and now for a guest this evening it's a it's a special treat for me to be introducing Hank crumpton for one thing it's not every day that we get to present someone with such a secretive background someone with a first hand experience in covert CIA operations uh in fact before I say anything more about Hank and his new book The Art of intelligence lessons from a life in the cia's Clandestine Service I want you to just look at this cover it's all black it's pretty dark and mysterious don't you think uh but it's pretty classy and it's um and it feels really really smooth to the touch it sort of has a a silky silky velvety feel to it um much like Hank himself actually he's a he's a pretty smooth Operator or was in his days at the uh as a CIA agent he was an operations officer in the cia's Clandestine Service for 24 years serving for for more than a decade in in Africa where he recruited all kinds of sources uh he later held a liaison assignment at the the FBI and in late uh 1999 he rose to the rank of Deputy Chief of operations at the cia's counterterrorism center in the summer of 2001 uh he accepted an assignment as chief of one of the best CIA stations in the world and he was just settling in there at the time of the 911 attacks and then when the US decided to invade Afghanistan Hank was asked to lead The agency's Campaign which he did during the first year some of the most riveting parts of Hank's book in fact are about that experience in Afghanistan in 2005 Hank left the Spy business and became a diplomat joining the state department with the title of Ambassador at large to serve as the coordinator for counterterrorism today he's the head of the crumpton group an advisory and Business Development firm I'll let Hank explain why he's he's decided to write a book about his previous ly Secret Life leading covert operations against America's terrorist enemies but I will say the book is an authoritative Frank and thoughtful look inside the intelligence world and so it's an important contribution to the ongoing debate about what our spies and analy and analysts should be doing uh now Frank plans to speak for Hank plans to speak for about 20 or 30 minutes and then he'll take questions if you have a question uh please step up to uh one of the two microphones at the front here because we do record these events and post them on on our website and afterwards uh Hank will stick around to um to sign any any books that you'd like like him to sign uh so if you haven't already please silence your cell phones and join me in welcoming Hank K thank you for that very generous production I don't think I've ever been called smooth before called a lot of things but never that it it really is an honor to be here it's such a great bookstore and uh I'm not only grateful for the invitation to speak but I'm grateful to you and and your wife for taking ownership of this place a year ago and keeping it alive as a community a bookstore and a place where people can gather and share books and ideas so my uh my uh thanks to you for that also before I get started I'd like to recognize some special guest um there's a character in my book his name is Ken I describe him as vigorous and wild eyed he is the gentleman who basically figured out how to develop the GIS the geospatial system that we used to capture all this data we had collected in different parts of Afghanistan and to render it to our intelligence consumers uh Ken is now uh teaching at Virginia Tech and he came up here to join us with K it's really an honor you to be here and come up and he's accompanied by another gentleman that worked in the same targeting Branch back in that uh at tough your old 102 Jake thanks for coming also was really good to see me here Peter it's a real pleasure thank you Peter was formerly the head of opic and he and I've been friends for many many years great great Senor here and Allan thanks for coming from uh uh many many decades ago uh we're very close and I'm honored with your presence and and finally my wife Cindy I I met my dear wife uh 30 years ago and uh it's been a great three decades and I'm looking forward to the next three so thanks for thanks for joining why did I write the book let me answer your your first question I didn't have any plans to write a book I had written a couple of chapters in an academic text called transforming us intelligence published by Georgetown University press I got the idea uh from this when I was on academic sabatical at John's Hopkins University and I encountered Professor Jennifer Sims and we were talking back and forth and she edited a book and I contributed a couple of chapters and I thought that was a really big deal and for me at the time it it was a big deal I think it's a a good book that's used in classrooms across the country now and I said that's it because for me I had stretched the boundaries of of what was at least culturally permissible for a CIA Clandestine Service Officer and I went to NR Division and then secretary rice asked me to come join her at State Department to serve as the coordinator for counterterrorism so I went from the Clandestine Service to uh a new role a very different role where I traveled around the world for 18 months held more than a hundred of press engagements all over the world different countries and it was quite a transition but during that process I learned firsthand how important communication is about policy about war about intelligence and about the leadership responsibility of the United States and it was a terrific honor to serve in that capacity and so with that I said okay let's move to the private sector because there was really no choice I had to educate some children couldn't do it on a government salary and that's the only reason I left the government was really family otherwise I'd probably still be there and it was it was of course the right decision so I was happily engaged in my private sector Pursuits and Andrew Wy and Scott Moyers from the wey agency contacted me out of the blo and uh Bill harlo a friend of mine who was a public affairs officer at the CIA vouched for me and he told me these were good guys and I said I'm not writing a book I've got got too much to do I've got to figure out how to survive in the private sector how to pay the kids tuition but I was