Hello everyone, I hope you are all thorough with the theory of Patta Lalada and Sri Sankuka. The next critic we are going to see after Sri Sankuka is Patta Tauta. Patta Tauta is a Kashmiri scholar who is believed to have lived in the latter half of the 10th century.
We know of Tauta primarily through the works of Abhinava Gupta, especially through Abhinava's Abhinava Bhairavi. Abhinava Gupta considers Patta Tauta as his master and often addresses him as my teacher. It is believed that Tauta wrote a commentary on Bharata's Natyashastra which is now lost.
and we know of it primarily through the citations in his theory from Abhinava Bharati. The popular assumptions is that the last critic who must have had a direct access to Kavya Kautuka, Bhattadavada's work was Hemachandra in the 12th century and we hardly hear anyone in the tradition talking about Tauta and his theory after the 12th century. In this class, we are going to discuss the theory of Rasa. propounded by Tauta.
Tauta's theory of rasa comes primarily in the form of a criticism against Sri Sankuka's observation that rasa is the imitation of the emotion in the character. Bhattadauda holds that rasa cannot be imitated. Why rasa cannot be imitated? Tauta says that it cannot be imitated because it is a mental state which cannot be perceived with our sensory organs such as eyes. ears, nose, skin etc.
It needs to be experienced internally. He also says that emotion is one thing and the physical reactions to the emotion is another thing. In other words, the emotion of grief is one thing and the consequent reaction to grief, for example, the shedding of tears etc. is another thing. Just by showing the shedding of tears, the actor cannot claim that He is imitating the emotion called grief. What he is imitating is a physical reaction to grief, not the emotion called grief.
This basic difference that Tawda makes has to be kept in mind while we understand his theory. We will see this theory in detail soon. I mentioned these aspects at the outset of our discussion only to prep you up to understand the observations of Tawda. Tauta criticizes the observation of Shankuka that Rasa cannot be imitated from three perspectives, namely from the perspective of the spectators, that of the actor and finally that of Bharata.
A knot of warning may be sounded at this juncture. When you try to understand the debate between Shankuka and Tauta, you should always keep your observations, questions and doubts at bay. and you should try to understand their theory as they are.
The first point is that something can be called an imitation only if the thing that is being imitated is perceived by the spectator by some valid means of cognition. If the spectator cannot perceive what is being imitated, then the spectator will not be in a position to see the imitation. For example, we can only interpret the drinking of water by an actor as the drinking of wine only if we see with our eyes the actor drinking the water. We are in a position to interpret the actors drinking of water as the drinking of wine because we can see this activity with our eyes. We see the actor drinking water and then we interpret it as the drinking of wine.
Here first we see the action of drinking water and then we interpret the action of drinking water as the imitation of drinking wine. Here there is no problem. This process of imitation where a physical activity is imitated is very very clear to us. Now, Bhattadatta asks another question which is related to the imitation of an emotion.
Dada asks, we understand the imitation of a physical activity. You say that rasa is the imitation of the emotion in the character. Then tell me What do we perceive in the actor that appears as the imitation of a particular emotion?
Say for example, the emotion of Rasa. Bhattadavada anticipates the answer and says on behalf of his opponent that the actor's body, the headwear that crowns it, his horripilation, his faltering words, the rising of his arms, the waving of them, his frowns, his expressive glances, etc. will be imitating the character's emotion of desire. Thattadawada is not satisfied with this observation. He says, this answer involves a lot of problems.
According to him, none of these elements you mentioned, that is the actor's body, costume or his physical actions such as horripilation, glances etc. can appear to spectator as the imitation of an emotion. Why cannot we consider these elements and actions of the actor as the imitation of an emotion? Thattadauda says, first of all, emotion is located in the mind and hence it cannot be perceived by the external senses such as sight etc.
In other words, emotion is not an outward entity and hence cannot be imitated. What the spectator is watching is the action and the outward experience or appearance of the actor. not the emotion.
How can one imitate a mental entity like an emotion through physical features that can be perceived by the external senses such as sight etc. An emotion is a mental state. It is located in the mind.
So, it cannot be perceived as a physical activity with the help of the external senses such as sight etc. Therefore, it is wrong to argue that spectators will feel that the actors are imitating an emotion which is mental entity through acting which is physical. Secondly, if the actor needs to appear to the spectator as the imitation of a character, the spectators should have seen the original character.
But since none of us have seen the character and the emotion that he feels, the idea that the actor is imitating a character and his emotion can be dismissed as an empty talk. Now, Pata Dawda says that his opponent will change his argument and say that the actor is not imitating the emotion in the character. Rather, the actor is imitating actor's own emotion for the spectator.
