Transcript for:
Key Cold War Events (1946-1956)

GREEK / TITO SPLIT / PRAGUE COUP / BLOCKADE GREEK CIVIL WAR MAR 1946 -[a] AUG 1949 Causes: Mussolini invades; Germany helps; Germany pulls out as resistance too much (not worth it) The British invade to support resistance but British forces, alongside Greek government troops, clash with EAM-ELAS fighters (communist resistance) - they call on Stalin to help but Stalin refuses to help Greek communists and even send Soviet generals to help Britain. Government implemented by Britain begins ‘White Terror’ in Greece after war; mass persecution of Greek communists who fought against Nazis in WW2 as apart of the resistance (1,200 killed and 40,000 arrested) Trigger = ‘White Terror’ - mass persecution of communists in Greece Why did the USSR not back the Greek communists (KEE) during the civil war? - Stalin followed the ‘Percentages Agreement’ in OCT 44’ which was a secret agreement dictating what the USSR and Britain would get after the war. - Stalin therefore wants to maintain good relations with the West, so he refuses to back the communists - however, Tito helps Greek communists. Key Events: - Until FEB 47' the British were funding, training and helping monarchists during the Civil War (spent £85 million in Greece since 1944), BUT they pulled out due to bankruptcy and appealed to the USA to help Greece. - Truman announced that the USA would step in to support the Greek government against Communist pressure. - Stalin was not aiding the KKE (Tito was however) so he allowed the KKE to get crushed in SEP 1949 Consequences: MAR 1947 - Trigger for Truman to adopt Truman Doctrine; target with aid with the purpose of containment Greek communists eventually lose, mainly due to a lack of Soviet support / aid - One of the main reasons for the rupture between Tito and Stalin was that Tito funded Greek communists, whereas the Soviet’s didn’t and they believed that this funding may threaten the USSR’s relation with the West. Developments in the satellite states: the rupture between Stalin and Tito 1948[b][c] Causes: - Stalin had been displeased by signs that leading communists in Eastern Europe believed that the states they lived in were sovereign entities able to decide their own destinies. Stalin wanted every country to adopt the Stalinist-Soviet style of communism which didn’t work for them. - He was particularly enraged by Tito’s decision to embark upon a path of development that differed from the example provided by the Soviet model, and the vocal support and practical aid the Yugoslavian communists were giving to their Greek comrades * Stalin had refused to intervene in the Greek Civil War on the side of the communists because he wished to maintain good relations with the USA and he thought Tito’s funding of the Greek KKE communists may undermine this. - Stalin was worried by Tito’s and Dimitrov’s (communist Bulgarian leader) idea of a Balkan Federation involving Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This project was decisively shut down by Moscow in January 1948. Why was it shut down? - as the Eastern Bloc may look to Yugoslavia / Bulgaria to seek leadership rather than Stalin and the Soviet Union * Yugoslavian communism was different and it undermined Stalin’s brand of communism, and therefore Stalin’s control over Eastern Europe. Key Events: - Between January-June 1948 a campaign to bring Yugoslavia into line with Soviet ideas was waged. Although the country’s trade links with other countries in the Eastern Bloc were severed and attempts to overthrow Tito were made (assassinations), they failed - in large part because the USA turned out to be willing to provide loans and aid. - In June 1948 the breach between Stalin and Tito became public knowledge Consequences: For Yugoslavia: - Cominform was initially located in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, but after the Tito–Stalin split which expelled Yugoslavia in June 1948, the seat was moved to Bucharest, Romania. - Yugoslavia was expelled for "Titoism" and anti-Sovietism, based on accusations of deviating from Marxism-Leninism. Yugoslavia was considered to be heretical for resisting Soviet dominance in its affairs and integration into Eastern Bloc as a Soviet satellite state. For the Eastern Bloc: - In Eastern Bloc politics, the split with Yugoslavia led to the denunciation and prosecution of alleged Titoists, designed to strengthen Stalin's control over the bloc's communist parties. * Many high-ranking official were executed / imprisoned as they were accused of conspiring with Tito and not adopting Soviet-style communism (e.g. Xoxe; Albania / Slansky; Czechoslovakia / Rajk; Hungary / Kostov; Bulgaria) - Furthermore, Albania and Bulgaria turned away from Yugoslavia and aligned themselves entirely with the Soviet Union. KKE also sided with the Cominform, declaring its support for Yugoslavia's fragmentation and the independence of Macedonia - Yugoslavia cut off support to the Greek guerrillas and the Greek communists collapsed almost immediately. Consequence for the West - an opportunity? - Tito initially went along with Stalin and rejected the Marshall Plan ,however, in 1948 Tito broke with Stalin. - Consequently, Yugoslavia first requested assistance from the USA in summer 1948 and then in FEB 1949, the USA decided to provide Tito with economic assistance on a small scale. And on a much larger scale in 1950–53 - Tito became the most favoured communist by the West, as he was anti-Soviet. - The USA threw Marshall Aid + old military equipment onto Yugoslavia (not part of the Marshall Plan). Developments in the satellite states: the Prague coup FEBRUARY 1949 Context: Communists in Czechoslovakia had genuine support; were the largest party in the 1946 elections (114/300 seats). Communist leader Klement Gottwald formed a coalition government and became prime minister, Beneš continued as president and Jan Masaryk continued as the foreign minister. Most importantly, communists gained control over key ministries such as information and interior (including police). Helping communists suppress opposition and place party members in positions of power. Turning point came in July 1947, when the government accepted an invitation to attend discussions about the Marshall Plan and took an interest in it. The Soviet Union responded immediately and Stalin summoned Gottwald to Moscow. How the coup happened: - January 1948, communist-controlled Ministry of Interior proceeded to purge non-communists in the Czechoslovak security forces. They deployed police regiments and equipped a workers' militia while the communist-controlled Ministry of Information refused to broadcast non-communist officials. Ministries held by non-communist were secured and purged. Gottwald threatened to call a general strike unless Beneš appointed a new, Communist-dominated government. - February 1948, the Communists staged a coup and forced President Beneš to appoint a Communist-dominated government from the list submitted by Gottwald. Klement Gottwald seizes power and becomes president after the coup that was supported by Stalin. Jan Masaryk “committed suicide” after falling out of a window as he took an interest in Marshall Aid - was the final non-communist senior minister. Was Stalin to blame? Consequences: Death of Jan Masaryk acted as a trigger for Truman to convince Congress to fund the Marshall Plan; before then they were reluctant to fund it. BERLIN BLOCKADE JUNE 1948 - MAY 1949 Causes: JAN 1947 - Bizonia created with the merger of British and American zones SPRING 1947 - Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers:[d][e][f] * Soviets tried to destroy Bizonia by demanding that a new central German government be created * This was opposed by British Foreign Secretary (Ernest Bevin) - remarking political unit to follow economic unity * Soviets disagreed - was seen as a ‘successful failure’ by USA and UK AUTUMN 1947 - Met again in London Conference, but by this time the Cold War was gathering pace and they failed to agree on a peace treaty for Germany and Austria. JUNE 1948 came the trigger cause - the final straw for Stalin came when: - The French also merged their zone with the British and Americans, creating trizonia - The Americans launched a new currency, the deutschmark, with the aim of fostering economic recovery in Western Germany - Stalin argued that since Western powers were against German reunification, and were instead going to create a West German nation, they had no reason to stay in Berlin which was in the east of country (100 miles behind Soviet lines) Why did the USSR not want an independent, Western-aligned Germany? - The USSR feared a strong, Western-aligned Germany on its borders - Security concerns; Germany has been an aggressor towards the USSR / Russia for a century, most notably with WW2 where the USSR suffered immense losses Key Events June 1948 - Stalin launched a ‘blockade’, cutting off all ground and water traffic to Berlin from West - In response Truman launched the Berlin Airlift, delivering more than 2.3 million tons of supplies to West Berlin May 1949 - Blockade ends Consequences: April 1949 - creation of NATO; the blockade and airlift underscored the need for a collective Western defence against Soviet aggression, leading to the creation of NATO May 1949 - Western powers create FDR (‘Federal Republic of Germany’) September 1949 - Elections in the FDR resulted in victory for the anti-communist politician, Konrad Adenauer, and the Christian Democratic Union October 1949 - Soviets established the GDR (‘German Democratic Republic’) - Berlin Airlift was a huge propaganda success for the USA and made Stalin seem aggressive Brussels Treaty, (1948) agreement signed by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, creating a collective defense alliance. NSC-68 / DOMINO T. / US attitudes / occupation of Japan Consequences of the defeat of Japan: * Presented a new type of conflict, not just capitalism vs. communism but also imperialism vs. Third World nationalism. * Created power vacuums; most notably in China, Vietnam, Korea. * Led to the rise of Third World nationalism and got rid of the myth of white coloniser supremacy and invincibility; changed the perspective of the people in those colonies. (NO!! This is because of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour and occupied Indo-China instead of French -> non-western powers can be imperialistic colonisers) Why was Japan important? * Only industrialised country in Asian (access to tanks and capability of building a navy) Key Events:[g][h] Initially, Douglas MacArthur is made US military governor of Japan with the purpose of punishing Japan: * He began a programme of demilitarisation, breaking up large business groupings (associated with war)[i][j] and punishing generals / imperial politicians. In turn, it caused economic downturn. Only up until 1947 MacArthur was punishing Japan. TURNING POINT = A ‘reverse course’ on Japan was taken from SUMMER 1947: - New constitution (MAY 1947) makes Japan adopt an American-style constitution: ended nobilities privileges, removed emperors’ power, abolished slavery, gave women the vote, legalised trade union, religious freedoms given - The policy towards Japan changed to rebuilding it; through re-education, democratisation, economic reform and demilitarisation. * It was decided Japan would not have to pay reparations * The de-industrialisation programme (breaking up large business groupings) would be abandoned because the U.S. government rescinded the orders in an effort to re-industrialise Japan as a bulwark against communism in Asia.[k][l] Zaibatsu was allowed to regroup and America sent $500 million in aid to boost Japan’s economy. The USA wasn’t focused on punishment now but instead the USA wanted the development of firm democratic institutions and economic reconstruction. Why the turning point? - Kennan argued that a strong, rebuilt Japan and Germany would counter Soviet power; making them “immune to communism”. * American generals also warned Truman that if Japan fell under communist influence, then the USSR would gain an additional war-making potential equal to 25% of its existing capacity. So from 1947, the USA treated Japan as the Asian equivalent of Western Germany. ANOTHER TURNING POINT: Japan’s importance increased even more after Mao’s victory in OCT 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in JUNE 1950: This is reflected in the San Francisco Peace Treaty[m] in SEPT 1951 which was relatively lenient: * It gave the USA unrestricted use of military bases in Japan, administrative control over Okinawa, the USA could prevent other countries from using those bases * For Japan they had to renounce many claims (including Korea and Taiwan) BUT it recognised full sovereignty of Japan. Japanese rearmament: JULY 1950 - National Police Reserve (NPR) is established, consisting of 75,000 personnel. AUG 1952 - National Safety Agency (NSA) established and increased to approximately 110,000 ground troops + 7,500 maritime personnel. JULY 1954 - NSA restructured into Japan Self-Defence Force with 140,000 personnel + $240 million in US funding NSC-68 APRIL 1950 - turning point ‘shift’ in US foreign policy Causes: Why the USA felt the need to escalate its defence spending in 1950: AUG 1949 - Soviets successfully develop their own atomic bomb and test it OCT 1949 - Mao defeated Jiang Jeishi (Nationalists) and proclaimed the People’s Republic of China FEB 1950 - Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance * Recognition that containment has not been sufficient enough and had failed - especially in China - (e.g. aid to Jiang Jeishi $2.8 billion) Truman called for review and re-assessment of American foreign + defensive policy. Key Aspects: - Reiterated threat posed by the USSR - Advised further reconstruction of Japan and expansion of conventional and nuclear weapons. - Advocated for an “immediate and large-scale build-up in our military and general strength” - The report called for tripling defence spending to $50~ billion per year from the original $13 billion set for 1950 - even though it was peace time. - They understood that the USSR’s output was nearly half of the USA's current output, so they assumed it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union could not keep up. * However, due to the expense, Truman initially made no practical commitments to NSC-68 (until KW) Why? - Truman had little chance of convincing Congress or the public to go along with it as it increased defence spending nearly threefold during peace-time, would require raising taxes, imposing economic controls alongside upsetting isolationist Republicans. It would also mean justifying it and telling the public