In January 1919, Great Britain had just
emerged victorious from the First World War, and ruled over an even larger empire
than before . But many in Ireland were unhappy with British rule, and over the
next two years, Irish republicans won their independence – so how did the mighty
British empire lose the Anglo-Irish War? The Irish War of Independence, or Anglo-Irish War
that raged from 1919 to 1921 was rooted in Irish desire for independence from Great Britain. The
so-called Irish Question had marked UK politics since Ireland became part of the UK in 1800, and
was still a difficult topic in 1914. That year, the British parliament passed a Home Rule Act
giving Ireland more autonomy within the UK, but the government delayed implementing
it when the Great War broke out. Many Irishmen though, they felt British rule
was foreign and unjust and wanted a fully independent republic . Some radical armed
groups launched the Easter Rising in 1916, and declared a free Irish government – but
British troops crushed them . London tried to find a political solution with an all-party
Irish Convention, but it failed. Then, in the December 1918 election the republican Sinn
Fein party , with links to the Easter Rising, won three quarters of the Irish seats in the UK
parliament with support from Ireland’s Catholic majority. The mostly Protestant Ulster region
though, supported the pro-UK Irish Unionist party. Sinn Fein didn’t send its representatives to sit
in the London parliament – instead, leader Eamon de Valera announced an Irish-only parliament
called the Dáil. Preparing for conflict, Sinn Fein worked closely with the armed group
known as the Irish Republican Army, or IRA. So, in early 1919, a self-declared Irish
parliament allied with the independent IRA, and the Anglo-Irish War soon began. The Dail sat for the first time January
21, 1919, and declared independence: “We solemnly declare foreign government in
Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which we will never tolerate, and
we demand the evacuation of our country by the English garrison.” (Hopkinson 208)
The British though, still controlled Ireland through the Dublin Castle administration and
the police – the Royal Irish Constabulary or RIC . To republicans, they were an occupying
force even though most police were fellow Catholics, so on the same day the Dail declared
independence, the IRA ambushed and killed two policemen at Soloheadbeg . Sinn Fein had not
approved the attack, but it’s often seen as the start of the war even though London
considered it a police matter at first. The IRA now began a guerilla campaign against the
RIC and British officials. They avoided pitched battles and instead ambushed police patrols
or barracks with whatever weapons they had, even home-made bombs . The IRA also organized
itself into county brigades, or parish companies, and recruited unit leaders. They also used
“flying columns” of mobile attack groups that could quickly form up, attack, and disappear. This
was a tricky process and there were struggles, but a decentralized structure had advantages:
“The democratic organisation of the Volunteers and the impossibility in the circumstances of
any tight control by the headquarters staff permitted and encouraged the development of
local initiative on a scale quite abnormal in a regular army .” (Hopkinson 16)
To the RIC, the attacks seemed to come out of nowhere, and the attackers melted
away into the civilian population. IRA fighter Seamus Conway described a typical ambush:
“In a brief space of time two lorries… approached. The mine on being exploded blew the front part off
the first lorry, bringing it to a standstill and throwing out the occupants. The second lorry
pulled up behind this and concentrated rifle fire was brought to bear on it. Its occupants
jumped, and dived for cover, a good many of them knocked out as they did so. Cover at
this point was scarce. They got their Lewis gun into operation immediately, but after a few
bursts, the gunner was knocked out and the guns did not get into action any more.” (Leeson 138)
The IRA attacks were small -- they killed 15 policemen in all of 1919 – but they had a big
political impact. Even when the RIC repelled IRA assaults on better-defended police barracks,
which they usually did, they improved republican morale and forced the British on the defensive.
