[Music] on the morning of October 29th I was woken up by a colleague who alerted me that uh a lion aircraft crashed he said it's the max and I was surprised because it was a new aircraft my company provided the air data for aircraft flying around the Jakarta area so I went to the computer and looked at the data it was a immediately apparent that okay something was wrong the plane went up to about 2,000 ft just over a minute after takeoff and the plane had a bit of a dive and then the plane climbed to about 5,000 ft but then at 5,000 ft the plane was fluctuating up and down the plane just started diving it it just didn't make sense you don't see planes diving on departure I was baffled why did it go [Music] down Lion Air flight jt610 went missing from radar 189 people were killed in the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 the Boeing 737 Max a the plane was a new Boeing 737 Max what do we know about this 73 7 max 8 the fastest selling jet in Boeing history just introduced the year before we don't yet know what caused this crash a breakthrough this evening in a flight data recorder it holds many of the keys the data from the Black Box quickly got to FAA engineers in the United States there is a purity of this data it comes directly from the black boxes so it's recording air speed altitude the data showed what appeared to be a glitch something repeatedly moving part of the plane's tail controlling its pitch it didn't take long just a couple of minutes to see that there was rapid movement of the horizontal stabilizer it's probably the fastest way to kill yourself in an airplane is to have the stabilizer malfunction my spine literally tingled when I saw the traces from the Black Box the plane continually tried to push the nose down and the pilots were trying over and over again to stop the plane and in the end they lose that battle what Boeing had not told Airlines or their pilots was that it had put a powerful Software System on the new airplane in the Lion Air crash this system was receiving incorrect information and that made a plain dive straight downward and destroy itself inside boing they quickly diagnosed the problem and be began working on a fix but they stood by the max as hundreds of them took to the air around the world carrying thousands of passengers the company alerted Pilots about handling a potential malfunction Boeing in the FAA today warned airlines that sensors on 737 Max 8 Jets can malfunction Boeing are calling this a formal advisory and it's been issued to the pilots the reporting showed Boeing knew that it was risky but their response was to blame the pilots pilots did not hit two cut off switches Boeing says that action was part of wellestablished protocols for all 737s and that led to a series of decisions that kept the plane in the air and then we got another crash breaking news out of Ethiopia where a plane went down it was Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 on its way to Nairobi from Adis Ababa for a new 737 max8 jet ler crashed minutes after taking off two crashes the same plane 346 people killed an iconic American company's reputation in tatters the story of the Boeing 737 Max would end up exposing corporate deception and a broken regulatory process but at the center was a Software System supposed to keep people safe that instead led to their deaths [Applause] [Music] black boxes from the Ethiopian crash have been recovered it's the second disaster within 5 months involving the Boeing 737 Max that's the same kind of aircraft that crashed back in October in [Music] Indonesia 157 people including passengers and crew members on board all [Music] dead the first thing you get to see at the site is a very big hole and then to only imagine this is the place that they were last alive we learned that there were no survivors on the plane and then our objective was to go and bring my daughter's body home now you're in close proximity you're able to see the fine details you're able to maybe think these are personal effects belongs to K my sister or my mom or this bone whose bone is this and they told us that there was no part of a human that was bigger than a femur that was left left that whole experience is just a jumble of images and painful thoughts and blankness really to me I don't really I can't really make sense of it the crash of Ethiopian flight 302 was the second time in 5 months that a Boeing 737 Max had gone down [Music] as families gathered at the crash site across the world reporters at the New York Times were investigating what had been going wrong with Boeing's new commercial jet statistically speaking the likelihood that these two accidents were not in some way connected was extremely low it suggested that there was something going on with the plane and obviously we were determined to find out it was clear from the GetGo that Bowen was in full crisis mode as the facts from the accident become available and we understand the necessary next steps we're taking action to fully reassure Airlines and their passengers of the safety of the 737 Max this was going to be an existential crisis for the company if these two events were related China grounds the plane first other International regulators ground the plane then the European Union grounds the plane but in the US the FAA says it's not grounding the plane boing and the FAA all were saying that they were sort of waiting for the facts before they rushed