that containment had failed = unpopular. He needed an opportunity to put it into practice. What caused its implementation? JUNE 1950 - With the Korean War begun, NSC 68 took on new importance. As Acheson later remarked: "Korea... created the stimulus which made action." The State Department used the North Korean attack of June 1950 to steer congressional and public opinion toward a course of rearmament between the two poles of preventive war and isolationism. Consequences[n][o]: Shaped US foreign policy for years to come: Implementation of NSC 68 shows the extent to which it marked a 'shift' in US policy - not only toward the USSR, but toward all communist governments: * Marked a shift from passive containment (which had failed) into active containment. * Provided justification for USA to assume the role of world policeman. NSC 68 "provided the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War from 1950 to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s." The description of the international situation, as provoked by the Soviet Union, as endemic. By using this language, it is clear they wished to portray the Soviet Union as a sickness, and the U.S. as the cure. This message was received loud and clear, and dominated many foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold War. Increased defence spending:[p] - Truman’s Administration almost tripled defence spending between 1950 and 1953 (from 5 to 14.2 percent) - Escalated the arms race by accelerating the development of the hydrogen bomb (tested in 1952) Domino Theory[q] Basis of US foreign policy Causes: * Containment had failed: the 1949 victory of the Chinese Communist Party, the June 1950 North Korean invasion, the 1954 Quemoy offshore island crisis (first Taiwan Strait Crisis), and the conflict in Indochina constituted a broad-based challenge not only for one or two countries, but for the entire Asian continent and Pacific. This connotes a strong magnetic force to give in to communist control, and aligns with the comment by General Douglas MacArthur that "victory is a strong magnet in the East." * It was used by successive United States administrations during the Cold War as justification for American intervention around the world. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower first publicly announced the theory during a news conference in APRIL 1954, when referring to communism in Indochina. Explanation: 1. Japan’s importance as it’s the only industrialised country in Asia; hence if Japan lost its exports its industry would likely fall. Domino theory also refers to dependence as Japan relied on exports from other countries: * Rice exports to Japan from Burma and Thailand would be lost if a Communist takeover were to happen. * Indonesia was the largest producer of petroleum, need to ensure they don’t align with the soviets and can continue. * Malaysia was the main exporter of rubber; ensure no Soviet alignment * This would lead the USA to helping and aiding the survival of the British and French Empires as their colonies were key exporters and US allies (like Japan) were dependent on it. Alongside this the colonies neighbours could fall, as well as the colonial power itself (e.g. if Indo-China fell, then France would be put under pressure and lose its power) * Alongside this key trade routes would be compromised which would undermine the US and its allies and other strategically important commodities would be lost. * With Southeast Asian nations falling to Communism, as well as harming Japan’s economy and capacity to trade with the USA, Washington worried that eventually, there would be “such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to Communism”. Implementations: The Origins and Early Implementation of the Domino Theory 1. Truman Doctrine (1947) - First implemented in 1947 in the form of the Truman Doctrine which was used to justify providing aid to Greece and Turkey ($400 million), Achenson said the domino theory that is: if Greece fell to the communists, Turkey would not last long. Similarly, if Tukrey folded to the USSR (wanting control over the Dardanelles) then the position of Greece would be endangered. 2. Marshall Plan (1947-48) - The same ‘domino theory’ included the Marshall Plan providing aid in the reconstruction of West Germany and other European countries; done so West Germany’s weakness (as well as the war-torn European countries) would not create a vacuum of power into which communists could enter - To stop the further advance of the left as if Eastern Europe fell to communism, Western / Southern Europe was believed to be under threat. * The effects of major political upheavals were predicted based on their potential to influence the surrounding region Application in Asia 3. There was a turning point in 1949: - After the Communists triumphed in China, U.S. policymakers had to draw a line against any new Communist states in Asia. * Explains American intervention in Korea in 1950. * And support for France against the Vietnamese national liberation movement. 4. However, the domino theory was popularised by President Dwight D. Eisenhower when he applied it to Southeast Asia, especially South Vietnam during the First Indochina War. 5. Moreover, the domino theory was utilised as one of the key arguments in the "Kennedy and Johnson administrations during the 1960s to justify increasing American military involvement in the Vietnam War."; was used more than any other for justifying US involvement in SE Asia - central to US foreign policy. - The loss of Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), the American government formally articulated in June 1952, “would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with Communism by the remaining states of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, an alignment with Communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term of the Middle East (with the probable exception of Pakistan and Turkey) would probably follow. Such widespread alignment with Communism would endanger the stability and security of Europe.” - Not only would “major sources of certain strategic materials” be lost, but also communication and trade routes. The world’s main source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities would be lost in Malaya and Indonesia. It’s important here to note the ongoing Communist insurgency in Malaya against the British that started in 1948 (and was only beaten in 1960) * Not only neighbours but dependency on other countries as well * For example, domino theory of Japan focused on its reliance / dependency on exports from other countries; as Japan itself lacked natural resources which it needed for its manufacturing industry (was the only industrialised country in Asia = vital importance to the USA) Basis for Vietnam War; if Vietnam fell to the communists, would Laos be next, followed by Cambodia, Thailand, India. What caused its implementation? Embraced more in 1949-50, after America lost its nuclear monopoly, the Communists triumphed in China and the Korean War sparked. Consequences Basis for US intervention in almost all conflicts, especially SE Asia, Cuba, Angola and South America. The USA helped to promote the survival of the French and British Empire, as well as funding and supporting ANY regime that was anti-Soviet, even if it was undemocratic or repressive. KOREAN WAR Korean War [r] JUNE 1950 - JULY 1953 Context: Decolonisation; - Post-WW2 led to the rise of Third World nationalism against white, European colonial empires. When imperial powers left, they often left leaving a power vacuum. - In Korea, the Japanese Empire had occupied it since 1910; imposing a brutal and exploitative form of colonialism that was so repressive that Korean opposition couldn’t even emerge in Korean but rather in Manchuria in the 1930s where they joined the PLA. - The sudden collapse of Japanese power at the end of WW2 left a power vacuum. The two Korean leaders: Both leaders wished to lead a united Korea but under their authority. Syngman Rhee: * Based in the south; authoritarian, pro-capitalist regime. Pro-USA. * Anti-communist; against land reforms and nationalisation. Backed by wealthy people and officials. * Rhee spent most of his time living in the USA while Kim Il Sung was a guerilla fighter who fought against the Japanese during WW2. * Was NOT known to the Koreans - unlike Kim - as he was in the USA and did not fight Japaneses oppressors * Rhee claimed legitimacy to govern the whole Korea. * Syngman Rhee was deeply unpopular, even with Americans and the US State Department didn’t want him in charge but Rhee was placed in power by Doughlas MacArthur (military governor of Japan). This was against Truman’s wishes. * Doughlas MacArthur favoured him and put him in power * Deeply unpopular. Kim Il Sung * In the north, the communist Kim Il Sung also claimed legitimacy to the entirety of Korea. * Nationalist = doesn’t want Korea dominated by outside powers. * Supported by Koreans that aren’t even communist: * Support his land reforms and distribution of land (over 50% of the arable land was redistributed); makes him an attractive leader * All heavy industry was to be nationalized. * Improvements in the health of the population after he nationalized healthcare and made it available to all citizens. * Spent WW2 in the USSR + China and was put in power by the Soviets; Stalin had instructed Beria to recommend a communist leader for the Soviet-occupied territories and Beria met Kim several times before recommending him to Stalin. * Korean opposition had to emerge in Manchuria and Kim Il Sung became a guerilla fighter and joined the PLA (Chineses Communist Army) in Korean regiment = give him popularity. Causes: Why did Stalin eventually give Kim Il Sung permission to invade? 1. Stalin felt more secure after acquiring his own atomic bomb (AUG 49’). 2. Mao proclaimed the PRC (OCT 49’). Mao and Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Friendship that secured a military alliance in case of attack. 1. Stalin intended to have Mao do all the fighting for him. 2. The USA did not send troops to China (which was far more important - most populous - than Korea), which gave an indication that the USA was unlikely to care for Korea. 3. Stalin’s failures in Europe, especially regarding Germany as it was split (something Stalin did not want) and NATO (APR 49’) was created which was the first military alliance of the Cold War as well as a collective security organisation directly against Soviet expansionism. 4. Stalin thought he could get away with a cheap bit of expansionism as it seemed as if the USA was not interested in Korea. 1. Achenson’s ‘defensive perimeter’ did not include Korea which gave the impression the USA would not intervene or care for what happened there. 2. American troops had been withdrawn from the peninsula and elements of Soviet espionage attained inside information that painted a picture of President Truman receding American power from Asia. 1. NSC 8/2 stated that the “U.S. will complete withdrawal of its occupation forces from Korea on 30 June 1949 “ 3. Evidence suggests that Soviet intelligence, through its espionage sources in the US government and British SIS, had obtained information on the limitations of US atomic bomb stockpiles as well as defense program cuts, leading Stalin to conclude that the Truman administration would not intervene in Korea. 4. The USA did not send troops to aid Jiang Jieshi during the Chinese Civil War, which is far more important than Korea. * Therefore, Stalin saw this as a low-risk way to gain some expansionism to make up slightly with the immense failures that occurred in Europe. What role did Mao play? - He thinks Kim Il Sung is right but Mao knows China can't afford a war as they had just ended the Chinese Civil War (that has been going on since 1927). Therefore, Mao is more worried about consolidating his power in China and rebuilding, as well as dealing with the threat of Jiang Jeishi. - Mao only joins the war in NOV 1950 as Americans get close to the Chinese border (Yalu River) and Mao thinks that the USA will continue into and invade China. * So China is dragged in by proximity even though USA or UN troops had no intention to invade China or cross into China. What role did Truman play? - NSC-68 took on a new importance during the Korean War and it won the argument for Truman to justify it. * It called for tripling defense spendings and the willingness of the USA to send troops = shift from passive containment. * Achenson remarked that: "Korea...created the stimulus which made action." What role did Attlee play? * Was biggest recipient of Marshall Aid and ‘iron curtain’ speech was followed by Attlee = thinks they’ve got to be active and almost bankrupt. Why did Mao end up sending troops to support North Korea? How was Truman able to go to war on North Korea? 1. The United States entered the Korean War under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), avoiding the need for a direct declaration of war by Congress. 1. Absence of Soviet Veto: The Soviet Union, which could have vetoed these resolutions, was boycotting the Security Council at the time over a dispute regarding the UN’s recognition of China. This allowed the resolutions to pass. 2. The USA did not formally declare war on North Korea. Instead, President Harry Truman framed the conflict as a "police action" under UN authority. In this way Truman was able to bypass Congress as he managed to send U.S. troops without a formal declaration of war (Congress was needed to declare war 3. The Korean War fit into the broader U.S. strategy of containment, aimed at stopping the spread of communism. 1. Truman Doctrine (1947): The U.S. had committed to supporting nations threatened by communism, as seen in Greece and Turkey. Korea was seen as another critical front in the Cold War. 2. Domino Theory: U.S. policymakers feared that if Korea fell to communism, other countries in Asia, such as Japan or the Philippines, might follow. 