Roman Military Engineering in Gallic War

Title: Recent archaeological research on Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War URL Source: file://pdf.cd1384ebdee9ee705ccc89e820262f7a/ Markdown Content: Chapter Title: Recent archaeological research on Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War Chapter Author(s): Michel Redd Book Title: Julius Caesars Battle for Gaul Book Subtitle: New Archaeological Perspectives Book Editor(s): Andrew P. Fitzpatrick and Colin Haselgrove Published by: Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv13nb9k6.12 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Julius Caesars Battle for Gaul > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms # Chapter 6 Recent archaeological research on Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War # Michel Redd Caesars account of the Gallic War teems with the names of places and peoples that are often hard to identify. This is particularly true of battlefields, which the procon - sul generally describes succinctly. Sometimes just a few words suffice. On the siege of the hillfort of Vellaudunum, which we cannot locate for certain it was possibly Nevers the proconsul writes oppugnare instituit idque biduo circumvallavit (He deter- mined to assault the place and in two days invested it, BG 7.11). There is nothing more. But that was enough, because everyone understood what was going on when a Latin technical term like circumvallavit was used, indicating the building of fortifications to encircle a stronghold. In contrast, no fewer than twenty-one chapters are given over to the episode of Alesia, which is by far the lengthiest in the entire account. But then again it was the final victory that was to ensure Caesar of glory the duel with the opponent the imperator had picked out for himself. This difference in treatment is obviously a bias for the modern historian who does not always have the necessary information to identify any particular one of the numerous sites of battle in this war of conquest. Another difficulty is that the narrative is extremely succinct and the geographical descriptions are only cursory. This can be explained both by Caesars personal style of writing, his brevitas (concision) and by the fact that ancient military accounts were to be read without any maps or sketches. To weigh them down with detailed descriptions was not only contrary to good literary taste but also contrary to common sense. It was enough to set out the gist of the matter for it to be understood by the reader. Needless to say, these were all accounts composed after the event by the victor. These preliminary indications explain why it is so difficult for archaeologists to identify the battle sites of the Gallic War. In the 19th century, Napolon III spent substantial sums on this, launching French archaeologys first great programmes > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 92 of works, with undeniable successes and incontrovertible failures (Napolon III 18651866). Today we still take that pioneering research as our starting point, to confirm, clarify and possibly challenge it. Here I shall review recent research on the subject, emphasizing first that the following examples, which number just four in all, are all that we can present with certainty today, apart from the recent discovery of Hermeskeil, in Germany. For example, so major an episode as the siege of Bourges has still not yielded an archaeological context categorically related to Caesars account. The sites of the battles against the Helvetii in 58 BC or the Germans of Ariovistus that same year remain to be proved. 1 The battle of the Aisne and the camp of Mauchamp This episode relates to the campaign of the year 57 BC. Caesar was attempting to subdue the Belgae who, except for his allies the Remi, were leagued against him. The event took place in the Aisne valley, not far from the oppidum of Bibrax, which was under siege from the coalition of the Belgae. Caesars arrival lifted the siege; there followed a pitched battle in the valley against the Gallic forces (Figure 6.1): Figure 6.1 Plan of Mauchamp, Aisne, from Napolon IIIs Histoire de Jules Csar, pl. 7. > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 93 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War > At first Caesar determined, because of the vast numbers of the enemy and their excellent reputation for valour, to avoid an engagement. By cavalry combats, however, he sought daily to prove what the valour of the enemy could do and what our men could dare. Then, perceiving that our men were not inferior, he chose a ground before the camp naturally > suitable and appropriate for forming line of battle; for the hill where the camp had been > pitched, standing up but a little from the plain, offered to the front as broad a space as a line deployed could occupy; on either flank it fell away, while in front by a gentle slope it came down gradually to the level of the plain. On either flank of that hill he dug at right angles a protecting trench of about four hundred paces, and at the ends of the trenches he constructed forts and there posted his artillery, so that, when he had formed line, the enemy might not be able, because of their great superiority of numbers, to surround the Romans fighting on the flanks ( BG 2.8). Caesars position is clear, then: a hill on the northern bank of the Aisne. On the strength of these indications, Napolon III and Stoffel, his aide de camp , had long trenches dug out from the road that crosses the site along the crest. The excavations eventually brought to light a series of ditches forming an