The IRA usually chose the time and place of any combat, which overwhelmed the RIC, which
suffered more casualties than the attackers. So in March 1920, the British created the RIC
Special Reserve, better known as the Black and Tans since they used some army khaki in their dark
uniforms. Most were English or Irish Protestants who had fought in the Great War, though 20% were
Catholic – but contrary to popular belief, very few were criminals before joining. Poor training
and pressures of counter-insurgency combat meant that the Black and Tans would commit more crimes
than other British soldiers while in uniform. The IRA’s guerilla campaign against
the police accelerated in 1920, which also saw escalation from the British side. IRA ambushes become more frequent and more deadly
in the second year of the war, killing 143 police. The embattled RIC spent more time in barracks
in towns for safety, leaving rural Ireland in the hands of the IRA. The IRA also began an arson
campaign that summer, burning over 400 abandoned police barracks and 50 courthouses . Sinn Fein
set up a parallel state in the countryside, including republican courts, police patrols, and
taxes. They also brought the British courts system to a virtual halt, as witnesses, juries, and even
judges refused to participate. This was partly due to republican sympathies among most Catholics,
but also IRA intimidation. One magistrate wrote: “Everybody is yielding to Sinn Fein whether
they approve of it or not. They say they can do nothing else, and that the [UK] Government
cannot or will not protect them, and the police can barely protect themselves.” (Townshend 149)
London underestimated the republican movement, but British officers in Ireland took
it seriously. Lord George Riddell recorded a conversation with general Lord French: “It was absurd to think that the British Army
could not quell such an insurrection if given proper powers. [French] said it was an
underground conspiracy. You might pass from one end of Ireland to the other and
not see anything abnormal. But the rebel organisation was there.” (Riddell 202/203)
British strategy was failing, so they created a new force in July 1920 – the Auxiliary Division
of the RIC, or Auxies. They’re often confused with the Black and Tans, but they were a separate
paramilitary force of ex-Great War British officers. Their task was to take the fight to the
IRA in the southern counties, and while they were well armed and well paid, they were poorly
housed, poorly fed, and poorly organized. The Auxies had some success against the IRA,
like capturing 40 prisoners at Kilmashogue in September, but morale was bad and turnover
high. Auxie Ernest Lycett explained the stresses: “We were on dangerous duty, which was to keep
the highways and roads open to traffic. Every morning the patrols would leave the Castle […]
All in battle order and ready for trouble on the way […] it was very interesting, passing through
the most beautiful country, but we never knew what was just around the bend.” (O’Brien 34)
The Auxies and Black and Tans became more known for violence against civilians than
for fighting the IRA. They often couldn’t find the IRA after an ambush, and many
shopkeepers refused to sell to police, so under constant threat of attack, the
Auxies and Black and Tans turned to violent reprisals as punishment. After an IRA attack
or simply for perceived republican sympathies, they shot into homes, looted shops, and
burned buildings. Between July and September, there were notable reprisals in
Thurles, Upperchurch, Limerick, Templemore, and Balbriggan, and Tubbercurry.
Local resident Mrs. Murricane recounted her experience: "They all seemed to me to speak
with an Irish accent. The swearing was awful. The men asked me where my husband was, and
I asked him what they wanted him for. They replied, 'To shoot him.'” (“Tubbercurry,"
Manchester Guardian, 4 October 1920. p. 8.) The British officially banned reprisals in
August, but officers turned a blind eye and some encouraged them: “The more you shoot the better
I will like you, and no policeman will get into trouble for shooting a man .” (McMahon 62)
The reprisals turned more Irishmen against Britain, but also frightened some into
giving the police information. The IRA also pressured civilians to cooperate with them,
and killed suspected police informants. In general the republican side benefitted politically
from the violence, except in Ulster. There, an attempted republic economic boycott led to the
revival of a unionist paramilitary organization, the Ulster Volunteer Force. Many northern
towns became divided on sectarian lines as Protestants and Catholics fought in the streets
and forced each other into separate neighborhoods. So by fall 1920, the violence had spread to all
parts of Ireland. British police morale was low, but the Auxies had gained control over
some republican areas. In early November, British authorities reported on their progress:
“Much of the moral and material support lent to Sinn Fein is due to fear and with
the growth of the realisation that the Government is beginning to get a grip
of the situation there are indications of a return to sanity and revulsion against
Sinn Fein on the part of more responsible persons.” (Townshend 216/217) But the IRA was
about to launch its most ambitious attack yet. One strength of the IRA was intelligence. Sinn
Fein’s secretive Minister for Home Affairs and Director of Intelligence, Michael Collins, had
become a legendary figure. He built a network of informers in the British administration and
police, using the information to carry out targeted assassinations of British officials.