3. NSC-68: A key policy document, NSC-68 (April 1950), called for a military buildup to counter Soviet expansionism. The Korean conflict provided a justification for implementing this policy. Why was the UN allowed to send troops to Korea? The UN Security Council consisted of five members: USA, UK, France, Russia, China * The issue of which China should be on the UN Security Council arose - Republic of China or People’s Republic of China. * In 1950, Stalin wanted the Security Council to throw out Jiang Jeishi and replace him with Mao. * After the Soviet Union lost a motion to seat the PRC in the UN in JAN 1950, it decided to boycott the organisation. * During the Soviet boycott, the Security Council passed a resolution which allowed for the deployment of UN troops to the Korean War in defense of South Korea against the attacking communist North Korean forces. And because Stalin is boycotting, he cannot veto it. Achenson didn’t include Korean in defensive perimeter Soviets had atomic bomb = more confident to give Kim the green light America realises passive containment had failed Loss of China = massive failure in passive containment (2.8bn wasted on Jiang) Truman had 1950s midterms and 1952 election Koreas split at Potsdam was meant to be a temporary split for administrative purposes, similar to Germany Superpower role: Conflicts rooted in Korean society caused the war: Regardless of superpowers, the division of Korea was deeply unpopular and this made it inevitable that one side would seek to reunite the country through war. Syngman Rhee’s unpopular regime: * Syngman Rhee's government faced instability and lacked strong support, tempting the North to attack. The regime in the south was extremely unpopular and only managed to cling onto power through direct American military support. The widespread hatred for the southern regime meant that the North invaded to help their southern compatriots overthrow the unpopular Syngman Rhee and reunite Korea, which everyone wanted. The reliance of Kim Il Sung’s regime on Soviet aid makes it unlikely that the invasion could have taken place without Stalin’s support. However, to see the war as simply the result of Soviet expansionism does little justice to genuine grievances of the Korean people at the division of their country. In the North, it was the Americans who were held responsible for this situation, since they had initially put forward the idea of dividing the country into North and South. In 1948 the USA had organised elections that were to take place only in the South; this was seen as legitimising the division of the nation into North and South. Popular anger towards this was demonstrated by many Southern politicians refusing to take part in the elections, and how the voting itself saw widespread sabotage and violence, resulting in 600 deaths. Syngman Rhee’s party achieved only 13.5% of the vote. * In April, North Korea, supposedly in an effort to delay the elections, sponsored a unity conference in Pyongyang to promote reunification of the two Koreas, which both Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik attended. The conference was inconclusive towards any upcoming reunification and did not delay the elections. * The people of Jeju island saw the election as a unilateral attempt by the United States military government under the flag of United Nations to separate a southern regime and to employ its first president Syngman Rhee, The Jeju uprising occurred, during which tens of thousands of Jeju people were killed Additionally, the USA had reinstalled former collaborators with the Japanese into positions of power in the South and Rhee was friendly towards them and appointed them, which was deeply unpopular. Rhee’s reliance on American backing only reinforced the widespread hostility towards his government When the North Koreans invaded the South, the South was on the verge of civil war. Uprisings and guerrilla activity in the South against the Rhee regime took place deliberately to coincide with the North’s entry into the South and aid the Communist takeover When the North invaded, little resistance was offered to their advance and barely any people fled before it. Many soldiers deserted and switched sides to the North with no desire to support Rhee’s government. As the North Koreans advanced, they installed local southern communists in positions of power, released political prisoners and enacted land reforms that broke up large estates and gave the land to poor peasants During the Northern invasion, reflecting his desperation, Rhee ordered the execution of between 100,000–200,000 Communists or individuals suspected of Communist sympathies throughout the South Autumn Uprising 1. In the Autumn Uprising of 1946, an 8,000-strong railroad worker strike began in the southern city of Pusan. This was in response to previous deaths of workers during a strike. 2. This sparked a peasant uprising across the south of Korea. The uprising was against the presence of the American military in Korea and the support it gave to the Rhee regime. 3. The American military helped suppress the rebellion, sending in U.S. troops and tanks, and declaring martial law, and succeeded in putting down the uprising. The uprising resulted in the killing of 38 policemen, 163 civil workers, and 73 civilians. Various right-wing, anti-communist groups inflicted terrorism and mass damage on the grounds of arresting leftist protesters. Jeju Uprising (APR 48’ - MAY 49’) Some historians, including military historian Allan R. Millett, regard the Jeju uprising as the true beginning of the Korean War. 1. It was a rebellion on Jeju island, off the south coast of Korea, which lasted 13 months, following the brutal suppression of protests in 1946. 2. It initially began as opposition to the planned elections in South Korea as it was seen as cementing division. The elections, backed by the United Nations and the United States, were perceived as illegitimate by many Koreans who sought reunification with the North. 1. Those protests were met with indiscriminate violence which only brought more citizens of Jeju out in support of the demonstrations against the elections. 3. Between 15,000 and 30,000 individuals were killed or were executed by Syngman Rhee’s government (10% of Jeju's population was killed by Rhee’s forces). 4. The brutal suppression of this rebellion by the South Korean army resulted in many deaths and in the destruction of many villages on the island (70 percent of the island's 230 villages were burned to the ground), and it influenced more rebellions on the Korean mainland. 5. The violence against civilians by pro-government forces contributed to the Yeosu-Suncheon rebellion in South Jeolla during the conflict. Yeosu–Suncheon Rebellion (OCT 48’) * Rebellion of soldiers that were set to put down the Jeju Uprising 1. The Yeosu–Suncheon Rebellion was an October 1948 rebellion that took place in Yeosu, Suncheon, and surrounding towns against the fledgling Rhee government. 2. CAUSES: This rebellion was largely caused by that government's suppression of the Jeju Uprising and refusal of Yeosu soldiers to help suppress the Uprising. Not wanting to "murder the people of Jeju," these troops mutinied. In Yeosu, rebellious South Korean soldiers seized weapons and took control of the town. The residents paraded through the town holding red flags, symbolising communist support. They restored the town people's committee, and executed a number of police, officials, and landlords. 3. US INVOLVEMENT: American military forces played a role in suppressing the Rebellion: American commanders planned and directed the military operations, American military advisors accompanied all South Korean units, and American aircraft were used to transport troops. 4. Rhee learned from this rebellion that the Korean army had been infiltrated by members of the Workers Party of South Korea, and soon started a full-scale purge of communists: members of the Workers Party of South Korea and soldiers who came from the Korean Liberation Army were all expelled from the South Korean army. Significance of these uprisings These uprisings showed the widespread hostility and resistance to Rhee’s government. There was effectively a civil war within the South, between Rhee’s government and the American military and the mass movement against Rhee’s regime, led by local southern communists It was in this context that the North invaded the South, intervening on the side of the mass movement resisting Rhee’s regime The Northern invasion can thus be understood not as Soviet expansionism, but as an attempt to overthrow the increasingly unpopular Rhee regime Korean War: Key Events JUNE 1950 - JULY 1953 Phase 1: The North pushed south (JUN-SEPT 1950) * North Korea captured the capital of South Korea, Seoul and they pushed the UN forces backwards. By early September, the South Korean forces were pushed back to Pusan Phase 2: The UN / USA push north (SEPT-NOV 1950) * MacArthur landed at Inchon, behind North Korean lines. The UN forces fought back and by October the South Korean troops had crossed the 38 Parallel. US policy shifted from containment to ‘rollback’ as outlined in NSC-68. Intelligence suggested a swift victory seemed imminent. * MacArthur approached the Yalu River by November 1950 and there were fears that UN troops would continue their invasion into China. * Under pressure, China sent 300,000 troops across the Yalu River. Phase 3: Counter-offensive (DEC 1950 - JUNE 1951) * Chinese forces crossed the 38th Parallel and UN forces were driven back past Seoul. * MacArthur recommended using atomic bombs publically and in April, MacArthur was dismissed by Truman. Phase 4: Stalemate and peace (JUNE 1951 - JULY 1953) * There were no significant offences mounted by either side during this period. * Eisenhower won the election of 1952 in part owing to his sentiments to end the war. * In March 1953, Stalin died and new Soviet leaders were able to reach an agreement with the USA. Korean War: Consequences JUNE 1950 - JULY 1953 Cost of the Korean War for Korea: The results of Korean War: - In July 1953 and after more than two years of negotiations which went on whilst the fighting continued, the adversaries signed an armistice. - The agreement drew a new boundary near the 38th parallel that gave South Korea an extra 1,500 square miles of territory and created a 2-mile-wide DMZ that exists today - Dictators ruled over both halves of divided peninsular Deaths: * 3.5-4 million civilians * 1.2 million combatants killed from all sides (contentious – could be higher) * In winter of 1951, 50,000-90,000 South Korea National Defence Corps starved to death while marching southwards under the Chinese offensive when their commanding officers embezzled funds meant for their food – this event is called the National Defence Corps Incident. Destruction: * Significant damage was done to Korea’s economic infrastructure - especially in the North – with the result that economic hardship was widespread. * In mid 1951, American Major General Emmett O’Donnell reported that “almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. Everything is destroyed.” * The USA dropped 635,000 tons of bombs (more than they dropped on Japan even though Korea was not industrialised or a major threat) as well as dropping 32,000 tons of napalm on Korea (widespread death and damage as housing was largely made from combustible material). * “The US bombed Korea back to the Stone Age.” Cost for America: * Americans spent $18bn for a draw in the Korean War. * The war prompted the adoption of NSC-68. The US assumed the role of ‘global policeman’ against communism. US military spending tripled and an arms race ensued. * USA fought a “high-tech war” and the PLA tried to counter this with human wave attacks = have more manpower which led to discriminate loses. US economy benefited majorly: * The government uses defense spending to increase arms production. By doing this, they create industrial jobs and economic growth (not only making weapons, arms productions creates more jobs for people because of the need for motorways, steel production ect.) * HOWEVER, creates a new structure in US society as it leads to the rise of the ‘military industrial complex’, a permanent system where the government, military, and private defense companies become tightly linked. * USA’s leadership in the West was confirmed. * South Korea, Taiwan and Japan were integrated into the American sphere of influence. * Looking for an ally against the Soviets, Turkey sought to join the NATO alliance, and the Korean War was viewed as an opportunity to show Turkey's good intention. Turkey's entrance into the war as part of the U.N. command did indeed have a great impact on earning a place in NATO in 1952. * It was the first conflict involving the United Nations in a military role outside the Western world; the UN was seen as puppet and weaponised by the USA. Alliances: * Australia: Sent 17,000 troops; signed the ANZUS Treaty (SEPT ‘51) with the US and New Zealand post-war. * HOWEVER, limits to American power were demonstrated as their firepower failed to deliver a decisive victory * Division opened up between Truman and MacArthur. Consequences for West Germany - fueled by the USA: The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 led to U.S. calls to rearm West Germany to help defend Western Europe from the perceived Soviet threat. This lost the possible solution towards reunifying Germany. Cost for the USSR: - Political disaster for the Soviet Union. Its main objective (the unification of the Korean peninsula under Kim Il-Sung) was not achieved. Boundaries of both North and South Korea remained practically unchanged. - Relations with its communist ally, China, were severely strained. The foundations of the Sino-Soviet split that would occur in 1956-62 were laid. * Why? - The Soviets did none of the fighting and had China do all of it, leading to immense Chinese casualties due to the nature of the war. - The US's intervention and strong resistance to the invasion may have prevented a Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia during the Tito-Stalin split. * Why? - The USA was giving Yugoslavia aid and old military equipment. - The war, meanwhile, united the countries within the capitalist bloc, while a division in the communist bloc: 1. The Korean War accelerated the conclusion of a peace agreement between the US and Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty - September 1951). 2. The warming of West Germany’s relations with other western countries. 