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Rationalist Theories of War and Peace
May 4, 2025
Rationalist Explanations for War
Overview
Author
: James D. Fearon
Publication
: International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer 1995
Publisher
: The MIT Press
Pages
: 379-414
Abstract Summary
Rationalist explanations for war challenge the idea that rational states fight when no peaceful bargains are preferable.
Under broad conditions, negotiated settlements that rational states prefer over war exist.
Common rationalist and realist explanations fail to address why leaders can't find less costly bargains.
Two key mechanisms explain why wars occur even when preferable bargains exist:
Private Information and Misrepresentation
: States have incentives to misrepresent capabilities and resolve.
Commitment Problems
: In certain strategic contexts, states cannot credibly commit to upholding mutually preferable bargains.
Historical examples suggest the empirical plausibility of these mechanisms.
Key Concepts in International Relations
Foreign Policies
International Relations
Comparative Political Economy
Security Policies
Environmental Disputes and Resolutions
European Integration
Alliance Patterns and War
Bargaining and Conflict Resolution
Economic Development and Adjustment
International Capital Movements
About the Journal
"International Organization" is a peer-reviewed journal covering various aspects of international affairs.
Published by Cambridge Journals Online.
Publisher Information
The MIT Press is a major university press publishing in various disciplines, including international affairs.
Pioneers in electronic publishing, continuously adopting new technologies.
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903