to judgment and grounded such an important new plane but for months the times was reporting there was something wrong with the 737 Max itself the software system that Pilots had not known existed the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system or mcass the function of this previously undisclosed system was to save the plane when it believed that the plane might go into a stall and fall out of the sky and so this system was designed then to sort of take over the stabilizer and push that nose back down in case the pilot gets in trouble then a major setback for the company [Music] radar showed the two planes flight patterns were eerily similar days after the rest of the world had reached the same conclusion they finally grounded the plane for the New York Times reporters all the signs pointed to mcass we knew that mcass was the beginning we knew that we needed to start with this system this was a really problematic Software System in the way it was designed okay well then how the hell did it end up in the plane this way Boeing declined to be interviewed for this film in a statement the company said safety is its top priority and it has worked closely with Regulators investigators and stakeholders to implement changes that ensure accidents like these never happen [Music] again this story really begins in 2011 the 2011 Paris Air Show officially opened Monday Boeing and Airbus had been going head to-head for at least a decade but air Airbus had been quickly catching up and really nipping at Boeing's heels it's the best air show ever for Airbus in terms of aircraft numbers sold in 2010 Airbus introduced the A320 Neo a more fuel efficient version of its stalwart a a 320 the A320 is the direct competitor to the Boeing 737 Airlines wanted an airplane that was more fuel efficient than the airplanes then in service Airbus chose to re engine the A320 into what they called the Neo the new engine option it's a record 200 orders for its A320 Neo was one of the fastest selling programs of aviation history and it placed enormous pressure on Boeing to respond about 40% of the profits for the entire Boeing Company came from the 737 the 737 was the bestselling commercial airplane of all time 10,000 737 aircraft is going to roll the assembly line more than 10,000 of these airplanes have been used by hundreds of Airlines all over the globe the official 737 christening ceremony took place in the new Final assembly bu what always amazed me is that the 737 was first introduced when the Beatles were still together right January 17th 1967 flight attendants christened the first Boeing 737 by Smashing champagne bottles over the wings it was designed to be very low to the ground now by the 1980s Boeing had to upgrade the 737 and they created what was called 737 classic which had a new engine on it brand new Boeing 737 500 in the 1990 you had the 737 Next Generation which had a new wing on it and some fusel stretches and so here we are in 2011 at the Paris Air Show with the A320 Neo and Boeing frankly was caught flat footed within a couple of weeks Airbus and American Airlines have the preliminary workings of what would become the first deal for American to buy Airbus planes in more than a decade Gerard RP the CEO of American Airlines calls Jim McNerney the CEO of boing it's a courtesy call at this point just letting their longtime supplier of airplanes know they're going to go with the competition and that is essentially a dagger in the heart of Boeing and within 48 Hours Boeing had decided to pull the trigger on launching the re-engine 737 which later became granted as the Max from the very beginning from its birth it was marked by competitive [Music] pressure you need to understand what was going on with Bo at the time that the max program was launched Bo was billions of dollars over budget on its 787 program on its 747-8 program airlines are thoroughly ticked off at Boeing over the delays and boow was looking at the max to restore its own credibility within days of the 2 737 Max crash another investigation was underway in Washington DC we started getting information in from whistleblowers from people both current and former FAA and Boeing Employees Doug Pastak was leading a congressional investigation this is the first time he is speaking publicly about what he found as soon as the second accident occurred we started our investigation and our Focus was on the design development and certification of the max we got hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from Boeing one of the things that really struck me from speaking to a lot of Boeing Employees was that they were so excited to go to work at Boeing Boeing is a tremendous engineering company and it's technical Marvel but almost without failure they point to a degradation of that mindset and that safety suffered as a result looking backwards I think you can clearly see the trajectory to tragedy along the way a at [Music] Boeing Boeing publicly said the max went through a deliberate six year development process but in their first stories the New York Times reporters found insiders who said that Boeing Executives had been putting the pressure on to design the new 737 quickly and cheaply one specific engineer we spoke to was Rick Ludy he helped design the cockpit in the Max and he talked a lot about how there was an obsession in limiting changes this program was a much more intense pressure cooker than I'd ever been