3. Creation of military and political blocs: ANZUS (1951) and SEATO (1954). - HOWEVER, the authority of the Soviet state grew, which showed in its readiness to interfere in developing countries of the Third World, many of which after the Korean War went down the socialist path of development after selecting the Soviet Union as its patron (Third World would look to Soviets to escape imperialism) Cost for China: The human cost to China of the Korean War was enormous with over 200,000-400,000 troops being killed and many times this figure wounded. * The considerable firepower of the American military was something the PLA had not encountered fighting the Japanese or the GMD. * The economic cost of the war, despite some aid from the USSR, was also a crushing burden on the poor, undeveloped nation and slowed down Mao’s drive to modernise and industrialise China. The war also prevented the complete defeat of the GMD. Rather than invade Taiwan and defeat Jiang, the PLA was preoccupied with Korea. * Additionally, as a result of the war, Taiwan and the KMT were to be protected by the American 7th fleet. The USA even promised to defend the small offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu held by the KMT. Like South Korea, Taiwan was a pro-Western capitalist state, with an advanced state. - HOWEVER, Mao presented the war as a success as having fought back against the world's most powerful capitalist power. China had taken on the most powerful nation in the world and forced it back, gaining a friendly buffer state between China and the hostile West. The main beneficiary: Japan Japan’s importance increased even more after the outbreak of the Korean War in JUNE 1950: Rewarded with the lenient San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951 which restored Japan’s sovereignty and saw US forces withdraw. * It gave the USA unrestricted use of military bases in Japan, administrative control over Okinawa, the USA could prevent other countries from using those bases Japan’s economy benefited as it supplied the US troops. * By 1954, the Japanese defense industry had earned $3 billion from sales to the USA ($3bn out of $18bn spent in the Korean War was spent on Japan). * e.g. Toyota company received an order (JULY 1950) from the USA for 1,000 trucks. * e.g. Japanese islands were key bases for all operations. - The Korean War was therefore a massive stimulus to the post-WW2 economic recovery of Japan, helping to create a rich, friendly capitalist state that in many ways was the cornerstone of American interests in the region. Japanese rearmament took on a new importance: * The USA underlined this by signing a security pact with Japan in SEPT 1951 and persuading the Japanese to begin a partial rearmament. JULY 1950 - National Police Reserve (NPR) is established, consisting of 75,000 personnel. AUG 1952 - National Safety Agency (NSA) established and increased to approximately 110,000 ground troops + 7,500 maritime personnel. JULY 1954 - NSA restructured into Japan Self-Defence Force with 140,000 personnel + $240 million in US funding * The Americans bolstered Japan and Taiwan as bulwarks against China. * The Japanese PM Yoshisa claimed that the Korean War was ‘the grace of heaven’, due to how beneficial it was to Japan. CHINA CHINA Chinese Civil War Why did the USSR want Jiang Jeishi in power instead of Mao Zedong, even though Mao was a communist? China - Korean War Laying the foundations of the Sino-Soviet split: Sino-Soviet Split - One of the main reasons for the rupture between Tito and Stalin was that Tito funded Greek communists, whereas the Soviet’s didn’t and they believed that this funding may threaten the USSR’s relation with the West. Taiwan strait crisis Soviet interference in the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’: * Albania * Hungary + Poland NEW LOOK Eisenhowers’ New Look[s] 1952 Why was it adopted? Failure of containment and the need to get tough: * For Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, Truman’s containment policy had simply caused a stalemate with the USSR and to break this, rollback was needed. * Eisenhower attacked containment in the 1952 election and campaigned on the failures in Korea. * Containment was too expensive and didn't deliver much: * Failed in China ($2.8 billion for Jiang Jeishi), failed in the Indo-China war ($3bn to France), failed in Korea ($18bn for a draw in the Korean War). Make the attempts at battling communism not just more effective, but more affordable as well: * It was hoped that through brinkmanship and an increased reliance upon nuclear weapons would significantly reduce costs. * It was thought that the prospect of “massive retaliation” would deter the Soviets from expansionist activities; the threat of nuclear war would make the USSR and Chinese behave. * It was also hoped that the possession by the USA of a massive nuclear arsenal would encourage the Soviets to toe (accept the authority of) the American line. * Coupled with the tactic of brinkmanship - defined by the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as “going to the brink of war without being scared”. Influence of McCarthyism: * Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy started a mass-hysteria that secret communists had infiltrated the government, known as the ‘Red Scare’. * Sparked a wave of criticism for Truman’s foreign policy, accusing him of being too ‘soft’ on communism and being responsible for the ‘loss’ of China. * McCarthyism ruined Truman and forced him to drop out of the 1952 presidential Democratic primaries. * Main reason the Democrat candidate Adlai Stevenson lost the election was that Eisenhower utilised McCarthyism and the corruption accusation to his advantage in the 1952 election. * The anti-communist climate created by McCarthyism allowed Eisenhower to attack Truman and the Democrats for being too ‘soft’ on communism. * McCarthy fueled the view that the Korean War would not have happened if it was not for Truman’s failure to support Jiang against Mao. Other points to use for essay (main reason for the adoption of the New Look) * The Berlin Blockade in 1948 brought both superpowers uncomfortably close to a ‘hot’ war. * New Look in practice: Massive retaliation / brinkmanship / containment & rollback / covert operations / alliances & aid New Alliances: (continuity with Truman) * Eisenhower’s strategy was to create a global network of alliances in order to encircle the USSR and China with pro-US allies. * This also aligned with Eisenhower’s goal of having more value for money / bang for the buck as a consequence of this strategy was that in the medium to long term, US forces would be replaced by those of the USA’s allies. This would reduce the US military presence in Western Europe for example, but retain the fundamental US objectives based on containment without needing more conventional forces. * This strategy was based on the USA providing a nuclear umbrella for its regional allies, while they provided ground forces for regional defence against Soviet aggression. 1. SEATO (SEPT ‘54) Causes: (counterpoint: e.g. was the USA solely responsible for more aggressive foreign policy or was it a response to the USSR?) * The Sino-Soviet alliance (formed in February 1950) was strengthened in May 1953 when the USSR agreed to provide defence-related technology to China. During Sept-Oct, Khrushchev visited China as a sign of reinforcement of Sino-Soviet links, providing significant economic aid and technological expertise to strengthen China’s economy and national security. * It was in response to what seemed to be close Sino-Soviet relations that John Foster Dulles brokered a defensive alliance. * Founded in the wake of the victory of Vietnamese communists led by Ho Chi-Minh over France. * Members included: Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, France, UK, USA. * Only two member states were located within the actual SE Asian region. Unlike NATO, few members actually bordered eachother but instead were spread over a wide area. * Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were “protocol states” meaning they were not members but were protected under the alliance (intended to protect former French territories from falling under communism) * Domino theory at work. 2. CENTO (FEB ‘55) * Founded by the Baghdad Pact with US support. * Was a military alliance of countries in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey), alongside the UK. The US joined in 1958. * It was modeled after NATO and it committed the nations in the alliance to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other’s affairs. * Its goal was to constrain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states alongside the USSR’s southwestern border. To prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. 3. ANZUS (SEPT ‘52) * Treaty between the USA, Australia and New Zealand. * The United States was initially reluctant, but the need to strengthen the West against communism grew with the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the 1950-1953 Korean War. ________________ Brinkmanship: (change from Truman) * Taiwan Strait Crisis * Threat of nuclear war and brinkmanship forced Mao to back down. * Berlin Ultimatum * ________________ CIA Covert Operations: * Iran: * * Guatemala: * * Congo: * ________________ Eisenhower Doctrine (1957): * Extended U.S. commitments to the Middle East to resist communist influence. Limitations to the New Look: * It did nothing to ‘roll back’ communism in eastern Europe. The USA failed to exploit the rebellions in Germany (1953) or Hungary (1956) * Similarities to Truman’s containment: Eisenhower accepted much of what formed the basis of Truman’s national security policy (the policy a state deems necessary in order to protect itself from external threats) * The USA would retain sufficient influence in Western Europe and there should be a collective Western defence strategy, which included Germany and its economic and military potential. * The USA must retain its influence in Asia. * The Soviet threat was significant and real and the containment of Soviet territorial expansion was fundamental to US security interests. * The USA must retain a strong nuclear arsenal and conventional forces (albeit to a lower extent for conventional forces for Eisenhower) in order to deter and counter Soviet opportunism. * Commitment to military alliances, but Eisenhower placed much greater importance on developing allies than Truman. * Truman set up NATO in * Eisenhower continued this which more military alliances, this time intending to contain and prevent communist expansion in the Middle East (CENTO) and Southeast Asia (SEATO & ANZUS) * There was a continued belief in containment. * Financial aid was still used to prop up anti-communist government, e.g. Diem’s government in South Vietnam after 1954 Differences to Truman’s containment: * Eisenhower relied heavily on nuclear weapons in an attempt to reduce the costs of the Cold War. Eisenhower rejected Truman’s commitment to a major expansion, regardless of cost, of the USA conventional forces. * Containment was limited and its effectiveness was insufficient as the basis of US foreign policy. McCarthyism Influence of McCarthyism on the USA: Anti-communist hysteria gripped America in the 1950s in part because Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy alleged that the U.S. State Department was ‘infested’ with communists. * There was a committee - The House of Un-American Activities Committee - that had investigated Hollywood filmmakers. * McCarthy promoted the idea that there was an army of communist conspirators working within the US government. * e.g. Alger Hiss affair: Hiss was a prominent member of FDR’s government and was accused of being a communist. When Hiss was publicly convicted of perjury, Achenson still publicly offered him his support, heightening the belief in the notion that the USA’s leaders were somehow tainted with communism. * This sparked a wave of criticism for Truman’s foreign policy, accusing him of being too ‘soft’ on communism and being responsible for the ‘loss’ of China. * McCarthyism ruined Truman and forced him to drop out of the presidential race. * Eisenhower utilised McCarthyism and the corruption accusation to his advantage in the 1952 election. Influence of McCarthyism on Europe and Britain: McCarthy did have some significance in terms of foreign relations. As Crockatt comments “the significance of McCarthy’s career lies in the coincidence of his brief period of notoriety with the shift of attention from Eruope to the Far East, a shift which he helped promote.” * McCarthyism emphasised the urgency of moving US policy away from a Eurocentric focus and towards politics with a more determined ‘Asia first’ viewpoint. * Containment had consolidated the West's position in Europe but Asia was much less secure. Causes of Asia focus = creation of PRC in October 1949 and alliance of mutual cooperation between China and USSR in February 1950. McCarthy’s anti-communist rhetoric coincided with Truman’s reluctance to support Jiang Jeishi in face of growing communist power during the Chinese Civil War. * McCarthy fueled the view that the Korean War would not have happened if it was not for Truman’s failure to support Jiang against Mao. McCarthyism served to strengthen the shift towards a more clearly defined ‘Asia first’ policy. Influence on Britain: * The USA’s growing ‘Asia first’ thinking was believed to be dangerous by the British. * Britain was becoming increasingly concerned about what it saw as the USA’s more aggressive stance over Korea might lead the USSR destabilising Europe while the international community was focused on Asia. * It also necessitated increased defense spending by the British at a time of austerity, * The conflict in Korea appeared, in the eyes of the British, to place in jeopardy the stability and territorial status quo that the creation of NATO had established. The globalisation of the USA’s role was not what Britain saw as being in its interests. * However, Britain's primary concern was to remain a close ally of the USA, and as such, Britain made significant military contributions to the allied war effort in Korea. Fall of McCarthyism: McCarthy’s influences ended in 1954 when he accused the army of being infested with communists, and Eisenhower - who himself was a general - FRG and NATO / Warsaw Pact MAY 1955 Why did the FRG join NATO? * Influenced by Konrad Adenauer. He recognised that the best way of strengthening his country was to align West Germany to the Western powers. The regeneration of Germany was supported by the USA, who saw a strengthened West Germany as a safeguard against communist expansionism, while its reliance on the USA would prevent a resurgence of German nationalism and militarism. In Nov ‘49, FRG joined Council of Europe (right to establish consulates in other country and have direct representation in the OEEC) By May ‘52, the General Treaty abolished the statue of occupation and thereby recognised full sovereignty of the FRG. Adenauer agreed to renounce nuclear weapons and limit his army to placate the French. Thus the way was open for German rearmament: In May ‘55, with the support of US pressure on the French, West Germany was admitted into NATO. Link to Eisenhower’s New Look: * The FRG's entry into NATO underlines the commitment the USA had, not only towards the centrality of Germany as a regional force but also to the concept of regional alliances designed to contain communism at the lowest possible cost to the USA. Soviet response: The USSR immediately recognised