Transcript for:
Imperialism + WWI and its legacies (Euro100 w:10)

Euro100 week 10 transcript nau mai haere mai, kia ora tatou, Welcome, everybody. Week ten. We are, uh, rapidly entering the 20th century and our course. And so today we're going to start back with, uh, political story, but bringing in, uh, a lot of that information from last week about cultural change, economic change, industry, uh, into the picture as well, uh, focusing on or centring around, I guess, the First World War. And some of you will have studied that in some detail. You might well have studied the Anzac story, um, others it'll just be familiar from general knowledge. I'm not planning to go through that. The details of all of the, uh, campaigns of World War One, for example. This is not the course to do that. What we are trying to show is the the impact of World War One on European society. Uh, more broadly, some of the changes that came about as a result of that, uh, and how it links to changing ideas of the organisation of European society. So some of the political shifts and therefore this, uh, I hope works quite well. Uh, as a three part lecture, we'll look at, uh, what happened before World War One through ideas of nationalism and imperialism and how those grew in the later 19th century. What have nationalism look like? What does that mean? Some definitions around that. The expansion of European empires in the late 19th century. How did that all work? Um, and then but how do we get you've seen me show quite a few maps. How did we get to this map? Which looks a lot more tidy in the sense there's fewer, uh, larger chunks of territory here in this map by 1914. Um, how do we get to that? Uh, and then in part to look at World War One and some of its consequences itself and the settlement after the war. Importantly, what happened at the end of World War one? And again, this is stuff that you may well be familiar with or studied in other contexts. If you haven't, that's fine too. It doesn't matter. Uh, we will let you know some of the key points about how Europe was shaped after World War One, had the attempt to rebuild, and then we'll look at why that was very problematic in the 1920s and 1930s in part three, and suggests that some of the instability, some of the problems of the settlement of World War One led to a lot of the instability and, uh, gave rise, in a sense, to World War Two, possibly made that inevitable, as might be too strong a word, but likely that more conflict would, would be needed. Indeed, some historians have called this like the later part of the period we'll be looking at today, from 1914 through to 1945, and Tracy will deal with the Second World War, the last part of that period next week. Uh, so I'll get up to the 1930s today, but some period some historians have called that period from 1914 to 1945, a 30 Years War of the 20th century. That you might recall, I mentioned the other 30 Years War. That was, uh, the first large total war in some senses. And back in the 17th century. I didn't talk about it for very long, but it was a period of real instability back in the the 17th century, including some religious conflicts, religious wars, but other forms of conflict between rising great powers, too. So a period of real uncertainty, instability, instability in Europe. So stories have suggested that you by using that term a 30 years war. What they mean is that it wasn't just the two wars that we know so familiarly as World War one and World War Two, the interwar period between 19 1819 and 1939, while there wasn't one big world war going on, there were a few small wars. But generally speaking, it was a time of more peace. But the conditions were such that the problems that had given rise to World War One simply hadn't been resolved. And therefore the ways of of trying to deal with them were not successful. Um, the idea of a League of Nations again, Tracy will talk about that next week. Um, didn't work out so well. We had economic problems. We had, as we'll see today, the rise of alternative forms of political power, notably fascism, but also, uh, communism and socialism in the Soviet Union. So these alternative forms of power alternate to what we might call the growing trend of liberal democracy, which we've looked at in earlier weeks, uh, suggest that extreme solutions were being sought for, uh, problems that were arising in European society. And World War Two would therefore be the working out of some of those problems. That's one way of looking at it. So that's quite an interesting hypothesis. Okay. So let's see how we get to that point. We'll start off in with nationalism and imperialism in the later 19th century. And this actually takes us back for our starting point today. So 1848, that year of revolutions. And I finished the lecture a couple of weeks ago at that really important moment, uh, a year in which there are lots of revolutions and major capital cities around Europe looking for, as you'll recall, um, things like better economic conditions, better recognition for workers. Uh, this is all just revision from a couple of weeks ago. Um, better, uh, or more, uh, or expanded franchise. More people having the right to vote, for example, a number of those things. But also one of the things that look for was increasing national self-determination. A lot of those revolutionaries, whether it was in Rome or Berlin or Budapest or wherever, uh, were looking for, uh, to be part of a nation that represented more clearly what they who they thought they were. So they didn't want to be part of a large multinational empire, even though, as you'll see from the map on the previous slide, that's sort of where a lot of them ended up. And we'll come to that point soon. Okay. So the the revolutions of 1848 represented an attempt to create a vision of what national societies and nationalism in Europe might look like, that we can sort of think of as from below. In other words, many of the revolutionaries in 1848, uh, while they were patriotic, they were also, uh, full of that, what we called last week, that romantic sense of nationalism. And we saw a little bit of that, if you remember those of you who were here last week in that brief clip from Simon Schama, the the, uh, documentary that I show the sense of really belonging to something, whether it's a football team or whatever it might be representing your nation. So that that very emotional, uh, strong sense of, of attachment to the nation is something, uh, associated with Rose in the 19th century. People want that. And they see that as perhaps, uh, romantic, probably Republican. They want a new form of government not ruled by a king, but rather by a republic, a more democratic form. But that that's the usual sort of model and quite radical. It wants to overthrow the existing forms of politics and government and create something new. So that's what we might think of as nationalism from below. And it reaches its it's peak moment, if you like, in 1848, where people are asking for this sort of thing. But then, as I said at the end of the lecture two weeks ago, it doesn't succeed because relatively authoritarian regimes tend to overturn the gains of those brief revolutions. It looks quite different depending where you look. But that's the basic story. But that's one model of nationalism and national self-determination that's been tried, that's been put out there that people across Europe recognise as a possibility. Okay. A, uh, more republican romantic style of nationalism from below, as we can call it. That's not really the one that succeeds, although it is associated with some key figures, like the guy on the left. You can see there Giuseppe Garibaldi, a great hero, romantic hero, figure of Italian national unification. So that's that's the model that's associated with him. Wherever you go in Italy, every little town you go to, there's going to be a Via Garibaldi, Garibaldi street. They're all named after him as a as the, the great hero of that unifying process. So we'll just talk more about the details in a moment. So that's that's one way of looking at it. But the other one then the opposite to that sort of from below nationalism might be a form of nationalism that is tending to be more successful in the later 19th century that is imposed from above by the ruling palace, whether they be kings or emperors or something similar to that, uh, that is led by a powerful state that is harnessing industry and the hard realities of industrialisation and making weapons, for example, to create a more powerful state that is able to unify through force and then to expand overseas into it, turning a nation into an empire through force of arms as well. And that's really associated with the guy on the right, Otto von Bismarck, the leader of Prussia and not the king, but effectively the sort of prime minister. He's a chancellor, which is really like a prime minister sort of figure in Prussia in the. Later 19th century. And so these are the two models from below, from above that we see. And of those that from above the authoritarian one, using the power of the state and industry to, uh, unify. In Bismarck's case, Germany is going to be the more successful one. So let's just have a quick look at the details of those two examples, because we've been saying for a long time that Italy wasn't unified back when previously Germany wasn't unified. Remember, the Holy Roman Empire had been brought to an end by Napoleon and had been at some stage as 300 tiny little city states and different units that I've referred to from time to time. Napoleon had reorganised it a bit, but that's still been 30, uh, smaller states within the German lands even into the 19th century. The two dominant ones then were Prussia, up in the north. Talked about this a couple of weeks ago and Austria down in the south. But when all these eastern lands were not really part of Germany or German speaking parts, but they were incorporated in those empires. So the problem is how to unify Germany in a way that's going to resolve some of those difficulties. Okay. So in the 1860s and 1970s, we do see finally both Italy first and then Germany unified into new nation states. And it's these two sort of models of nationalism in action there. The first is Italy itself. You can see the little map there. Uh, of Italy. And after the failed revolutions of 1848, there's, uh, increasing desire, uh, to make Italy a unified nation is a recognition that if Italy is going to be a an important player in Europe, it's got to be unified. It had been divided up between these different areas. A kingdom in the south, the yellow part, Lombardy, was ruled by Austria, for example. But there was a little independent kingdom here, what's known as Sardinia, Piedmont. There's the term on the map you can see there. So Sardinia is this island down here in the, in the Mediterranean and Piedmont area, up in the north west. The capital of that is Turin. Uh, and they were they were combined. The island was ruled by, uh, Piedmont. They were combined as a small kingdom. They had a king, not particularly powerful, but they allied with France, uh, under that authoritarian leader, Napoleon the Third. And Napoleon sort of went into battle for them, sent some troops for them, um, against the Austrians, who were the big enemy. So in a series of campaigns, uh, eventually the Kingdom of Piedmont was able to persuade some of the other areas to defeat the Austrians and persuade people in Lombardy, and then some of these other bits in the middle of Italy to combine with them, to sort of join on to an existing kingdom. So that's a sort of, uh, a model of, of nationalism, the nation being created from above by an existing kingdom, joining bits of Italy to it through military victories. And then as it gets more powerful, it seems more attractive for people in those other parts of Italy to join in. And yet, why is Garibaldi, this, uh, nationalist romantic figure, the great hero of Italian reunification, rather than anybody from Piedmont itself? Well, he he leads some armies coming down to the south, defeats, um, the Kingdom of Naples, for example. And those people decide to join in as well and to join into a unified Italian nation. But the fact is that Garibaldi had sort of given up his, um, desire, his dreams for a republic. He wanted it to be a republic, to be democratic. All of those those features that I talked about before, that was his desire. But he was also a pragmatic man. And in order to get a unified Italy created, he had to sort of give up some of his principles and agree that it would be a kingdom with the King of Piedmont now becoming the king of united Italy. And so Italy does become unified, uh, even eventually Rome and Venice, they hold out for a while. The Pope is in Rome. That makes it a, uh, a different problem and a problematic area. But even Rome itself and Venice join in by 1870. So all of those parts we know of as modern Italy unified into one nation from 1870, and its rule by the king, who had been the king of this area of Piedmont. So