in company was trying to avoid costs minimum change to simplify the training differences and to get it done quickly that put what had happened in the context of this broader corporate narrative yeah speed was what they seem to desire there was a lot of decision making that was somewhat arbitrary and didn't involve as much of the of we what engineering considers health the um debate the challenge to the boing designers was that any designs we create would not drive any new training that required a simulator in his recorded interview with the times ly said Boeing management was so determined to avoid the expense of new training they made a bold promise Sals had made a commitment with Southwest that for any airplane they delivered that had a new level the differences training Bo would pay the company $1 million per every airplane delivered if the max required simulator training it would rebate Southwest a million dollar per plane and there's that incentive that's why it was so important to Boeing that pilot training be kept to a minimum all of this comes out of trying to give Airlines the most fuele efficient vers version of a plane that they can spend as little money training their pilots on that meant Boeing had to do a number of things to make this plane fly like the old one and that was because the max had much bigger engines on it to make them more fuel efficient but because the 737 was a 50-year-old airplane at this time practically when it came time for Boeing to put those engines on the wing the engines were so darn big they had to mount them further forward on the wings they were testing in this wind tunnel and they were discovering the plane was handling just a little bit differently but they didn't even have a plane built yet so this wasn't you know happening in real flight this is something you have to fix and they leaned on a system that they had used once before in a military tanker it was designed as a system on the plane to really just smooth out the way the plane handled it was MCAS it was designed for these extremely unusual Maneuvers situations that hopefully the plane would never get in and to prevent the nose from getting too high the system would move the stabilizer on the back of the plane to push the nose back down but inside Boeing there were early signs of trouble one of the first documents we found was from November of 2012 a Boeing test pilot was flying the max in a flight simulator and trying to respond to an activation of mcast and that resulted in what he described as a catastrophic event it showed that if that had been in real life he could have lost the airplane they realized from that moment on even a Boeing test pilot may have trouble responding to mcass the company kept quiet about the simulator experience and appeared to have discounted the test results still in the following months some Boeing Employees suggested simply removing all references to mcass from training manuals Boeing from almost the very beginning realized the significance of mcast and the significance mcast would have on pilot simulator training if we emphasize mcast is a new function there may be a greater certification and training impact recommended action investigate deletion of mcast nomenclature what that meant was that if they said mcast was a new function the FAA was going to scrutinize it a lot [Music] more Boeing told Congress it kept the FAA informed about MC's development and final configuration but Boeing has a complex and close relationship with the agency that oversees it the airplanes are part of the story but so are The Regulators the FAA regulated Boeing in part with a handful of Boeing Employees whose paychecks came from Boeing but whose jobs were to represent the interests of the FAA it's a decades old Arrangement known as delegation that allows federal agencies to give oversight powers to the companies they regulate in the beginning there was a really good Reas reason for this the FAA was certifying things that made no sense to have them certify every single exit sign or bathroom sign or paint the issue that many of the FAA employees that we talked to had was that it went Way Beyond bathroom signs over time Congress passed laws that pushed the FAA to hand over the responsibility for more and more tasks to the company to Boeing with this level of Delegation between the company and the FAA it became hard to understand who was working for who there was one key person inside the FAA Ali barami I'm Ali barami my job at the FAA is to lead and manage Aviation safety organization in the midst of a long career at the FAA alib barami had left to spend four years as a lobbyist for the Aerospace Industries Association while he's in that Gabi enroll he says we urge the FAA we urge the FAA to allow greater use of Delegation not only to take full advantage of Industry expertise but to increase the collaboration that improves Aviation safety so here's the guy who would ultimately lead the faa's safety operation encouraging the fa a to let industry do as much of its certification work as possible neither Ali barami nor the FAA would agree to an interview but former FAA administrator Michael herera spoke to us about delegation and the relationship between the agency and Boeing there are those that believe it is the fox guarding the hen house here is why it's not the company has an organization whose responsibility is to ensure that it is in compliance with these