the sovereignty of the GDR and created the Warsaw Pact. Warsaw Pact: The decision to allow West Germany to rearm and join NATO prompted the USSR to further consolidate its relations with the satellite communist states of Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact was seen by the USSR as a means of legitimising its influence in Eastern Europe, just as NATO had legitimised US influence in Western Europe. It noy only served as military reinforcement, but also consolidated the political and economic relationship between the USSR and its satellites. Members of the Warsaw Pact: USSR, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, East Germany Geneva Conference JULY 1954 It was agreed in the Geneva Conference that Vietnam would be divided into two zones (French troops would leave the northern zone while nationalist forces would withdraw from the southern zone). This division was not meant to be permanent and national elections were to be held in two years. The USA, and the regime set up in the southern zone, refused to sign the agreement. In July 1954, the USA, and the regime that was set up in the southern zone, refused to sign the agreement that was set out at the Geneva Conference. The new president of South Vietnam was Ngo Dinh Diem. The USA rapidly pledged support to his regime. CIA INTERVENTION CIA Interventions MAR 1946 - AUG 1949 Iran: Guatemala: Context: - The United Fruit Company was extremely powerful and owned vast amounts of land, having a monopoly over the lucrative banana trade and its close relationship with Guatemalan leaders led it to control docks and the railroads in the country. The Congo: Context: Congo suffered a brutal colonialist regime under Belgium (20% of the pop. killed + mass exploitation of resources). - Patrice Lumumba becomes democratically elected leader of the Congo. - Asked for help from the UN but received little practical support (province Katanga declared independence with support of Belgian govt. + rich mining companies). This forced Lumumba to turn to the USSR for help that agreed to provide weapons, logistics and material support. Around 1,000 Soviet military advisors landed in Congo. - This Soviet involvement alarmed the USA and long believed that Lumumba was a communist and that the Congo could be on track to becoming a Soviet puppet state. - In AUG 1960, CIA agents in the region reported that the Congo is experiencing a classic Communist takeover. - In early 1961, Lumumba was captured by his opponents, taken to katanga, and executed. Eisenhower had authorised the murder of Lumumba and CIA Chief, Allan Dulles, allocated $100,000 to accomplish the act but this was not carried out. TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS Taiwan Strait Crises First Taiwan Straits Crisis (SEPT 1954 - MAY 1955) [t] Context: As the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the United States resumed military aid to the ROC and sent the US Navy's Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. Key Events: In August 1954, Mao started attacking the small islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of Taiwan. These islands claimed to belong to Taiwan’s GMD government. A Chinese Communist leader, Zhou Enlai, claimed that Taiwan must be ‘liberated’. Fighting continued between the PRC and the Taiwan GMD govt. around various islands off China’s coast. This renewed Cold War fears of Communist expansion in Asia at a time when the PRC was not recognized by the United States Department of State. Many suggest that the PRC backed down in the face of American nuclear brinksmanship, and in light of the lack of willingness by the Soviet Union to threaten nuclear retaliation for an American attack on the PRC. Eisenhower's threats to use nuclear weapons during the crisis prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program. Whilst on May 1st the PLA temporarily ceased shelling Quemoy and Matsu, the fundamental issues of the conflict remained unresolved, and both sides subsequently built up their military forces on their respective sides of the Taiwan Strait leading to a new crisis three years later (the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis). U.S. actions: * In response, the United States and the ROC agreed to the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954 (defense pact). * In January 1955, the Formosa Resolution was approved by both houses of Congress, authorising Eisenhower to defend the ROC and its possessions. * During the crisis, Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear weapons against PRC military targets. * In March 1955, Dulles publicly stated the USA was considering using nuclear weapons to stop the PRC attacking Taiwan; in April the PRC stopped its shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower also reaffirmed his willingness to use nuclear weapons. Why? * ROC was part of the United States' policy of containment of communism. Second Taiwan Straits Crisis (AUG - OCT 1958) Causes: Key Events: On 23 August, Mao again started shelling Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower and Dulles immediately suspected, as they had with the First Straits Crisis, that the shelling of the islands was a preparation for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by the PRC. They responded by putting the American military on full alert, sending a large American fleet to the Taiwan Strait, and, crucially, authorising the dispatch of additional nuclear-equipped forces to the region. * They were aiming to deter the PRC’s aggression with a show of overwhelming force. Representatives from the USSR travelled to Beijing in an effort to defuse the crisis. They were shocked at the attitude of the Chinese government: they claimed that they knew their actions would lead to war with the USA, and they were “ready to take all the hard blows, including atomic bombs and the destruction of their cities”. The USA was indeed preparing a nuclear response. Eisenhower’s military advisers urged the use of low-yield nuclear bombs against Chinese military installations, which they acknowledged would cause millions of civilian casualties. Eisenhower did this because he saw Mao’s actions as a serious test to the USA’s credibility as ‘world policeman’. The crisis ended when Mao stopped the shelling on 6 October. On 19 September, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a letter warning that the American actions threatened world war, claiming that the Soviet Union would be forced to honor its commitments to the territorial integrity of Communist China. The letter was rejected by the American government. Consequences: During the crisis, American leadership risked the alienation of the American public, relations with key allies such as France and Japan, and even nuclear war. Overall, both of the Crises were very similar: American nuclear brinkmanship made the PRC back down and thus were successful examples of two key American policies in the 1950s: brinkmanship and containment. The expansion of the Communist PRC (which had an alliance with the USSR), was contained. Taiwan was considered part of China, so protecting it inhibited the Communists from gaining full control of China – successful containment in practice. KHRUSCHEV: EAST + WEST RELATIONS IMPACT OF RISINGS IN POLAND & HUNGARY De-Stalinisation in the Soviet Bloc: Nikita Khrushchev wanted to redefine the relationship between the USSR and its Eastern Bloc satellite states. He wanted to achieve long-term political stability, economic growth and improved living conditions through the process of de-Stalinisation. * On 25th February 1956, Khrushchev delivered his ‘Secret Speech’ which reported Stalin’s crimes. * De-Stalinisation involved the removal of some or most of the controls that were present within the Stalinist system (Stalin wanted Eastern European states to be clones of the Stalinist communist system developed during his reign): * e.g. cult of personality, centralised planning, a one-party political system, dominance of the Communist Party, a secret police system, and press censorship. Polish Uprising: JUNE-OCT 1956 Context: The unexpected death of Boleslaw Beirut (MAR ‘56), who supported and implemented radical Stalinist policies in Poland. Very oppressive and his regime was marked as a silent terror (executions of political opponents and opposition members) Khrushchev nominated Edward Ochab as his successor and tasked him with implementing de-Stalinisation in Poland. Causes: 1. After the Secret Speech (FEB ‘56), many Poles started to demand more political freedom and national sovereignty. It also weakened the hardline Stalinist faction of the PZPR. 2. Death of Beirut (MAR ‘56) 3. 1956 - Poznan protests: In June, dissatisfaction with the status quo led to mass demonstrations (workers lost their bonus pay and raised required work quotas). This escalated into wider protests over food shortages, bad housing and poor living standards. The Polish government responded with a harsh crackdown which soon turned demonstrations into a violent riot. Many were killed and hundreds arrested. * Limitations to extent of de-Stalinisation. What did the Secret Speech, death of Bierut and Poznan protests highlight and lead to? Highlighted the people's dissatisfaction with the situation in Poland which allowed Gomulka to come to power. Gomulka was a moderate communist skeptical of the Soviets, in contrast to Bierut who was a devout Stalinist loyal to Moscow. Gomulka was previously removed from power and arrested by Stalinist hardliners. The Soviets were pressured to compromise with the Gomulka faction. The Soviets gave permission for Gomulka to stay in power and greater autonomy to Poland in exchange for maintaining its loyalty to Moscow (Gomulka ensured his reforms would not abandon communism or treaties with USSR like the Warsaw Pact) SIMPLIFIED - The Secret Speech in FEB, death of Bierut in MAR, and violent protests in Poznań in JUNE, led to the Polish Thaw. Why was force not used to suppress Gomulka? * Force was not used, primarily, because of the support shown from Beijing and Mao towards the Polish Communist Party. Why were the events in Poland worrying for the USSR? * The USSR believed that any liberalisation in one country could lead to the destruction of communism and the ruin of Soviet influence in the region as a whole. Consequences: * Many Poles supported Gomulka because they believed he had preserved a Polish path to socialism rather than conforming to Soviet views on how their satellite states should behave. * Gomulka skillfully balanced the need for Polish security with the presence of Soviet troops in Poland, in order to placate Moscow. The USSR would protect Poland from revanchism (revenge; the idea that a people may wish to restore their lost territories and thereby threaten Poland’s security) from West Germany. * The Polish Rising showed that Moscow would allow its satellites a measure of national independence if the regimes were led by trustworthy and loyal men. * Khrushchev’s instinct had been to use force once Gomulka, a nationalist leader, had taken control of the Polish Communist Party. Force was not used, primarily because China supported them. This was part of the increasing role being played in international communism by China. The Polish October resulted in a temporary liberalisation and the effective end of Stalinism in Poland. News of the events in Poland contributed to the more violent but less successful Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Hungarian Uprising: OCT-NOV 1956 22nd OCT - students in Budapest demonstrated and listed 16 demands. These included the appointment of Imre Nagy as prime minister, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, freedom of speech and a free press and multi-party elections. The next day, the situation had escalated to an armed revolt (workers’ groups joined students and seized power from local communist authorities). 24th OCT - Nagy was appointed PM. He immediately met with the Soviet delegation to convince the USSR that military intervention was not necessary. He argued the revolt could be calmed and assured Moscow of Hungary’s loyalty. 28th OCT - Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Soviet forces from Budapest and declared they’d completely withdraw from Hungary. 31st OCT - the USSR reversed its decision as they feared the collapse of communism in Hungary: with the introduction of a multi-party political system, the dissolution of the Secret police, and moves towards a free press. 1st NOV - Nagy announced Hungary had withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact and declared its neutrality. 