Hi, my name is Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. I teach at Duke University in the Philosophy Department and the Kenan Institute for Ethics. In this video, I want to introduce you to a new position on free will that is called contrastivism.
The best way to understand this new position is to compare it with old positions in the traditional debate. That traditional debate has gone on and on. on for millennia.
Much of that old debate is fueled by fear of determinism. Determinism is, roughly, the claim that every event, including every action and every choice, is caused by some previous event, and that cause ensures that its effect will happen. So, if determinism is correct, then your desires and circumstances guaranteed that you would choose to watch this video. You could not possibly have chosen or done anything else in the exact situation that you faced.
Many philosophers assume that determinism of this kind is incompatible with free will. That means that you cannot possibly have it both ways. Necessarily, if you're determined, then you're not free.
Philosophers who believe this are called incompatibilists. Now, some incompatibilists believe that all of our actions are determined, so they conclude that no human has free will. These are called hard determinists. Other incompatibilists claim that our actions are not determined, so humans can have free will. These are called libertarians.
But both of these groups, hard determinists and libertarians, share a common assumption. They agree that determinism and free will cannot coexist, so they are both incompatibilists. The opposing camp is called compatibilism. Compatibilists claim that determinism is compatible with free will and free action. In other words, you can have free actions and free wills even if your actions and choices are determined.
But how is that possible? Compatibilists usually think that freedom depends on control. We're free when we control what we choose and what we do. They also think that we can control our actions by our choices, And we can control our choices by our desires and values, even if our choices are determined. The crucial question is then not whether our acts and choices are determined, but instead how they are determined.
If our own desires and values control what we choose and do, then we, our acts, and our wills are all free. This debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists has continued for centuries. Yes, no, yes, no, yes, no.
It seems never-ending. One option is to pick a side and go to battle, but how can we fight for our side? Incompatibilists resort to name-calling.
William James called compatibilism a quagmire of evasion. Immanuel Kant called it a wretched subterfuge. In return, Peter Strawson calls libertarianism panicky metaphysics.
And many compatibilists called incompatibilism useless or empty because it provides no way to tell whether or not an act is determined in a real situation. The two sides abuse each other instead of arguing and analyzing. Such slurs and propaganda fuel the war instead of stopping it. I am a peace lover. I want to escape the war.
I want to go home and do constructive philosophy. Contrastivism reveals the path home, the road to peace. The contrastivist journey begins by asking not what freedom is, but instead what it is not. That is, what freedom contrasts with. Imagine that you enter a restaurant.
You ask the server, is that table free? Then you sit down and ask, are these rolls free? Free seats?
Free rolls? What does any of that mean? What does the word free mean? The answer is simple.
To say that something is free is to say that it is not prevented by any relevant barrier. The relevant barrier for a table is a reservation. If there's no reservation, then the table's free.
The relevant barrier for a roll is a cost. If the rolls don't cost anything, then they're free. This general formula applies even if the relevant barriers vary from one context to another.
Contrastivists apply this same basic analysis to free actions and free wills. But which barriers are relevant to free action and free wills? Hume distinguished two kinds of barriers to freedom, quote, that which is opposed to violence and that which means a negation of necessity and causes, close quote. Contrastivists follow Hume, but they describe the options in more modern language. One could say that an action or choice is free only if both.
doing it and not doing it are not prevented by any cause. Let's call this concept freedom from causation. This kind of freedom is clearly not compatible with determinism. However, this is not the only legitimate concept of freedom. One could instead say that an action or choice is free if and only if doing it or choosing it is not prevented by any coercion, compulsion, ignorance, or any other constraint on desire.
that is, on doing what you want to do. Call this concept freedom from constraint. The second kind of freedom is compatible with determinism because what you do and choose depends on you, on your desires and values, even if everything is determined.
So how do we choose between these concepts of freedom? I don't. I refuse to choose. I want it all.
According to contrastivists, Both concepts are perfectly fine. We just need to specify which concept we're using and which concept matters. Wait a minute. Matters to what? Some philosophers who discuss free will are metaphysicians, so they worry about how we as humans fit into the universe.
Are we different from other animals, from computers? Are we exempt from the laws of physics? For this question, what matters is freedom from causation. However, Other philosophers who discuss free will are ethicists, so they worry about responsibility. Do wrongdoers deserve blame?
Do they deserve punishment? For this question, what matters is freedom from constraint. We do not deserve blame or punishment when we are coerced or compelled or ignorant or otherwise constrained, and we can tell when these excuses apply. In contrast, if freedom from causation were necessary for responsibility, We could not ever tell who is responsible because we can't ever tell who is free from causation. But now, who wins the war?
Compatibilists or incompatibilists? Neither or both. There is a legitimate concept that matters to some important issues and which is incompatible with determinism.
That concept is freedom from causation. There is also another legitimate concept. that matters to other important issues and which is compatible with determinism. That concept is freedom from constraint.
So, incompatibilists insist on the concept of freedom from causation. Compatibilists insist on the concept of freedom from constraint. Both are right to insist that their own concept is legitimate.
But both are still wrong to insist that their own concept is the only one that is legitimate. They're wrong to deny that their opponent's concept is legitimate. It's legitimate too.
In the end, if they admit that they do not possess the whole truth, then they have nothing left to fight about. In this way, contrastivism brings several benefits. It explains what the debate is about and why it goes on and on. And it shows us how to end it and achieve peace.
Sweet. Peace.