Back in April we discussed the idea that Ukraine might be about to enter one of its most vulnerable periods since 2022. We outlined that it would take time to see the full effect of delayed decisions around American aid and Ukrainian mobilisation. And that in the interim the Russian military had every incentive and potentially an opportunity to push, and push hard. And we've seen that with Russian offensive actions not just on familiar sections of the front but also on the previously quiet front facing Ukraine's second largest city, Kharkiv. The offensive has taken place against the backdrop not just of changing military conditions in Ukraine, but also a significant political shake-up back in Moscow. Some major figures like long serving Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (who has been shunted sideways to head up the Russian Security Council) have been moved on relatively gently. Others, like a series of Russian generals who have suddenly been arrested nominally for fraud or corruption, have been moved on rather less gently. So in this episode I'm going to look more closely at Russia's most recent offensive, what it might mean, and the political context around it. To do that, I'm going to start by looking at the current political and military context particularly in Moscow, to understand why Russia making new attacks now might make a degree of sense. Then I'll look at the way the Kharkiv sector has evolved, including the recent escalation. And then dig down a little bit deeper to try and understand what Russia might be trying to achieve with these attacks, whether they've been worth it, and what we might see next. But before we jump into it, a quick word from a sponsor. And today I'd like to welcome back my long-term VPN of choice, Private Internet Access. Generally speaking, I think the digital world has lot to offer. 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Starting of course with the significant shake-up we are watching happen in Moscow. Where the last few weeks have seen a very high-stakes game of organisational musical chairs play out. Over the course of an extended war it's not exactly unheard of for leaders to shuffle their leadership teams a bit. We covered the Ukrainians doing basically exactly that a number of months ago. But in the aftermath of the Russian Presidential elections we've also seen a significant reshuffle happen in Moscow. Perhaps, hypothetically, if a leader were to be able to decide the results of an election in advance they'd have more time to think about what their leadership team might look like after it. And while we can't go through every movement that we've seen, I can give you some of the greatest hits and see if you notice a theme. The Deputy Defence Minister, Ivanov, has been arrested on bribery charges. Something which might be linked to his alleged penchant for luxury goods and holidays in France despite his supposedly humble military salary. Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Vadim Shamarin had been the head of the Communications Directorate. He has now also reportedly been arrested, allegedly for receiving bribes. The commander of Russia's 20th Combined Arms Army, Lieutenant-General Sukhrab Akhmedov, a name you might remember from when we were talking about the famously successful Russian operations around Vuhledar back in 2023, has reportedly been removed from his position. While Major-General Ivan Popov, former commander of the 58th Army who was previously removed after being rather critical of the Russian war effort, has also been arrested, allegedly on suspicion of "large scale fraud" (to quote Russian state media). But at least he'd already had some time to adjust to his fall from favour. Unlike Lieutenant-General Yuri Kuznetsov, the head of the MoD's main Personnel Directorate (a position that obviously has zero potential for corruption whatsoever) who has now been detained and is being investigated for, you guessed it, corruption charges. Now maybe, if you came at this from a certain point of view, you might argue that this was finally a sign that Russia is getting tough on corruption. That there will finally be consequences for crimes like stealing military resources, getting units under your command completely wrecked through sheer incompetence, or equally egregious crimes like Popov's attempt to call out legitimate failures in the Russian war effort. But before you get too excited, I think it's worth noting that while a number of these senior leaders have apparently been arrested, the move that potentially won the most headlines didn't involve an arrest or really even that much of a demotion. With it being reported that the man, the myth, the legend, Sergei Shoigu had finally lost his position as Minister of Defence, a role he had held since 2012. Many of the headlines I saw essentially cast this as Sergei's downfall, suggesting that the Teflon Tuvan who had survived a mercenary uprising, being publicly thanked by Ukrainian anti-corruption authorities for allowing corruption to fester in the Russian military, public accusations of truly hilarious levels of unexplained personal and familial wealth, and of course his oversight of a Russian invasion which is now in its third year (despite Putin reportedly once saying that he could take Kyiv in 2 weeks) had finally (one might argue, belatedly) lost his position. But if you look a little closer at this story, there might arguably be more to it here than someone in a position of power in the Russian government finally facing some sort of accountability for their manifest failures. Because while Sergei has arguably never proven to be a particularly good Defence Minister, he's often proven to be an excellent politician. And in the cut-throat games of Russian politics it appears he may just have managed to pull one more rabbit out of his hat. Shoigu will no longer be the Defence Minister, he'll just now be the Secretary of Russia's Security Council. A position previously occupied by the very influential Nikolai Patrushev. It's a position that has less direct power than Minister of Defence, but it will keep Shoigu close to Putin and senior Russian decision-making processes. And almost importantly as the role we've seen Shoigu be given, is what we haven't seen happen: there have been no appropriated mansions, no sudden disappearances, no whispering of corruption charges. And before the reshuffle was announced Sergei Shoigu was allowed to preside over one last Victory Day celebration as Minister of Defence. Being seen carrying out that role by the Russian public and being photographed and imaged shaking hands with Vladimir Putin. I'm not a Kremlin whisperer and I never aspire to be, there are others who specialise in observing Russian political affairs far more closely than I do. But it strikes me that if Sergei was on the out and about to be windowed, he wouldn't get this sort of public opportunity. So while if I were him I might be a little bit selective about what airlines I choose to fly in the immediate future, for now it seems like Sergei may have demonstrated his skills for the world to see just one last time. Having failed to effectively prepare the Russian military and Russian military industry for the invasion of Ukraine, having then presumably signed off on a bad plan for that invasion, and then presided over a war which in the last year has cost Russia dearly in lives, treasure, and a significant percentage of the ludicrous number of arms and supplies Russia inherited from the Soviet Union expended, only to move the territorial lines of control from this to this. Sergei has apparently managed to sit through his annual performance review and confirmed his position as a patron saint of failing upwards, or at the very least sideways. Apparently keeping his wealth and some of his influence, as well as moving out of the firing line. An almost golden parachute in a country where those are seldom offered. More seriously, the "why" of this move drifts into the world of Kremlin whispering that I try and avoid. Although I'd argue from the outside looking in, Sergei appears to have been a hilariously bad Defence Minister in the Ukrainian context, and removing him would have been a good idea several years ago. But I've also seen some contend the golden parachute too might make a degree of sense. To steal a phrase from fellow YouTuber Vlad Vexler, Shoigu may have failed Putin, but he never betrayed Putin. He may have been corrupt and incompetent, but he was seemingly loyal until the end. And so potentially by giving Shoigu a soft landing and keeping him close, Putin can signal that he does indeed reward loyalty. Even if he doesn't want to, you know, lose the war because of it. So how might we go about reconciling Sergei's fate with that of those Russian generals we just talked about, some of whom literally sat in his vertical of power? In some of these cases it might be possible that what we're observing is the use of corruption in the Russian system as a sort of human resource management tool. There's long been a sort