the story of romantic Italian unification with Garibaldi, true to a point, but in fact even this was a more from above authoritarian example of unification. It's extremely clear that that's what's going on in Germany. So, Bismarck, to tell a long and complicated story very, very briefly. Bismarck uses the power of the state. He uses a series of small wars that he effectively creates by, uh, a series of managed, provoking, managed crises with his neighbours. A series of small wars that demonstrate Prussian power. So remember, this is, uh, first of all, Germany, as we talk about in the 1860s, 1870s is, first of all, Prussia. This area up around Berlin. Okay. So it's the largest of the northern German states. It's still a separate state. And Bismarck provokes crises, first with Denmark to grab a little bit of territory up there. That part joins and leaves Denmark and joins in with with, uh, Prussia. Then he provokes a major crisis with Austria. They have a war against Austria to show who's the more powerful state, um, in 1866. And that's rapidly won by Prussia, partly because Bismarck is already been chancellor for a while. He's been running the Prussian state, and he's able to, uh, ensure that the Prussian state is much more efficient as a military power than any of its neighbours and enemies, if you want to call them that. Okay, so they use, for example, the railroads. I talked about the importance of the railroads last week. Bismarck, uh, has his generals manage the logistics so they can move the troops, the people and the equipment around much more efficiently than Austria can, or other enemies that they're fighting, because, okay, we're using industry. It's got to be state led. We're going to unify Germany by defeating our enemies. Uh, and then it will seem clear to these other small German states, just as in the small towns of Italy, to the other small German states, that they're much better off joining the larger, more powerful unit of Prussia. And that's what they do. First, the northern states and Germany agree to join in and become part of the Kingdom of Prussia. And then eventually, in 1870, the southern ones, which had held out for a while, they agreed to as well. Why is that? Because Bismarck launches his greatest gamble in 1870. When he invites France, he creates a sort of a crisis with France, a diplomatic crisis, uh, to the point where lots of people in Germany saying France is insulted, a slave insulted, the King of Prussia. We need to go to war. Germany. Prussia is much more prepared again through using the railways, through using better technology, through using industry. Uh, Germany as it now becomes Prussia, defeats France very rapidly in 1870, the so-called Franco-Prussian War of 1870. And this is the moment where Germany now declares itself an empire. And where do they do that? They've just defeated France. The troops of March to Paris. They go to Versailles. I remember they saw the home of Louis the 14th. But we'll see it again at the end of World War one, they go to their site and they declare a new German Empire. Are you? All those little bits of Germany have agreed to join in with Prussia. Now Austria apart from Austria, Austria is separate. Everything else is part of this new German Empire, and it looks quite a lot by 1878 like it does on this map. Here they go to Versailles, just outside Paris, and the king is declared the new emperor of Germany. David Bismarck at his side. What an insult to France. Yes, they've been defeated in battle. That this is something that the French are not going to forget in a hurry. That the their enemies have, uh, had sort of exalted right in the middle of the heart of French power so that it is very much a the creation of a new state, a new nation, a new empire of Germany with that authoritarian from above model. And it's summed up by Bismarck's famous phrase he's seen these days on as the Chancellor of Germany for quite some time, till he's a very old man, and he's seen as a master realpolitik politics, German phrase politics not dictated by morality or any particular ideology, but just a sense of pragmatism. What you need to do to get things done. And if that means provoking fights with your enemies and invading them, so be it. And this is what he called blood and iron. That victory will be achieved not by this sort of wishy washy, romantic, uh, emotional idea of belonging to a nation that's not what interests Bismarck. He's much more interested in blood and on so through military activity and industry, that's going to create a great nation and a great empire and a great state. So German unification is very much, uh, that from above authoritarian model. All right. Now, in the light of 19th century, we see these European nations. Germany is one of them. Italy tries to do it, but in particular Britain and France are the more well-known examples. But also the Netherlands, too, expanding overseas. So the sense of competition, if you're going to be a great nation, you've got to be unified. We saw Germany in Italy, but you've also got to dominate your neighbours, and increasingly you've got to show how important and powerful you are by spreading out overseas. This becomes what's known as the new imperialism of the late 19th century. Now, there've been lots of previous examples of, um, Europeans expanding. We've seen that ever since Columbus, if not before. Yeah. So of course, it's not the first time European states have empires. Not at all. But now it really takes off. In the late 19th century, partly because of the technical capabilities that the Industrial Revolution has provided, as we'll see that Europeans have better tools and weapons and everything else to expand and to dominate other parts of the world. So this reaches a peak around, uh, 1900, but also importantly because of the ideology of imperialism that goes with it, the ways in which these actions are justified. You could have all of the best weapons in the world and not actually use them for taking over, uh, vast parts of the earth that you don't control. But, of course, that it was never likely to work out that way, was it? So the the the tools are there, but also the ideology, the rationale, the sense that Europeans deserve belong, in fact, have an obligation to take European civilisation to other parts of the world, whether or not those parts of the world want it. And that's the story we see in the new imperialism of the late 19th century. Now, to understand this, I find it really useful to go back for a moment to think about an idea called social Darwinism. And and he talked a few weeks ago when we're talking about the enlightenment. She took you through the enlightenment philosophers, philosophers through to some other examples. But later on, and Darwin was one of those she talked about. So just to sort of overlap and link up these ideas again, it's in the 19th century that the ideas of Darwin, uh, are enormously influential after his great work is released in the 1850s about the origin of species. But they are also twisted and turned in ways for which they were not intended, including to justify European expansion and imperialism. So let me explain what I mean by that. So Darwin, of course, had the idea that through observing nature, through observing individual examples of species and birds and animals and other things in nature, that the stronger ones tended to survive, and he worked out that, uh, that meant that over time the species would change as the best traits and habits and physical features of those species were passed down to the next generation. And now we know all about genetics and genes and all that and how that all works. Darwin didn't have quite a bit of knowledge yet, but he was the first one to say this on that pathway. There were others too, around that time, he said, certainly the most influential and the most famous. So the idea was that species would be able to adapt themselves to their circumstances, and that this was something that evolved over many centuries, thousands of years, years, millennia, hundreds of thousands of years. So on one level, this means, of course, that Darwin is challenging the traditional Christian view that the world was created only 6000 years ago. You go and look at some rocks and some fossils and you say, that can't possibly be true. So? So Darwin's idea is a very influential, but also controversial because there and at one level, the challenging the biblical story of how the world was created, but also are putting in place this view that some species are simply better than others, and some individuals within those species are better than others, and that they will survive and pass on their characteristics to the next generation. This becomes known as survival of the fittest, not a phrase that Darwin himself used, but it becomes associated with his theories later on. Okay, so that's fine. He's talking about this in a very neutral way. This is how nature works. This is how some animals adapt and they grow. They take on new physical features in the next generation of this gets passed down over millennia. So that's his theory. If you're looking at that as an imperialist European in the 19th century, you might say, oh yes, of course, they're survival of the fittest. You need to be a strong nation or empire. You need to be able to dominate others. That's how we can adapt Darwin's theory to our political and imperial rivalries, that there are some parts of the world, some nations, that have adapted better than others, and those nations deserve to be in charge of the weaker ones. The stronger ones need to be in charge of the weak ones. So that is a sort of what we might call an adaptation in its own way, an evolution, if you like, of Darwin's ideas. Not in the way he intended them for at all. Okay, so I want to stress this point. This is not what Darwin said or meant that some nations deserve to rule over other ones. That's got nothing to do with his ideas. Social Darwinism refers to the way in which many within European society, many powerful figures in European society, were taking the ideas that were circulating. The scientific ideas that were circulating was Darwin, and adapting them for their own purposes, twisting them effectively, using them out of context. We might even say, but it justifies or seem to justify, even though we might not agree with it seemed to justify the expansion of European powers because the view becomes very prevalent in the late 19th century that Europe deserves is obliged to rule other parts of the world. This is a sort of a Darwinian struggle which Europe is winning. That's the way people might see it. So this is the philosophy of imperialism in the late 19th century. That is is quite difficult in a sense, for us to sympathise with, to get our heads around that. This is a very powerful, uh, stream of thinking at this point in time, and it's seen indeed as eye civilising mission. So let's have a look at a couple of examples of that. We've even got a French prime minister. Jules Ferry is the prime minister in 1884. Doesn't matter who he is, he's the French prime minister. And listen to what he's got to say about all this. We must say openly that indeed, the higher prices by which he means the French and the other Europeans, even though they've just been defeated by Prussia. But that still, let's forget that have a right over the lower races. I repeat that the superior races. That's what he's talking about. The Europeans, a superior, have a right because they have a duty. They have a duty to civilise the inferior races. In our time, I maintain that European nations acquit themselves with generosity, with grandeur, and with sincerity of the superior, civilising duty. So they're being very generous when they go out and conquer other bits of the world that don't necessarily wish to be conquered. So that's you get when we're looking at a history like this or examples from history like this, we need to try and understand these perspectives, even though they seem so foreign and difficult and perhaps reprehensible and offensive to us. We can't understand why something's happening without getting ourselves inside the head space of those who were saying things like that. So it doesn't mean we need to agree with them or approve of them. Obviously not. That's not what I'm saying. But we do need to try and understand why Europeans at the time might have seen it as something that they were obliged to do, so not just because they were able to and good at it and had better weapons, but also it was a duty to go out and bring what they saw as the benefits of a superior European civilisation to other parts of the world. And we see this across the world. We see it in India, for example, is Queen Victoria, um, becoming the Empress of India? So Britain had had an interest in India for many, many years. They turned that into a formal empire in the 1850s in order to rule it more effectively. Uh, and we see these ideas that I've been talking about, this, this adaptation of Darwin's ideas, this taking of