Now, Dawda asks a question back. If the actor is imitating his own emotion, tell me what does this imitation consist of? The opponent will now say that it consists of all the elements that involve the production of an emotion in real life, such as a vipava, anupava and yabhijari bhava. Suppose the actor is imitating his own emotion of desire. In that case, as in real life, there will be a cause, a vipava in the form of a beautiful woman.
A series of yabhijari bhavas arising out of the emotion. of desire caused by the lady. And finally, there will be an anubhava or reaction to the vijayari bhavas in the form of sight-long glances etc. If that is the case, Tauta says, this will appear to the spectator as the real emotion of desire, not as the imitation of desire. At this juncture also, the opponent will come up with a counter-argument.
The spectators will not take this imitated emotion as real emotion because the Vipavas, Anupavas and Vyapijaripavas which involve the production of Rasa are not real here. They are just artificial. The Vipavas etc are real only in the world of the character. They are artificial in the world of the actor.
The Vipavas etc in the fictional world are simply invented and imitated by the actors thanks to their skill, training. and study of poetry. Bhattadavada says, okay, let it be so.
We admit your argument that the vipavas etc. are factitious and they are not real vipava, anupava and vipacharipava of an emotion. Say for example, the emotion of desire. But tell me, if that is the case, how will the spectators have the real awareness of the emotion of desire? Now, the opponent will retort. This is what we have been saying, there is no real awareness of desire here.
The spectators will very well know that it is just an imitation of the Vipavas etc. that exist in the fictional world of the character. Since they know that the Vipavas etc. are artificial, they will never take the emotion of the actor as the actual emotion of desire. For them, this will appear to be an imitation of desire. Bhattadavada now says that that is not possible. always.
It is true that the artificial Vipavas etc. will appear to be artificial to a person who knows the difference between the artificial and the original Vipavas. In other words, only a knowledgeable person will be able to distinguish between what is artificial and what is real. For an ignorant person, even the so-called imitated Vipavas will function as real Vibhavas.
For such a person, there is no question of imitation here. Here, Bhattatauda brings in the analogy of two kinds of scorpions. The scorpion that is born out of cow dung and the scorpion that is born out of another scorpion. Seeing a scorpion born out of cow dung, an inexperienced person will say that it is the kind of scorpion born out of another scorpion. In the same way, we do not often infer an imitation of desire from artificial reactions.
We take them for real expression of desire. Now, the opponent will come up with another proposition. The actor who is angry on stage is not really angry, but only appears to be so for the spectators. In other words, the opponent says that This is an imitation based on similarity, not an exact reproduction of imitation.
The spectators who are watching an actor on stage will say that he and his emotions are similar to the character and the character's emotion. Bhattadavada says that the actor may be similar to an angry man and this similarity must be coming from his frowning and so on. This similarity is exactly like the resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like species due to the shape of the muzzle etc. That is to say, this is just the physical similarity of the actions of two people who are angry.
We cannot say that the spectators perceive any similarity between the emotion of the actor and the character. In the case of emotions, a physical reproduction is not possible. Since emotion is a mental entity then how can the spectators think that there is a similarity in terms of the actors emotion and the characters emotion. No physical signs may be taken as the imitation of an emotion because feeling is not a physical element. The bottom line of the argument is that emotions cannot be imitated.
since they are not perceptible to the sensory organs. What is being imitated in the name of emotion is just the physical actions which follow the experience of the emotion, not the emotion per se. One will be able to reproduce or imitate the similarity between the physical appearance of a character who is angry and the actor who is actually reproducing the physical features of an angry person.
It cannot be called the imitation of an action. How can someone imitate something that is not perceptible to the sensory organs? Also, Tawda points out that while watching the actor reproducing the physical features of an angry man, the spectators know that the actor is in a particular mental state.
The spectators also share that mental state. But it is incorrect to say that this is an imitation of an emotion. Now, Bhattatawada goes to attack Shankuga's theory that Rasa is an imitation of the emotion in the characters using Shankuga's own theory of aesthetic experience.
Shankuga says that aesthetic experience is a unique experience. He mentions three possibilities while a spectator is watching an act. playing the role of a character.
Say for example, the character of Rama on the stage. The first possibility is that the spectator may think this is actually Rama. The second possibility is that the actor is not Rama.
Thirdly, it could be thought that the actor may or may not be Rama and finally the actor is similar to Rama. Sankuka opines that an aesthetic experience is different from all these four possibilities. That is the possibility of a true appearance, a false one, doubt and a similitude. He says that none of these possibilities arise in the minds of the spectators as they are watching a particular character on stage.