of understanding in Russia that senior leaders will engage in at least some corrupt activities. Given relatively low official salaries after all, that is the only real way to get rich in these positions. If Sergei Shoigu had never engaged his entrepreneurial instincts for example, he'd be pulling the equivalent of a middle-class American income from his position as the country's Defence Minister, not watching his children build multi-million dollar mansions. But because everyone is corrupt, anyone could be arrested at any time, and the charges in some cases wouldn't even have to be fabricated. The people involved are probably guilty of something, the political element is just deciding to prosecute them for it. And what we're seeing in Russia right now is a number of these people who were prominent under Shoigu being removed in this way. Arguably saving on HR processes and severance packages in the process. Plus there may potentially be a little bit of added military utility to the whole manoeuvre as I suppose if any of these senior officers are convicted and end up in prison, I do wonder what might happen if they then took up the offer for early release in exchange for joining the Russian Army. To paraphrase a piece from the Centre for European Policy Analysis, all of these criminal prosecutions are going to rely on materials provided by the Military Counter-Intelligence Department of the FSB, the DVKR. And "Russian officers understand that compromising materials collected by DVKR are likely available on almost anyone in the army and can be swiftly presented when needed." That will presumably make way for some new appointments, some of which will likely be made by the new Defence Minister himself. Allowing him to entrench a small new cadre of people he trusts. The new Defence Minister will be Andrey Belousov. A lot of the coverage I've seen has focused on the fact that Belousov is an economist. But I put a little asterisk up there and a small warning about reading too much into that one data point. Firstly, when a lot of people hear the word "economist" they might think of austerity, someone who isn't going to be willing to spend money on the military. Andrey is an economist, but he's a Soviet economist, his education and graduation are a product of the Brezhnev era. And so when you read the way he is described by people who have worked with him, it's not exactly as Milton Friedman reborn. Instead he is reportedly someone much more state centric. Someone variously described as believing that state spending on things like the military have a key role in driving the economy. And who takes a very hard-line view of Russia's place in the world and its relationship with the West. So my guess, noting it is only a guess, is that instead of trying to economise the war, he tries to put more war in the economy. And we end up with a Russian military-industrial complex that looks more and more Soviet as time goes on. As a political side-note though, he's going to be moving into a Russian Defence Ministry where all of the senior personnel appointments for the last decade or so were made under Shoigu and Gerasimov. Meaning, if other historical incidents are to set any precedent here, he might face an imperative to get more of his people into position stat. The other political note is that, as an economist, he doesn't exactly strike a figure that military men might be likely to unify behind. That might actually be a plus from a coup-proofing perspective, as a popular powerful Defence Minister is one of those positions that internationally just pops up again and again on a list of "whodunnit" for military coups. Economists aren't exactly famous for being the ones that storm the barricades and declare martial law. From Putin's perspective at this point, competent but unpopular might be a winning combination. And from Belousov's perspective, a bunch of corrupt generals being removed might be a very convenient development. Both because reduced corruption is a cost-saving for the budget in time of war, and his reputation reportedly is as one of the less corrupt members of the Russian political elite. Plus of course with every subordinate that's removed there might be an opportunity for Russia's new Defence Minister to put someone they can trust just a little bit more in that now vacant chair. And one of the reasons why I've chosen to focus on this particularly high-stakes game of musical chairs is that from the standpoint of personal incentives, reshuffles have a way of pushing everyone to try and do something. If you're an old military leader who hasn't been purged, maybe you want to demonstrate some short-term military success in order to make yourself look valuable and try and keep your position. If you are someone newly appointed to a position, maybe you too want to demonstrate some short-term results in order to demonstrate that, yes, you were the right choice for the job and to help secure that position. And if you are at the absolute top of the structure, maybe you want to see some short-term results received in order to demonstrate that the reshuffle that you have led has achieved something, and that your wisdom is delivering real results. So even if there were no other contextual factors in play, we might expect to see more Russian activity in Ukraine after this reshuffle. But it just so happens that arguably the military context might also be pushing Russia towards more offensive actions. It's well understood by now that Russia's pace of progress in Ukraine since 2022 (if it can even be called that) has been relatively glacial. These were the rough lines of territorial control 2 years ago today, that became this one year ago, incrementing only very slightly to these lines today. In trying to predict the way this very attritional war might evolve going forward, one of the approaches we've used in the past is to look at the relative balance of key resource inputs on both sides. Elements like manpower, materiel and financial resources, and to ask not just what the balance is today, but in which direction it is trending. Arguably the relevant balance between Russia and Ukraine in those areas is perhaps the worst it has been since 2022. That has been influenced by factors like long running delays to the expansion of Ukraine's mobilisation system, and of course the extended delay in approving additional US aid. Russia meanwhile has been working very proactively to build up its manpower and materiel resources. That has likely widened the resource gap, creating a moment of opportunity. But with Ukraine now having passed some changes to its mobilisation system and US aid now having been approved, there might be reasons for Russia to be concerned that the trend, the balance, may now move against them. The bulk of appropriated US aid for example hasn't even been allocated yet, let alone delivered. But we can already see very clear correlations between the delivery of a few key systems like ATACMS missiles and battlefield outcomes. YouTube generally isn't a great fan of combat footage, but the image on the right there is a still taken from a recently released video that shows most of an entire battery of Russia's premier S-400 air defence systems rippling off multiple very expensive interceptors at a target off screen. But apparently to no or insufficient effect, because a moment later you start to see the characteristic sub-munition explosions from an ATACMS cluster warhead before hundreds of millions of dollars in launcher and radar vehicles starts to explode in spectacular fashion. Individual strikes like this are obviously never going to be decisive. But they can be very destructive, and demonstrate the correlation between aid arriving and Russian stuff exploding. And Russia has all the reason in the world to believe that more might be on the way. At the same time, Russia's largely repair and reactivate base model has been successful in giving them a sustained materiel advantage. But it's a model that relies on drawing from a very large but still finite stockpile. And while there's still a lot to go, as you can see on screen some of Russia's storage yards are looking a lot more empty now than they did before 2022. So if you are in Moscow and looking at this war in very materially-focused terms, there are at least two conclusions you might draw about the near to medium term. Firstly, you likely have a significant resource advantage over a Ukrainian Army that is probably stretched, tired and under-gunned. But you also can't be sure the balance will remain as much in your favour if you allow too much time to pass. If you accept those conclusions and believe that the Ukrainian military might be at the beginning of a sort of window of vulnerability, it might make sense to apply additional pressure sooner rather than later, to find a way to take those thinly-spread Ukrainian resources and stretch them even further. And it might be that context, potentially, that forms part of the story that leads us straight to Kharkiv. OK, so let's talk a little bit about the Kharkiv