Lecture on Oligopoly and Cartels
Introduction to Oligopoly
- Continuation of the discussion on oligopolies, focusing on cartels.
- Previous discussion on non-cooperative equilibria in oligopolies.
Cartels and Cooperative Equilibria
- Cartels: Groups of firms cooperating to achieve monopoly-like outcomes.
- Example: American and United airlines cooperating as a cartel.
- Demand: 339 - q, Price: 339 - q, Marginal Cost: 147.
- As a monopoly: Optimal quantity = 96 flights, Price = $243, Profits = $4608 per firm.
- Non-cooperative equilibrium: 64 flights, Price = $211, Profits = $4096 per firm.
- Cooperation increases profits by 12.5%.
Instability of Cartels
- Cartels are fundamentally unstable due to self-interest and incentive to cheat.
- Example of Cheating: If American increases flights from 48 to 50, price falls to $241.
- American profits increase to $4700.
- United profits decrease to $4512.
- Cheating Incentive: Firms benefit from cheating by sharing the negative effects with others.
Legal and Historical Context
- Cartels are illegal due to antitrust laws.
- History: 1800s saw attempts at cartelization in railroads and oil.
- Formation of trusts to enforce cooperation.
- Antitrust laws were enacted to prevent these practices.
Examples of Cartelization
- Movie Industry: Production companies bought theaters, exclusive film rights led to antitrust action.
- Airlines: British Airlines and Virgin Atlantic's hidden price coordination.
- Sports: NFL's exemption from antitrust laws, forming a legal cartel.
- International Cartels: OPEC’s partial success in oil production.
- Government-Endorsed Cartels: Voluntary export restraints with Japan in the 1980s.
Economic Welfare and Market Structures
- Comparison of perfect competition, monopoly, and oligopoly.
- Monopoly: Higher profits, fewer flights (lower market output).
- Perfect Competition: Maximizes welfare with highest quantity sold.
- Oligopoly Outcome: In between monopoly and competition outcomes.
- More firms reduce markup and approach competitive equilibrium.
Mergers and Economies of Scale
- Mergers evaluated by federal government based on economies of scale vs. market power.
- Example: Hospital mergers in the 2000s led to higher prices without efficiency gains.
Price Competition (Bertrand Model)
- Firms compete on price, not quantity.
- Can achieve competitive equilibrium with just two firms.
- Situations Favoring Price Competition: Markets with small production lags.
Product Differentiation
- Firms use differentiation to escape Bertrand competition and increase market power.
- Example: Cereal brands introducing diverse products to differentiate.
Conclusion
- Competitive markets enhance social welfare but reduce firm profits.
- Understanding oligopolistic behavior, cartels, and market structures is crucial for economic policy and welfare.
Note: This lecture covers complex topics in game theory, industrial organization, and economic policy, highlighting real-world applications and implications.