The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Overview

• The hard problem of consciousness involves explaining why physical states are conscious rather than nonconscious.
• Functional, dynamical, and structural properties of consciousness can be explained through science, but the essence of consciousness itself remains elusive.
• The problem questions why consciousness exists at all, contrasting with "easy problems" that are explainable through science.

Historical Context

• Coined by David Chalmers in 1995, it is central to the philosophy of mind.
• Touches upon ontology, limits of scientific explanation, and introspection.
• Diverse reactions include denial, reductionism, panpsychism, and dualism.

Philosophical Perspectives

1. Chalmers

• Phenomenal consciousness eludes functional explanations.
• Proposes that consciousness must be added to ontology as a fundamental feature.

2. Nagel

• Argues consciousness is inherently subjective.
• Explores the "what it is like" aspect through the example of a bat's experience.

3. Levine

• Identifies a special explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical.
• Good explanations should deductively entail what they explain, which is missing in consciousness studies.

Underlying Reasons

• Consciousness features that complicate explanations:
  • Immediacy: Direct access to conscious states.
  • Indescribability: Qualities that cannot be fully conveyed.
  • Independence: Conscious qualities seemingly unrelated to mental functions.

Responses to the Problem

a. Eliminativism

• Denies the existence of consciousness.
• Criticized for denying the basic certainty of conscious experience.

b. Strong Reductionism

• Posits consciousness as reducible to functional properties.
• Includes theories like Global Workspace and Representationalism.

c. Weak Reductionism

• Identifies consciousness with physical properties without further explanation.
• Addresses counterintuitiveness via the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy (PCS).

d. Mysterianism

• Asserts that the hard problem might be unsolvable with current or even future scientific knowledge.
• Temporary versus permanent mysterianism.

e. Interactionist Dualism

• Views consciousness as distinct from physical but interacting with it.
• Challenges the causal closure of the physical domain.

f. Epiphenomenalism

• Phenomenal properties accompany but do not cause physical events.
• Contradicts intuitions about mental causation.

g. Dual Aspect Theory/Neutral Monism/Panpsychism

• Propose a more fundamental substance underlying both physical and phenomenal properties.
• Avoid epiphenomenalism and challenge traditional reductionist views.

References and Further Reading

• Extensive list of references related to consciousness, philosophy, and neuroscience for deeper exploration.

Author Information

• Josh Weisberg: Contributor and researcher in the field of consciousness studies at the University of Houston.