3rd NOV - 15 divisions of the Red Army and 4,000 tanks reinvaded and within a few days the uprising was crushed. A new government led by Janos Kadar was installed; was a hard-line communist loyal to Moscow. Consequences for Hungary: * 4,000 Hungarian civilians killed * 200,000 civilians fled * 22,000 were sentenced and imprisoned and over 200 executed * Imre Nagy was trialed and executed Impact: * Lack of intervention from the West confirmed that the post-war status quo had been accepted. It ensured to the USSR that any future problems that arose in Eastern Europe would have no interference from the West. * The rising was demoted to merely a debating issue in the UN illustrating that it would not interfere in Eastern Europe either. * Moves towards peaceful co-existence were compromised. * The rising showed that there was a need for social and political reform in Eastern Europe. Influence of Mao: Mao Zedong influenced Khrushchev's decision to repress the Hungarian uprising. The deputy chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Shaoqi, pressed Khrushchev to militarily repress the Hungarian Revolution. Western response - Suez Crisis: Meanwhile, in the West, the concurrent Suez Crisis (29 October – 7 November 1956) of the French and the British empires' seizure of the Suez Canal from Egypt voided the political possibility of Western military intervention in Hungary. On 28 October, Khrushchev said that Soviet military intervention to Hungary would be a mistaken imitation of the Anglo–French intervention to Egypt. the Suez Crisis prevented the West from criticizing the imperialism of the USSR the U.S. vice president Richard Nixon said that: "We couldn't, on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary, and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against [Gamal Abdel] Nasser." Despite Cold War rhetoric from western countries espousing rollback of the Soviet domination of eastern Europe, and Soviet promises of socialism's imminent triumph, national leaders of this period (as well as later historians) saw the failure of the Hungarian Revolution as evidence that the Cold War had come to a stalemate in Europe. Suez Crisis OCT - NOV 1956 Causes: Key Events: Consequences: ARMS RACE BERLIN WALL Berlin Wall 13 August 1961 - 9 November 1989 [u] Context: MARCH 1952 - ‘Stalin Note’ * Stalin issued a proposal for reunification and neutralisation of Germany, with no conditions on economic policies and with guarantees for the “rights of man and basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly” and free activity of other democratic parties. Response from West: * The USA responded negatively - probably because it feared that a free, neutral and demilitarised Germany might eventually fall to Soviet control. * Stalin's proposal was met with intense suspicion in the FRG, which instead signed the European Defence Community Treaty that month. After these developments, it became clear to both the Soviet Union and the GDR that Germany would remain divided indefinitely. Consequence for East Germany: * Walter Ulbricht interpreted Stalin's failed attempt at German reunification as a ‘green light’ to proceed with the "accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR", which the party announced at its Second Party Conference in July 1952. * This move to Sovietize the GDR consisted of a drastic increase in investment allocated to heavy industry, discriminatory taxation against the last private industrial enterprises, forced collectivization of agriculture and a campaign against religious activity in East Germany. * Stalinist model of industrialisation (de-stalinisation?) These changes eventually lead to the East German uprising (JUNE ‘53) [v] Why? - Consequences of Ulbricht’s policies * The result of these changes led to a rapid deterioration of workers' living standards + clear downward trend in the living standard of East Germans. * Food prices rose as a result of both the state's collectivisation policy (40% of the wealthier farmers in the GDR fled to the West), leaving over 1,900,000 acres of productive land to no good use = poor harvest in 1952. * To ease economic strain on the state, the Politburo decided to increase work quotas on a compulsory basis by 10% across all state-owned factories: that is, workers now had to produce 10% more for the same wage. * Many East Germans' response was to simply leave the GDR (350,000 left by 1953). JUNE 1953 - East German Berlin workers uprising * Initially against the work quotas during the Sovietization process in East Germany. Later protests were against declining living conditions and Sovietization policies. * 1 - 1.5 million demonstrators * Violently suppressed by tanks * 100+ killed (some executed) * Many workers lost faith in East Germany's socialist state following the uprising, disgusted by the violent suppression of the strikes. West German response: * The 1953 uprising was celebrated in West Germany as a public holiday on 17 June until German reunification in 1990. SIMPLIFIED = Stalin’s Note was a proposal made by Stalin to reunify Germany into a neutral, demilitarised and democratic state which the West and FRG refused. Ulbricht as a result implemented drastic economic policies that were widely disliked. These policies led to economic downturn, worst living conditions, lower wages which led to demonstrations and an uprising in June 1953, which was violently suppressed and caused greater dissatisfaction. MAY 1955 - Austrian State Treaty: * Soviet hopes for a resolution of the German question were raised when this treaty was signed at Vienna. * In OCT 1955, the four occupying powers left the country Austria and an independent, democratic and neutral Austrian state with few military capabilities was created. Was Khrushchev’s first diplomatic success. * Khrushchev hoped that a similar treaty / arrangement could be reached over Germany and thereby assuring Soviet fears about a revived Germany’s capabilities to harm the USSR. The ‘brain drain’: * 1953: 350,000 had left. * By October 1958, the total had reached 2 million. * By 1961 - prior to the wall - the total figure of desertion was now close to 3.5 million (about 25% of GDR’s population. * Issue was accentuated by the fact that Ulbricht put a lot of money into educating young people to boost the economy (create skilled labourers). Ulbricht succeeded in upskilling the workforce, however, many ended up leaving East Germany for the West due to low wages and poor working conditions. Konrad Adenauer: * Starting in AUG 1950, Adenauer began to pressure Western Allies to free all German war criminals in their custody and allowed many former Nazis to re-enter public life and their professions. * One of the reasons economy did well, as well as partially receiving partial Marshall Aid (11% went to West Germany) * In May 1955, the USA, Britain and France granted the FRG full sovereignty, and it was admitted to NATO. German rearmament: From the beginning of his Chancellorship, Adenauer had been pressing for German rearmament. After the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the USA and Britain agreed that West Germany had to be rearmed to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. - In November 1955, Adenauer launched a rearmament drive, creating a large and well-equipped conscript army, the Bundeswehr. * Every male in West Germany had to serve. - Adenauer also launched the Hallstein[w] Doctrine. Under this doctrine the FRG refused to recognise East Germany or maintain any diplomatic relations with countries that did recognise the GDR (states in the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe). GDR at the risk of collapse - closening of the Berlin Wall: - Payment of the German war reparations owed to the USSR severely weakened the East German economy. By the early 1950s the Soviets had extracted some $10b in reparations in agricultural and industrial products. - The poverty of East Germany induced by reparations provoked the Republikflucht ("desertion from the republic") to West Germany, further weakening the GDR's economy. Western economic opportunities induced a “brain drain” of skilled workers, technicians and professionals. - Ulbricht feared that the GDR was at risk of collapse, and so pressured Khrushchev to stop the outflow and resolve the status of Berlin. - He also looked to Mao for support in both this and in his opposition to the sort of de-stalinization measures that a pro-Khrushchev faction in the SED, led by Karl Schirderwan (left), favoured. * Karl Schirderwan was Khrushchevite that was meant to de-stalinise in East Germany; wanted to reform communism. SIMPLIFIED = Khrushchev wanted Ulbricht out as he was a hard-line Stalinist (Khrushchev wanted to destabilise). Khrushchev would like to get rid of East Germany (like with the Austrian State Peace Treaty) so it is no longer a point of tension or conflict. However, under pressure from Mao and the ongoing issue with Germany this was unfeasible. * The Berlin Wall saved Ulbricht’s regime. First Berlin ultimatum (NOVEMBER 1958) Why? - Khrushchev was genuinely appalled by the situation in the GDR - he felt that its collapse would allow the FRG to fill the resulting power vacuum, and bring the Bundeswehr up to the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia. - In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and France six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. It must also ‘liquidate the occupation regime’ and turn Berlin into a demilitarised ‘free city’ - Khrushchev thought if he could get West Berlin made into a free city, and if the Western Powers would recognize East Germany, that he could curb the East German emigration crisis. - If the West did not agree to this, Khrushchev would unilaterally sign a treaty with the GDR and turn over all control of access to Berlin to the East Germans. What happened after? - Eisenhower was enraged and he made clear to the Soviets that access rights to the Western sectors of Berlin remained central to American policy. He also reiterated America’s commitment to West Germany, and stated he was prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend it. - When the 27th May 1959 deadline came, Khrushchev quietly allowed it to pass and insisted the West had simply misunderstood him. Khrushchev visited the USA in September, and negotiated with Eisenhower at Camp David (SEPT 1959). Although the talks yielded no significant results, it appeared that better relations were coming about. - It seemed like American intransigence had been successful. Khrushchev’s backing down was largely due to him recognising the USA’s determination to maintain the established setup in Berlin, and the USA’s willingness to risk nuclear war to do so. * Brinkmanship was successful. HOWEVER, this was all ruined by the Gary Powers U-2 incident (Paris Summit - MAY 1960). American press characterised Khrushchev's decision to emphasize the U-2 incident at the summit as an attempt to gain leverage on this issue. The U-2 incident shattered the amiable "Spirit of Camp David" that had prevailed for eight months, prompting the cancellation of the summit in Paris and embarrassing the U.S. on the international stage. * May have prevented further cooperation for a possible peace treaty for Germany. The building of the wall: By the summer of 1961, the Berlin Crisis was on the boil again * Such had been the increase in the numbers of East Germans deserting their country (the total figure of desertions was now close to 3.5 million - about 25% of the GDR’s population), that Khrushchev expected an immediate collapse of the GDR and its swift absorption by West Germany. * If East Germany collapsed then the only entity that was able to fill that power vacuum was West Germany. * Khrushchev re-issued his demand for East German control over Berlin, and Western recognition of the GDR. * Worse still, Kennedy vowed to defend Berlin, even at the cost of war. Mao was once again on Khrushchev’s back (as he had been over Poland and Hungary in 1956), demanding tougher action. Drastic measures were required. * In mid-August 1961, therefore, Khrushchev finally permitted Ulbricht to build a large barrier along the East-West border in Berlin to prevent further emigration. Vienna summit: June 4th-5th 1961 - Khrushchev took an extremely tough line on Berlin with Kennedy. Kennedy described the meeting as the “Worst thing in my life. He savaged me.” - Why did Khrushchev take such a tough line? i. Because Kennedy was still reeling from the effects of the failed Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba on 17th April 1961 ii. Because Germany mattered to the USSR – especially since the FDR had joined NATO - Observing Kennedy’s morose expression at the end of the summit, Khrushchev believed Kennedy "looked not only anxious, but deeply upset…I hadn’t meant to upset him. I would have liked very much for us to part in a different mood. But there was nothing I could do to help him…Politics is a merciless business.” Khrushchev made a similar threat to that which he made in late 1958, for East German control of Berlin • Kennedy thought this put American – and his own personal – credibility directly under threat. Kennedy responded by saying “We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin.” • Kennedy increased the defence budget by $3.2 billion and allocated $207 million for a fallout shelter programme to prepare American people for a future nuclear attack by the USSR • But rather than have the DDR seize control of all of Berlin, Khrushchev permitted Ulbricht’s government to do something different that solved the problem of people fleeing to the West • In August 1961 the DDR government started to construct a barbed wire barrier to separate the Soviet and Western zones of the city. This soon became a permanent wall stationed with armed guards. It was an ugly and dangerous symbol of Europe’s division into Western and Soviet blocs • US and Soviet tanks faced off at Checkpoint Charlie on 27th -28th October – but the USA backed down, allowing for an easing of tensions • However, with the construction of the wall (the Berlin Wall), the Berlin Crisis was solved. The main problem for the Soviets – West Berlin being an attractive symbol of Western capitalism that Germans would flee to – was no more. The Wall had solved that. The Wall, by stopping East Germans leaving, also gave life support to Ulbricht’s regime • “It’s not a very nice solution,” said Kennedy, “but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.” Because of the Wall, Kennedy never had to confront the difficult question of whether the USA would be willing to go to war over Berlin, a war that would cost millions of lives - Standoff at Checkpoint Charlie 13th August 1961: the Wall begins to go up 15th August 1961: Hans Conrad Schumann makes his bid for Freedom In addition, the drain of East Germany's young population potentially cost it over 22.5 billion marks in lost educational investment. The brain drain of professionals had become so damaging to the political credibility and economic viability of East Germany that the re-securing of the German communist frontier was imperative Consequences: - Avoided war - Propaganda loss for the USSR + East Germany - Saved Ulbricht’s regime Key Quotes: Kennedy: “A wall is a hell of a lot better than a war”. Kennedy: “Democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in”. Kennedy: “ We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin” Khrushchev: “the testicles of the West: every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin”. Eisenhower jointly asserted that general disarmament was of utmost importance and that such issues as that of Berlin "should be settled, not by the application of force, but by peaceful means through negotiations." (at Camp David) CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS Cuban Missile Crisis MAR 1946 - AUG 1949 Context: Monroe Doctrine - nature of U.S. imperialism (longer term): * “Independent” Cuba emerged as the model for US imperialism. American economic and political dominance had been secured without the seizure of a colony. The US could continue to boast its anti-colonial tradition and beliefs despite having made Cuba a dependency. * Political domination - the Platt Amendment (1901) gave the US the right to intervene in newly independent Cuba’s political and military affairs. * Economic domination - by 1877, the USA accounted for 83% of Cuba’s total exports, meaning it was able to control price and hence production levels closely (sugar / tobacco). US investment in Cuban industry and infrastructure (60% of the Cuban sugar industry was US owned by 1926). Batista’s dictatorship + U.S. support: * Fulgencio Batista (Cuban president). Pro-American with close political cooperation between the US and Cuban govts. * Brutal and repressive regime (coercion, patronage, corruption) * Complete domination of Cuba’s economy by the USA in this period; the number of American corporations owning Cuban companies grew (sugar / tobacco / oil). * This combination of American economic dominances, Cuban subservience, and the brutality of Batista created resentment amongst Cubans. Cuban Revolution: DEC 1956 - Castro begins his guerilla struggle against Batista’s regime. JAN 1959 - Che Guevara and Fidel Castro overthrow Batista, he flees the country. The 26th July Movement establishes itself as the de facto government of Cuba. * There was initial US acceptance of the revolution as Castro was a nationalist not a Communist. * Issues arose as Castro planned to reduce US economic and political influence in Cuba in order to legitimise the revolutionary state and cement his own position as leader (consolidate his new regime). * Castro’s economic reforms - seizure of US owned companies (nationalisation) led to US resentment. * To do this he needed the support of a great power (Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba in FEB 1960 and agreed to a reciprocal trade agreement). * $100,000,000 in credit from USSR to Cuba - Soviet version of Marshall Plan (economic and political relationship established). * The relationship established between the Cuban revolutionary govt and the USSR provoked the USA. * The nationalisation of Cuban industries (sugar, tobacco) threatened American economic interest (Marshall Plan = one of the aim was to ensure hegemony of US businesses over its rivals and continued growth of US economy) * Flow of refugees from Cuba to Florida. * Therefore US-Cuba relations deteriorated. * Evidence - APRIL 1960, crude oil arrived in Cuba from the Soviet Union but the US oil companies in Cuba refused to refine the oil (making it practically useless). This promoted Castro to nationalise the oil companies which triggered a US response with them imposing economic sanctions and cutting off Cuban sugar imports by 95%. Bay of Pigs (17th APRIL 1961): The situation of Cuba was seen by the US as intervention in their “sphere of influence” - Cuba was their summertime backyard / playground. 