in New York on another business and Andrew said just come by and see me so I did and I told Andrew I said you should have been a case officer because you are terrific at recruiting he did everything but put me in a headlock and uh he convinced me to give it a try so I talked to Bill harlo I talked to some other people and they also encouraged me and it was really about the mission in some ways the same mission that I pursued during government service how do we convey the right message to the right people how do we open up a topic that is by its very nature closed by its very nature complex and why now why is it so important now and again I was struck by this in my last years of the CIA particularly during the Afghanistan campaign and then working for secretary rice I was struck by the growing importance of intelligence before 9/11 not a whole lot in depress about intelligence not many books about intelligence hardly any academic text about intelligence budget was pretty small and now today more than a decade later we've got this gargantuan budget to too big I believe you've got all this press good and bad all this literature about intelligence the value of intelligence will continue to grow I have no doubt about that the interdependence between intelligence and the citizens of this country will continue to grow and be incredibly important I think US citizens and our allies need to know more about intelligence and that's why I wrote the book what are some of the key lessons well for me as a junior officer in training and then my first couple of Tours I realized that the lifeblood of Espionage really is the recruitment of sources of human sources that's what Espionage is about it's about understanding the human terrain and being able to forge relationships with foreign Nationals who will provide you secrets that are true that are relevant that are timely and that are actionable that's what intelligence is you have to have all those characteristics otherwise how can the consumer the enduser put them to work and the consumers of intelligence are also growing not just the president although he is the primary consumer but members of Congress diplomats policy makers in various branches of government military war Fighters law enforcement officials that are negotiating trade packs and on and on and on they have to be able to put this intelligence to use otherwise just information and in the Espionage business in the cestine service the best way to do that is to recruit that foreign National to spy often risking his life in most cases risking his life to do so and that's what I focused on the bulk of my career particularly in the first uh 15 years or so and as I outlined in the book there were a lot of things I was not very good at including foreign languages including technology I was only a mediocre writer I think when I started but I could recruit spies and I love doing it and those spies were able to provide the CIA an enormous amount of intelligence over the years intelligence that was indeed for the most part accurate relevant timely and actionable now how do you do that how do you recruit someone to SP for America motivations are vared often it's a jumble but the starting point is to understand what the needs the values the aspirations of that individual might be and is there any overlap is there any fit with the objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency that's your starting point and there are all types of officers recruit all different types of of Agents you don't have to be a back slapping extrovert I am not one you don't have to be brilliant in any particular topic although that sometimes can certainly help my knowledge is not deep in many things other than intelligence and covert action I'm building a knowledge base in the private sector takes all timeses what about maybe the hardest part what about the philosophy the morality of Espionage is it the right thing to do I think in this complex dangerous world that we live in that if we don't have human sources we are not serving our nation and that requires some judgments not only operationally but morally and there's some things I did not do some things the CIA will not do in terms of who we might recruit and run it's particularly challenging when you're in the counterterrorism business because the targets you're working against they kill people that's their mission and so how do you recruit within a terrorist Network how do you pick someone that you can trust to at least a certain degree how can you work with someone who's in the business of killing innocent people even if it's in an aspect of support they might not be pulling the trigger they might not be The Detonator but how do you deal with that and each case is different there is no textbook that explains how to do that it also leads to some imp imperfections if you will there is nothing more imperfect I think in all of man's Endeavors than Espionage in war and when you have policy makers citizens and others looking back on intelligence missions that are by their very nature imperfect the unifiing of mistakes there's also a lot of ambivalence in the Espionage business what's right what's wrong what's the line do you cross it or not if so at what price despite these challenges I loved it every day it was a mission that uh for me was a Boyhood dream come true and not only excitement the thrill the Romantic Notions but most of all it was the mission delivering intelligence to the president of the United States to the war fighter to the law enforcement officer so they could do their job for me the biggest part of my covert action career and bearing mind intelligence collection analysis is different from CT action intelligence collection and Analysis informs all the instruments of statecraft and supports those consumers I talked about but covert action is one of those tools of statecraft that the president can use and the CIA that's the organization that executes and for me the defining moment in my career at the CIA was having the honor and the privilege of leading CIA forces into Afghanistan after the horrible attacks on 911 the reason I was selected for that was for the previous two years I had been working in the counterterrorism center working for kofer black who was the chief of CTC and I