almost square complex measuring 658 655 m (about 42 ha), with rounded corners, the north-east side being at an angle. Five gateways, two of which were to the west, provided access. These gateways were defended by internal claviculae , that is, semi-circular ditches barring the way and forcing any assailant to present his unshielded, right-hand side. Two large ditches some 750 m long ran one from the north-west corner of the camp to a small stream, the Miette, that it virtually joined up with; and the other from the south-east corner towards the river Aisne, so that Mauchamp hill was completely barred off and any outflanking manoeuvre rendered impossible. Some smaller ditches, the layout of which is unclear, cut off crosswise the tip of the northern arm; no equivalent ditches have been found to the south, perhaps having been eroded by a change in the course of the Aisne, but they are dotted on Napolons map. The archaeologists who have worked on the case generally debate three points: the consistency between the published map and Caesars description; the material character of the remains discovered; and the chronology of the site. On the first point, it has to be observed that the plan drawn up by Napolon does bear similarities to the details in de Bello Gallico . Peyre (1979) proved convincingly that each of the topographical indications given by Caesar matches a feature on the ground; but even if some interpretation or other of the Latin text is challenged, the account and the excavations are strikingly consistent on the main point: the presence of long ditches on either side of the hill (Figure 6.2). True, the Roman redoubts have not been found, but these castella , which were necessarily made of wood, would only have left postholes, and around 1860 it was barely known how to recognize such features. Aerial photographs taken by Bernard Lambot have revealed a clavicula , and recent excavations at Alesia attest that these were already in use in Caesars time (Redd 1995). It therefore seems a sound hypothesis today to attribute the camp at Mauchamp to the battle against the Belgae in the year 57 BC, particularly because the identification of the oppidum of Bibrax with the site of Vieux-Laon, 12 km from > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 94 Mauchamp, has recently been confirmed by the exceptional discovery of a Balearic coin attributed to Caesars slinger auxiliaries (Lambot and Casagrande 1997). It was not the usual type of coinage in circulation in northern Gaul. The siege of Gergovia In 52 BC, the seventh year of the war, Caesar had to face the emergence of a vast coalition led by a young noble of the Arverni, Vercingetorix. After a brilliant start to his campaign, in which he systematically avoided confronting the legions directly, Vercingetorix had to fall back before the end of the summer on Gergovia, the oppidum of the Arverni, which was threatened by the Roman army. The proconsuls description of the stronghold is cursory and has fuelled much controversy. Having reconnoitred the position of the city, which was set upon a very lofty height, with difficult approaches on every side, he despaired of taking it by storm, and he determined not to attempt a blockade until he had secured his corn-supply. Vercingetorix, for his part, had pitched camp near the town, and posted the contingent of each state separately at short intervals around himself. Every eminence on the ridge from which a birds-eye view was possible had been seized, and the appearance was formidable Opposite the town there was a hill at the very foot of the mountain, an exceedingly strong position, precipitous on every side. If our troops secured this they thought they could cut off the enemy at once from a great part of their water-supply and from freedom of foraging. The post was held, however, by the enemy Figure 6.2 Air photograph of Mauchamp (courtesy Bernard Lambot). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 95 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War > with a garrison, albeit not a very strong one. None the less, Caesar marched out of camp in the silence of night, dislodged the garrison before it could be reinforced from the town, and made himself master of the position. He posted two legions there, and ran a double ditch, twelve feet broad in each case, from the greater to the lesser camp, so that even single soldiers could > pass to and fro safe from a sudden onset of the enemy ( BG 7.35). Napolon III and Stoffel proposed to identify the site of Gergovia with the volcanic plateau of Merdogne (70 ha), south of Clermont-Ferrand, and their excavations revealed a large camp of 35 ha to the east of the oppidum and a small camp of about 5.5 ha to the south of it, on the hill of La Roche Blanche. Traces of a linear fortification were recognized joining the two. This evidence has, though, long been contested, like all the work of the Second Empire. It must be said that, while the plateau of Merdogne was enclosed, it does not seem to have been inhabited at the end of the Iron Age. The confusion has recently been intensified by the discovery of very dense protohistoric settlement at two nearby oppida (Figure 6.3): Gondole, immediately east of Merdogne plateau, and Corent, a few kilometres south of Gon - dole. While Gondole had a rampart, although not yet necessarily dated with any certainty, Corent did not, at least as far as we know for now, but the two sites were inhabited at the time of the Gallic War, even if Corent lost some of its importance after the conquest (Poux 2011; Poux et al . 