region. Because while through 2023 and early 2024 it was known as a relatively quiet front, it obviously wasn't always that way. It might seemed like forever ago now, but on the right there I've included a map from March 10 2022, which I think shows relatively clearly just how significant Russia's offensive actions in north-east Ukraine were in the opening stage of the invasion. Russian troops pushed towards Kharkiv itself in the north east, Chernihiv in the north, and launched a deep penetration to come up on Kyiv from the east. At this point Kherson was in Russian hands and it seemed like both Kyiv and Kharkiv might be under significant threat. But just as the Russian tide had come in in the north and north east, by the end of 2022 it had gone out again. The duo of the Russian retreat from Kyiv coupled with the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive meant that across vast tracts of the line the actual line of control became the pre-war state border. And generally the most serious fighting became localised to Ukraine's south and east. For the most part then, the front around Kharkiv would settle down to be a relatively quiet one. Both sides appeared to strip forces away to support efforts in other areas. But note that just because I say it was a comparatively quiet front doesn't mean nothing ever happened there. For example, perhaps a little ironically given recent events, on a number of occasions in 2023 and again in the March of this year, we saw cross-border operations being launched in this region by volunteer Russian units fighting alongside the Ukrainians. These were relatively small operations in the grand scheme of the war, but probably took more territory initially than most analysts were expecting, caused recriminations and leadership changes on the defending side, forced defensive resources to be switched to the region and thus probably served a range of purposes including shaping public opinion, and diverting opposing resources from other areas of the front. This was obviously very different from the current situation where Russian units are crossing the border in this area, albeit this time under Russian command. That had the potential to take more territory in the grey zone than originally anticipated, to cause recriminations and leadership changes on the defending side, shape public opinion and divert military resources from other areas of the front. Obviously there are significant differences between those raids and the recent Russian operation, but the parallels do bring home the fact that in war there is no requirement for a plan to be original. The offensive we finally saw was, as seems to be almost traditional in this conflict, both highly telegraphed and proceeded by a period of build-up. Earlier this year the Russian MoD started referring to a "Northern" group of forces. And while that naming scheme might seem like it had tremendous potential as a basic deception exercise, it turned out to be accurate and descriptive with the group operating around places like Belgorod. The group appears to include some relatively new Russian formations, as well as a significant number that are believed to have undergone significant regeneration. With quite a few having been active in 2022. Estimates for the current rate of Russian personnel regeneration do of course vary. But at the upper end of the range, the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that just over 40,000 people per month sign contracts with the Russian military through 2023. Some sources, including the British Ministry of Defence, suggest that figure is probably significantly inflated. And a slightly more conservative estimate I've seen used a bit would be around 30,000 per month. But leaving aside the very human nature of those changes, the big picture would probably be a manpower inflow of about 1,000 per day. What that means is that very roughly every time Russian irrecoverable daily manpower losses have dropped below 1,000, we can assume there might be room in the manpower budget, so to speak, to generate new units or regenerate those that have been seriously mauled. That's also not counting other potential sources of manpower at the front, like bringing in personnel from other units and other parts of the military to make up losses. Regardless of how exactly it was done, by April Russia was described as having roughly 30,000 troops in the Kharkiv region. This was actually a considerably lower figure than we'd seen cited earlier in the war, but an up-tick over more recent force levels. We have some subtle clues that at the high command level the Ukrainians might have known this was coming, like for example, Andriy Yermak telling the press that Kharkiv was the most likely target for a new Russian offensive. And President Zelenskyy publicly warning that Russia might attempt a new offensive in late May or early summer. So it seems like the Russians were slowly building up forces over time, and that the Ukrainians were aware of it. A problem however, was that there were very severe limitations on what they could actually do about it. One of the arguably strangest features of this war is despite the very costly and arguably existential nature of the conflict for the Ukrainian people and state, there are very public rules restricting where and when Ukraine can use a lot of the weapon systems it receives from Western states. The vast majority of Ukraine's long-range precision munitions, including all of its American munitions, are provided by allied powers that either forbid, or very strenuously discourage, their use against internationally recognised Russian territory. This is very important, because other than these weapons, Ukraine's ability to launch long-range precision strikes against tactical targets is rather limited. The country had a reasonable stock of old <i>Tochka</i> TBMs that were mostly exhausted in the first two years of the war, along with some domestic long-range attack drones that are mostly useful against long-range strategic targets, not tactical and operational ones. As well as a handful of domestically manufactured long-range weapons like Neptune. None of those systems are capable of achieving what the Western systems are, despite their relatively limited numbers. And it can lead to situations like the one described in a recent interview where Ukraine can't use one of its most effective counter-battery systems, HIMARS and the Gimler rocket, against even active Russian artillery or drone units if they are on the Russian side of the border. On some parts of the front that sort of restriction might be deeply inconvenient and demoralising, but somewhat less decisive. That's the case for example if you look at the fronts in Zaporizhzhia or Kherson. On these fronts Russia has advanced far enough into internationally recognised Ukrainian territory that out of necessity a lot of their logistics infrastructure, air bases, support facilities and headquarters have to be in Ukrainian territory, and thus open to targeting. Crimea is arguably a fantastic example of this, because it provides logistics hubs and air bases that support a lot of Russian operations in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. It's also now getting smacked with long-range Ukrainian weapon systems painfully and on the regular. In just the last week we've seen a number of ATACMS strikes against targets in Crimea. Which according to some Russian sources always seem to involve massive salvoes of irreplaceable missiles being fired, all of them then being shot down, with some incidental damage done by falling debris. On the right there you can see satellite images from Belbek Airbase in Crimea and see exactly what some of that falling debris damage looks like. The current estimated tally from that strike is two irreplaceable MiG-31s, a Sukhoi 27, a MiG-29, the fuelling infrastructure you see in the top of the image, and potentially another aircraft damaged in an unrelated drone strike. ATACMS are also believed to have been successfully employed against the Russian Navy. And we've previously described strikes by Storm Shadow, SCALP or ATACMS against things like the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, ships in harbour, air defence installations, logistics targets, ammunition depots etc. Ukraine is obviously seriously restricted by the number of munitions it has available, but in terms of visually confirmed return on investment, it's very much there. A depot of ammo destroyed is a depot of ammo that didn't get fired at Ukrainian troops. And the four destroyed aircraft in that image, in monetary terms are probably worth far more than all of the ATACMS missiles that we have seen Ukraine launch thus far. But in Kharkiv, and also potentially if the front goes live, Sumy, geographic realities are going to provide a better defence for the Russians than their air defence systems ever could. Here the front line runs across the recognised Russo-Ukrainian border, which meant that the Russian build-up didn't have to happen in occupied territory, it could happen