standards that are set by the FAA and that has a level of independence from the entities that they're overseeing what that gets back at is the issue of trust and transparency because the whole regulatory framework and the whole delegation process is premised upon a notion that everyone is going to share their knowledge and their expertise with one another in the design of the 737 Max many things would be delegated to Boeing that included mcass under the impression that this was a relatively benign system the FAA agreed to delegate it as is the custom with the FAA and Boeing and that's what happened in this case it handed it over in a statement the FAA blamed ineffective coordination and said it had not focused on mcass when it certified the max because Boeing had not identified mcass as significant Congress has ordered the agency to revise the delegation process after years of going through design and development the 737 Max prototype was rolled out of Boeing's Renton Factory for its Maiden flight Ed Wilson is in the cockpit he's the new Chief pilot and he takes off and let's just take a listen as this airplane gets ready for its very first [Music] take a short time after this first Maiden flight Ed Wilson he and his co-pilot start to realize that the 7 37 Max is not handling as smoothly as it should in certain lowp speed situations it's shortly after takeoff you know it's still kind of climbing to ascend it's not going full speed Boeing Engineers had an idea for how to deal with this they know about mcass and they know that mcass was actually used for a similar situation in these highspeed Maneuvers and so theoretically mcast could also be used in these other situations to also smooth out the handling crucially it's already been created it's already been approved and it's something that we could just apply you know to a different phase of flight it's actually a pretty easy fix this ends up being an extremely fateful decision they enable the stabilizer to move much more actually four times as much now the systems designed for low speed situations like just after takeoff and after takeoff is when the plane is still only a few th000 ft over the ground that means you have much less room for error it's happening in automated fashion and a repeated fashion this fundamentally changes mcast it makes it much more aggressive much more risky it's a far more dangerous [Music] system Boeing was doubling down on the system expanding it despite the earlier catastrophic result in a simulator test the times reporting on mcass focused on a former Boeing pilot I started to hear about a pilot at Boeing whose name was Mark forkner he came up through the Air Force Academy he flew for Alaska Airlines and he became the chief technical pilot for the 737 he had played a definitive role in making sure that there was minimal pilot training on the max Boeing released to our committee instant messages and emails from Mark forkner and some of his colleagues in one of these emails that Mark forkner sent out he says I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulat training required to transition to Max and he said quote Boeing will not allow that to happen he was this key liaison between the company and the FAA he was the person who personally emailed the FAA asking for mcast to be removed from the pilot [Music] manual that was an important piece of this because we understood that the FAA really didn't know that mcast became more powerful he was speaking absolutely on behalf of the company this was not some low-level employee and he was asking for something that was really quite substantial that a new piece of software that made the plane behave in ways that it previously hadn't be concealed from the pilots this is where the commercial pressures from the executive level come right down to the development of the airplane Mark forkner certainly was not a lone actor in what he did he was following through in a policy by Boeing to ensure that the program did not have to put pilots in a flight simulator it got to the point where Mark forkner got an award for keeping training on the 737 Max to a minimum nearly 8 months after requesting that mcass be removed from Pilot training manuals forner texted a colleague with a shocking realization this appears to be the moment where Mark forner learns that mcass has been expanded he writes in that message I basically lied to The Regulators unknowingly but he never went back and corrected the record he never went back and fixed the error Mark forkner wouldn't speak to us but his lawyer told the times reporters that his Communications with the FAA were honest and that he would never jeopardize the safety of other Pilots or their [Applause] passengers when Boeing Engineers expanded the mcast system they included a feature that would make it particularly dangerous planes have millions of parts in them and there's one little one on the 7 37 that sticks out of the fuselage see that little black circle there that is called the angle of attack sensor on the 737 Max it had the power to trigger mcass it's the AOA sensor that is one of the crucial parameters to the computer to tell the plane that's in a perilous condition the angle of attack sensor would activate mcass by telling the system that the plane's nose was too high and then mcass would try to push the nose down but if this sensor is broken for whatever reason mcass never realizes and so it keeps pushing