British intelligence, on the other hand, consistently failed in Ireland: they once
arrested Collins but only realized it after they’d already released him. IRA intelligence operative
Florence O’Donoghue explained British troubles: “One thing [the British] lacked which
the IRA had in generous measure [was] the co-operation of the people and without it
they were blind and impotent.” (O’Brien 43) The British relied on paid informants, a
problematic system but one that did bring some results. Collins decided a dramatic action
was needed. The Dail approved his plan for an IRA group known as the Squad to kill 12 members
of British intelligence known as The Cairo Gang, in their own homes . On the morning of Sunday
November 21, 1920, the Squad killed 14 men, including the first two Auxies of the war
in an unplanned clash. It’s not clear how many of the dead were in The Cairo Gang.
That afternoon, the British responded, surrounding a crowd watching Gaelic football at
Croke Park. The police said they wanted to search for IRA agents, but claimed that someone
fired at them from the stands – a claim that has never been verified . The Auxies
and RIC fired into the crowd, killing 14, including 3 children. At Dublin Castle, British
officers executed three prominent IRA prisoners. Publicly, the IRA trumpeted
Bloody Sunday as a victory: “My one intention was the destruction of the
undesirables who continued to make miserable the lives of ordinary decent citizens. […] If I had a
second motive it was not more than a feeling such as I would have for a dangerous reptile. By their
destruction the very air is made sweeter […] They have destroyed without trial. I have paid
them back in their own coin.’ (Dolan 794) Privately though, Collins had doubts as he
had not expected the harsh British response. The events of Bloody Sunday sent a
shockwave across Ireland and Britain, but the violence continued
even as diplomacy began. Even before Bloody Sunday, the British had
been divided about Ireland. General Nevil Macready wanted to impose martial law,
but Lloyd Geoge refused, saying one did not declare war on rebels. Instead, in December
1920 London passed the Government of Ireland Act, which foresaw two Home Rule systems and
two Irish parliaments: one for Ulster, and one for the rest . But the act didn’t satisfy
republicans or unionists. Lloyd George started secret talks with Sinn Fein’s Arthur Griffith,
but IRA commanders were planning more ambushes. In County Cork, the Auxies had become complacent:
“There was always careless talk in the town and it was easy for [the enemy] to find out which section
we would be patrolling on any day some days ahead, and make any plans they thought fit.” (O’Brien 55)
On November 28, Tom Barry’s IRA unit ambushed a convoy of two police lorries – killing 16 of 18
Auxies on the spot and one later. The IRA accused the police of pretending to surrender before
opening fire, a claim that is still debated a century later. The lone surviving policeman,
on the other hand, insisted the IRA executed the police after they had surrendered.
The Auxiliary Division had suffered its bloodiest defeat of the war and the British
declared martial law in four counties, including this public warning:
“Note Well: That a state of armed insurrection exists, that any person taking
part therein or harbouring any person who has taken part therein, or procuring, inviting,
aiding or abetting any person to part therein, is guilty of levying war against His Majesty The
King, and is liable on conviction by a military court to suffer DEATH.” (O’Brien 49/50)
After another IRA ambush in Cork City, British troops and police torched the city
centre in reprisal. Foreign governments condemned the British action, and London paid
residents 3 million pounds in compensation. Some Auxies though, saw it as payback
and wore burnt pieces of Cork on their caps. The British decide they need to
channel the violence of their forces, so they introduce a system of official,
limited reprisals in January 1921. But imposing martial law in part of Ireland did
not solve London’s problems, like poor morale, complicated British command structure
and infighting between various police, administration, and military services.