safely in Russia. And so as long as the activities involved weren't in range of any active Ukrainian batteries of old Soviet-era artillery systems, Russian troops could train, concentrate, maintain their equipment and sleep in peace. I read extracts from a brief interview reportedly with a battery commander in Ukraine's 57th Motorised Brigade, who claims to have been relocated to the Vovchansk area several days before the Russian offensive was launched, who described the Russians at that time as "brazenly assembling". And even now that the attack is ongoing, a lot of Russia's logistics and even a lot of Russia's artillery positions can remain safe on the Russian side of the border. A Russian Lancet crew for example, would be entirely capable of launching from Russian territory in this scenario and engaging various Ukrainian front-line targets. In terms of fairness, it's kind of like trying to play a professional soccer match, only one side is allowed to issue its bench players with air rifles and freely take shots from beyond the side-line. With the ref quickly intervening if the side on the receiving end gives these side-line snipers so much as a dirty look. The result has been that a) Russia was able to prepare for and concentrate this attack without Ukraine being able to really offer anything in the way of a spoiler or a disruption, b) it means that Russia maintains a degree of control over which of its assets are or are not put in range of Ukrainian systems by crossing the border. Ukraine may not be at practical liberty to choose to target what it believes are the most important targets, but instead only those that Russia chooses to send forward and is thus probably willing to sacrifice. By launching cross-border infantry-led operations for example, like the ones we've seen in Kharkiv, Russian commanders might be able to protect assets they consider somewhat more valuable like Russian artillery or Russian drone teams, while only sacrificing resources that the Russian high command might care somewhat less about - like Russians. Finally, it means that this offensive is taking place in a section of front that is sort of a logistic strength for both sides. The Ukrainians are fighting with Kharkiv at their back, a city of more than a million people, and significant rail and other transportation infrastructure, although it can be attacked. The Russians meanwhile are supported by the infrastructure in Belgorod, which, while much less developed, is out of range of most Ukrainian systems. The city does tend to be bombed on average at least once a month by the Russian Air Force, but so far those VKS strikes don't appear to have hit any vital logistics targets. So while both sides might face some so-called "last mile supply" issues dealing with their troops and units right up close to the front, rear area transportation (unlike some other fronts) is less likely to be an issue. And of course, unlike in Crimea, the Russian airbases supporting glide bombing operations in Kharkiv are under the full protection of allied restrictions on Ukrainian long-range fires. Something which has facilitated the continuous use of glide bombs to reduce Ukrainian defensive positions prior to Russian assaults. One observation is that entirely apart from any short or medium-term battlefield movements, if nothing else the Russian actions in Kharkiv have certainly brought those restrictions and the debate around them back into the public spotlight. In the US we've even seen a number of highly placed Republicans come out against the administration's current stance. With reportedly, speaker Mike Johnson saying that Ukraine should be allowed to prosecute the war in any way they see fit. Indicating that Ukraine needs to be able to "fight back, and I think us trying to micromanage the effort there is not a good policy for us." In some Western capitals the debate around hitting targets in Russia is obviously a politically fraught one. The potential escalation risk of Ukraine hitting targets in Russia was originally used in many cases as one of the justifications for not providing long-range weapons in the first place. And when those long-range weapons were eventually provided (although some like Taurus from Germany have still not been forthcoming) often that provision has had to come with guarantees by the Ukrainian side that weapons will not be used to hit targets in Russia. But from both a military and historical perspective, it's easy to see why those restrictions might impose massive difficulties on Ukrainian forces going forward. In military terms, a one-sided safe haven has always been an incredibly powerful thing. During the Korean War, MiG-15s flying out of Chinese bases were massively outmatched by United Nations air forces. But knowing that at any time they could dash back across the border to their air bases to rearm, refuel and repair in complete safety gave those aircraft operating in what became known as "MiG alley" a massive asymmetric advantage. Here the advantage also seems to apply, although it's operating in favour of the more powerful military force. It also raises longer term questions about Ukraine's endgame in scenarios where it does enjoy success on the battlefield. In any place where Ukrainian forces are able to push the Russians back across the recognised state border, it might be possible for Russia to continue with a campaign of long-range artillery and missile strikes to which Ukraine is not really able to respond. Unless it's able to do so with the help of whatever Soviet relics it has left. Whether those restrictions are likely to change at any point in the future is ultimately a political decision, but the operations around Kharkiv have arguably served to bring them into very sharp focus. Along with some of the very real military and human costs associated with this particular red line. One just has to imagine what it might feel like to be a Ukrainian commander under those conditions. You might be receiving casualty reports as Russian fires rain down. You might have satellite or drone footage that shows you exactly where those fires are coming from, and know that you have systems in your inventory that can hypothetically hit those targets. And yet for political reasons you have to sit there and take it. Any change to those restrictions would probably kick off a discussion about supplying Ukraine with more weapons to hit the targets that it was now allowed to hit. But in the short term it seems likely that the debate will remain focused on the restrictions themselves. So against the context of those restrictions, it appears that Russia was able to build up a force that may not have been the largest in terms of personnel count, but which was significant given the area of the front. And on paper at least, included a number of units that should have relevant experience. Some of the Russian troops fighting near Vovchansk for example, are believed to have been from the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment. That regiment is believed to have taken part in the 2022 Russian invasion, where they reportedly lost their commanding officer. And this isn't some third-tier regional unit from out in the Russian boonies. Its permanent garrison is in the Moscow region, and it is subordinate to the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division, famous for their almost Praetorian role in the coup attempt of 1991, and later the events of October [1993]. Further to the west we've seen Guards units, more Guards units, a little bit of Airborne, and some more Guards units. Now to be fair, in the modern Russian Army I'd advise against reading too far into the fact that a unit has a Guards designation. It is a label generally awarded for some sort of historical performance, and as a result it can be a bit like something being labelled "premium" at the supermarket. It might genuinely be a step up on other offerings, or it might just be a basic-tier entry with a relatively fancy name. So when you hear talk about Russian "Guards" units in Ukraine, I'd always advise looking at that unit's particular history, combat performance, issued equipment and especially its recent experiences and combat performance. And that's relevant with a lot of the Russian units we've seen in these recent operations. A lot, but far from all, of these units share similar stories. They had elements participate in the 2022 invasion, suffered significant losses during operations in the Kharkiv region, and were later pulled back into Russian territory to refit and rebuild. It meant that at least some of the troops crossing the border would be veterans who were doing it for the second time. And so perhaps unsurprisingly, as Russian troops finally moved into the grey zone separating both sides' primary lines of defence, the initial advances were relatively quick. On the 10th of May Russian forces reportedly undertook two simultaneous offensive manoeuvres. One appeared to push roughly in the direction of Lyptsi, and the other in the direction of Vovchansk to the north and north-east