the nose of the plane down over and over again Congressional investigators would later find documents showing that Boeing Engineers had raised this very concern an engineer asked what if we have a faulty AOA sensor because AOA sensors are known to be faulty you know what happens to the airplane so you have those concerns raised and the respones again from Boeing Engineers was to essentially dismiss [Music] those 2 1 Boeing began delivering the new 737 Max in mid 2017 at the outs that 737 Max was arguably one of Boeing's biggest successes it had become its bestselling jet ever Advanced sales were estimated at $370 billion American had orders for 100 Southwest Airlines for 200 Boeing had focused especially hard on selling to developing markets in Asia where lion A's parent company became the first customer to fly the 737 maaps signing an agreement worth more than $20 billion Airlines loved it there was a yearl long waiting list to get one but boing's signature new jet had a fatal flaw breaking news the search for wreckage is underway after a passenger jet with 189 people on board crashed a lioner Boeing 737 nearly brand new boing investigators from the US national Transportation safety board attributed to an analysis of what led to the Lion a crash leading up to the Lion Air accident the angle of attack probe itself was miscalibrated the maintenance crew was not able to properly identify this miscalibration an angle of attack sensor sent bad data to mcast the plane thought it was an aall because of bad information and as a consequence of this angle of attack data error the mcast activated when it really shouldn't have 5 months later almost the exact same thing happens halfway across the world new 737 Max 8 jetliner crashed today investigators say that flight had similar problems to the Lion Air crash once again the angle of attack sensor is malfunctioning but there is this question now about systems within the aircraft if mcass hadn't been on those planes those planes wouldn't have crashed it's that simple the world Mourns 157 people killed in the Sunday [Music] crash on the flight of 737 Marx crash we we lost five of our family members we had our mom and karanga our dear sister koline karanga her three kids Ryan jog Kelly wanjiku and Ru Wango [Music] not like there's a manual of how you need to react you just there it's like motionless you just feel infuriated by anyone and everyone at that point I remember the boying company blaming what they call the foreign pilots and deflecting blame to to them say saying they are the cause [Music] all of us at Boeing are deeply sorry for the loss of life in the Ethiopians Airlines flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 accidents Boeing CEO Dennis mullenberg latched on to findings that inexperience and lack of training were part of a chain of events that led to the crashes it was a controversial position understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots and in some cases our system safety analysis includes not only the engineering design but also the actions that Pilots would take uh as as part of a a failure scenario right Boeing's contention from the beginning was that even though the pilots did not know that mcass existed that they did not need to know that and in some cases uh those procedures were not completely followed so Boeing believed that the pilot should have been able to realize that it was very similar to a runaway stabilizer situation runaway stabilizer is an aviation term for a malfunctioning stabilizer after the Lion Air crash Boeing had issued a directive to Pilots to be aware of this possibility and told them what to do if it happened when that part of the tail was not acting the way that it should be you take manual control of it the pilots could have stop their roller coaster ride by turning these two switches off to shut off power to the stabilizer stop it from moving on its own and then you start cranking a wheel in the cockpit that literally will manually move the stabilizer back to where you want it to move the issue was were there things happening inside the cockpit that might have made that harder to do that's what we were [Music] asking when we finally got the preliminary blackbox data from the Ethiopian Crow crash we called up Dennis taser an American Airlines 737 pilot and sent him the data and we read through it together my mission was to provide them I'm in the cockpit I see what's happening now so we walked through each line and I had no idea what was in it I knew that the crew had an experienced captain and a lesser experienced first officer we go second by second through the few minutes of this flight going through the steps that the pilots had taken and saying yep I would have done that yep I would have done that and as soon as they lift off the ground all these different alerts started popping up the air speed was unreliable the altitude was showing unreliable there were alerts related to that but they bring the gear up and they continue to climb out 2 minutes into the flight B based on faulty data from the AOA sensor mcast kicked in and began pushing the nose down don't think and I have very clear memory of noting a Time Mark where the first officer is quoted as saying stab trim cutout switches which takes the weapon away from mcass which is what Boeing told us to do and I have to confess I probably swore I said the kid got it right the kid got it right what