With Irish elections planned for May 1921, Lloyd George proposed a truce, which the
IRA rejected since they’d have to disarm. So both the British and the IRA were
facing serious challenges to achieving their aims in the war – but the fighting
would be more intense than ever in 1921. Both sides went on the offensive. Britain
sent reinforcements, and soldiers and police patrolled aggressively into IRA-controlled
territory. The IRA also adapted, with better training and replacing the Flying Columns with
smaller Active Service Units. The Dail also took responsibility for the IRA, to smooth tensions
and improve ammunition and weapons procurement. At first, the spike in violence in 1921 led to
British success. Several IRA raids went badly, and at Clonmult the British killed 8 and arrested
12. Police and soldiers also seized IRA weapons, leading to a critical shortage.
But politically, violence still benefitted the republican cause. In
March, they planned an ambush to kill British Lieutenant General Strickland. 70 IRA men
under Sean Moylan and Paddy O’Brien attacked the British convoy with mines and machine guns:
“Our men opened fire on the leading lorry, and stopped it by killing the driver. The second
lorry pulled up, and the touring car and armoured car almost dashed into it… The rear lorry came
on until stopped by our rifle fire. There must have been a big roll of casualties in this
car, as a very effective fire was poured into it from the north and west. After a
2 hour fight, in which the enemy machine guns searched the whole countryside, and which
finally developed into a series of skirmishes over a large area, we retreated in good order
after inflicting heavy casualties and without suffering any on our side.” (Townshend 243)
The IRA had killed a British officer, but it wasn’t Strickland – it was Brigadier-General
Hanway Robert Cumming, along with 4 others. It was not as successful as the IRA made it out
to be, but was another blow to the British army. Such countryside attacks were important,
but republicans knew the political centre was Dublin. The IRA’s new Dublin Active
Service Unit stepped up small-scale attacks, striking more than 200 times between March and
May. De Valera wanted a larger operation so on May 25 IRA units stormed the Dublin Custom House on
May 25. 120 IRA men set the building on fire, but Auxiliaries in an armoured car arrived, killing
6 IRA men and forcing 80 to surrender. Sinn Fein publicly celebrated a victory, but internally
members worried about such heavy losses. The escalation in 1921 left both sides
exhausted: the republicans were militarily weak but politically strong, while the British
had the opposite problem. Something had to give. By July, the British had arrested 4500 IRA
men, leaving only 2000 active IRA fighters in the field. The British even narrowly missed
capturing Michael Collins himself - again. Lloyd George, however, acknowledged the reality
of majority republican support outside Ulster and offered more talks. In July 1921, a fragile
truce began. Hardliners on both sides grumbled since they thought their side was winning,
but for Collins at least, it was a necessity: “We had not when these [truce] terms were offered
an average of one round of ammunition for each weapon we had. The fighting area in Cork… was
becoming daily more circumscribed, and they could not have carried on much longer.” (Knirck 76)
London wanted an autonomous Ireland to remain part of the empire. Sinn Fein leaders were divided
between those willing to compromise and those who felt anything short of a fully independent
republic was a betrayal of the cause. Talks bogged down on two questions: the status of Ulster and
whether an Irish government would have to swear an oath to the Crown. Most republican politicians
eventually accepted Ulster would remain in the UK, and de Valera proposed an oath that recognized
an “association” with the Crown and not loyalty. But De Valera went back on his own draft oath,
and refused to participate directly in the talks. On December 5, Britain gave the divided
Irish peace delegation in London an ultimatum: accept the latest deal or face renewed war .
The delegates thought they had the authority to sign without consulting de Valera, and did.
The final terms represented major compromises by both sides: an Irish Free State would have
its own Parliament for domestic affairs; enjoy financial independence; and have its own
small military. British troops would leave the country, except for Ulster, which chose
to remain in the UK. The Irish Free State was still a part of the British Empire and the
parliament had to swear an oath to the Crown. The Irish War of Independence took the lives
of around 260 British soldiers, 360 police, 550 IRA fighters, and 200 civilians. But the
peace caused a political crisis in the Free State. De Valera and other hardliners bitterly
opposed the treaty, and republicans split into pro- and anti-treaty factions . Just before
the Dail ratified the treaty in January 1922, De Valera made an ominous prediction:
“If the Treaty was accepted, the fight for freedom would still go on, and the Irish
people, instead of fighting foreign soldiers, would have to fight the Irish soldiers of
an Irish Government set up by Irishmen… They would have to wade through Irish blood,
through the blood of the soldiers of the Irish Government, and through, perhaps, the blood of
some of the members of the Government in order to get Irish freedom.” (De Valera and Moynihan 98/99)
Ireland had just won partial independence – but the Irish Free State was
on the brink of civil war. We here at Real Time History love learning
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