of Kharkiv city respectively. Russian forces quickly occupied a number of Ukrainian villages in the border grey zone, noting that, as in many places in Ukraine, a significant grey zone existed between Ukrainian and Russian positions. Most of these border villages were relatively small, do not appear to have been extensively fortified, nor do they appear to have been heavily garrisoned and fought over. What isn't immediately clear at this stage is the extent to which they were meant to be. There have certainly been accusations from a number of Ukrainian sources that a selection of units may have abandoned their positions. There have also already been leadership changes, and as a general rule, people don't tend to get fired for doing their job well. But fully parsing exactly what happened in those first few days will probably require a little more time yet. But what is clear is whether it be due to some combination of poorly positioned or ill-prepared fortifications, the shock value of Russian fires, or confusion and miscommunication issues, was that at least initially the Russian attacks (which in many cases consisted of dismounted infantry advancing on foot) were able to move forward into Ukrainian territory penetrating to a depth of several kilometres. However, despite there potentially having been a moment of Ukrainian vulnerability in this area, as far as we can tell there was no large scale attempt at exploitation by a Russian mechanised force. We'll come back to this issue later, but in the classic Russian way of war you would expect the identification of a weakness in the opposing line to be followed by a mechanised attempt at exploitation. A massive metal wedge being driven into an identified chink in the opposing armour. In Kharkiv that doesn't appear to have happened. Instead, while the fighting remained fierce and the front often quite dynamic, the rate of Russian advance slowed considerably. As far as we can assess, the Russian offensive hasn't reached the main belts of Ukrainian fixed defences that we can identify by satellite. With instead engagements taking place much closer to the border. At this point it looks like broad lines of resistance have formed with a number of focal points. With one of the most discussed roadblocks to the initial Russian advance having been the town of Vovchansk, pre-invasion population of approximately 17,000. Which, as that time of recording, is believed to be split between areas of Russian control and an ongoing combat grey zone. To give a sense of the scale of destruction at Vovchansk, I include some images from a Guardian article here. Which I think brings home just how damaging heavy ordnance like glide bombs can be to urban structures. Ukrainian civilian evacuation efforts have complicated the situation further. And even now at time of recording, there are believed to still be a handful of civilians left in Vovchansk sheltering from the ongoing fighting. As traumatic and potentially life-changing as these events have been for civilians living in these villages close to the Russo-Ukrainian border, and as many headlines as this Russian offensive effort have won, I think it's important to try and give a sense of scale to these operations in a grand strategic sense. Geographically we've already showed what the Russian gains so far look like on a strategic scale. And while we know the fighting has been very intense and difficult at a local level, getting accurate counts for force commitments and casualties has been rather difficult. Ukraine has claimed high losses among Russian infantry units, who in many cases advanced on foot. But those are very hard to verify compared to equipment losses. While the sample sizes for the equipment we have seen lost remain very small, complicating analysis. While it's always a very imprecise activity, and in Kharkiv probably shaped by the fact the Russians have been doing lots of dismounted infantry assaults rather than mechanised ones, in the first 10 days of the offensive there were 33 heavy equipment losses geolocated to the Kharkiv sector. Those numbers come in courtesy of Twitter user @naalsio26, who's previously done excellent work geolocating losses to other fronts. For many militaries out there, those 33 pieces of heavy equipment 22 Ukrainian and 11 Russian, would constitute a very painful loss of materiel. But in the context of a war on this scale it kind of just looks like a Tuesday, albeit with slightly tweaked ratios. It represents only a single-digit percentage of visually confirmed losses documented over that 10 day period. And to give a sense of scale, operations in the Pokrovsk District (an area which includes the fighting around Avdiivka) was, as of 17 May 2024, believed to have accounted for 1,160 visually confirmed Russian losses and 209 Ukrainian ones. The point is that while the fighting in this region has no doubt been very intense and costly for those involved, it is a long, long way (so far) from being one of the larger engagements of this war. To build on that then, the next question to ask is probably why might the Russians be doing this, and is it working? For some reason, even after all these years I've yet to receive an invitation to a classified Russian MoD briefing. So if we're going to try and assess what Russia was likely trying to achieve here, we are going to have to look at some of the available theories and match those against the available evidence. For his part, Vladimir Putin, making a speech after the Russian offensive had already started to slow down, has reportedly claimed the offensive was never intended to do anything like take or threaten Kharkiv, but instead to establish a buffer zone, an area which would prevent Russian territory from being subject to Ukrainian raids or fires. That claim seems a bit strange though, given that so far the attacks have been relatively narrow and also relatively shallow. There are still points on the front where Ukrainian forces are about as close to Belgorod or a number of other Russian villages as they were before this offensive was launched. And in an era of long-range attack drones, rocket artillery and tactical ballistic missiles, a buffer zone might potentially make some sense in the context of ground incursions, but establishing one that can realistically protect against missile, drone or even just artillery strikes would likely require a far grander offensive effort than what we've seen thus far. And for me, that issue of mismatch between the resources allocated and the stated goals also weighs against some of the other explanations that we've seen advanced. One theory for example, is that this Russian operation was actually intended to partially encircle the city of Kharkiv. This was an idea put forward in a recent article in <i>The Economist</i> that claimed to have reviewed retrieved Russian military plans, which were claimed to set the goal of reaching the village of Borshchova in the west. Which would have put Russian tube artillery within range of Kharkiv itself. While also aiming to swing east around the reservoir roughly 30 kilometres from the border within 3 days of launching the operation. If those were the Russian objectives, then the operation so far has been a tremendous failure. This is what those objective points would look like on a map compared to what the Russians have actually achieved in 2 weeks, not 3 days. But based on the evidence we have available I am highly sceptical that this was actually the Russian objective. In terms of force composition, if the actual goal of the Russian attack was to make it something like 30 kilometres in the first 3 days of operations, then I would have expected to see a lot more mechanised and armoured units being used. Not dismounted infantry from motor rifle units. Under ideal conditions, making a 30 kilometre advance on foot in full kit might be doable, but almost certainly not if you're trying to assault your way through Ukrainian positions while doing so. We haven't seen even the sort of concentrated mechanised pushes we did at places like Vuhledar or Avdiivka. And reportedly, even when operating a mere 10 kilometres from the Russo-Ukrainian border some of the more advanced Russian infantry units might still be dealing with somewhat stretched logistics. Obviously part of the reasons the Russian force won't have gone further is because of the efforts of the Ukrainian defenders. But even if the Ukrainians hadn't been putting up a very determined fight, I have questions over how far the Russian force that we saw committed could realistically have gone, or at least how far it could have gone quickly. We've also seen continuous and arguably more intense Russian offensive actions elsewhere, especially in the Donbas. And signs that Russia might be preparing for other offensives at different points along the front as well. The fighting around Chasiv Yar is particularly fierce for example, and there we've seen a number of BMD-2s and BTR-Ds likely belonging to the 98th Guards VDV. And if you're trying to discern Russia's main area of interest