Darwin's ideas and using them for different purposes. And this lovely cartoon from punch magazine, a satirical magazine in Britain with a very long history. Uh, and you can see it takes the idea of evolution and, uh, uh, change over change of species over time. Uh, and here we are. You start off with a worm. So a familiar thing, you know, like the the, uh, cartoon of the someone transforming from an 8 to 9 into a human, that type of thing. So here you got a worm, and you go around the spiral is not to develop a face, and it evolves into a monkey and then evolves into a sort of an early human like creature. It evolves into a caveman. It evolves into a bourgeois 19th century gentleman, and then it evolves into an old Charles Darwin. So that's satirising that. This cartoon understands very well the way in which Darwin's ideas are being sort of taken and changed for other purposes, too. So we can see it in, in, uh, economics, the idea of, uh, a very, um, open market economy where everyone for themselves, no protections for the workers, that sort of thing. It's like a Darwinian struggle between those who have money and those who don't. And in nationalism and imperialism, too, we see these types of ideas becoming very, very prominent. I couldn't help thinking I was looking back over. There's some similarities to what we were talking about last week with Max. Max saw history as a series of struggles between different groups those who have wealth, power, money, land, and those who do not. You can see all history as the, uh, an example of of different forms of that same struggle. That's how Marx would interpret it, which I suggested had some elements of, uh, of value, but is also a little bit simplistic, but very, very powerful and influential. So to Darwin's looking at geological and and evolutionary history is a form of struggle. This is being adapted by Europeans and changed for their own purposes. And we see that in the late and in 19th and into the early 20th century, with the way in which these European powers do indeed take this on board and expand and take over much of the rest of the world, um, for their own purposes. And so here's the famous scramble for Africa, for example, from around 1880 through to the eve of the First World War in 1914, over that sort of 30 year period, uh, almost all of Africa was taken over by European powers. Some of it, of course, had been controlled by Europeans before that. A relatively small amount had been controlled before that. But in this scramble, this rather unseemly scramble for the land, all of the great European powers are trying to grab as much as they could. France got all of this stuff up here in, uh, north west Africa. Britain was trying to create a corridor from Egypt in the north, down through Sudan, Kenya and on down. They didn't quite manage it that down on to South Africa as well. Uh, the Germans, after Germany became a united country, after Bismarck's efforts, the Germans tried to get in on the act and had a few colonies themselves. You can see in that orange colour. Um, and, uh, who else? I forgotten all of the Italians tried to in Libya and in Somalia. Everybody's trying to get a bit of the action, because you need to be. In order to be a great European pal, you have to have colonies now, yes, they have an economic benefit, but they have a benefit of prestige as well. And we'll see that in our first prime resource for this week, which is talking about German colonies at this point in time, uh, particularly South West Africa, that's Namibia these days, that was German colony. And the some reference to that and the primary source reading for this week. So European, uh, superior technology is able to help European armies often quite a small number of people, but but lots of powerful guns conquer, uh, these parts of Africa and exploit the wealth of those regions, most infamously in the Belgian Congo. Here's the modern state of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo. Uh, and that was a colony of Belgium, a very small place, Belgium, vastly smaller than the Congo, of which it was the imperial overlord. And this has become the symbol of the excesses and brutality of the colonial and imperial era. It was actually not, uh, attached to the Belgian state, but it was a personally an area personally ruled by King Leopold of Belgium himself. And he oversaw all sorts of abuses, exploitation of the, uh, indigenous people, uh, the grabbing of wealth and resources, the the slaughter and murder and mistreatment, uh, of the native peoples, uh, for a long period, to the point where the Belgian government actually had to step in and say, no, we need to take over. This isn't good enough. And and improved a little bit, but not very much. And so that's usually seen as the worst example, if you like, of the excesses of this mentality of Europeans feeling they were able to come in and take over large parts of the world, not just in Africa but also in Asia. You can see the map here where Britain, uh, had this large empire, not just modern India, but the parts that are also these days, uh, Pakistan, down into Myanmar, Burma, Sri Lanka as well. The French were in French Indochina. Uh, that means this the bit between India and China in Southeast Asia, as we might call it. So that's modern Vietnam and Cambodia allowed, uh, the Dutch East Indies that would later become Indonesia. Uh, some parts stayed, uh, independent. Of course, not everybody was taken over, but Japan stayed independent parts of China, particularly the coast. Hong Kong is the most obvious example, which taken over was trading ports to my European powers. And Russia is a European powers expanding across Siberia to the Pacific coast as well. So there's the sense of expansion also in Asia. And a lot of this was unwound in the post-World War Two period. And I think Tracy is going to mention that next week. So it builds up in the late 19th century and then lasts for at least the 100 years before independence. But most of these countries achieved independence after World War two. But of course, the colonial legacies are still very powerful, even obviously in New Zealand as well. And why was this possible then? Let's have a quick look at the way in which this, uh, industrial. So this imperial expansion was linked to the themes of industry that I was speaking about last week. We'll just do this one and then we'll have our first quick break for the day. This would not have been possible without military and technological superiority. So in one sense, they were right. The European powers were superior. Well, they certainly were technologically. You can't argue with that. They had better weapons. And this is partly because of the ongoing. Industrial dominance, but what's often referred to was the second industrial revolution. Last week I talked about the Industrial Revolution, the first one, which was mostly about cotton and steam, the steam engine and the factory system. That's usually how it's, um, described or seen. There was the first big transformation in an industry. The second wave in the later 19th century is all about iron and steel coming up with better processes for for creating steel smelting on and so on. And then you can build things like this. You can build massive warships once you are able to create, uh, better forms of steel that you can make warships out of. Then you could create a whole new fleet, a whole army, a whole navy. Uh, this is the expansion of the second part of the 19th century. So here's, uh, German warships being built, for example, in 1906, just a couple of numbers to to to put some context to that, I showed you a few statistics last week. Uh, promise. Not very many this week. Just a couple steel production in 1861, Britain, France, Germany. And we'll throw in Belgium as well, just so they can do something down in the Congo. They're 125,000 tons of steel produced by those four countries. 1961 okay, sounds like a lot, but not very much when you compare it to 1913. So over that 50 year period, the expansion of steel production was such that by 1913, as you can see, those countries are now producing 32 million tons of steel, not 125,000. So vast expansion in industrial and therefore military capacity. So some of us went to things like warships, others went to maybe not the best example, the Titanic. You know, we know how that one worked out. Uh, not not so well, uh, but you can create something like the Titanic now. You can build something like that. Thanks to the, uh, developments of the second part of the Industrial Revolution. And you can create, uh, the weapons, like the machine gun, for example. You can see, uh, a very proud looking, uh, unit serving in the Anglo Boer War. That's the war of the English, uh, the empire against the South Africa and the white South African settlers, the Boers, uh, to for dominance of that part of the world or a couple of those wars that that was the first overseas war in which New Zealand soldiers served on behalf of the Empire as well. Uh, but this the ability to defeat either the Boers or earlier, the Zulus are the, um, natives of South Africa. Southern Africa was largely down to technical superiority and beautifully satirised and summed up by, um, this little poem from a, uh, a comedian, we might call them a satirist, effectively really available. Whatever happens, he said, we have got the Maxim gun, a machine gun, and they have no. So we're always going to be able to win because we've simply got better guns than they have. We can kill more of them. That's the view of someone who understood, um, the perhaps the basis of empire. That's one way of looking at the imperial expansion of the late 19th century that is based on technology, that is based on being able to harness the great developments of industry in ways that could support that, so that by 1914, then we can see that European states now control 84% of the world's entire land area, a huge amount by 1914. Um, and, uh, that's compared. So it's still still a pretty substantial 35% in 1900. But it grows through this new imperial period. So it's just going to as we pause for our First Reich, I'm just going to go back to that map of empire back here by the eve of World War One. Then this is what the empires looked like. Italy was the united country, the Prussian part of Germany, and it expanded and allied with all the small German states. Austria was quite a separate, uh, unit then, uh, with lots of different national areas such as Hungary, um, and others. The, some of the Slavic areas, uh, which is going to be a bit of a problem. Russia is huge, of course, France and Britain, of the other great powers, a number of small powers, but those are the large ones. And just to note, there's also the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic Ottoman Empire based in Istanbul, that has been around since 1453, uh, since it conquered Constantinople, but which is now in decline. But that's going to have a role to play in World War One as well. Okay, so let's have a break then. That's the story of nationalism and imperialism in the late 19th century up to World War one. Let's have a break for five minutes and we'll come back and look at the war itself. No idea. Okay, let's have a look at the reasons why World War one started in the context of this Imperial Europe that I've been describing to you. Uh, a few of the key features of the war, how it's changed European society. And then importantly, uh, what happened next? The settlement after the war and how that maybe wasn't as successful as it could have been? Some of the reasons for that. So what, you can maybe get a sense of what that map I showed in this other one that's in front of you now, is that we have a number of these large powers, and that what we see in the lead up to 1914 is some of them. While they're all expanding, other cities are also allying with one another. They are creating different groups. Uh, and this is not that different from that balance of power idea that I referred to in the 18th century context a couple of weeks ago, that there are various different great powers. They're all rivals one way or another. Sometimes some of them will gang up against some other ones to try and stop anyone. Maybe it was France in the 18th century getting too big for itself. Then they'll they'll have some. There'll be some peace for a while, and then they might get together in a different grouping and have another war. That idea of a balance of power to maintain overall balance, and that none of those wars should ever be big enough and devastating enough to upset, uh, the European society generally. Now, what we see is with industry, as I was just describing, with larger weapons and with expansion around the world, the consequences of that sort of balance of power system start to become almost unmanageable. Nobody expected the First World War to be as devastating as long lasting as it was. A lot of people expected that it would just be another one of these relatively short wars, which, while devastating in their own way, were