had advocated strongly for the CIA and the US government to have a stronger presence in Afghanistan for collection and a stronger cover action and even over military program I was unsuccessful in my arguments but because I had been working on that thinking about it advocating it for the two years coper black asked me to come back from overseas and to organize lead the CIA force of Afghanistan I would like to make respectfully one correction if I may in your otherwise wonderful introduction you referred to the US invasion of Afghanistan most people do knowledgeable people academic journalists historians policy makers you read a newspaper and if they're referring to post 911 Afghanistan immediately after 911 it's referred to as a US invasion I promise you it was not on December 7th 2001 when Kandahar fell the last Urban stronghold of the Taliban this is after 10,000 20,000 maybe double that of the enemy were laying dead at least a quarter of al-Qaeda leadership had been killed the Taliban were routed they were on the way to Pakistan morein 20 sites Al-Qaeda sites had been uncovered and were being exploited for intelligence including the anthrax Laboratories December 7th 2001 how many Americans were on the ground in afghanan less than 500 110 CIA officers and 300 maybe 400 Special Forces US military Special Forces it was not an invasion it was a war won by our Afghan allies on the ground with our support with our intelligence certainly with our air power with our communication support our strategic planning helping them synchronize their attacks but it was an Afghan Victory and we have forgotten that or maybe in some cases we've never realized that and that in part explains why we're still in Afghanistan today we never realized we never acknowledged we never rewarded our Afghan allies for their heroic efforts and for their trust that they put in us one of the most important things that we did when we dropped these Commando teams into Afghanistan Behind Enemy Lines it wasn't just where we dropped in in the geography and the strategic planning but it was equally as important the most visible demonstration of trust in our Afghan allies and I can imagine imagine if if you're in Afghanistan October Winter's coming on you're surrounded by the Taliban you've got intermittent Communications maybe with a cell phone put through usbekistan and you're you're talking to a gentleman from the CIA that you have known maybe you're introduced by your cousin or or your tribal brother who's living in the US somewhere all different ways that we connected with our Afghan allies some were very strong connections going back over the years like the Northern Alliance and the panir valley where we have been sending teams for the last two years uh when knew them intimately they knew us but there were other allies in Afghanistan that uh were not as well known but imagine you're this tribal leader with a couple of thousand people most of them women and children that are your responsibility and you've got Communications linked and the CIA says we're coming we'll be dropping in Saturday night and you ask well how many you of you are coming and say eight now how do how do you think that Afghan tribal leader thinks about this he's thinking they got to trust me a whole lot and we did and once our teams landed there this is very important because it goes to what I stress in the book it's not just data it's not just intelligence that you have on a piece of paper or a satellite image it's deep intelligence is rooted in an empathetic understanding and that's how you mount the human Terrain this was a great demonstration of that because once our teams arrived they asked our African allies what do you want what do you need and more often than not they'd say well I've got several hundred women and children over here Winter's coming they're hungry they're cold I need to take care of my people I need to take care of my clan and my tribe and yeah we need weapons we need ammo well in response to that within 48 72 hours the CIA working with a remarkable US Air Force airdropping supplies from mid October to mid December 2001 the US government dropped 1.69 million pounds into Afghanistan 110 air drops in 41 locations and each air drop was tailor made to what our Afghan can allies requested so if you're that tribal leader think about the respect the pride The Prestige the honor conveyed upon you because you ask these eight guys for something couple of days later you've got it falling from the heavens you can take care of your family of your clan you can arm your warriors and then you can go Engage The Real Enemy not us Invaders but those Al-Qaeda foreigners that have come in and hijacked your country those Arabs and weers and chin and pakistanis who've come in and basically taken away your country they have killed your own people Ahmed sha massud others this is the Deep intelligence that's so important this is how you bind your allies together and of course with a superb very precise air power that followed we were able to keep our Afghan allies alive let me close there but with a one note if you look at Afghanistan today there's no longer a safe haven for Al-Qaeda maybe a 100 Al-Qaeda left scattered along the border the big problem is Pakistan why is that because we failed to achieve those three strategic objectives although the first one we've done a pretty good job I think we're almost there number one is the Nullification of enemy leadership last year when we killed Ben lad that was an important strategic objective but zari's out there and so some others the second is the denial of enemy Safe Haven pretty much done that in most of Afghanistan for Al-Qaeda but they still have some safe haven in Pakistan they're expanding Safe Haven in Yemen Northern Africa Somalia is also an issue and the third strategic objective where we're pretty lousy and that's addressing those specific often very local social economic political conditions the enemy exploits you look at Syria right now Al-Qaeda is exploring those conditions of Syria Somalia the same thing and those three objectives you've got to do all three to achieve Victory now those three points aren't anything you basically borrowed that from counter Insurgency 101 and what we're looking at is not a classic Insurgency