neither the strength of India the mood of the nation nor the determination of the government uninformed comments abroad or on on our internal affairs is hardly internationalization and the reputational and real differences between India and Pakistan will always put paid to any hyphenation effort in reality these fears are but a thinly disguised advocacy of inaction their intent conscious or otherwise is to legitimize the status quo that has now been overtaken by history the balance sheet for India's foreign policy after seven decades presents a mixed picture National Development is at the heart of any assessment and it is difficult to quarrel with the view that there has been significant progress but not enough the comparison with what China achieved in the same period is sobering reading the global tea leaves right and then leveraging the international situation could have gone better indeed the mantra of unchanging foreign policy axioms has discouraged an honest review of our performance and the introduction of timely correctives diligence and debate have not been as rigorous as they should have been for an aspiring player when combined with the hesitations of history it has led to unexplored avenues and unrealized outcomes what we are now but we are now at a cusp of change with more confidence the pursuit of seemingly divergent goals and the straddling of contradictions are being attempted taking risks is inherent to the realization of ambitions a nation that has the aspiration to become a leading power someday cannot continue with unsettled borders and an an unintegrated region and under exploited opportunities above all it cannot be dogmatic approaching a visibly changing world order Napoleon once said that history is a version of past events that people have decided to agree upon the world that awaits us not only calls for fresh thinking but eventually a new consensus at home as well putting dogmas behind us is a starting point for that journey thank you very much [Applause] you