relatively limited in their impact. And you can look at what Bismarck had done. So Bismarck engineered these wars, notably that Franco-Prussian War of 1874 specific ends to unify Prussia and to ensure that, uh, the new German state would be more dominant than France. And it only lasted a few weeks. Yes, of course, there was a lot of violence and a lot of people died, and and France did not. Uh, France had a very difficult period after that war. But relatively speaking, compared to the wars of the 20th century, it was a it was a more limited war. That was the model. So you have a few small wars and then the balance will reassert itself. That's sort of what people expect it to happen in 1914 as well. Now, famously, of course, the war was, uh, a consequence of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So he was on tour with his wife down in the provinces in Sarajevo. I don't know if you can see it on the screen, but there's Sarajevo, which of these days is the capital of Bosnia. And he was on tour down there. And he was or they were. Both he and his wife were both shot, uh, by a what's called a nationalist, I suppose, someone who wanted more national, uh, identity and separation and independence for the Serbian people living in that area of Bosnia. Now, Serbia was actually a small independent state. You can just see it. There. It is today. And Serbia was a small independent state at that point in time. But there were lots of other Serbians, as they still are over in Bosnia. So you get all these different nationalities, particularly in this Balkan region. The Balkan region has always been very difficult. Lots of mixed groups, mixed religions to somewhere, uh, where Catholic, some were Protestant, some were Muslim. Uh, so it's been an area of lots of different identities as it remains to this day. But this was the moment that triggered what would become the First World War, because Serbia was allied with Russia as a sort of a a friendly big power. It was on its side, uh, and Austria decided to sort of use this assassination, which of course was a terrible event for Austria, the heir to the throne being killed. Uh, it wanted to get its own back. I wanted to have one of those maybe those brief wars against Serbia to teach them a lesson, to, uh, to try and put them back in their place because it blamed the Serbian state for the assassination, even though we don't know exactly whether that was the case or not. Was it just 119 year old kid with a gun, or was it something the Serbians wanted to happen? We'll never really know the truth there. So Austria was going to have a small war to, uh, get its own back on Serbia. But the alliance system kicks in, and all of the other large powers feel they have an obligation to come and join in on this side, whichever side it is, of these different groupings of great powers. So over the next month, after this happens, there's diplomatic back and forth. There's all sorts of letters and visits and, uh, and brinksmanship going on, uh, until formally war is declared between the two sides, uh, in the summer of 1914. So Serbia is backed by Russia. Russia says, okay, if Austria goes to war. With you. We will support you. We'll send some troops to support you against Austria, Austria and Germany. Even though they'd had that rivalry in the 19th century as to who was going to be the largest German speaking power by the stage, their allies. Okay, so if Austria is going to go to war, Russia is now threatening them. Germany says, well, we've got an alliance with Austria. Well, we'll come and help you. You know, we'll send some troops to help you, because Germany has always been, uh, thinking about the possibility of a war against Russia as well. You can see that at this point there was no Poland, for example, between Germany and Russia. Of course, there were Polish people, and there were people who wanted a Polish state, but it had been dismantled. It had disappeared off the map, and that area had been split up between Prussia over Germany and Austria and Russia itself. Okay, so Germany and Russia had a border, and the Germans were always concerned about the possibility of, uh, invasion from Russia or indeed themselves expanding in that direction. And so that is something where they see an opportunity once they've, uh, got involved, to ally with Austria and perhaps to take on Russia. But I know that that's a big task. Oh, we've seen it with Napoleon, for example. We know it's a very big task. And Germany knew that if they fought against Russia, Russia's allies would come and support it. France and Russia were allied. So one of those groupings had France and Russia and Great Britain on one side. The other one had Germany and Austria and the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Empire in the middle Italy was on one side, but then sort of dropped out and joined the other side later on. We won't worry too much about Italy for now. So Germany, Austria and the Ottoman Empire, uh, on one alliance. And Russia, France and then Britain joining in, particularly to support Belgium once it had been invaded on the other side. So the size are the two broad groupings. And once uh, war is declared, the others all have to join in. Now, at first people thought a lot of people thought this is a good thing. Here are people in London in 1914, celebrating the fact that Britain has now declared war on Germany because Germany had invaded Belgium on its way to France, because it wanted to knock out France first, so it could then deal with Russia. And Britain is obliged to support Belgium and France. So I'm going through that very rapidly. I just want you to get the general idea. There were a lot of these alliances that made people were dragged into what they thought might be a quick war, which turned into something very, very different. So people were thrilled because of the sense of almost jingoistic nationalism. This is in London, you know, let's teach those Germans a lesson. We'll go. And they've been having all these quick wars. They've been winning. Let's teach them, uh, let's let's show them that we can do that, too. There's a sense that it'll all be over by Christmas is the famous phrase. It's in July 1914. It's just going to take six months. We'll sort it all out. We'll have a bit of a minor war, and then we'll all be happy. Uh, sorry. Something that happened in a in a very unsatisfactory way. But that's the type of mentality you can see with all these people throwing their hats in the air and cheering and saying, we're at war, Germany, isn't this a great thing? Now, if you look at that from the perspective of 1918, when we all know what happened and how terrible the war was, it's really, really hard to understand. But we can't do that. We can't understand 1914 with the benefit of hindsight. So that's another thing we need to do when we're studying history. We need to try. And as difficult as it is to put that hindsight to one side, we know the outcome. They didn't know that in 1914, so they thought this was going to be a bit of an adventure, a jolly good time where we can teach the German to listen and then go back to whatever we were doing before. So there's there's almost this the sense of, of euphoria, of the outbreak of war in Britain and other parts of Europe, too, um, in, in 1914. And that, again, is linked to that sense of imperial destiny that I was talking about before, and the sense of the civilising mission. Britain sees itself as the other European powers do. Britain sees itself as a great power. It's almost its destiny to go and fight meaningful war. So this is all part of, uh, reinforcing their sense of self-worth, their self-image as a great imperial power. You need a good war to show how important you are, for example, that type of thing. So that's just trying to sum up some of the mentality, but it leads to this domino effect. Whereas that I've been describing as one, uh, pair of countries declare war on each other, others are obliged to join in. And then all of a sudden, well, I like 1914, you've got mobilisation, you've got an eastern front with Germany fighting against Russia, and a Western front where Germany makes quick gains, comes through. Belgium, gets close to Paris in the very early months of the war. Um, there's, uh, some movement troops are moving. But then very rapidly, as Britain comes in to help France fight back, we get a stalemate on the so-called Western Front. That's more or less that blue line there from the, uh, the channel from the North Sea down to Switzerland, between what is, broadly speaking, between Germany and France, which is going to become the great image of the First World War over the next. Oh, sorry. Over the next few years, the horror of the trenches that the each side as. It actually finds out that they can't have a quick war anymore. Despite all of those logistical gains that Bismarck admired, he could move troops around all those things. The other sides caught up. The benefits of industry mean that both sides are able to come up with new, more powerful weapons of roughly equal magnitude, uh, so that they can both bomb each other, uh, for four years without being able to move anywhere. And so the war gets bogged down. Nobody had expected this war to be like this. There's going to be a massive reality check for the way in which this, this imperial system of alliances had led to something that nobody expected, but also the way in which industry was creating a new type of warfare based in the trenches. People just dug in these trenches, and men were stuck there for months at a time. And obviously terrible conditions, unsanitary rents, everything else with with al-Assad lobbing shells and weapons at them. And so we get this new image of warfare. This is what the new warfare looks like, not the rapid wars of the earlier period, not even the the great wars of the Napoleonic period. It's a war of industrial slaughter. And we see it for the first time at this level in the First World War that comes to be known. And so in order to do that, you've got to put your whole economy to work in order to support this war effort, because it's fine having these great weapons and industries being able to churn them out. But it takes a lot of money and resources and people back in the factories at home to do that, to create enough with not just weapons, but other supplies, food and everything else, clothing, the uniforms, whatever else they need to to keep the war if it going for a much longer period than anybody expected. So this is the way the war looks on the Western Front. It is more a bit more back and forth on the eastern front. But for the Western Front, this is more or less what it looks like for the next four years, based in the trenches, new weapons being developed, uh, industry and technology, creating massive new guns like this to bombard the other side. Tanks, aeroplanes, even submarines. I've got a picture of a submarine. The early ones that developed during the First World War. Uh, and the use of poison gas, of course. Chemical warfare. Uh, this is something that is a feature of the First World War. And after that war, there would be international treaties to try and ban it. But a new form of warfare had been created whereby one side is not, um, a beyond, you know, it's willing to take the chance of, of spreading chemical gases to poison people on the other side. These these are the new realities of warfare. And so young men are sent to the front. They are either killed or they're sent back with with what was called shellshock, which is effectively PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder, as we know now. And their lives are changed. You can see the the effects of, uh, of the technology on the war, but also the new visions that opens up. This is it looks like a bit of cheese on a pizza or something. This is, uh, a picture taken from, uh, an aircraft, an early aircraft. The first two planes were used in combat in the First World War over the battlefield. A place called, uh, in I was in Belgium, and it just shows the total devastation of all the shells going back and forth. All the forests have been wiped out. All the trees had been wiped out. So this is the new reality of warfare that people have to get themselves used to in, uh, the First World War. And I'll just, uh, before going to talk about the next bit, I'll just note the other part. So that's what's happening on the Western Front. And of course, is a lot of cultural response to this, to, uh, during and then after the war, um, a lot of, uh, novels, certainly poetry. This some very famous war poets, uh, trying to get to terms with us in trying to explain what this means, what its impact was, and those had been involved on those who who'd stayed behind at home as well. So European culture responds to this massive shock, this massive new, uh, events that it had just simply hadn't seen coming. And it's also worth noting that although this, that that, uh, settlement on the Western Front and the, the, the war between Germany and Russia, which