from potential distractions, the zone that's being allocated more mechanised and airborne units might be higher up the priority list than the one that, so far at least, doesn't even seem to have got a full golf cart allocation. We've also seen Russian forces postured on other areas of the front rather than concentrated to support the Kharkiv attacks. The Ukrainian border guard for example have warned that Russia does have forces around Sumy, and that an offensive across the border there, potentially in the Kharkiv style, certainly can't be ruled out. Obviously again we can't be certain, but I'd argue all of this is consistent with a much more modest range of Russian objectives in Kharkiv. One where there is probably an understanding that taking a city of a million people is probably beyond Russia's military capacity right now. But that by expending infantry and munitions on a previously quiet front it might be possible to further stretch and corrode Ukrainian resources at a time they are in rather short supply. To paraphrase one Western analyst, Russia's aim might not be to take Kharkiv but to menace it by advancing towards the city, threatening it with artillery, and forcing Ukrainians into a dilemma where they could choose to bolster the defences around Ukraine's second most populous city, but in doing so potentially weaken other parts of the front line. That could be particularly significant in places like the Donbas that likely remains a primary Russian war goal. It's worth noting that, yes, by attacking Kharkiv Russia has to use forces that hypothetically it could have chosen to concentrate in the Donbas instead, the attack isn't free. And there are schools of military thought that would generally argue that if you want to take an objective you should concentrate force against it, not disperse it all along the front. But equally the Russian logic might go: the defences in the Donbas have been so strong and the costs of advancing so high, that it might actually be more efficient for them to use their larger overall force to stretch the Ukrainian defenders out and try and create gaps and weak spots in the Ukrainian defences in the Donbas rather than try and just Douglas Haig their way through those defences one strong point at a time. It's also worth noting that from the Russian perspective there might be a secondary benefit here from an information warfare perspective. We have talked before about how practically speaking it's just not possible for Russia to win an all-out war of attrition with Ukraine's allies. Its best potential outcomes therefore, are likely to depend on convincing allies to walk away or pressure the Ukrainian government to surrender territory and make concessions. All else equal, that's probably more likely to happen if Russia can convince the world that it's winning and that ultimately nothing can stop it winning. In both the United States and Europe, Russia has made some progress in that regard since 2023, with the percentage of surveyed respondents who think that Russia is likely to win the war increasing in most cases. But at the same time from a Russian perspective there is probably still a long way to go. An early 2024 European survey for example found that only about 20% of respondents thought that a Russian victory was the most likely outcome. But by launching campaigns that drive headlines saying that Russia is advancing week after week, Russia might hope that public analysis glosses over the exact scale of those advances and the cost at which they're made, and that public opinion shifts in favour of just giving Russia what they want. So whether this offensive ultimately turns out to be worth it for Russia probably comes down to a range of factors. It's likely about more than just how the front line moves in this sector, but about how it affects outcomes elsewhere. What does it mean for the relative state of the two forces? Their exhaustion levels, their ability to maintain combat power? And how does it shape international opinions and perspectives in a long-term geopolitical battle of wills? The answers to those questions are probably something that only time will tell. And so for the moment, I think there might be more value in zooming in on the last two weeks worth of action, and ask what sort of tentative observations we might want to make about how the Russians and Ukrainians have fought it. Now on one hand, despite having made some advances in the area, there are some respects in which the Russian military hasn't exactly covered itself in glory, and which I think from an analytics perspective are worth taking some note of. And I'll split this up into the question of force make-up, capability, and leadership. The leadership question is interesting, because after 2 years of war you'd expect Russia to have a pretty good understanding of its choices. Many militaries have found themselves going into wars with ineffective senior leaders, only to then replace them with those who prove themselves more capable. It's very hard from a distance to definitively judge the quality of any Russian or Ukrainian commander. We just don't have enough information to make that call with any certainty, but sometimes very cautious tier listing is possible. If you have commentators from both sides saying that someone is broadly competent and they are commanding in an area where Russian forces outperform for example, you might tentatively conclude that they were one of the more capable ones. Last month Russian sources announced that Colonel-General Aleksandr Pavlovich Lapin would be the commander of the newly recreated Leningrad Military District and the Northern group of forces. And he by reputation and record is not one of the competent ones. We'll leave aside for a moment the quasi-Soviet cosplay involved in recreating the "Leningrad Military District" rather than creating a "Saint Petersburg" one, and instead focus for a moment on the man himself. A brief bit of history, Lapin was a commander of the Russian Central Group of forces during the 2022 invasion, that meant his forces were fighting in some of the areas we're talking about now, Kharkiv, Sumy etc. It also meant he was one of the relevant commanders during one of the war's great victories, namely the Ukrainian victory during the Kharkiv counter-offensive. An operation which achieved a degree of surprise, collapsed Russian lines, recaptured swaths of territory and immense amounts of Russian military equipment. So much equipment in fact that it would be enough to re-equip entire Ukrainian brigades. This particular military feat didn't win the General many friends, with Ramzan Kadyrov somewhat famously suggesting that Lapin be demoted to the rank of private, stripped of his decorations, and then sent to the front lines to "wipe away his shame with blood." That may have represented a partly politically-motivated exaggeration of just how incompetent Lapin had been, but he would in the end be removed from his commanding position and, for a while at least, placed on leave. Both before and after that point Lapin appears to have demonstrated a number of idiosyncratic qualities that marked him out among Russian commanders. For one he seems to be a classic Gucci gear enjoyer, who is a big fan of wearing stuff that clearly marks him out from all the troops surrounding him. Historically, this has often been considered a no good very bad idea from an officer survival perspective. You really don't want to give the opposing sniper, or these days a drone operator, a very clear visual indicator of who the most important person in a grouping is. And in that respect running around like an overly cashed-up airsofter might be the modern equivalent of wearing too fancy a hat. But hey, I guess in all his photo shoots it makes very clear who the main character is meant to be. And publicity, historically, has been something this bloke tends to take fairly seriously. In 2023 for example, when Lapin was made responsible for pushing pro-Ukrainian Russian forces out of the Belgorod Oblast, we got this incredible footage of the unarmed General sporting a Soviet flag on his helmet purportedly leading troops from the front like some kind of 40K commissar, yelling at them to advance as they ran past him in a totally not choreographed fashion. Something which was absolutely not a publicity stunt response to Russian critics who claimed that he stayed too far from the front lines and was disconnected from realities there. In fact it seems the General wanted to be perceived to be so hands-on that we got video of him doing things that you would typically expect general-level officers to do, like giving traffic directions to individual vehicles. And I don't mean he was micromanaging individual units over the radio, I mean he was standing in the middle of the road giving hand signals to individual armoured vehicles. Now in a lot of countries taxpayers might be a little bit miffed if they found out they were paying a general's salary to get a guy to direct traffic, but given how much those traffic control guys with the