but there are many aspects of it and for me that was an important reference point how do we Define victory in Afghanistan and in South Asia and I think it applies worldwide covert action can be an important piece of this but it should not take the lead Afghanistan was very unique I think in the agency history cover action should in fact complement a broader more robust foreign policy it complement foreign policy it should not be a substitute let me close there I'd be delighted to try to answer any questions you may have sure hello can you hear me yes okay uh my name is Art I'm a physician so I'm a dilaton really I don't really you know I'm kind of dabbling in the in this area but question I had is as you look on the internet and as you look on you know YouTube you often come across presentations that you know complain about like American hemony and often they you know they cite like the cia's role this here and there and recently I wrote a book by Joseph NY and towards the end of the book he talked about something that kind of was enlightening he talked about America's role he said that hemony so-called hegemony is necessary because of the role that uh America plays as a in its role protector of the global comments so I think that really the Americans haven't done a good job of getting in other words the world needs to know know why we we are in a leadership position I don't think that's a because a lot of these presentations are very convincing when you look at them so not knowing that the I think the world should be made aware of the role the US is playing the things that it's doing behind the scenes in other words we are different than most other countries so for example a lot of people like are complain that we have like 10,000 bases around the world and that's a sign of hegemony but then when you read nine he' explains how we're like protecting like the ability to trade like the British used to like the British Empire used to protect all the you know the ship Lane so that people could you know move freely I think that should be do you think that's important other words that's a question that I have I think that's a misunderstanding that I think should be made clear or else it doesn't reflect well I I don't think people have the the correct knowledge right thank you for the question professor and I uh Harvard University uh he is the the gentleman who coined the term soft power and professor and I is written extensively on this I I I'm a little uncomfortable with the word uh hey but I think in terms of us power us power can be a good thing if we use it correctly hard power soft power and of course the right the Right Mix what I like to think of in terms of US policy in a global level it's not just nation state on nation state the the West faan system which is really very conventional particularly in a landscape that's increasingly populated by nonstate State actors not just enemies Al-Qaeda his Bala these these Narco terrorists down in Mexico and in Central America and many other examples in cyers space but also allies or prospective allies non-state actors are increasingly a part of this the Strategic landscape and we've got to to factor them in and when I think of states and non-states in this Global landscape I think of liberal values and liberal in institutions and if the US foreign policy is geared toward that I think I think that's important whatever it might be because if we see liberal institutions organizations institutions that are in fact inclusive I think we're on the right track with that and to the extent that us power should be used to inform and strengthen liberal thought liberal values and liberal institutions I'm all for that you bet and and part of my concern is that we have become so Adept at projecting our power in military terms or in covert action terms and and That's essential because you've got to stop the enemy from killing us but that's maybe the first 10 or 20% that buys you space and time but that 89 90% us power should be projected but in different ways State Commerce agriculture Justice our universities do a pretty good job of it look at all the foreign students come in here and all that knowledge all those liberal values they take back with them that's a great way to project power the medical profession we are by far the world's leader in in in in medicine Healthcare around the world that's a great way to power there many other examples this just doesn't have to be in the government realm in fact most of what we project in soft power is is in the private sector hands so in terms of that reference point I I I would agree next question let me go to this microphone yeah you're right there are there have been a lot of books published recently and I've read most of them even going back to Dy clarage um Larry delin who also within Africa but the books recently seem to have a common theme in that there seems to be a dysfunctional or inhibiting with the compartmentalization of everything within the agency particularly Ali San's book recently Glen Carl's book uh kaca and I wonder if that was your experience it's actually more hindering operations than it's actually helping a good question I haven't read those books so I can't refer to them specifically compartmentation is really important the need to protect sources and methods and that was foremost in my mind when I I when I wrote the book because if you don't protect those sources and methods then you don't have an Espionage service and compartmentation is fundamental to that I think that if you get to the next level after you can protect those sources and methods and the intelligence produced how do you disseminate that how do you share that that is a crucial issue and I think that not just the intelligence Community but the policy Community is still struggling with this and the biggest reason I believe is that the nature of war and risk is changing I talked about all these non-state actors that are populating the landscape well that's just part of it you look at the growing a symmetry of power I mean how can 19 guys with box cutters compel us to spend maybe2 trillion do we've never seen this in the history of human Warfare and and the piece of it is it is increasingly a flat condensed complex Global Battlefield if you will so intelligence