Shankuga says there is no appearance of doubt or indeed of truth or falsehood. We have just the thought this is Rama. We encounter no antithetical ideas. Now Bhattatauda begins his argumentation. He says You say that the audience has the awareness that this is Rama.
If this awareness is certain and is not negated then why do you say that it is an imitation of the character? Why does it not become a true knowledge? If you say that it is an imitation then why do you say that it is Rama? So there is a basic contradiction in the argument. On the one hand you say that the actor is imitating the character and the actor's emotion.
You also say that the spectators are aware of the artificial nature of the vibhavas etc that produce the emotion. But in the same breath, you say that the spectators will think that this is Rama. This is contradictory. Now, Tawada sees the whole situation from the actor's point of view.
Bhattadawada says that the actor does not have the notion, I am reproducing Rama or his feeling. The opponent may say that here the work Anukarana or imitation should be taken in the sense of making similar. That is the actor is making himself appear similar to the character and is approximating to the latter's mental state. Bhattadavada says that this is not something that the actor can accomplish. since he has never seen the original actor.
Without seeing the original, how can the actor make a similarity between his artificial emotions on the stage and that of the character? You may say that the actor is not imitating the emotion of any particular character, say for example Rama. On the other hand, he is simply imitating an emotion, for example grief of a high status character. Thattatavata says that now the opponent should explain what the actor is using to produce that imitation. It cannot be grief since there is no reason for the actor to be grieving.
As we all know that the actor does not experience grief. In other words, we cannot say that the actor is imitating the grief of a high status character by developing grief within himself. for there is no reason for the actor to be grieving. Now the opponent will say that the actor is imitating grief by shedding tears and the like. At this juncture, Bhattadauda again reminds the opponent of the previous point he had raised.
Shedding tears is just a physical activity. There is a radical difference between material teardrops and immaterial emotions. Now, the opponent may say that the actor is imitating the character's reaction to the emotion of sorrow. Now, Bhattadavata will ask, who is this character whose reactions that the actor is reproducing?
If you say, any such person, no matter which, then we replay that, no person can be brought into the mind without a definite idea. In other words, An entity lacking particularities cannot be brought into our awareness. Now the opponent will modify his argument further and will say the actor is reproducing a person who should have wept in the manner the actor weeps. If this is the case the opponent will have to admit that the actors own self is barging into this process. If the actor is reproducing a person who is expected to weep in the manner the actor weeps.
Then there is no question of imitation here. Here the whole relationship of subject and object of imitation collapses. The actor also does not feel that what he is doing is an imitation. He just has the feeling that he is acting just by showing physical reactions thanks to his training.
Then by recollecting his own vipava, for example his lover. and Anubhavas in real life and finally by reciting the poetry with proper intonation and all other factors. Nor did Bharata ever say in any passage that Rasa is the reproduction of a permanent mental state. Such an assertion was never made by him even indirectly by means of an indication. Now the opponent may caught a line of Bharata.
Drama is an imitation of everything contained in the seven continents etc. Now, Bhattadauda says that here the sage means something else. Here Bharata is not talking about the imitation of an emotion. Here he means that drama is an imitation of all the forms of existence in the world. The term imitation must be interpreted as a retelling of the affairs of the seven worlds.
By this, Parada does not mean the imitation of the emotions. Now, we have covered all the major criticisms of Bhattatauda against Samguga. Now, let us see some other associated thoughts that Tauda shares with respect to the question of Rasa. Bhattatauda believes that Shanta Rasa is the most important Rasa of all rasas because it is based on the highest end of man and it results in liberation from transmigration.
He is also of the view that rasas are found in drama only and its presence in poetry is only to the degree it limits drama. According to Tauta, a poet always has a huge burden to carry upon his shoulders such as definitions of figures of speech, language qualities, awareness about flows, dramatic modes and plot elements etc. Rasa comes into being only when all these aspects come together in a mutually suitable manner.
He further notes that a poetic composition that is smooth and engaging in a language that is easily comprehensible will definitely facilitate the experience of Rasa. Quoting Bhattakauta, Abhinava Gupta in his commentary on Ananda Varthanas Dhunyaloka says, Rasa is delight, delight is the drama and the drama is the Veda. Bhattadavada was also the first critic to draw a radical distinction between the secular poet Kavi and the Vedic poet who is also called a Kavi. Pollock's words merit attention in this context.
He says, he was the first to draw a radical distinction between the secular poet Kavi and the Vedic poet. cave and to restrict the idea of cavia or literature to the work of the former. The importance he attributes to description in the constitution of literature rather than say narrative action captures something essential about the specific nature of classical Sanskrit poetry.
With this we are wrapping up this class. I hope you have understood. all the major points we discussed in today's class. Thank you.