1,500 anti-Castro exiles - trained by the CIA - landed in Cuba to carry out a military coup. This was planned under Eisenhower and inherited by Kennedy who was humiliated by the disaster. This had the adverse effect of strengthening the revolutionary govt. and consolidated Castro’s leadership (good propaganda). Confirmed US attitudes to its “sphere of influence”. 1961 is already a bad year for Kennedy and he has midterms next year in NOV 1962 (VIenna, Berlin Wall, Bay of Pigs, Gagarin) Fear of Cuba drifting to China: Castro began criticizing the Soviets for lack of "revolutionary boldness", and began talking to China about agreements for economic assistance. In March 1962, Castro ordered the ousting of Anibal Escalante and his pro-Moscow comrades from Cuba's Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. Soviet foreign policy planners were concerned that Castro's break with Escalante (pro-Moscow Cuban communists) foreshadowed a Cuban drift toward China, and they sought to solidify the Soviet-Cuban relationship through the missile basing program. Causes: Soviet decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba (1962): US military response to developing situation in Cuba. US “Operation Mongoose” in NOV 1961 (covert); collection of 33 CIA plans to discredit and overthrow Castro (e.g. assassination, disruption to sugar crops) US “OPLAN 312 and 314” 1961 (air strikes / invasion plan) * Military plans for invasions + air operations US “Operation Quick Kick” MAR 1962 (a symbolic show of US military power) * 40k US soldiers and air power carried out mock invasion of a Caribbean island * This convinced Castro and Khrushchev that the USA was going to invade Cuba Khrushchev is provoked (US brinkmanship), Soviets decide to deploy nuclear weapons on Cuba Bombers, troops,missiles, launchers sent to Cuba * Decisions to place missiles in Cuba was in MAY 1962; named Operation Anadyr, they start arriving in Cuba in JULY * Response to US Jupiter missiles in Turkey in 1961. Key Events (the ‘Thirteen Days’): (Everything Kennedy does is in the shadow of the NOV ‘62 midterms a month away; that are essential in winning the NOV ‘64 presidential election) Context: 14th OCT - US first obtained U-2 photographic evidence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba Thirteen Days begin: 16th OCT - * Kennedy is informed about the missiles in Cuba. * Robert Kennedy contacts the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. * Khrushchev assured Kennedy that the USSR had no intention of "disrupting the relationship of our two countries" despite the photo evidence. 17th OCT - * Military and diplomatic responses are debated. 18th OCT - * Kennedy meets Soviet Minister Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who claimed that the weapons were for defensive purposes only. Kennedy hides the fact he already knows about the missiles to avoid panicking the American public. 19th OCT - * Secret meetings continue - military airstrikes vs. a blockade are debated. 20th OCT - * Kennedy decides to go with a naval blockade ("quarantine"), avoiding immediate military action. 21st OCT - * Considered the two remaining options: an air strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba. * Plans for the quarantine are finalised - blockade renamed "quarantine" as term "blockade" was problematic - according to international law, a blockade is an act of war, but Kennedy did not think that the Soviets would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade. 22nd OCT - * EXCOMM formally established. * Kennedy delivered a nationwide televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles. He announces the ‘quarantine zone’ around Cuba. * During the speech, a directive went out to all US forces worldwide, placing them on DEFCON 3. 23rd OCT - * Kennedy receives a letter from Khrushchev in which he states that there is a “serious threat to peace and security of peoples”, and offers to remove the missiles if the US respects Cuban sovereignty. * Problematic as the letter takes 12 hours to be received and decoded. * Robert Kennedy speaks with Ambassador Antonin Dobrinin. 24th OCT - * Most Soviet ships stop and reverse course except for one, avoiding confrontation. * The US Strategic Air Command (SAC) raised to DEFCON 2 (one step away from nuclear war). * US Ambassadors notified EXCOMM they were considering making an offer to withdraw missiles from Italy and Turkey if the Soviets withdrew from Cuba. But Turkish officials said they’d "deeply resent" any deal involving the US missile in Turkey. 25th OCT - * Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram by stating that the USA was forced into action after receiving repeated false assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba (placing responsibility for the crisis on the USSR). * The US requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. * Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorising the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft, which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union. 26th OCT -[x][y] * Khrushchev sends a letter to Kennedy stating that the USSR would remove its missiles under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons again, in exchange for a public statement by the US that it would not invade Cuba. 27th OCT (‘Black Saturday’)- [z] * Two conflicting letters arrived from Khrushchev: * The first, softer letter (sent OCT 26) offered to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba if the U.S. promised not to invade Cuba. * The second, harsher letter (OCT 27) demanded the U.S. also remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. * Kennedy decided to publicly respond only to the first, softer letter. EXCOMM was against the proposal because it would undermine NATO's authority, and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated that it was against any such trade. * In private, his brother Robert F. Kennedy met secretly with the Soviet ambassador and offered a private deal: * The U.S. would quietly remove missiles from Turkey later, but not as part of any public agreement. Major Military Incidents: * An American U-2 is shot down over Cuba, killing the pilot. * A U-2 spy plane made an accidental and unauthorised flight into Soviet airspace near Alaska, and was almost intercepted by Soviet fighters. * The US Navy dropped a series of "signalling" depth charges on a Soviet submarine. * The Soviet submarine commanders, believing war might have started, nearly launched a nuclear torpedo — but ultimately held fire. * Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, what is now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), which urged the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba 28th OCT -[aa] * Khrushchev announced over Radio Moscow that he had agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba. * In return, the US agreed to withdraw its missiles from Turkey (secretly), thus ending the Cuban Missile Crisis. The crisis was effectively defused by: two messages from Khruschev and the actions of Bobby Kennedy and Dean Rusk that played a key role in persuading Kennedy to reach a compromise. ________________ What influenced Kennedy’s actions during the CMC? 1. Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin. He remembered that during the Suez Crisis (1956), Khrushchev had used Western military distractions to his advantage - and feared Khrushchev might do the same with Berlin now and would possibly wind up trading off Berlin. 2. Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation. 3. Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States... the United States would act." 4. Further, US credibility among its allies and people would be damaged if the Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic imbalance by placing missiles in Cuba. ________________ EXCOMM: Each side trying to win Kennedy over Hawks: Military men that want confrontation; outraged by a negotiated settlement and saw Cuba as a defeat. * General Curtis LeMay - Head of Strategic Air Command (in charge of bomber missiles) * General Maxwell Taylor - Head Joint Chief of Staff Unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution Doves: Faction most in favour of a negotiated settlement * Dean Rusk - Secretary of State * Robert F. Kennedy - Attorney General * Robert McNamara - Secretary of Defense (changes into a hawk for Vietnam War) Reach out to Soviets for negotiated settlement and meet with them: * Anatoly Dobronin (Soviet ambassador to USA until end of Cold War) * Denies Soviet missiles as he was not informed of it. * Andrei Gromyko (Soviet foreign minister) * Hard to convince Americans that the missiles weren’t a threat. Plans discussed by EXCOMM: 1. Do nothing: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new. 2. Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to induce the Soviet Union to remove the missiles. 3. Secret approach: Offer Castro the choice of parting from the Soviets or being invaded. 4. Invasion: Full-force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro. 5. Air strike: Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites. 6. Blockade: Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba. ________________ Operational Plans (OPLAN): Two Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered: * OPLAN 316 envisioned a full-scale invasion of Cuba after a huge bombing campaign. * OPLAN 312 was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316's ground forces. Consequences: Consequences for superpower relations: After this crisis, neither side wanted to risk such a dangerous confrontation again and both realised they had to start communicating with each other. This led to a period of greater cooperation known as détente - the crisis had effectively sown the seeds for détente. * Arms control; ‘nuclear non-proliferation’ became a serious issue for the first time. * Non-proliferation refers to efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and related technologies. Not to reduce them directly (stockpile), but reduce the amount of testing. * The Soviets never gave nuclear weapons to its allies so they didn’t get dragged in (e.g. Mao’s erratic nature during the Taiwan Strait Crisis). * The Americans, however, gave them out to its allies. * e.g. in Turkey, the Jupiter missiles weren’t under US control but the Turkish army. * Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (OCT ‘63) - Limited Test Ban Treaty * Limitation: French and Chinese do NOT sign up * Communication; made it clear that reliable, direct communications between the USA and USSR was a necessity (took the US nearly 12 hours to receive and decode Khrushchev’s initial 3,000 word settlement message). * Presidential ‘hotline’ established (JUNE ‘63) between White House and the Kremlin. * e.g. used in * Detente - an emerging doctrine (“easing of tension”) * Doctrine of M.A.D. * Mutually advantageous and mutually pragmatic * Starts in JAN 1969 when Nixon becomes president; therefore the CMC sowed the seeds for detente but did not directly trigger it. * Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy (2 days after the crisis) suggesting initiatives that were intended to prevent the possibility of another nuclear crisis. These included: a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or even disbanding these military blocs; a treaty to cease all nuclear weapons testing and possibly eliminate all nuclear weapons; resolution of the difficult question of Germany by both sides accepting the existence of West Germany and East Germany; and US recognition of the government of mainland China. Consequences for Cuba: * Cuba remained communist; Fidel Castro had effectively secured his regime. * Cuba became a “threat of a good example” for other Third World nationalists (e.g. Sandanista in Nicaragua was inspired by Cuba in July 1979). * Castro was especially upset that certain questions of interest to Cuba, such as the status of the US Naval Base in Guantánamo, were not addressed, and Cuban-Soviet relations deteriorated. Alongside this, Castro was not consulted by Khruschev over the removal of the missiles. Consequences for the USA: * The removal of the Jupiters from Italy and Turkey began on 1 April, and was completed by 24 April 1963. * Strategy of brinkmanship was played out - it led to an easing of relations between the USA and USSR during the 1960s, and paved the way for detente in the 1970s. * Kennedy had successfully secured a good position for the Democrats in the NOV ‘62 