is going to be more important more people need intelligence and so how do you disseminate to the right people so they can act on it and that's a huge Challenge and I think we are are struggling with it whereas in the Cold War days in the bipolar world it was for the most part nation state on nation state Army on Army and spying although it was difficult you could argue was maybe even easier then because you could measure armies you could measure missiles you could keep track of conventional forces now there's always been some unconventional risk but never to the degree we see today and I think that's an enormous challenge because the asymmetry of power the growing role of non-state actors This Global landscape that we talk about their emergence and convergence we we have never seen that in history of human conflict and not just in in Lethal terms when I talk about asymmetry what happens with that Al-Qaeda operative with a camera that captures some horrible images and uploads them in cyberspace bang he's got immediate Global impact I refer to these as micro actors with macro impact and that trend is continuing and that's that's a tough intelligence ch so I think in part that might be good what you're referring to thank you you're welcome yes my name is Ron I was really happy to hear you say that uh as of December 7th 2001 we only had we had so few uh US forces in Afghanistan my question is on hindsight uh thinking back on uh Osama Bin Laden and Bora Bora do you think it was a good thing to rely on our Afghanistan um allies at that time or do you think we should have had more uh US forces in there to try to capture Bin Laden at that time um a good question one slight correction it it wasn't Bora Bora that's an island in the Pacific it was t t Bora okay sorry I would I would have brother Ben and Bor Tor Bora yes we needed more forces there because it was a different landscape and my men on the ground and I I outlined in this book they were adamant on that point and I'm being polite when I describe their uh perspective when they talked to me on the secure line they were basically demanding uh Rangers several hundred Rangers going into Toro because it was a unique place it was high it was up in the mountains it was tough and you didn't have Afghans local Afghans fighting for their Village there's only reason one reason to be up in the high mountains of torob Bor and that's to hide or to fight and uh given the terrain they were adamant that we should have sent forces and and I I talk with General Franks and I had a great partnership with General Franks I I'll always be grateful to him and and deeply respectful um and I remember the phone call you know very clearly it would to take time there had been no planning there had been no preparations to drop those rangers in there and I was adamant that we had to move quickly and I was frustrated to some degrees that we could not respond to what my men had requested I informed the director I informed corer black U But ultimately it was a military decision it wasn't my decision and it wasn't tennis decision and um we were not able to deploy the forces needed now having said that I take great umbrage with the description of tore being a fiasco a horrible defeat for the US it was anything but we basically wiped out almost all of al-Qaeda leadership their command and their control in Afghanistan and killing hundreds of people we didn't lose a Soldier and we had less than 20 there in the fight had more journalists there than CIA officers and how did we do that we had some help from our Afghan allies and had a whole lot of help from US Air power so it was an overwhelming Victory but it was tarnished because been L got away yes sir you talked about recruiting in agents uh I just want to bring it down to the more domestic level um I'm in my upper 80s now but when I was getting out of college uh post World War II the agency of course was just trying to get traction at that point build itself and there was a lot of recruiting at College levels and although the media seemed to dwell an awful lot on the ivy league recruitment I happen to have several friends who were recruited in Catholic colleges for their obvious anti communist and U how were you recruited well I grew up about as far away from the Iva league as you can imagine at least in the United States um from a small farming community in Georgia between M and Augusta my father was a Forester still going strong and my mother was a kindergart teacher and uh this is sort of a longer answer than you wanted but I if you'll bear with me no I'm interested I uh my my mother's brilliant she finished college at 19 and U was a great teacher it taught me how to read and write at a pretty early age and would take me to the library Warren County library and I just became fascinated with the books there particularly history particularly the Revolutionary War and I became infatuated with it I read and read and studied and studied uh a lot about more recent history became fascinated with the OSS Merl's Marauders and Burma you know story after Story gu come out and um I went and saw Sean connory and Thunderball and I said well I'm not a Brit and I never be that sophisticated um didn't like to wear fancy clothes but I wanted everything else in that movie put G and and I was determined to join the CIA so I wrote to them when I was about 10 or 11 I'm not sure exactly and the CIA responded on CI letterhead some some kind soul um and I I I I don't have the the letter sadly I can only imagine I you as a you know boy hand writing on probably some R notebook paper uh they sent a very nice letter and I I remember coming off of the school and it was there on my desk and uh said thank you for applying when you a little bit older reapply and I did and I was rejected again and basically they told me the same thing I was 21 at the time and they said I needed to grow up and get an advanced degree and and you learn a foreign language and require technical skill and uh being hard-headed and persistent what I did was uh I found a different Office of the CIA and back then uh you could in fact find the office and walk in and knock on the door and that's what I did just a few month months after that second rejection letter and fast forward and uh uh they hired me