Transcript for:
Overview of New York Times Company Case

  • [Narrator] Freedom of speech has its limits. Those limits were tested in New York Times Company versus Sullivan. In 1960, a civil rights organization took out a full page advertisement in the New York Times. The advertisement detailed a "wave of terror" perpetrated by civil rights opponents. Amongst other horrors, the advertisement accused the Alabama police department of terrorizing student protesters. In particular the advertisement claimed police had padlocked the students' dining hall "in an attempt to starve them into submission". The problem was that the advertisement contained a number of factual inaccuracies. The Alabama police never padlocked the student dining hall and several other statements in the advertisement were either false or exaggerated. The advertisement offended L. B. Sullivan who served as the Montgomery commissioner of public affairs. Sullivan felt that the advertisement harmed his reputation because it was his job to supervise the police department. Sullivan sued the New York Times in Alabama State Court for libel, which is the legal term for defamatory speech published in writing. The trial judge applying Alabama law determined that the advertisement was libelous per se, which meant that Sullivan didn't have to show actual harm to his reputation to recover damages. The jury rendered a verdict for Sullivan and the judge ordered the New York Times to pay Sullivan $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment rejecting the New York Times' argument that the First Amendment protected it from liability. The New York Times petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review. The court granted cert to consider the question of whether the First Amendment allows a public official to bring a defamation action for false statements about public issues. The Court unanimously held that the First Amendment, which applied to Alabama through the 14th Amendment, restricts a trial court's ability to award damages in defamation actions brought by public officials. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Brennan showed that case precedents establish a firm commitment to robust, uninhibited debate on public issues. Brennan explained that often public debates will feature "vehement, caustic, "and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks "on government and public officials". Those debates may even include false information. But the First Amendment allows for all kinds of speech, even speech that is antagonistic and untruthful. The United States belief in free speech is so strong, in fact, that the law prefers factual errors over discouraging free discussion. Brennan noted that the threat of an expensive civil lawsuit can handicap free expression just as much as criminal punishment. However the Court carved out an important exception. If a public official can show that a false statement was made with actual malice, then the official can prevail on a defamation claim. To show actual malice an official must prove that the defendant knew the statement was false or otherwise acted with reckless disregard of the statement's truth or falsity. Reviewing the evidence, Brennan concluded that the New York Times didn't know that the advertisement contained inaccuracies. Therefore the Times hadn't acted maliciously against Sullivan and couldn't be held liable for defamation. The Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. Justices Black and Goldberg wrote separate concurring opinions each joined by Justice Douglas. Justice Black agreed that the press was protected from defamation claims brought by public officials. But Black argued for extending the immunity even further. He wrote that the press's First Amendment right was absolute and unconditional. In Black's view, the Constitution should shield the press from defamation claims by public officials, even if the press acts with actual malice. Justice Goldberg concurred in the judgment. Like Justice Black, Goldberg also rejected the majority's exception for statements made with actual malice. Goldberg agreed with Black that the press's First Amendment privilege was absolute, even if criticisms are made maliciously. New York Times Company versus Sullivan is important because it established the requirement of actual malice in defamation suits brought by public officials. To be clear, this standard only applies to claims arising from speech about public officials. The actual malice rule does not apply to speech directed toward private individuals. The significance of Sullivan has only grown in recent years. Communications technology, particularly the Internet, has increased the scope of debates on public issues. These important debates are protected and encouraged by the Court's landmark decision in Sullivan.