will come back to, um, a little bit later, there's also important developments elsewhere, uh, most famously from our perspective, of course, down here in Gallipoli. So I was part of an attempt to distract the Germans, um, uh, from up, up on the Western Front to try and sort of open up other fronts to try and get this stalemate moving again. That was the reason for the Gallipoli campaign, where British troops, supported by troops from the Empire, of course, Australian and New Zealand troops, uh, try and invade the German ally, the Turkish Ottoman Empire in 1915, um, landing it at Gallipoli. And what, of course, was the Anzac campaign. And that didn't go very well either. This as as we know, the, uh, Anzac troops were bogged down, many were killed, many were injured. And that becomes that moment, though, even though it was essentially a failure as a campaign, it becomes, in an unintended way, almost at moment of of national arrival, of national recognition for New Zealanders and Australians, uh, something that sort of forged the sense of nationhood through military sacrifice. And we still, of course, commemorate that every April the 25th. So that was part of the, uh, aside campaign, in a sense, in the First World War, but an important one, certainly an important one for New Zealand and for Australia. Now, eventually, uh, after, uh, many years, the Americans do come into the war. One of his ships had their this the Lusitania being sunk in 1915. Uh, it takes some time, but in 1970. Saying the Americans come into the war. And that's where the great new industrial power that's really growing. And that sort of tipped the balance in favour of the Western allies, uh, of Britain and France with America, because it can pour much more resource, many more troops and weapons and everything else into it. And gradually that's what breaks the stalemate to the point where, uh, there can be a move towards Germany in early 1918. Uh, and the Germans recognise that they cannot, can no longer win and they have to surrender and we'll see what happens after that. So the stalemate is eventually broken, but only with the intervention of the Americans. All right, so we've got this new form of what's called total war. And all economic activity has to be directed to keeping the war effort going. All of the logistics have to be directed in that way. And that means that Homefront becomes what's happening back at home, away from the Western Front. Uh, and the the social effects that go with it become just as important a theatre of war. In a sense. You can't. All those people at home can't just ignore what's going on back in Britain, for example. Um, partly because the the young men are out there fighting, of course, but also because they have to be making sure that the war effort is maintained. So these are largely British examples, but he's a French one too. So there's a sense of of social sacrifice, not just the human sacrifice of the soldiers, but the women are giving something up to the women of Britain. Say, go, they're doing their bit, and you start to see the whole of the state directed towards what we might call a propaganda effort, putting out posters like this to convince people that they're doing the right thing by sending their sons and brothers away and husbands away to fight in the war. The women are making a sacrifice as well, uh, by, uh, by agreeing for that, uh, to happen. So the whole country, the whole community, the whole empire is in some sense contributing one way or another to the war effort. A woman, uh, encouraged to carry on what might be seen as more traditionally female roles, uh, baking bread. But everyone needs to eat a bit less. So we've got more to send off to the troops at the front, but also new roles one and two, whereby the men who would normally have worked in some of the armaments factories, uh, going off to fight in the war so women might come in and replace them. Now, we've seen a bit of that, that sort of thing. Women in factories last week with the earlier phases of the Industrial Revolution that by, um, this period, these were largely jobs that men would have in factories like this. Women come in during the First World War to take their place. And then, of course, there's a sense that maybe this is meaningful employment, and maybe they don't want to go back to a more domestic role after the end of the war as well. We'll certainly see that in World War two. So the the new nature of the warfare, surprising as it is, gives rise to social changes, significant social changes as well, uh, significant changes in expectations of gender roles as well, all of these different things that were unintended consequences of the First World War and the empires that I spoke about were important part of it, too. I mentioned Gallipoli and the Anzacs, not just with the British Empire, but the French Empire is relying on its, uh, citizens and subjects for assistance in their war effort, too. So they're, uh, signing up and encouraging, uh, people who live in their African colonies to come and fight for France against Germany in the First World War. Troops, uh, colonial troops, uh, really important to the French effort. Uh, and so while unlike World War Two, um, not as much of this war is taking place elsewhere. Some some of it is, but generally speaking, it's within Europe, but it is being contributed to by people from all around the world. So we need to think of these, uh, enormous social changes that are taking place when we're looking at the impact of World War One. All right. So how did all this come to an end? Already suggested that eventually, the intervention of the Americans was probably the factor that made a difference. That allowed the stalemate to be broken. And by late 1918, and on the 11th, at the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month, the 11th of November 1918, an armistice was agreed. A ceasefire essentially was agreed between the sides. The Germans gave up, now the the Russian side that had already come to an end. We'll come back to that in the next section. We'll see what happened with the Russians shortly. So really, when we're talking about the armistice, it's on the Western Front. It's between Britain and France and America on one side and Germany mostly on the other side. So the Germans were defeated and their allies. Of course they were. I mean, I mentioned there were some other parts to the the Ottoman Empire was dismembered. So there were some, uh, New Zealand troops involved with, with the British and going into Jerusalem and parts of what we think of as the Middle East that had been controlled by the Muslim Ottoman Empire and that were were taken over by Britain and France after the war. So it's not that there was no fighting at all outside Europe, that the main theatre was on that that Western front. So how are we going to clean up the mess that becomes the next big question. What is the settlement going to be? This is not a war anybody was expecting in July 1914. It turned into something far larger, far more disastrous, uh, far more cataclysm, cataclysmic than anyone had foreseen. And so we need to think about a new Europe afterwards. What are we going to do to change it so that this sort of terrible war can't happen again? It was called the war to End All Wars, of course, as we know it didn't end up that way. But there was a sense that something's changed and we need to almost redraw, rewrite the rules of how Europe works in order to stop something like this happening again. So that self-confidence of the imperial period, that that sense of colonial mission, the idea that European Europeans were a sort of superior race in that that twisted Darwinian sense, that social dominance sense is destroyed, that confidence is destroyed by the utter destruction of the First World War. And now in 1918 and 19, uh, 1919, really? And the years after. People need to work out what to do next. And so there's a massive peace conference, uh, several peace conferences. But the most important one, particularly for the relationship between the Western powers and Germany, is the one that takes place again, some I've already mentioned today. It's it's I, I, the French have been on the side that's just defeated the Germans. Why might they want to hold a peace conference at Versailles? Partly because that's a great seat of French power, but also because that's where the Germans had humiliated them in 1870. And they want to get their own back. So they sort of force the Germans to come back to this eye and agree to a set of terms, um, that will resolve the conflicts of the war. But the French are not the most important place. Certainly the the leaders of France, Italy, who joined in on that side, Britain and the United States get together as the the, the victorious Western powers. But in many ways it's the Americans. This is the sort of in a way, the moment where America rises to that sense of global supremacy it held for much of the 20th century. It's the Americans who had a lot to say about what Europe will look like afterwards. And President Woodrow Wilson, who's a Democrat and, uh, a very enlightened, uh, fellow. He's someone who sees this as a moment of opportunity where we can create a new world in quite a positive, optimistic sense. And he put forward, uh, a series of statements that become known as his 14 points about how Europe should be reorganised after the war and how the rest of the world should be reorganised to that. There should be. And I can't help thinking what a contrast this is to the current administration that should be open diplomacy and free trade. Uh, this is what the Americans were saying in 1919, okay, that the tone has changed a bit these days. But anyway, that's a different story. There should be arms limitation. We've seen what dangers unchecked expansion of weapons through industry has done. Let's dial this back. We want some. We want some sort of, uh, a peace agreement that that allows but so limitation. So they have a whole bunch of treaties around. You can only have so many naval ships. Each country will restrict its numbers, that sort of thing. Importantly for Wilson, he was an idealist, almost in that romantic, from below nationalist tradition that I spoke about at the start of which today that was his view of how things should be. He wanted each national group, however, defined. And as we'll see, the problem is trying to define them, uh, to have its own country. So if you're Polish, you should have a Poland, right? There was no Poland, as I said before, let's create Poland again. That used to be a Poland in the 17th, 18th centuries ago. In a way, it didn't mean the Polish people had gone away. It certainly didn't mean the desire for Polish national self-determination had gone away. So let's create a new Poland. Wilson was all for this. This is one of the things he wanted to see happening after the First World War. And there should be a, uh, an international group, a League of Nations, that where people can get together and sit down and talk through these problems. So we didn't have to have a war every time there was a disagreement. And, um, Tracy's going to talk about the League of Nations next week, so I'll leave that one for now. Okay. So this sounds wonderful, doesn't it? And in fact, a lot of what you're ends up looking like in 1923 here on the right hand, that compared to the imperial position before the war, is the creation of new nations. They do come into being. So you've got a nation of Czechoslovakia, uh, which is how I knew it when I was growing up, because it was that like that until 1993, when it split into two. We've got now the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but it was one country for for a long time, created after the First World War, Poland, again Austria was dismantled. So, uh, that big empire over here becomes a little state of Austria, a little state of Hungary. And we've got this new one, Yugoslavia, the South Slavs, the area of the South Slavs, all those Serbians and Bosnians and others that we've talked about before. So the sounds great. All those people who want to have their own nation have now got it. Isn't that fantastic? But of course, the problem is that it's never as easy as that. It's impossible to define one group of people who live in one area, who all speak the same language, who all feel like they belong to the same tribe or the same group. There are sub. Sets of other groups within these areas. So there's lots of arguing about the fact that there's Germans living over here in the western part of Czechoslovakia, or there's as other groups as Hungarians or Romania or whatever it might be. So although it's nice in theory, it just doesn't work very well in practice. That doesn't get rid of all of the problems of desire for national self-determination that it existed before the war. Still, these this is the new map of Europe with these new nations created to try and put some sense of national self-determination into place after World War One. But perhaps the biggest problem