that time around the third time I got in and I joined 23 years old persistence pays yes it does it's a a good lesson for the US government just just keep on doors till you get the right answer nice human story thank you very much you're welcome thanks for the question yes ma'am hi another another human story uh a couple of questions at once uh one what do you think of the work of Jean lare who was a Former Intelligence person himself but I'm more interested in what happens to the people that you recruit they don't do this for life they obviously have put their lives at Great risk what happens when they stop giving intelligence how are they supported and helped and if you could also say a little bit about tradecraft um occasionally people appear at this masonian and they show these wonderful disguises that you could take on and off in one minute that's very you know exciting and uh provocative but I I wonder what you can share about how your agents are trained to do the work that they need to do which is so risky and so easily foiled I think he's I think he's a good author I I enjoy reading his his his work in in terms of tradecraft let me answer that question first or a second it depends entirely on the agent entirely on the environment that you're working in in in what you might call a denied area environment like Russia or China or Cuba where there's a very hostile very sophisticated very aggressive internal security service the tradecraft required in that environment is entirely different than working outside those areas that's probably the most obvious example the tradecraft employed in a war zone like Afghanistan or Iraq is entirely different than tradecraft somewhere else one of the biggest aspects of it no matter what your environment though is the threat of surveillance and I could talk about many aspects of TR crap but let me just touch on this that counter surveillance is really essential no matter what the environment and there are different methodologies that you can use to determine if you're under surveillance or not and both the case officers and the foreign agents spend an enormous amount of time in in pursuit of safe secure meetings or safe secure Rush passes and counter surveillance has got to basically do the the prep work before you do that operational act and that's one of many that really transcends any environment could talk a lot about the the the tradecraft aspects U but that gives you an idea your other question about what about the future of foreign spies what happens to foreign spies that work for the CIA again it varies greatly sadly some of them die in the line of duty I I I write about an example of that in in the book uh a man I was very close to and worked with closely for three years he taught me so much and as I not in the book I miss I miss him very much he was I was very close to him happily that's not often the case most are either moved to a different job do not have access and then they go into something else they're basically you know paid what's uh owed them and they move on to a different job different life some but there very few of these will work to a point under such extreme conditions and provide such value to the us that they are given a pension an even smaller number even a smaller percentage will be resettled in the US and I had the distinct honor of of recruiting and working with a couple of those assets and uh when that happens you you you know you've got a great one because uh it takes a lot for the US for the CIA to to acknowledge the the foreign spot has done that well as resettled here thank you this man good question change of Direction uh you you mentioned earli in your talk but in passing about that the intelligence budget has grown dramatically in the last 10 15 years and I believe you said that you you felt it should be cut back some um I agree with that and I have my own ideas about you know how much it should be cut and where it should be put um so that we can still get the intelligence we need but use monies free it up for other in my opinion more vital purposes I'm just curious about your thoughts about how much the intelligence budget should be cut and over what period of time and and from which operations important question sadly I cannot give you a good answer because I've been out of government for five years and uh I I if I gave you some specific figures and a plan it would be entirely giz wor so I'm not qualified to give a good answer I I will make a general comment though that and this is not only tied to budget but it's it's tied to structure if you look at where we've had the the best intelligence and cobt action success in most cases it's where we've had a great bias to the field whether it's Afghanistan 0102 southeast Asia after the Bali bombings in 02 terrific success there you look at what's happened in Colombia against the far tremendous success had a feel bias in those three examples and there are others I can give you and the good thing about a Feld bias it usually doesn't cost that much now you look at the wars in Afghanistan Iraq those I think in retrospect leaving before far more conventional than they needed to be particularly Iraq I could talk for a couple hours about mistakes made Rock so it's how you approach the issue and if you look at overall the US government response post 911 it's been overwhelmingly Washington Centric Department of Homeland Security the Director of National Intelligence uh The Washington Post did a study I think there more than a thousand entities agencies in the federal government now that are involved in some type of classified National Security work so I think it's size it structure is focus and if you got that right I think the budgets would just just be reduced by by that that alone and you'd get more work done sure yeah the initial relationships you described with the Afghan counterparts that was pretty good uh what would you say that state of that relationship is now and how about President carai Plus or negative the state of that relationship now is is very uneven there are some Afghans particular particularly the military particularly their equivalent of our special forces that are very good and the relationships are very close interdependent where they go into battle and they're depending on each