lollipop signs pull per hour, maybe this represented an overall saving. He also arguably demonstrated a number of classic redeeming qualities for a senior officer by proactively doing things like making sure that his subordinates received proper recognition. He reportedly for example gave an award to a Russian officer (who just happened to be his son) for his role in the famously successful Russian operations at Chernihiv back in 2022. It's important to stress that I'm not bringing any of this up in order to argue that Lapin is completely incompetent or that all Russian generals are idiots. In fact I think we should actively doubt both of those statements. The Russians have some competent commanders and Lapin is not one-dimensional. The point though is that in Ukraine he does have an incredibly scratchy record. Which from an analytical perspective I think allows us to ask at least one question and perhaps make at least one prediction. The Russian operation in Kharkiv might run anywhere on a spectrum from complete failure to complete success. But whatever result is ultimately achieved, odds are the results might have been better for Russia if someone with a better track record had been chosen in place of the guy who was literally removed for incompetence. History is full of examples of senior officers being demoted for failures, building up their skills, and then eventually maturing into excellent commanders. It is possible that might happen here. But to the extent that past performance can be a predictor of future performance, this one was probably a lucky break for the Ukrainians here. If that's the prediction, the question that we probably can't dig too deeply into right now is what is it about the Russian military that makes it seem like a good pragmatic idea to appoint as your commander of your second Kharkiv offensive one of the guys who arguably screwed up the first one? In terms of observation about how the Russian force has performed, and what that might tell us about capabilities, there are a few tentative ones. Although they do have to be framed in the context of what so far has been a relatively small-scale Russian operation. Firstly, we continue to see Russian units operate mostly in small groups. Not just in the sense that vehicles or personnel might be spaced out in order to reduce attractiveness as an artillery target. But also in the sense that activity on an entire section of the front line on any given day will often be defined by a series of small tactical actions that at a local level might consist of a handful of vehicles or a platoon of infantry, as opposed to a much larger number of assets being used in a coordinated fashion. You could argue this might be seen as a way to mitigate losses, to continually probe Ukrainian positions until a weakness is found and a larger exploitation force can be sent in. But a) over the medium and long term this might actually end up being a more casualty-intensive way to fight in a lot of circumstances than launching larger, better-coordinated offensives. And also b), at least in Kharkiv so far, where there might arguably have been opportunities for exploitation, we haven't really seen said exploitation. Right at the start of this push it seemed for a moment like the opportunity might be there. We had footage of some Russian forces being able to move somewhat unmolested by Ukrainian fires, and some Ukrainian forces falling back. But whether it's because our read of the situation was wrong, the Russian read of the situation was wrong, or because the Russian military just didn't have the capability in the sector to quickly throw together an exploitation operation, so far we haven't seen visual evidence to suggest that one was attempted. Namely significant territorial gains if it had been successful, and lots of burnt out infantry fighting vehicles if it hadn't been. In terms of the Russian force composition, the interesting observation is the juxtaposition between what on paper are meant to be relatively good units (in many cases Guards Motor Rifle units) and an equipment situation that's a little more - diverse. So far it feels like we've seen far fewer Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles than we would normally expect to see. And when we have seen heavy equipment, it's been a bit all over the place. We've seen small amounts of very modern stuff, a reasonable amount of modernised older stuff. But to give you just one microcosm of the broader situation, recently there was video taken of a Russian equipment train seemingly heading south towards the Kharkiv front that (based on its position and direction of travel) was likely intended to supply the units there. The vehicles on board were also carrying this marking, which indicate they were part of the Northern group of forces. On board some highlights include the only tank, which is a T-62M, a pair of MT-LBs that appear to have been pre-fitted with cope cages, some older BDRMs, and interestingly some MRAPs with parade markings. Suggesting they may recently have been on parade duty and are now being sent to the front. Frankly, it suggests some of the units involved might not exactly be drowning in huge supplies of Russia's latest equipment. Instead this looks like a hodgepodge of reactivations and whatever could be pulled together. A sign which might remind us that there is a difference between having a lot of equipment and an infinite amount of equipment. And it might suggest there are very real constraints on Russia's ability to just scale and sustain offensives like this without regard to either losses or resource limitations. These attacks might stretch Ukrainian resources, but they likely stress Russian ones as well. A final observation would be that while in Kharkiv so far the ratio of visually confirmed equipment losses between Russia and Ukraine has been much more in Russia's favour than normal, we are still arguably seeing evidence that Russian offensives, even relatively local ones, are still incredibly resource intensive. To make even just the gains it has, Russia has been continually applying systems like glide bombs as well as far more artillery ammunition than the Ukrainian defenders. The Russian sources I've seen tend to differ on the exact scale of that fire's disparity. While local Ukrainian sources have estimated the shellfire ratio at about 5:1. What that might suggest is that while Russia might have more resources and munitions available than the Ukrainian defenders, they likely still haven't found a way of making even, reliable tactical gains without asymmetrically applying those resources to grind through or reduce defensive positions. At the same time, while some Ukrainian units appear to perform very well, the fighting so far does seem to have revealed a few rough spots. And the removal of the Ukrainian commander responsible for the north-eastern front line probably confirms that. There are questions here we can probably look at in more detail in the future, but for now I'll split them into three categories: force quality, generation and deployment; preparation and fortifications; and reporting accuracy, realism and the potential danger of bullshit. In terms of force generation and regeneration, Ukraine is probably in a bit of a valley right now. Mobilisation changes have only just happened, and it remains to be seen how much more manpower they'll bring in. New personnel also require new equipment and that's been backlogged as well. Meaning that for many months at this point, Ukraine hasn't been generating or regenerating units at the pace it otherwise might have been able to. That, along with potentially other concerns like questions of force quality, might explain why we often see Ukrainian commanders seem to rely on battle-tested units. The risk here is it drives a phenomenon that sometimes is described as "fire brigading". Where elements of the most competent and trusted units are constantly switched to different points along the front to stabilise situations and fight proverbial fires. This is also a phenomenon we've seen with Russian forces, just ask yourself how often the VDV have turned up for the most desperate defensive or offensive actions. But even more generally, it's a phenomenon you might see in almost any organisation. If particular leaders, teams or employees get a reputation for being reliable even under very stressful circumstances, then leaders might be tempted to constantly send them in to do the difficult or the impossible, rather than risk assigning the job to more middling performers. But there's a danger you wear them out and cover up wider weaknesses in the team by just playing that ace up your sleeve again and again. Because there's every chance that works until suddenly it doesn't. Whether that's because in the private workforce an employee quits, or in a military context a unit gets worn down or exhausted. Over the medium term it's likely to be an imperative for both sides to make sure that their best units are given a chance to regenerate, and that the capability of the broader