2015, 505530). Might not one of these settlements have been the Arvernian capital, rather than the plateau of Merdogne? Very recent excavations, though, have shown beyond doubt that the rampart of Merdogne, dating to the late Hallstatt period, had been substantially remodelled, with a dry-stone rampart erected towards the middle of the 1st century BC, at the time of the Gallic War (Pertlwieser et al . 2010). So what is to be concluded from this? A programme of recent research conducted over more than 20 years around Gondole in particular, but also research into the remains identified by Napolon III as Caesarian military engineering works, has been synthesized recently and I will summarize it here (Deberge et al . 2014; 2018) (Figure 6.4). The existence of the large camp, almost square in shape, has been confirmed by a series of trial excavations on its western and eastern sides, and its north-western and south-eastern corners. Its perimeter takes the form of a V-shaped ditch with a very regular profile that is often extremely eroded. In the south-east corner, the scant material found comprises a few pottery vessels and an iron fibula associated with a skeleton. The iron rim of a shield was recovered from the northern ditch. It seems that all of the finds can be attributed to the middle of the 1st century BC, given the known typologies. The existence of the small camp has also been confirmed by a series of excavations that traced its north-eastern side over some 250 m. The ditch was 3.5 m wide and 1.8 m deep. Unfortunately the small scale of the excavations meant it was impossible to look for a rampart. Various Dressel 1 amphora bodies, two iron catapult bolts, and three granite projectile balls attest to the use of the site by the Roman military (Guichard and Deberge 2006). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 96 The trace of the intermediate fortification has also been verified and established in four places. The single ditch, which is often truncated by erosion, had an asymmetric fill, suggesting a rampart on its southern side. It is not known how this engineering work connected up with the two camps. Various other ditch-type engineering works, unknown to the Second Empire excavations, have recently been unearthed in the lowlands and at the foot of the oppidum . These include a ditch associated with a wooden palisade to the north of the large camp in the ancient lake of Sarlive, which was cultivated land at the time, before the paludization (development of marshy conditions) of the lake, which Figure 6.3 Map of Celtic oppida and Roman siegeworks in the Limagne, Puy-de-Dme (after Poux 2011, 243, courtesy Mathieu Poux). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 97 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War occurred shortly afterwards, in the early Roman period (Trment et al. 2007). This type of arrangement is very much like that discovered in the Roman siegeworks of Alesia at the foot of Mont Ra. Another identical ditch segment over 200 m long has been discovered opposite the oppidum of Gondole. It is irregular in form, even if it is predominantly V-shaped with relatively steep sides and a flat bottom. A final trace of linear engineering work has been identified opposite the exit from the oppidum where it bars access routes to the fortification. Finally, the entire site contains a series of finds of militaria that are entirely consistent in their typology with those from Alesia (Figure 6.5). A scorpio (catapult) tip lodged in the south-western rampart of Merdogne is especially noteworthy. Can it be concluded from this set of old and new evidence that a positive identification has been made? It will be observed first that the archaeological works of the Second Empire have indeed been confirmed. The location of the small camp at La Roche Blanche is an excellent argument for locating the Gauls stronghold at Merdogne rather than Gondole. As for Corent, which was not fortified, it obviously does not count any more than other fanciful sites suggested in recent years. Was Gondole itself even fortified? The question is apparently still under debate, but it is clear that Merdogne offered a far more daunting defensive position, above all because, as said, its rampart had been rebuilt. The position of the large camp on the low-lying land at the centre of the arrangement, between the two high points, and its protection by ditches lined with fences to the north and east are good arguments for seeing this as effective protection against an attack from the rear. This threat, which Figure 6.4 The Roman siegeworks between Gergovia (top left, in blue) and Gondole (on the right, in blue), Puy-de-Dme (courtesy Y. Deberge). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 98 Caesars text accounts for since the Aedui had then gone over to Vercingetorixs side and were attacking Caesar in his back was real enough ( BG 7.3840). As the position of the Gauls was too strong, the Roman troops were forced to lift the siege after several fruitless assaults and to move back north. Although not completely elucidated, much headway has been made with the Gergovia dossier in recent years. The physical identity of the capital of the Arverni and the settlement does, however, remain a problem that has not been definitively solved. It could not have been Merdogne, which may just have been a stronghold brought back into service at the time of the Gallic War, in anticipation of threats to come. M. Poux has argued for a multi-polar Gergovia (Corent + Gondole + Merdogne) around a fertile plain, which is a brilliant and attractive hypothesis, because the locations are so close. But it is a novel and unproven hypothesis to date (Poux 2011). The siege and battle of Alesia Few ancient battlefields are as well documented as Alesia both through Caesars writ -ings ( BG 7.6869) and archaeological excavations. The events occurred at the end of Figure 6.5 Types of weapons discovered around Gergovia (courtesy Y. Deberge). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 99 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War the summer of 52 BC, after those of Gergovia. The account closes Caesars book and is its climax, earning the imperator an unprecedented 20 days of official thanksgiving in Rome as if the conquest were already complete. That at any rate was what the con- queror wanted people to believe, concerned about good propaganda at a time when his political adversaries in Rome were becoming a threat. In point of fact, the fighting was to go on for another two years. The circumstances are common knowledge: having been thwarted at Gergovia, the Roman army moved north and rebuilt its strength around Langres during the summer, before setting off back for southern France. It was a considerable military force of 10 to 12 legions or 40,000 to 60,000 men, allowing for losses in previous engagements. The army of the Gallic coalition, including the Aedui, blocked his path somewhere in the Sane valley. There ensued a first battle between Caesars German cavalry and Vercingetorixs cavalry. At the end of this indecisive fight, Vercingetorix took refuge in the oppidum of the Mandubii at Alesia. For once, Caesar gave a relatively detailed description (Figures 6.6, 6.7) 69: The actual stronghold of Alesia was set atop of a hill, in a very lofty situation, apparently impregnable save by blockade. The bases of the hill were washed on two separate sides by rivers. Before the town a plain extended for a length of about three miles; on all the other sides there were hills surrounding the town at a short distance, and equal to it in height. Under the wall, on the side which looked eastward, the forces of the Gauls had entirely occupied all this intervening space, and had made in front a ditch and a rough wall six feet high. The perimeter of the siege-works which the Romans were beginning had a length of eleven miles. Camps had been pitched at convenient spots, and three- and-twenty forts had been constructed on the line. In these pickets would be posted by day to prevent any sudden sortie; by night the same stations were held by sentries and strong garrisons 72: [Caesar] dug all round [the Gallic stronghold] two trenches, fifteen feet broad and of equal depth; and the inner one, where the ground was level with the plain or sank below it, he filled with water diverted from the river. Behind the trenches he constructed a ramp and palisade twelve feet high; to this he added a breastwork and battlements, with large fraises [stakes] projecting at the junction of screens and ramp, to check the upward advance of the enemy; and all round the works he set turrets at intervals of eighty feet 73: Caesar thought proper to make a further addition to these works, in order that the lines might be defensible by a smaller number of troops. Accordingly, trunks or very stout branches of trees were cut, and the tops thereof barked and sharpened, and continuous trenches five feet deep were dug. Into these the stumps were sunk and fastened at the bottom so that they could not be torn up, while the bough-ends were left projecting. They were in rows of five fastened and entangled together, and anyone who pushed into them must impale himself on the sharpest of stakes. These they called markers. In front of these, in diagonal rows arranged like a figure of five [V], pits three feet deep were dug, sloping inwards slightly to the bottom. In these, tapering stakes as thick as a mans thigh, sharpened at the top and fire-hardened, were sunk so as to project no more than four fingers breadth from the ground; at the same time, to make all strong and firm, the earth was trodden down hard for one foot from the bottom, and the remainder of the pit was covered over with twigs and brushwood to conceal the trap. Eight > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 100 Figure 6.7 Air photograph of Alesia, from the west (courtesy R. Goguey). Figure 6.6 Plan of Alesia, Cte-dOr, from Napolon IIIs Histoire de Jules Csar, pl. 23. > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 101 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War > rows of this kind were dug, three feet apart. From its resemblance to the flower the device was called a lily. In front of all these, logs a foot long, with iron hooks firmly attached, were buried altogether in the ground and scattered at brief intervals all over the field, and these they called spurs. 74: When all these arrangements had been completed Caesar constructed parallel entrenchments of the same kind facing the other way, against the enemy outside, following the most favourable ground that the locality afforded, with a circuit of fourteen > miles. This he did to secure the garrisons of the entrenchments from being surrounded by > a host, however large it might chance to be. Then comes the account of the siege, which breaks down into several episodes and probably lasted several weeks, while a sizeable army of Gauls marched to support Vercingetorix. In a final battle that probably involved the entire theatre of operations and during which the Romans, caught in crossfire, risked annihilation, Caesars army, which was well protected by its defences, won out. The following day Vercingetorix was handed over by his troops and the Gauls surrendered. Despite this account, the