other you don't hear about that in the news because it's not us it but it happens you know day and night let me give you another example where it's not so good that's with the Afghan police force corrupt inefficient um a big gap in in trust when I talked earlier about how do we project power it's not military power well first and foremost it has to be rule of law and we have failed to do that in Afghanistan not just the law enforcement but the courts and all that comes with it I think the Afghan people this is pretty remarkable given their history they generally want us to stay not necessarily fully armored up separate from them and our own little Ford operating bases but they they know that we can bring development prosperity and help them integrate into this Global community of Nations and they certainly don't want the Taliban back if you look at any kind of polling you see Afghans in favor of the Taliban it's in single digits so it's it's uneven now sadly the window that we had from 02 to about 05 where you had relative stability and the Afghans waiting there for the global Community to come in and fill in that 80% I talked about didn't happen we were over in Iraq and the rest of the world was fumbling around goes to your earlier question about Joseph n the US has a leadership role and we when we don't lead there's no one else that really jumps in there that's just just a fact you look at Libya more recently if we hadn't to push NATO it wouldn't have happened and you had a second question I'm sorry president president positive or negative very positive in the beginning not so positive now he was truly heroic what he did know when I write about it in the book raise the tribal Army as breathtaking what he was able to do and he was the consensus pick of all the Afghan tribal leaders and the Afghan people to be president but again in that 0205 window I think we to a large degree fail and Fa the Afghan people it's easy to point your finger now it's a effectless uh corrupt government and uh Cabo Banks just one example of many examples but we we can't walk away for lots of reasons including those three strategic objectives I've talked about okay um first uh I might uh give a brief uh counter example of uh recruitment u i attended in the early first half of the 60s I was in the women's division of an IV League school and we had our own placement office and one day a notice went up that someone from the CIA was recruiting so thought well I want to do International stuff and like why not go along so first the guy was the antithesis of what I expect of CIA is s Tim little tip Mouse and second when I gave him my pit my resume and said I'd really be interested though I'm not sure I was he said we don't hire women for those sorts of jobs and it was sort of why are you at the women's section so I didn't persist um I do I have several question I I've trying to choose first I'm glad that you have talked about Afghanistan I worked there in civilian capacity and uh you didn't mention that we're not totally exactly winning against the Taliban um and it seems to me that Iraq was a perversion misuse of intelligence uh mainly by the defense department uh but I guess the main question I feel hasn't been asked uh you're talking about gaining intelligence and there's a debate now that's come to be seen to some exent as FBI versus CIA about the use of torture and how useful that is in obtaining intelligence uh versus you know treating people like human beings and uh I don't know whether you can comment on that but I'd be interested if you could um thank you first uh today the see I they do recruitment I would guess I don't know the fact uh exactly but I guess probably half of the operations officers that recruited today are are female and they do some extraordinary work in some extraordinary places in fact they can do a lot of things that that medal operations officers could could never do and what I love to see is when when the CIA takes full advantage of the bias against women and other coasters It's a Wonderful asiz tool your your question about U enhanced interrogation techniques or torture I did not write about it in the book simply because I didn't have any direct knowledge of it in terms of my service and what I was uh deployed overseas and when I was back here and my premise for writing the book was I should write about what I knew EI either my stories are about my direct involvement or about people that that work for me so that's why there's no reference to it in the book I believe that in some cases enhanced interrogation techniques May indeed work but I am certainly no expert the question I have not just for you not just for our policy makers but for you citizens what do we think is right because it's not the choice of the CIA or just the executive branch or just the legislature just Supreme Court it really is about our decisions let me give you a very specific example this is not as theoretical as you might think what if an Al-Qaeda operative was coming to your neighborhood to your community and had both the intention and the capability of killing thousands including your family and there was another alqaeda operative who had been apprehended in the other side of the world and he had knowledge of this he had sufficient knowledge where that attack could be prevented what if enhanced interrogations techniques were the only way to obtain that information in time to stop that attack only well I I'm I'm not advocating I'm asking the question and it's really up to to Americans to decide because it is a a deep moral dilemma and I think it goes to the changing nature of warfare I referred to the asymmetry of power so this is what I'm talking about and we have the Geneva Convention we've got laws us laws International laws we have treaties well how do how do we keep up with this changing nature of war and risk what is legally correct what's morally justifiable and that's another reason that I I think intelligence is going to be important and we need to have this discussion and this is a a critical question I would be honored to take a question for my dear friend how you doing had seen had seen you for years I'm so I'm sorry I've got someone over here next okay okay please so on the the same topic of more ambiguity so you know all