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Rationalist Theories of War and Peace

May 4, 2025

Rationalist Explanations for War

Overview

  • Author: James D. Fearon
  • Publication: International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer 1995
  • Publisher: The MIT Press
  • Pages: 379-414

Abstract Summary

  • Rationalist explanations for war challenge the idea that rational states fight when no peaceful bargains are preferable.
  • Under broad conditions, negotiated settlements that rational states prefer over war exist.
  • Common rationalist and realist explanations fail to address why leaders can't find less costly bargains.
  • Two key mechanisms explain why wars occur even when preferable bargains exist:
    1. Private Information and Misrepresentation: States have incentives to misrepresent capabilities and resolve.
    2. Commitment Problems: In certain strategic contexts, states cannot credibly commit to upholding mutually preferable bargains.
  • Historical examples suggest the empirical plausibility of these mechanisms.

Key Concepts in International Relations

  • Foreign Policies
  • International Relations
  • Comparative Political Economy
  • Security Policies
  • Environmental Disputes and Resolutions
  • European Integration
  • Alliance Patterns and War
  • Bargaining and Conflict Resolution
  • Economic Development and Adjustment
  • International Capital Movements

About the Journal

  • "International Organization" is a peer-reviewed journal covering various aspects of international affairs.
  • Published by Cambridge Journals Online.

Publisher Information

  • The MIT Press is a major university press publishing in various disciplines, including international affairs.
  • Pioneers in electronic publishing, continuously adopting new technologies.

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