The Most Famous Problem in Game Theory: The Prisoner's Dilemma
Introduction
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a fundamental problem in game theory.
It appears in various situations, from international conflicts to everyday chores.
The game illustrates the challenges of cooperation and competition.
Historical Context
On September 3, 1949, the US discovered that the Soviet Union had developed nuclear weapons.
The US considered a preemptive strike against the Soviets.
John von Neumann, founder of game theory, suggested immediate action.
The RAND Corporation studied the implications using game theory.
Two mathematicians at RAND invented the Prisoner's Dilemma in 1950.
The Prisoner's Dilemma Explained
Two players can either cooperate or defect.
Payoff matrix:
Both cooperate: 3 coins each.
One defects, the other cooperates: Defector gets 5 coins, cooperator gets none.
Both defect: 1 coin each.
Rational choice leads both players to defect, resulting in a suboptimal outcome.
Applied to US-Soviet relations: Both developed nuclear arsenals, wasting resources.
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Impalas grooming each other illustrate repeated interactions in nature.
In repeated games, cooperation can emerge as a strategy.
Robert Axelrod's 1980 computer tournament tested game strategies.
Axelrod's Tournament
14 strategies plus one random strategy competed in 200 rounds.
Strategies included: Friedman (always defect after one defection), Joss (cooperate with random defections), Grass Camp (probe strategy), and Name Withheld (most elaborate).
Tit for Tat, the simplest strategy, won the tournament.
Tit for Tat: Cooperates first, then mirrors opponent's previous move.
Key Findings from Axelrod's Tournament
Successful strategies shared four qualities:
Nice: Do not defect first.
Forgiving: Do not hold grudges.
Retaliatory: Strike back immediately after a defection.
Clear: Easy to understand and predict.
Nice and forgiving strategies outperformed nasty ones.
Tit for Tat's effectiveness came from balanced retaliation and forgiveness.
Second Tournament
Axelrod held a second tournament with 62 entries.
Strategies were adjusted based on first tournament results.
Tit for Tat again performed well, highlighting the importance of being nice and forgiving.
Evolutionary Insights
Axelrod's simulation showed that nice strategies can eventually dominate a population.
Cooperation can emerge from self-interested behavior in repeated interactions.
Real-world applications include international relations and evolutionary biology.