the books I've read would it be boy pan dick Helms uh Gary Shan which I'm sure you know very very well I'm sure they're all probably good people maybe they're even bi to a certain extent so but a lot of what you did was lying you know as a false motivations to get information M so how did you deal with that as a 25 26 27 year old in Africa how do you deal with that I mean from what I've read there's not really much of a training course in ethics as far so it's to each person to deal with that so how did you deal with that yeah great question the three officers you mentioned are all terrific they're all men of of high virtue I have enormous respect for them it wasn't just lying it was lying and cheating and stealing and sometimes killing that's what Espionage and cobt action is about and it's more than an individual Choice the CIA looks at law the CIA looks at cultural norms and there are some very specific parameters let me give you a couple examples if we have an intelligence report that there is going to be an assassination attempt against a foreign leader even if our foreign policy is such that we would like to see someone different in that seat we have a duty to warn there no ambiguity there we have got to warn that foreign leader that there is going to be a temp of his life it's just a fact if you look at surveillance electronic surveillance they are very strict parameters guidelines and if you don't follow them and if you break us law the CIA is obligated to report this not just to their Inspector General but to the Department of Justice and and they do it I have seen it I have participated in that so it's not individual CI officers putting their finger in the wind and saying is this morally correct or not I mean there's a whole lot u in terms of structure guidance and expectations and we have attorneys and in my case I had some terrific attorneys and you would often turn to them and I had some great chief of stations men of of moral strength and virtue that provided me guidance when I came to them as a younger officer and said well you know how do how do you do this or not but having said that there are imperfections and what one operation officer might do another might not great question and I have no perfect answer but I hope that was good enough thanks more questions let me close Dale would you like to say anything this this is my great friend Dale Watson I I worked for him when I was detailed to the FBI for a year from 98 to 99 Dale uh was an executive there and Dale I'm going to brag about you I'm sorry Dale was was the first senior FBI special agent that was loan to the counterterrorism center and this started a program that we called an exchange of hostages where C senior Cia officer R the FB the FBI would send one to the CIA and U there are some gaps there are some imperfections in that relationship but there are FBI leaders like Dale that broke down a lot of those barriers and it was really a privilege to to work for you 98 to 99 when I was over at the FBI and I was treated Marly I've I've got a chapter in the book about that but Dale is I'm I'm honored that you join us today I just want to say for the crowd thank for your service to this country particular around the Afghanistan matters I don't know if you wrote about it in the book I haven't read your book but if you did it's it's something remarkable and I remember many times going in the White House and seeing you come out as I went in so you always warmed up the crowd before I get well Dale thank you and I I do mention you in in my book uh with with with gratitude you're a great leader and um I'm really honored you join us tonight thank you sir let me close with one quick V yet if I may I mentioned this in the book and I've mentioned it before in public statements but I think it's so important because for me it captures many of the lessons that I learned along the way in our alliances with various Afghan tribal groups there was no Alliance of Greater importance than with the united front sometimes called the Northern Alliance Ahmad sha massud he was known as The Lion of the panas Valley and he acquired that name because he blunted every Soviet attempt to take that Valley the panir valley which is north of the shamali Plains north of cabul even today you go there and you see the narrow Valley and the road littered with Soviet armored vehicles a very brave courageous man a brilliant fighter he was one of the most maybe the most important Ally that we had and and starting in September of 99 we had sent the first teams into Afghanistan and built a relationship with him several months later I had the opportunity to meet him on the Borderlands and uh had a long conversation talking about the intelligence the cobber action and how we were working against Al-Qaeda and against the Taliban at the end of this session and it was was a classic day it was raining outside it was cold it was windy we were in this small safe house that guarded by Mass's people around this fire and eat dried fruit and nuts and sweet tea the Afghans were always wonderful host even if they had very little and after this long important conversation massud very polite he asked me could I inquire of you one more thing I'm in his safe house I'm surrounded by his armed men so of course I said I'm sure you're can ask me he said you're great nation have such admiration for the United States your great nation your leaders do they care more about Al-Qaeda and finding Bin Laden or do they care more about the Afghan people and I looked him straight in the eye and I said Al-Qaeda the only person in the US government you're talking to is me and my men and our mission is specific spefic it's narrow it's singular it's alaa and he nodded and gave me the saddest smile he he knew the answer but as good leaders do I think he was tested me to see if I had enough gumption to tell him the truth but also as good leaders do he was teaching me a lesson and the lesson was you have to do both you have to find engage and finish the enemy but you've got to take care of the people tragically of course many of you may know that massud was killed just two days before 911 by Al-Qaeda operatives they knew his value to us but uh they couldn't kill his lessons and so I pass that on to all of them thank you very much