had happened was the pilots did do what they were supposed to do they had cut the electricity off don't think they hit these switches and they tried to take manual control the first officer is reaching to this large wheel on his left and that's the man ual trim wheel and trying to turn it it's like lifting up a 10 ton bucket of cement out of a deep well problem was at that point the plane was going so fast that even after they took manual control they could not physically get the plane to write itself they shouldn't have been going that fast too low terrain and they're continuing to accelerate towards the ground the ground is approaching them then with no apparent recourse the pilots reached for the stabilizer switches I'm yelling into the cockit don't do that but I don't know what they're facing MCAS was reactivated mcast says hey I'm back on here we go and now the airplane is in near full nose down trim and you can pull back forever and there's not enough metal in the back of the the airplane to make that airplane come up to a nose up terrain terrain pull up pull up pull up she died when she was 24 it's unbearable that she's not with us and the only thing I can do is try to prevent this for other people about 4 months after the Ethiopian Airlines crash the family of Samia stumo was about to receive news they would find bewildering we were eating dinner and I hadn't looked at my phone for a long time and it was blowing up we are joined today by Ali barami the associate administrator for Aviation safety chairman Colin rank M there were families from Kenya from Ethiopia from all over saying who is this Ali bahami we continue to evaluate Boeing's software modification to the mcast in addition the faa's Ali barami had been called before Congress where he was questioned about Revelations the FAA had known there was a risk of another Max crashing after lionaire if the agency's own analysis found mcast to be an unacceptable risk why did the FAA not take immediate action to address those risks the families hadn't known that before they didn't know that the safety agency gambled with passenger lives we knew that eventual solution would be to have the modification and based on our risk assessment we felt that this we had sufficient time to be able to do the mod ification uh you know and and and get the Final Fix after the Lion Air crash the FAA had conducted an analysis of the likelihood of another 737 Max crashing the worst case scenario was Grim they looked at the probability that there could be another crash of a 737 max if the FAA didn't do anything to mcast and just let the plane keep flying and what that assessment showed was that fa predicted there could potentially be 15 more fatal accidents of 737 Max aircraft over the lifespan of the fleet about one crash every other year but in explaining its decision not to ground the plane the FAA said in its statement that the actual risk at the time considering the number of planes in the air was as close to zero as their calculations allowed the agency had given Boeing 150 days to fix mcass and issued official directives to Pilots they were gambling they were betting against time that they would have a fix to mcast before the next crash happened and unfortunately they lost that bet not everyone within the FAA agreed with the agency's gamble people too quickly jumped to that conclusion that the pilot should have been able to figure out what's going wrong and be able to intervene properly FAA engineer Joe Jacobson examined the data from the Lion a crash and quickly raised concerns about the safety of the max this is his first on camera interview I was pointing out a design flaw purposely designed and certified to use only only one AOA input to drive mcast to move the horizontal stabilizer at a high rate talked to three managers said this is a design flaw they were skeptical not really buying in saying you know the pilot should have been able to intervene it's a failure our job is Aviation safety and when airplanes go down we feel a a real personal sense of loss and remorse and failure and it affects a lot of people in the fall of 2019 with the max having been grounded for 7 months Congressional investigators released internal Communications they found during their investigation test pilots working for Boeing WR about problems with the mcast system two years before the first fatal crash in they offered further evidence of the company's attempt to avoid pilot training for the max then we got the messages and I remember where I was in my kitchen because it was Mark forkner in one document the former Boeing pilot who had written notes assuring mcass would not be put in training manuals joked about swaying Regulators with Jedi Mind tricking other documents released later even showed forkner dismissing the idea of pilot training for lion a when Lion Air the airline that ultimately flew the first plane that crashed was asking for simulator training he was disparaging them to his colleagues calling them stupid I mean seriously did that ever cross their minds that they were going to let something go into the air that could potentially kill people Boeing CEO Dennis mullenberg appeared before Congress Boeing CEO is expected to acknowledge that his company made mistakes in the way and here's the first time this guy's in the hot seat appreciate the by then he'd become the face of the 737 Max crisis been on this committee a long time we