midterms - by not having to admit to removing missiles from Turkey - and hence put him in a greater position for re-election in NOV ‘64. * Cuba remained communist and remained a “threat of a good example” for other nationalists in the Caribbean / Central America. Other Third World nationalists would see how far the USSR went for Cuba in the crisis, perhaps even more reliable than Mao. * France withdrew from NATO in MAR 1966 and started developing their own nuclear weapons. This is because French leader Charles de Gaulle had to rethink policy after CMC as he was almost dragged into a nuclear war. Consequences for USSR: The escalating situation also caused Khrushchev to abandon plans for a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of Albania, which was being discussed in the Eastern Bloc following the Vlora incident the previous year. Victory as… * Cuba remained a communist state when the missile crisis had concluded. The USA agreed not to attack Cuba in the future. The USA also removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. * The communist state was within 90 miles off the US mainland. The USSR had succeeded in preserving a communist state in the USA’s ‘own backyard’. * Khruschev wanted to move towards greater nuclear parity with the USA. The missile crisis undoubtedly raised awareness for the need to move towards greater efforts on nuclear arms controls. This was in the Soviet Union’s interest and favour (did not need to spend more to reach parity, but could do it with treaties instead). * The crisis confirmed the Soviet Union’s commitment to the Third World. The stance against the USA - despite the loss - was a propaganda victory. Demonstrated itself as more reliable than Mao; maintained Soviet hegemony in the communist sphere. Defeat as… * The crisis WAS a defeat; the USSR had to remove its missiles. * The importance of Kennedy’s status as a world leader was enhanced. Kennedy had won the struggle over brinkmanship as Khrushchev withdrew. * The crisis strengthened the USA’s status in West Germany and Europe. The stand over Cuba strengthened the importance of the USA as the defender against communism, further weakening Khrushchev’s position in Europe. * Khrushchev was overthrown by Brezhnev in OCT ‘64. Top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation". VIETNAM WAR Vietnam War Context: Geneva Conference - MAY - JULY 1954 * The French were defeated by the communist-led Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu in APR 1954, and an agreement was reached at Geneva which temporarily separated Vietnam along the 17th parallel into two zones, a northern communist zone, and a southern capitalist zone. * A Conference Final Declaration, issued by the British chairman, provided that a general election be held by July 1956 to create a unified Vietnamese state * The USA and South Vietnam refused to sign the final agreement, but said they would "respect" it. Eisenhower thought Vietnamese communism was a proxy of Mao and an agent of China's expansion. South Vietnam aligns with America and abandons France. Eisenhower pursues a Truman-style containment. Domino theory in practice - the belief that if one country fell to communism, neighboring countries would follow. Americans are seen as ‘incompetent imperialists in denial’ Key Players in the North Key Players in the South Ho Chi Minh * President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from SEPT 1945. * Communist but nationalist first. Le Duan * First secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party from January 1959 * More hardline communist. * From 1959, he wanted to start pushing to take action in the South. Ngo Dinh Diem * The 'Winston Churchill of Asia' / 'miracle man' of Asia. * A corrupt and nepotistic leader - characteristics that would contribute to his downfall. * Was a Catholic, while 90% of the population was Buddhist. * Diem ran a state to benefit the Catholic minority and oppress the Buddhist majority. * Receives hundreds of millions in US aid. * Americans see him as capable of containing Ho Chi Minh and perceived Chinese expansionism. Ngo Dinh Thuc (Diem’s brother) * The Archbishop of Saigon and spiritual leader of South Vietnam’s Catholics - dedicated the country to the Virgin Mary Ngo Dinh Nhu (Diem’s brother) * Chief political fixer, and a leader of the secret police. Kennedy’s actions in Vietnam: 1955-59: - In November 1954, the American Joint Chiefs stated that a US-funded army - the ARVN - was needed to be formed to maintain “the security of the legal government in Saigon (South Vietnamese capital)”. To do this, this army would perform “operations in each province” and perform “pacification missions”. The aim was to destroy the remaining Viet Minh organisations around the South and ensure obedience to Diem’s government based in Saigon. - In October 1955, Diem seized power through a fraudulent referendum (with US backing), and declared himself President of the newly proclaimed Republic of Vietnam. - Power was concentrated in his family's hands, and enforced through secret police and the imprisonment and torture of political and religious opponents. - Diem's policies and conduct inflamed religious tensions. The government was biased towards Catholics in public service and military promotions, as well as the allocation of land, business favours and tax concessions. - In mid-1955, Diem’s regime launched a Communist Denunciation Campaign, in which the population was forced to inform against Viet Minh members. - Tens of thousands were jailed, executed, or sent to “re-education camps”. Many of these people were innocent civilians who had merely voiced their unhappiness with Diem’s ‘land reform’ programme. With this ‘land reform’ programme, Diem sent large landlords back into the countryside to reclaim lands that were distributed to the peasants by the Viet Minh during the war with the French. - Diem and his army allowed these landlords to force the peasants to pay rent for as many years back as the landlords could claim. Peasants who opposed this programme were labelled ‘Communist’ and persecuted. - During this period of repression, Ho Chi Minh and Communists in the North strictly banned their followers in the South to use armed force to defend themselves. - Ho Chi Minh deliberately tried to limit armed struggle in the South - despite Diem’s extreme repression against the Communists and general population. He remarks that they should go into hiding rather than fight back. * This proved to be a failure as 90% of all Viet Minh members in the South had been killed by Diem's regime by the end of 1958. * In the far-southern region of South Vietnam, Cochinchina, 70,000 Communists had been killed, over 90,000 had been jailed and tortured, and about 20,000 of these had become severely disabled after torturing. 1959-61: - The oppression gets so bad that the communists (alongside the general population and peasants) defy Ho Chi Minh and start fighting back against Diem’s regime. Peasants fought to defend their land rights, which led to a member of the Diem regime to complain in February 1959 that “at present, in the countryside the landowners can no longer collect their land rents because they dare not return to their villages”. - Even though it was mostly started by peasants who were not Communists, this unrest was blamed on the Communists. As a result, American and British military experts helped organise a ‘pacification’ programme by the Diem regime. - This programme involved the complete resettlement of populations. People were removed from where they lived and the land they owned. In fact, the resettlement programme was so severe that even government officials in Saigon criticised it. Peasant resistance to this began to grow. This forced Ho Chi Minh and others in the North to start supporting resistance in the South: if they did not support the resistance to the Diem regime, they ran the risk of losing the support of the Southern population completely. In January 1959 Ho Chi Minh issued a resolution at the ‘Fifteenth Plenum’ of the Communist Party. It permitted the Southern population to defend themselves, but only when “absolutely necessary”. For Ho Chi Minh, at this point, armed struggle was supposed to be a last resort. The population in the South generally ignored the advice of Ho Chi Minh and those in the North. Armed struggles against Diem’s regime started in many areas by mid-1959. The increasing armed struggles made Ho Chi Minh worried that he might soon end up with no influence whatsoever over the movement against Diem and the Americans in the South. 1961-64: [a]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_Civil_War#Civil_War:_1946–1949 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_(Greece) [b]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tito–Stalin_split#U.S._aid_to_Yugoslavia [c]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan#Yugoslavia [d]+ another key conference = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Six-Power_Conference [e]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_of_Foreign_Ministers got japan aswell + other ones [f]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Four_Conference [g]1945–1949: The U.S. provides over $2 billion USD in economic aid to Japan for rebuilding its war-torn economy and infrastructure. Although not explicitly for rearmament, this funding laid the groundwork for Japan's later contributions to regional security. [h]1950–1953: Korean War and U.S. Strategic Shift 1950: The outbreak of the Korean War leads to a U.S. shift in policy, urging Japan to rearm. The U.S. allocates approximately $200 million USD to establish and equip the National Police Reserve (NPR), including funding for weapons (e.g., 300 light tanks, 200 artillery pieces), vehicles, and uniforms. 1951–1953: Additional U.S. military aid increases NPR and later NSA capabilities. 1953: U.S. military assistance under the Mutual Security Act provides Japan with $50 million USD in aid explicitly for defense purposes. [i]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaibatsu#Postwar_dissolution [j]However, complete dissolution of the zaibatsu was never achieved [k]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaibatsu#Postwar_dissolution [l]However, complete dissolution of the zaibatsu was never achieved [m]Only USSR refused to sign it; alongside PRC [n]Furthermore, it can be argued that NSC 68, as proposed by the council, addressed Truman's problem of being attacked from the right following the "red scare" and Alger Hiss case. [o]NSC 68 and its subsequent amplifications advocated a large expansion in the military budget of the United States, the development of a hydrogen bomb, and increased military aid to allies of the United States. It made the rollback of global Communist expansion a high priority and rejected the alternative policies of détente and containment of the Soviet Union. [p]The 1952 election did not directly influence Truman's initial hesitation to implement NSC-68, as his reluctance occurred in 1950, shortly after the report was presented. However, the 1952 presidential election later became a factor in shaping his administration’s overall approach to foreign and defense policy. Here’s how the 1952 election context fits in: Truman’s Decision Not to Run By 1952, Truman had announced he would not seek re-election, meaning his personal political calculations were less relevant. However, his Democratic Party’s prospects were deeply affected by public opinion on his administration's handling of the Cold War and the Korean War. The Korean War (1950–1953), which had escalated due to the implementation of NSC-68's recommendations, was highly unpopular by 1952. The public was frustrated by the stalemate and the costs of the conflict. Impact on NSC-68 Implementation Defense Spending and the Korean War: After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, NSC-68 was fully implemented, leading to a massive military buildup and increased defense spending. By 1952, the defense budget had risen to around $50 billion annually, a direct result of NSC-68’s recommendations. This defense spending, along with the Korean War, became a point of contention during the 1952 campaign. Republicans, led by Dwight D. Eisenhower, criticized the Truman administration for mismanaging the war and the economy. Political Fallout: The implementation of NSC-68 and the Korean War’s unpopularity contributed to Truman’s low approval ratings, which dropped below 30% in 1952. This created a difficult environment for Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson, who struggled to distance himself from Truman’s policies while defending the broader strategy of containment. [q]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domino_theory [r]Superpower = Rhee only stayed in power with US support of rebellions, Rhee would have definitely lost control of govt to leftists and Kim could have unified Korea without war or formal declaration of one [s]The moist important reason for adoption was... Eisnhower new look was similar to truman [t]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis [u]Essay Plan: Who's fault was Berlin Wall: Adenaur + West Walter Ulbricht action USSR action [v]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_German_uprising_of_1953 [w]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallstein_Doctrine#Problems_of_the_doctrine [x]Kennedy informed EXCOMM that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. He was persuaded to wait and continue with military and diplomatic pressure. At this point the crisis appeared to be at a stalemate. The Soviets had shown no indication that they would back down. [y]Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion of Cuba was imminent, and on 26 October he sent a telegram to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US in case of attack. [z]Radio Moscow began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night before, the message offered a new trade: the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. Kennedy realised that he would be in an "insupportable position if this becomes Khrushchev's proposal" because the missiles in Turkey were not militarily useful and were being removed anyway, and "It's gonna – to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a very fair trade." [aa]Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev's solution to the crisis: the US would remove the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the Soviets would remove the missiles from Cuba. Khrushchev had made the offer in a public statement for the world to hear. Despite almost solid opposition from his senior advisers, Kennedy accepted the Soviet offer.