we're going to see and we'll just deal with this one, then we'll have another break, is the fact that France in particular, as I mentioned at Versailles, wanted revenge on Germany and the other Western powers were prepared to go along with us. And so the Treaty of Versailles, which is one of several treaties that are created, there's different ones with Austria and Hungary and others, but this is the most well known and the most important. We're reading a little extract, including this, but here actually is one of our primary sources for this Week in tutorial. So so have a look at this. And you can you can talk about it in tutorials and think about what it means. There is a demand for reparations from Germany. In other words the view from the Western powers. The victorious powers is that Germany was at fault. They're the ones who, along with Austria, started the war and therefore they need to pay for all this destruction that's been created in the last four years. Reparations, a fine, a big fine. It's a mess of great fun that Germany has to pay back over a number of years. Not only do I need to pay this fine, but they need to admit they were wrong. And so the famous war guilt clause is put into the Treaty of Versailles. Here it is. Here the Allied and associated governments affirm that the victorious Western powers and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and associated governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and their allies. So this is Germany is forced as a losing power to agree to this. Not only they have to pay this massive fine, they have to say we were the guilty party. Now, of course, they had some responsibility and guilt for the war. Of course they did. But if you think back to the way I was describing the outbreak of the war, is that domino effect? Wasn't that it was a series of alliances? Nobody quite knew what they were getting into, but the other powers were just as keen or felt as much of a sense of obligation to stick up for their allies and come to the help of their allies, as Germany did with Austria, so to say. It was all Germany's fault, while the Germans definitely had some fault, of course, but to say it with all them and nobody else's is maybe a bit unrealistic given the situation that Europe was in 1914. And so this is forced upon Germany. They have to pay massive fines and they need to accept that. And this is going to create enormous resentment in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. And I'm sure you all know what happened next after that, who came along as a result of a lot of that resentment within the German nation after World War One? So that's to say that while there was a genuine attempt to create a better world and a better Europe, particularly with the the relatively, um, idealistic vision of President Wilson of the United States, the result is one that leaves a lot of problems unsolved, and also creates some new problems with things like the war guilt clause and the reparations. And we'll have a look at the consequences of all that in the interwar period between World War one and two in our last section. So let's have a break for five minutes. So we'll come back and look at what happens after the war. Let's carry on with the final part of today's story. The legacies of the war and what happens in the interwar years is they'll become known. Of course, people didn't know them as the interwar years and the 1920s and 30s, because they didn't know there would be another war. But that's how we've come to refer to them, uh, these days, as you you can say, the first thing I want to look at is Russia. We haven't talked about Russia in great depth, uh, in the course, but this is a moment where it's important to bring it in and see both how these other events have impacted it, but what its influence is going to be on the rest of Europe and the rest of the world, too. So I spoke about that war on the Eastern Front between Germany and Russia, which had a direct border and the imperial, uh, era. The war does not go well for Russia. In fact, just to take a step back, what was the situation in Russia before World War one? Well, it had been an imperial power, as I said, its empire had tended to be one that expanded across Asia, across Siberia, to get to the Pacific. So it was a powerful European state, but it was the most, uh. Well, we put it another way. The least advanced, the least industrial, and the least advanced to the great European power. There's a long way behind previous. Some previous Russian rulers had tried to catch up with developments in, uh, Western Europe and some of the size. The rulers, the emperors, the emperors of Russia in the 19th century had tried to, uh, promote a sense of industrialisation that had been a bit of a push in the late 19th century to industrialise parts of Russia. But it was so far behind, uh, Germany and Britain, for example, the great industrial powers that when the war broke out, although it had some capacity, it was always going to be a bit on the back foot. The thing it did have was great territory. Uh, as we said a couple of weeks ago, if somebody invaded, you could just sort of pull back and back and back and wait for the winter to arrive and kill all the troops. Uh, it had it had, um, that possible, um, advantage. It also had the advantage, I suppose they had a lot of manpower, a lot of people who could send to to the front. But as we say again, uh, today with, uh, the Russian war in Ukraine, uh, but it also had the advantage in the sense that Germany was in the middle. So Germany was fighting on two fronts. And the reason Germany, that had not gone through Belgium to attack France as quickly as possible in 1914, is it wanted to get it out of the way so it could focus on Russia? Now that didn't happen. So Germany is always in this difficult position of fighting two wars at once. But the war was devastating on Russia. The, uh, cost in resources and manpower, uh, in the breakdown of social cohesion was absolutely enormous. There'd been some earlier, uh, uprisings in Russia that almost became a revolution back in the early years of the 20th century, there'd been some growing discontent among workers in the factories that would that would as I were trying to get going with industrialisation. So it was a sense that, uh, both peasants of the countryside and workers in the urban factories in Russia were um, uh, living in poor conditions and were not getting the, uh, any, uh, benefits that the state was not looking after them. The emperor was no longer a sort of father figure. He wasn't, uh, uh, protecting the people well enough. These these sorts of, uh, grievances were increasingly heard in Russian society. And the crisis of the, uh, of the ongoing war leads to workers uprising in February 1917, which is successful given how precarious the political situation had become, how badly things were going for Russia and for the royal family, so weakened, their position becoming untenable that this worker's uprising and Moscow and so Petersburg, uh, Petrograd, as it was then, uh, is able to force the SA there. Is this the word Tsar Nicholas the Second to abdicate? He actually stands down. He'd been busy trying to lead the war effort. Uh, he realises he has no support anymore. He he stands down, he stands aside. And his role as a leader was taken by a provisional government, a group of people who had been involved in the, um, the leading of the state, many of them. More from that. We might say that the liberal side of politics, but with one socialist involved in that as well. So a provisional government is put together that runs, tries to run Russia tries to sort of keep the economy going, tries to keep the war against Germany going, doesn't really succeed. And through a very, uh, a period of great crisis through 1917, uh, where it's not clear who's going to come out on top. And there are different factions of that, more traditional politicians on one side and the workers on the other side. It's the Communist Party that eventually, uh, leads another revolt against this provisional government later in the year, the so-called October Revolution. Not the whole of the Communist Party in Russia, which, of course, had looked to Karl Marx for its inspiration as a way of supporting workers that we saw last week and the very extract from The Communist Manifesto, workers of the world, unite! Workers should it should be supported. They should support one another. Against the imperialist state. This is the sort of thinking that's going into the opposition in Russia at this time. Yeah, I say the Communist Party. It's not the whole of the Communist Party. It's one of the most radical factions known in Russia as the Bolsheviks, led by this man, Vladimir Lenin, who was successful in overthrowing the provisional government that had only been in power, as you can see, for a matter of months, and creating a new state and, uh, late 1917, uh, based on Marxist communist principle. Let's see how it's going to work out. It took them a while to set it up because there was opposition to that idea. There was a brutal civil war in Russia over the next couple of years. One of the things that the provisional government wanted to do was keep fighting the war, try and to, um, defeat Germany in World War one, because it could see that things were going a bit better on the western side. One of the things that the Bolsheviks wanted to do was bring the war to an end, because they saw what harm it was doing to Russia in terms of cost, in terms of lives, economy and so on, so quite rapidly, the Bolshevik, uh, new power is it breaks the war, pulls Russia out of the war. Uh, and so in 19, early in 1918, uh, but that is a recognition of just how awful the situation was. And so we have the Civil War going on and stayed through the next couple of years connected to, uh, the economic crisis because of the mismanagement of the war, the fact that the workers in the factories, the peasants in the countryside couldn't get enough to eat. Those familiar themes that we've heard before and that have led to other uprisings that I spoke about a couple of weeks ago, they present very much in the Russian situation again, but the dominant power, when the Bolshevik forces are able to secure victory in the civil war, the dominant power now is that that faction of the one era, one particular group within the Communist Party known as the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, that's now going to create a new state based on the idea of it, the fact that it's a state for, ah, workers. And there are local committees, if you like, local representations, local workers, workers councils in all the urban areas. And the Russian word for that is a Soviet, a workers council. And so this becomes the Soviet Union, right. The workers councils are the backbone of the new state, uh, the, the core of the new idea of the state. So the Russian Empire is no more. But the Russia still controls all of that land. But the idea of an empire with an emperor with a star and his family is gone. And the salaries family is, as far as we know, a recession. I think that's proven that, uh, we assassinated fairly soon after that to get rid of them. So there could be no sort of replacement, uh, no new emperor or king coming back. And instead of a Russian Empire, we have, uh, the USSR, a union of socialist republics based on the Soviets, right. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. So they're quite self-evidently a republic, not a kingdom or an empire, even though they still have all that land that they have to manage. And the import, they are based on socialist principles, which means in this case, communist principles based on Marxist ideology adapted for the Russian situation by Lenin. Lenin becomes, uh uh, the leader for a while. He dies relatively young in 1924, so he's only in charge for a few short years. But his, uh, his ideology becomes the guiding force for the Soviet Union for the rest of the most of the rest of the 20th century. So we hear about Marxist-Leninist ideology, the ideas of Karl Marx, the Communist Manifesto adapted for the Russian situation by Lenin. And that becomes, uh, a mantra almost for other communist parties, whether it's in China or it's in Vietnam or other parts of the world, for much of the rest of the 20th century. So Lenin is the great leader of the Bolsheviks. That that unit within the Communist Party that takes up is the most radical and takes over and is successful, but only through violence, through civil war, and through suppressing enemies, takes over and starts to impose this ideal of a state for their workers, not a state for the rich people, a state for the workers. They're the ones who this is all meant to be for. Uh. Although, as we'll see, many of them do continue to suffer, um, in the Soviet regime, just as they had in the previous imperial one. So this is really putting Marx's ideas into action. This is what he wanted, a dictatorship of the proletariat. Remember that word from a couple of weeks ago that over the last week, actually, the, uh, proletariat, the working people, those who have nothing to give but their labour, they're the ones who have risen up in February and the workers uprisings, they're the ones who had risen up again in October. Um, in to overthrow the provisional government. This is meant to be the moment where Marx. His ideas are put into action. Now, Lenin dies, uh, relatively soon, as I say, 1924. And there's a massive power struggle within the Bolshevik Party and the communist leadership of the new Soviet Union, which is really only just still established. Itself in the mid 1920s, a massive power struggle to see who's going to take over next. And there's various competing, um, figures. I won't mention all of them, but the one who wins, of course, is the one on the right, and that is Joseph Stalin. Stalin is very much an outsider. He's not really even a Russian. He's from down in Georgia to the south of, uh, of Russia. He speaks Russian with a funny exit. Uh, he's he's not a member of the previous elites. He's not even really a member of the elites of the Communist Party. But he's the one who, through his own skill, um, his determination, his willingness to do whatever it takes to to reach and maintain and hold power manages to eliminate all his enemies and take over Lenin's legacy. And he very much does this, uh, in a way that shows himself as Lenin's heir, the one who will continue the work that Lenin started. So the idea of Lenin in this type of image, almost as a saviour figure coming to save the Russian people, is part of the propaganda that the Stalinist regime puts in place. I see the importance of showing the Russian people that something important has begun, um, that they're part of it, that Lenin was the great founding figure. Stalin is continuing his work. This is the type of message through propaganda that the Stalinist regime, uh, pursues for for the next few decades. And Stalin himself creates this cult of personality. So he's a, uh, an image of industrialisation in Russia in the 1920s and 1930s, not just a picture of a massive great factory or something, or an electrical plant, whatever that is. But Stalin behind it. It's only through Stalin's efforts and skills and determination that the Russian people are going to thrive and prosper. That's the type of propaganda message that we're getting from something like this. So Stalin's a charge from 1924 through to his death in 1953, right through the Second World War. I'll say more about him in that context, um, next week. But in terms of the nature of the Soviet state that, um, that Stalin creates and leads or takes over from Lenin and then leads, we're seeing it very much as, uh, authoritarianism in action. This is a totalitarian state. I've got that word on the on a, uh, later outline somewhere. And on another slide. We'll come back to that in a moment. But this is total control of the state of the means of production by a limited number of people. The leaders of, uh, Communist Party, of the Bolshevik wing of the, of the Communist Party. And Stalin takes this over, eliminates his enemies, makes sure that there's no possibility of any other party or group getting in power. It becomes a one party state, a cult of personality around Stalin himself, with all of the resources of the state, kept to putting him or keeping him in place. So. But he also recognises the, uh, need to get serious about industrialisation and catching up with the other Western powers, Britain and maybe Germany, that suffering a bit at this point. But then also, of course, America too. And so he does undertake rapid industrialisation through what's known as a series of five year plans. This involves massive disruption for millions and millions of people within Russia. In the Soviet Union it involves, for example, collectivisation of agriculture, not just building new factories, but there's lots of that going on. But out in the countryside, we're going to take all the people off the farms, all the traditional peasant farmers whose families have found them for centuries. And we're going to sort of make them all one big collective farm, which the state owns, because that's what communism said. There's no individual property. Everybody should own the stuff together. So the state will take over the farms, manage them, work them, uh, and all the people who happen to be on them. Some might stay there to to work the farm, but many will just be told to go somewhere else. And so millions of people are shifted. In the 1930s, uh, as part of the reorganisation of Soviet society and great hardship, millions of deaths through famine, uh, because these collective farms and work very well, uh, and through the deliberate displacement, uh, you want to call ethnic cleansing and a sense of shifting groups of people who might be seen as maybe not true Russians that are a different ethnic group, and therefore they might be a threat, so will push them somewhere in the middle of Siberia. So they're as far away as possible. Deliberate extermination, almost of large populations of people, uh, during the 1930s by Stalin as part of this, um, effort to supposedly modernise the Soviet state. So this is an example. This is one extreme of, uh, the communist version of an authoritarian, totalitarian, uh, government. And as well as that, he's eliminating his political rivals through the Great Purges that take place, show trials, perhaps as many as 300,000, um, potential political threats, people who might pose some sort of a threat put on trial and killed, and many others, um, sentenced to the Gulag, the prisons in the cold of Siberia, to the labour camps. So this is the state. This is the ideal workers state that the Soviet system created. Now, you might argue that it was. Starling's particular nature and his particular evil genius that created this. So this might be seen as a sort of a, um. Uh, a twisting of what Marx's ideas had been. And there's certainly some validity to that. But the brutality of the creation of the Soviet state might be seen, perhaps, as lending itself to the ongoing nature of that state as well. So this is authoritarianism in nature, a particularly communist form of it. We will talk about communist principles, but it's clear that one group is in charge. And many, many, many ordinary people are suffering and not getting the sorts of benefits that the Marxist ideal might have imagined for them. So that's the Soviet Union. Of course, it does succeed in its industrialisation push. So that's going to be able to take advantage of that in fighting back against the Nazis in World War Two. But that's a story for next week. All right. So we've got one example of an authoritarian regime there. We've got to get some others of course, in other parts of Europe too. Now back in the West, we don't get the benefits of the settlement after World War one that people like President Wilson might have hoped for. We get a period of great instability in the 20s and 30s with lots of economic problems, lots of suffering, the Great Depression starting in 1929. But before the depression, the problems of that World War One settlement for Germany become apparent because the need to repay these massive fines as the reparations degrade the German, the value of the German currency, there's simply not enough money to keep paying back the debt that they owe. The reparations have been put in place of the Treaty of Versailles, without much thought to the economic consequences that they would create. So by 1923, the German currency, partly as a as a response to the the need to keep shipping all this money away to fight it finds the need to keep printing more of it to do so. This was the massive inflation. Not just inflation, but hyper inflation by late 1923. You can see the ridiculous numbers here. Something that might have cost you ten max in 1914. In Germany, the food item that cost ten marks, whatever that it would have bought you. Um, is going up, but after the war, you can see 319, 20 to, to close to 700 marked by what it cost you to buy before the war. So that's, you know, massive, um, inflation. There was a, uh, some of my maths is going up hundreds of per cent of inflation. And then by July 20th, 1923, it's reached this number. And then in November in the second half of 1923, the currency completely collapses. So the printing notes with trillions of marks on them that can hardly buy you a loaf of bread. So the economic system in Germany collapses, um, in 1923. They eventually get out of it by scrapping the currency and starting a new one and starting again. And some changes are made to the reparations. But we see this, um, in other parts do it. Hyperinflation can really destroy a country. And that's what was happening in Germany, where here you see somebody using banknotes to light the fire because they're just worthless. They're just not worth it. You think so? You might as well put them on the fire. So this economic this is a massive, um, uh, strain on German economy and society and also one that has a lot of long term consequences for the almost for the mentality of running the economy in Germany, the idea of or the desire to quell inflation and make sure we never have this terrible inflation again is something that remains with Germany right through the 20th century and on to to the day that the sort of prudent management of the economy by the the banking powers in Germany still, I think partly a result of the the cultural memory of this terrible period of inflation. Eventually they do manage to turn it around, but not before, as you can imagine, an enormous amount of hardship. And this is followed up a few years later by that more worldwide economic, uh, uh, depression brought on by the stock market crash of 1929 in America. But that spreads around the world because the global economy is becoming more interconnected. The fact that Germany needs to repay these reparations, if they don't repay them, there are consequences for other economies who were expecting that money to come in. So that's one part of the picture. Uh, but there are other, uh, there is economic protectionism. America is starting to sort of put up the boundaries a bit more, again, quite like what Trump is trying to do today, uh, restricting free trade that those sorts of things. So for a whole bunch of reasons, uh, economic recession, a downturn, and they happen from time to time comes along, but it turns into a much, much worse economic situation because of bad policies that are put in place by many Western countries. So through the, the not early 1930s, there's a lot of economic, uh, dislocation which goes all around the Western world. And New Zealand was not immune from it either. One thing it does lead to when you see scenes like this in France of people queuing up to get food, free food in a soup kitchen, one thing it does lead to is, is a view that the current governments are not doing their job properly. They're not they're not really looking after us. And that's quite common in any era. You have a government in charge for a while. They might be a charge for 6 or 9 years, 2 or 3 terms in our case. And then people will say we had enough of them. We'll give the other not a chance. Well, that's definitely happening in Europe between the wars. Uh, and we see different versions of what that might look like now in Britain and France and also in Spain. Uh, at some point we're going to see governments of the left, of those who come from a more socialist point of view, the Labour Party. The Labour Party, which had been formed some decades earlier in Britain, first comes into power in this period between the wars, now the Labour Party. If we think back to, um, to Karl Marx, what is the Labour Party about? Its supporting labour, the proletariat? It's the same broadly. It comes from the same place as Marxist-Leninist or Stalinist ideology comes from, because it takes a very, very different form. But the Labour Party, including the Labour Party in New Zealand, the Labour Party in Australia, that's the government at the moment, the Labour Party in Britain, it's the government at the moment. They all trace their origins back to Marxist ideas and supporting workers. Now those have changed a lot. Of course, those have become much more to the centre, relatively speaking, these days of those Labour parties are what we might call more social democratic Labour Party these days. But they their intellectual origins are in Marxism. And for the first time in Britain, a Labour Party is elected because of these economic problems, and people think maybe they'll have a better chance of sorting it out. They actually don't. That problems are so great that they don't last very long. But it's the first time that a Labour Party came in. So too in France and Spain, very radical left wing governments are elected because the problems are so bad that people want to try a different solution, um, not their left wing governments. We might call Stalin left wing in the sense that communism is on the left of the political