force is built up. There are also probably questions being asked in Ukraine about the region's defensive preparations. We saw that Russia's initial advance into the grey zone was relatively quick, and one Ukrainian commander described the Russian troops as having basically just "walked in". While Ukraine has been preparing defences at different points along the front line (usually some way back from the actual line of contact because construction equipment and artillery shelling usually don't mix well) the map on screen prepared by Warmapper.org based on satellite imagery does provide something of a clue that Ukrainian defences might be a little less developed than their Russian equivalents. And that may have flowed through to issues like units falling back, or also things like losses of Ukrainian heavy equipment. At this stage the sample sizes are still relatively small, but in Kharkiv we've already seen a number of visually confirmed Ukrainian artillery losses. And compared to other sections of the front, the pieces lost in that footage have so far been more likely to be firing from a position out in the open rather than the kinds of prepared firing positions we've often seen elsewhere. Complete with things like camouflage and anti-drone protection. In such an artillery-centric war it might be a bit of a reminder of the value of making sure that artillery has good pre-prepared firing positions. It's also arguably served to highlight some less talked about areas in material disparity. Things like armoured vehicles, air defence systems, long-range fires tend to get plenty of attention. But the availability of good defensive options doesn't come up as often. To give just one example here, let's briefly talk about landmines. Both sides began the war with significant stockpiles of old Soviet anti-tank mines. Ukraine likely began with lots of mines, and Russia with an obscene number. But perhaps the biggest difference between the two is when you start talking about anti-personnel mines. Russia is believed to possess an absolute shit ton of the things, and has occasionally intermixed them with anti-tank mines in order to make minefields harder to clear. Engineers coming forward to try and clear anti-tank mines might find themselves falling victim to the anti-personnel ones. Ukraine meanwhile reportedly entered the 21st century with about 6.7 million anti-personnel mines. But in 2005 it ratified the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which prohibited the use of anti-personnel mines and required their destruction. All else being equal, you generally expect a defensive position screened by a minefield to hold better than one screened solely by good intentions. You could also argue positions are more likely to be held if commanders and decision makers have an accurate understanding of just how well prepared they are. Which leads into the final point I wanted to make here, the importance of making sure that decision makers have accurate reports. I have previously done an entire video on the motives behind false reporting and the way in which it might have hampered the operation of the Russian Army. But there is probably no force, indeed no organisation on the planet, that's entirely immune to that phenomenon. As anyone who has ever had to screen applicants for a competitive position probably knows, in some contexts bullshitting to make yourself look better isn't just an occasional human behaviour, it's downright expected. But in a military context, in the age-old battle between bullshit and reality, reality is yet to drop a game. Which makes it all the more notable when we see evidence that Ukrainian or allied leaders might be being fed an overly rosy picture. The fact that Ukrainian leaders warned publicly of an attack in the Kharkiv sector, yet the preparations at a local level in the region appear to have been far from perfect, suggests that maybe senior leaders were being told that preparations were more advanced than they actually were. There were also reportedly some statements made by Zelenskyy recently which you can see on screen there, suggesting that no Ukrainian brigades are currently complaining about not having enough artillery shells. If that statement has been accurately reported, then someone somewhere along the reporting line might be drifting just a little too close to Konashenkov territory. Because it's not hard to find statements from some unit representatives saying that they are still coming up short. And more broadly, because if Ukrainian units did have access to a sufficient supply of ammo we would expect to see a very different battlefield dynamic, be able to observe evidence of the change by satellite, and likely read complaints about the situation from Russian sources. It's just a historical reality that all sides in a war tend to suffer from issues like over-claiming and false or exaggerated reporting. So far in this war we have seen evidence of things like Ukrainian over-claiming, but generally speaking their statements have often been closer tethered to the available evidence than those that come out of Russia. But if the gap there widens there's a risk of lost credibility and decisions made on incorrect information. And so I think the last few weeks highlights the importance of having structures in place to verify information as it comes up the chain. If the bloke responsible for building fortifications for Pavel and his mates says that "Yep, they've all been constructed as planned," it might be worth someone, you know, giving Pavel a call to check. So where does all of that potentially leave the front going forward? For the moment it appears that Russia's Kharkiv offensive isn't going anywhere quickly. But I also still think we're at the beginning of Ukraine's window of vulnerability, not the end. So in the near term we should likely expect things to get harder for Ukraine before they get easier. With significant Russian pressure not only in regularly active areas of the front, but also potentially more operations to extend the front line. With a future larger scale Russian offensive still very much on the cards. This is something the Ukrainians have warned might happen and claim to be actively preparing for. Because in this war it seems, just about every battle gets a well teased sequel. The trade-offs for Russia in launching more attacks in more directions are roughly the same as those we analysed for Kharkiv itself. Theoretically it should involve tying down or expending a significant number of Russian forces and Russian ammunition in order to force Ukraine to commit in response. At a big picture level however, I think the more important question is not so much how much territory those attacks take at a local level but instead: which of the forces do they wear out first and how quickly? However the situation develops, it seems unlikely that Kharkiv itself is in any way in play. The Russian force involved is just far too small to realistically consider an attempt on a city of a million plus people. Especially given just how resistant we've seen even much, much, much, much smaller settlements be throughout this war to date. So while we might call this "the Kharkiv offensive", it's most likely significant results probably have very little to do with the city itself. And instead everything to do with stretching and corroding the Ukrainian military during a window of vulnerability to maybe set the conditions for Russia to make more significant gains elsewhere. But for the moment, a huge number of unknowns remain in play. Everything from the speed and scale of future Western aid deliveries, to the levels of exhaustion and endurance for Ukrainian and Russian forces. Russia has a number of military and political incentives to push. While Ukraine faces an imperative to hold until resupply and mobilisation can play out. As to how the battle between those two imperatives will play out, only time will tell. Leaving me with a brief channel update to close out. While I got a number of requests to cover this topic last week, I did think it was worth waiting a week for additional information to come out. And given the way we've subsequently seen the situation evolve, ultimately I think that was the right one. Information right after an event like this can be a little bit confused for the first couple of days, and so hopefully I was able to zoom out and give you a bit more of the bigger picture. In terms of broader channel updates - a few quick ones. Firstly to the long-suffering Perun Gaming fans, there should be the first new content coming up in the coming week. While for those of you on the Patreon, by the time this one goes live there should be a bit of a broader channel update posted there. I also might filter a couple of updates into the channel update next week. But for the moment let me just thank all of you for your continued support and engagement, extend my thanks to Private Internet Access for being a very long-term sponsor of the channel. And wishing you all the very best, I hope to see you all again next week.