have never undertaken an investigation of this magnitude we intentionally put the families close to the witness they're the victims here and it should be like you know a trial in court uh where you get to face the person who you know who committed a violent act against you the committee confronted mullenberg with an array of internal Boeing documents the next slide um this shows that Boeing became aware that the disagre from this that Boeing understood how important didn't know about this is unaccepted marketing Representatives emphasized to potential customers that FAA had reduced the length of pilot training that slow Reaction Time scenario 10 seconds found the failure to be catastrophic for those families the pain of this was accentuated because this evidence that was going up on the screen was information that they felt that Mr mullenberg could have used to inform his decision about keeping the plane in the air or not we do know that Boeing Engineers actually proposed placing a mcast annunciator in the we vulnerable to a single AOA sensor failure now as you emphasize uh flight control will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors and I guess the question is why wasn't it that way from day one Mr chairman we've asked ourselves that same question over and over and if uh if back then we knew everything that we know now we would have made a different decision Nadia milleron she was radiating with anger over this it's come to the point where you're not the person anymore to solve the situation I want to say it to you directly because I don't think you understand what we're saying she was right in front of him and here you have the CEO of what is one of the most important American companies one of the most important companies in the world in the end it's about safety and I are not capable of doing that looking in the eyes of the mother of a young woman who died on his airplane [Music] thank you I know that she wasn't afraid of flying at all until the last 6 minutes of her life that's just a horrible betrayal that Boeing in the FAA caused for this person in the last moments of their life and it kills me that that trust was betrayed Boeing's really kind of stuck in a hard spot here Dennis mullenberg was blasted on Capital Hill 2 months later with the company's stock plummeting Boeing stock has been dropping all day but it's down 22% since the 737 maxjet was first grounded and the Max still grounded Dennis mullenberg was out near the one-year anniversary of the 2 737 Max crash New York Times reporters Natalie kitro and David GIS flew to St [Music] Louis by then Boeing was recommending pilot training and retooling the mcash software with a second AOA input as a fail safe they'd been invited to Boeing's offices there by the new CEO welcome thank you for having us we're happy the interview was recorded you're here we got a lot of questions have a lot of catch he had been on the company board of directors throughout the 737 Max program and described himself as the company's backup plan to Dennis mullenberg handling of the crisis boards are invested in their CEOs until they're not we had a backup plan I think this board was incredibly well prepared I am the backup plan David goun had been on the board of Boeing for several years he laid the blame squarely at the feet of Dennis mullenberg he was in the midst of damage control it's more than I imagined it would be honestly and it speaks to the weaknesses of our leadership he was shooting straight from the hip it was kind of disarming to hear from the CEO of Boeing he told the reporters the company had indeed made a fatal mistake which was assuming all Pilots could counteract a misfire of mcass we made a decision in December to recommend simulator training and everywhere in the world because of the regulators and the pilots in the developing world not because the US Airlines needed it they probably don't there is this narrative that some Forum Pilots are not as good as American pilots and Boeing seemed to be suggesting as much we pressed Calhoun on this issue do you believe that if us Pilots had encountered the mcast malfunction that lioner and E 302 experienced would they have been able to deal with it in your estimation and um I'm not going to let you write this down do you agree or not going to write it down no all right forget it you can guess the answer that interview was essentially the last Boeing story that we did to this day I think Boeing doesn't accept full responsibility for these crashes there's always the implication that if the pilots had acted appropriately rately those 346 people would still be alive [Music] today in March of 2021 families gathered in Washington DC for the 2 Anniversary of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 Boeing had recently settled a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States brought by the Department of Justice we have some breaking news on Boeing fil in the settlement Boeing admitted to miss leading statements half-truths and omissions about mcass it agreed to pay $2.5 billion 500 million to the families of the victims and most of the rest to compensate the airlines the FAA retested and approved the 737 Max it is once again flying passengers around the world [Music] w for more on this and other Frontline programs visit our website at pbs.org [Music] Frontline Trum mines Boeing fatal flaw is available on Amazon Prime video [Music] w [Music]