scale. My left over here. All right. But they're not. While the Communist parties, uh uh, they are, um, having some impact in, in Western Europe, though not to the same extent as we see in Russia, but there is an attempt to try a different form of politics. These don't succeed very well in the 1930s in solving those problems. And so other alternatives are tried, um, as well. We'll see what happens in Spain, for example, that okay. So that's one side. But of course, the other alternative, which I'm sure you're more familiar with, um, is the one of fascism, again, because of the problems that we saw in Germany, but also in other parts of Europe, too, with these ongoing economic problems everywhere, we can try a left wing, socialist communist type solution. Or maybe we could try something else, something that gives us back our sense of national pride, a sense of belonging to something that matters. Um, our sense that we've been wrong, that we've got all these grievances that are not being met and that we need to, um, we need to get back our sense of being an important country that really matters in the world. Those are the sorts of mentalities a lot of people might have had in the post-World War One period. And one response to that is through the growth of parties that we've come to know as fascist parties, what are the characteristics of those? And so we're that's throwing around a lot. Um, it's a word with very negative connotations for very good reasons. What are the characteristics of those parties and why, if they're so unattractive in a sense, did they take power? Why did they rise to power? Why did people let them in? Well, the first, uh, purely fascist party that comes in is the one actually in Italy with the Italian leader. You can see his image on the top right there, Benito Mussolini, IL Duce, uh, who comes to power in Italy? Uh, in 19, as early as 1922. Now, Marcel and he had been a socialist himself, but he didn't like the idea of collective ownership. He liked some things about socialism, but he didn't like the idea of all of that collective ownership. They didn't think that was right. So he became eventually an enemy of the socialists. They wanted to get rid of all them. And it's interesting how groups from similar origins sometimes go different ways to the point where they're sworn enemies. So Motsoaledi had been involved in politics a little bit, um, after World War One. Uh, but he and his supporters organised a march on Rome, a big sort of protest march in 1922, where they used the threat of violence and intimidation to demand that they had a role in the state and in fact, so much so that the king went to Italy, was now a unified country since the 1860s. It had a king. The king, um, allowed or gave in essentially to Mussolini and appointed him to a position of power within the Italian state. And he was able to, uh, then, uh, as a sort of acting leader, if you like, bring in some elections which were a sham, where, you know, his people, little one, then to to eliminate any, uh, opposition parties, to make them illegal, to, uh, crush any, um, uh, dissent, to censor the press that was opposing him, all of those things that are going to become very familiar tactics of authoritarian regimes through the 20th century. We've seen a bit of the 19th century. We see more of it in the 20th century. So this is the first, um, major fascist state. And what we mean by fascism here, particularly in the Italian context, the word fascism actually refers back to some symbols of the ancient Roman state. Okay, so we're in Italy, and, uh, I must leave. You thought it was quite a good thing to give people back a sense of pride. And what Italy used to do. The great Roman Empire. We'll go back and look at some of the symbols of Rome and will adopt those as our symbol. So that's that's sort of where the word fascism comes from. But it comes to mean a set of characteristics of totalitarian rule. Is that where they are referred to before? So totalitarian rule just made so rule where you're not allowing anybody else to participate in the process so that you are totally in charge. Now that might be like Stalin and extreme communism, Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, communism in the Soviet Union. That's one version. And we might call that a left version because it's based on Marxist ideas originally. Or we might get them what we might think it was the more right wing version, which is, uh, the fascism of Mussolini and eventually the Nazism of Hitler, a form of fascism. Two uh, and I tend to think of the political spectrum as like a bit of a horseshoe. Right. So you've got left wing, you've got right wing. And the further away you go, the more extreme you get, the more extreme you get with their tactics. They start looking. It's almost like a horseshoe that's closing up. The more similar they get, right. So the ideologies might be different, but the tactics are very, very similar to what Stalin's doing on one side and what people like myself and Hitler are doing. So the features of this type of totalitarian rule we could see as, uh, a view that individuals matter less than the state, so individuals could be sacrificed for the state. The needs of the state outweigh personal freedoms and other personal freedoms, a sacrifice you could do whatever you want to stay in power, eliminating your political opponents. Definitely. You create this cult of personality. I mean, look at the way, uh, Mussolini is characterised here as this great military figure we saw it with, with Stalin as well, a personality cult there. Of course, when Hitler comes along, he's shown in this image is almost like a a saviour figure for the Germany that have been going through all these problems. That is almost it's like the, you know, God shining on him or something. Right. Um, and you get this cult of, of action, uh, fascists should be mainly active, um, young, you know, it's a sense of reinvigoration of the nation. You can see it in this lovely image of Italian youths practising mechanism. This looks like a very dangerous thing to do from leaping over this set of bayonets or something, that this is a typical fascist thing. You know, you got to be young and strong and powerful and athletic, and you're going to fight for the nation very, very strong nationalism, of course. And it's that authoritarian, top down nationalism that I spoke about earlier in the lecture. That's the type of nationalism we're talking about here, that the state is all important. You will have pride in the state. You will love Italy or Germany where it is, and you know you will fight against its enemies. That's the typical of that idea of fascist authoritarian rule. And violence and intimidation are not just allowed. They're a key part of maintaining power, a key part of staying in power. Eliminate your enemies. Use violence if you have to. We see this again and again, and Fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany. So the word Nazi comes from the National. It's a shortened German version of the term National Socialism, the National Socialist Party, which is the party that Hitler led in Germany in the 1920s and into the 1930. So it's even got that word socialist in it. It's another form of fascism with distinctively, uh, distinctive characteristics for Germany. And of course, Hitler two comes to power legitimately. He is actually voted in as Chancellor. Bismarck had been chancellor in the 19th century. Uh, Hitler is voted in as Chancellor of Germany. He'd been in elections for a while, and he sort of got up and up and done a bit better each time, to the point where Germany had, uh, the people were so, uh, disillusioned with the existing political parties with all those problems that he had in the 1920s and were back in the depression again, now, 1933. I voted him in as chancellor. So he was legitimately elected to power in Germany. But as soon as he got into power, he did. Looking at what Mussolini had already done in Italy. He used that power to ensure that he would stay in place, and he would turn Germany into a one party state with him in charge, by eliminating opponents, doing all the sorts of measures of censorship and intimidation and violence that Mussolini had already used to ensure that the Nazi Party became synonymous with the German state. And that's what we see in the 1930s. So just very rapidly. Uh, two minutes to finish up on this, though. So fascism, where you can see Nazism as one form of response to the difficulties of the post-World War One period. And again, while it might seem horrific to us, we can try and understand why might have there been that the German people elected someone like Hitler to power? And of course, I didn't know in 1933 what we know now, again, with the benefit of hindsight and what he would eventually do. But they did know a bit about his tactics, and he was this very, um, persuasive figure. Of course, I'm sure you've all seen images of Hitler speaking and the way in which he could really, um, rile up the crowds, get the enthusiasm and the crowds going. So what Hitler wants to do during the 1930s is to bring, um, a sense of power back to Germany. He does this various ways. He focuses on economic recovery, rearming, which they're not meant to do after the World War One settlement, bringing the Army and the Navy back up, uh, again, creating more living space, Lebensraum for the German people. And eventually he's going to start expanding to the east and to bits of Czechoslovakia and Austria and elsewhere, provoking the West. And that's not a story I'm going to tell today. Just to say that this is the fascist state that Hitler has created, it is in part a response to World War One. And by 1939, he's prepared to take on, uh, just not expanding in a more, uh, meaningful way by invaded Poland. That's going to be start of World War Two. Now, just a last example I want to give you, though, is just before the start of World War One. We'd seen this in action in Spain. So Spain had that fascist leader, General Franco. He's another one. We have muscle and we've got Hitler. We've got General Franco, who comes to power in a civil war in Spain, where he's one of these right wing fascist leaders. And he's there's a left wing government, one of those populist left wing governments in Spain that is very much of the Communist style. And there's now a real tension between, uh, the two sides where the fascists don't want to see, uh, their state giving in to a Communist party. So there's a civil war in Spain, and this is seen as a sort of in 1936, it's seen as, uh, almost a forerunner of what will become World War Two. It's a competition between these different forms of government. Are we going to go the way of the left leaning populist governments? Are we going to go way of the fascist governments? And so Hitler and Mussolini send in supporting troops to Franco, the Spanish fascist leader. They send in, uh, aircraft, for example. They sent the uh aircraft, uh, practising what they're going to do later on when when the war is going to get bigger. Hitler's got plans for that already. They bombed Spanish towns. And the reason I tell you that partly this is the tension that's going to expand into World War two, but also because it's the source of one of the most iconic images of the 20th century, the painting of Guernica, a small Spanish town painted by Picasso. Pablo Picasso, the greatest painter of Spanish painter of the 20th century, perhaps, depending on you here. Uh, but this captures a new horror. This famous painting captures the response of ordinary people in a little village somewhere in Spain, to the fact that they're being bombed from the air by the forces of the fascist powers of government, who sent planes to support Franco and the Spanish Civil War. So that, in a way, is the image of everything I've been talking about today, everything we're going to see in World War Two, the great conflicts, the era of conflict in, uh, the 20th century is almost summed up there by the horror of the, uh, the disembodied people, the horses and everything else that's captured so well, I think by Picasso's Guernica, a symbol for, uh, the problems of the first half of the 20th century. Okay, so there's quite a lot to to deal with us. Some more images of the Empire, World War one and the ideal, um, Nazi family there. And, uh, just before World War two, we've seen a three, I think, where those demands for national self-determination were largely superseded by authoritarian solutions. That leads to the the period of empire, um, the problems that will arise in World War One that nobody expected, reshaping Europe and those problems didn't really go away, led to lots more grievances and conflicts that were unresolved in the interwar years. Okay, I hope that's been thought provoking and put a few things in place for you. Um, thank. So very much. Tracy is on next week and I'll see you again in two weeks time in week 12 for the final lecture. So we're getting rapidly towards the end. Thank you everybody. Thank you.