site of the siege would probably not have been easy to identify if an old historical tradition had not associated it with Alise-Sainte- Reine, near Montbard, in Burgundy. It should be added that the discovery in 1839 of a large stone inscription in the Gaulish language mentioning the place-name ALISIIA (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XIII, 2880) supported this traditional location. Extensive excavations were therefore undertaken from 1861 to 1865 under the Second Empire and were resumed more recently by a Franco-German team from 19911997 (Redd and von Schnurbein 2001). So what, then, is the current archaeological state of play? First it should be recalled that the Second Empire excavation work proceeded by cutting narrow sections across uneven ground that was strewn with ancient vineyard trenches on the slopes and palaeochannels in the floodplain. Despite inevitable mistakes among these various types of natural and man-made structures and despite hesitations and changes of heart, Napolon IIIs men managed to identify most of the Roman military installations: a number of camps and the two main linear defensive systems set up by the Roman army, and known as the contravallation for the inner line besieging the oppidum and the circumvallation for the outward-facing defensive line designed to hold off the relief army. At the same time, a substantial quantity of finds was unearthed, of which only the coins and weapons were kept in the 19th century. Commendable records (Figure 6.8) were kept at the time, especially plan views and cross-sections (Le Gall 1989; Olivier and Redd 2015). Even so, the classical method of the day was unable to identify small features that were difficult to interpret, especially postholes and traps. It should be added that the terrain has been unevenly eroded since the events of the year 52 BC and the structures have not all been conserved identically everywhere. The ancient soil horizons, in particular, have only been preserved in rare locations, meaning that the shallow traps described by Caesar are not always observable in the field. Lastly, Napolon III himself often imposed his own views and choices, considerably simplifying the complexity of the excavation data in the publication of the finds. > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 102 The recent Franco-German project has identified anew Caesars siegeworks and checked the claims of the Second Empire investigators. Napolon III had identified several camps, located on the hills and in the low-lying areas of the site. Three have been confirmed by the recent excavations: Camps A, B and C. The last two, located facing one another to the north and south of the Roman installations, were also the largest (approximately 7 ha). Their shape followed the contours, which, contrary to what is often believed, was common in Caesarian and Augustan military engineering works. Their siting on hilltops accounts for the form of construction with dry-stone walls of locally extracted material. They are incontrovertibly Roman camps, because of the presence at their gateways of characteristic obstacles the titulum and clavicula 2 and military material found in their ditches. Camp C has, moreover, been identified as that of Labienus, Caesars first lieutenant, because two pieces of slingshot marked with his name were found there (Figure 6.9, 1). Camp A, which was much smaller (2.3 ha), was protected by a sloping earth rampart topped by wooden posts. It has yielded quite rich finds (fibulae, coins, weapons, a ladle, pottery), and in particular a piece of leather tenting. The camps in the floodplain identified by Napolon IIIs excavators cannot be systematically confirmed because of modern development that has destroyed the western part of the site. In other instances, especially at the foot of Mont Ra (Camp D) and in the floodplain of Les Laumes (Camp I), it is clear that Napolon IIIs men came to mistaken conclusions. From this review, it can be concluded that a number of Caesars troop emplacements remain to be discovered, especially on Mont Ra to the north and Pennevelle to the east. Figure 6.8 Excavations at the foot of Mont Ra. The plan records the location of the trenches and the ditch profile, with annotations indicating where finds were made (drawing by P. Millot, March 1863; from the Alesia archive). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 103 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War Figure 6.9 (1) Sling bullet with the name of T.LABI(enus) from Camp C; (2) Lilia with a Roman spearhead at the foot of Mont Ra; (3) Cippi of the circumvallation near Camp C (Franco-German excavations, photos R. Collot and P. Barral). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 104 The forts ( castella ) were not excavated in the recent campaigns. A previously unknown fort was identified at lpineuse crossroads, at the eastern end of the town of Les Laumes. It was located between the two defensive lines and covered a square of about 100 m 100 m, blocking off the dangerous narrow corridor in which the Roman legionaries were massed. Other devices of this type are surely waiting to be discovered. The contravallation has been recognized in various places where Napolon III had identified it (Figures 6.10, 6.11); the circumvallation, however, is more problematic. It was the less complete of the two lines of defence, having been built subsequently as protection from an attack from the rear. Some of the ditches were probably not fully dug, and the system of traps was probably less developed; above all the line cannot be traced with certainty on the slopes of Mont Ra because of the erosion that has affected the Caesarian works on what is sometimes quite a steep slope. This is certainly one of the sectors where future research would be beneficial. The recent excavations have above all shown the extreme variability of the defensive system from one line and one sector to another (Figure 6.12). The topography and the nature of materials available locally dictated the actual form the Caesarian siegeworks took. They were in keeping with a general plan that examination reveals Figure 6.10 German excavations (RGK) in the Plaine des Laumes (after Redd and von Schnurbein 2001, pl. hors texte 11). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 105 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War was not specific to Alesia but was based on familiar practice for the Romans. Numerous applications of it are found over time, in particular at the siege of Numantia against the Celtiberians in 134133 BC. On the limestone plateaux, the construction method used for the defensive lines was identical to that of the camps: slabs known in French as lozes dug locally from the ground were built into a dry-stone wall, some 5.4 m wide; in the floodplain, where clay and turf prevailed, unfired bricks or sods were assembled on the spot, much like breeze blocks, in a manner well-known in the Roman army. The rampart was as thick as that of the defensive lines on the plateau, and, judging from Caesars writings, stood about 3.5 m high, without the breastwork. The wall was flanked by wooden towers, which were clearly observed in the recent excavations, spaced at variable distances apart depending on how much of a threat there was in each sector. The wall was generally protected by two or even three ditches in part of the very exposed floodplain of Les Laumes. The types of obstacle fit Caesars description: metal spikes ( stimuli ), pits ( lilia ) (Figure 6.9, 2), and branches ( cippi ) planted in several rows parallel to the ditches, have all been identified (Figure 6.9, 3). However, the layout of these systems of traps is subject to marked variations according to the extent of the threat locally. Can this divergence with Caesars writings be explained? A detailed description of all the traps put in place by Caesar around Alesia would have taken up a great deal of space in the book with a wealth of unnecessary detail; it would have pointlessly blurred the account for readers who, it should be remembered, had neither maps, nor Figure 6.11 Reconstruction of the contravallation in the Plaine des Laumes (drawing J.-P. and C. Adam). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 106 plans, nor obviously photos! An understanding of events required a description that was not detailed like an archaeology book, but that was generic, so to speak, and in keeping with the historiographical tradition of the time. All told, each of the devices Caesar describes are indeed found in the field at Alesia, and that is the essential point. Their practical implementation was a matter of detail of little interest to readers who would not readily have understood it for want of convenient topographical markers. Studies of the material unearthed both in the 19th century and in the recent excavations have allowed useful comparison with chronologically similar collections. They confirm the material is essentially homogeneous, barring a few obvious exceptions. This provides a valuable reference context for the middle of the 1st century BC. The Franco-German studies of 19911997 have provided a renewed scientific basis for the study of the Caesarian siegeworks at Alesia, that have now been exhaustively published, which was not the case for the Second Empire excavations (Redd and von Schnurbein 2001). Obviously, this does not mean that all questions have been answered: on the contrary, the new research has highlighted the limits of our knowledge, especially when it comes to the sites topography. Uxellodunum The siege of Uxellodunum, the final stronghold of the Gauls, in 50 BC, is narrated by Hirtius, Caesars lieutenant and his literary continuator since he was the one who wrote Figure 6.12 Types of Roman defences at Alesia (after Redd and von Schnurbein 2001, figs 296297). > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 107 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War Figure 6.13 The Roman siegeworks at Uxellodunum, Lot, from Napolon IIIs Histoire de Jules Csar, pl. 30. > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 108 the final book of the Commentaries . It will be recalled that after Alesia, the proconsul had to quell uprisings throughout the country. One of the noteworthy final episodes was among the Cadurci (in the Cahors region): Caesars legates, C. Caninius and C. Fabius, came to grips with the Gallic chieftains Drappes and Lucterios, who had taken refuge in the naturally well-defended oppidum of Uxellodunum. C. Caninius began by setting up three camps on the high land around the site and constructing siegeworks. This is the classic scheme already seen at Alesia. Then Caesar himself came to direct operations that focused on a spring below the Gallic stronghold which was the water supply for the besieged. Caesar decided to cut off access to it (Figure 6.13). He began, just opposite the place, to push up mantlets against the hill and to build a ramp with great effort and continual fighting; for the townsfolk ran down from the higher ground and engaged without risk at long range, wounding many men as they doggedly worked upwards. However, our troops were not to be deterred from thrusting the mantlets forward and from defeating the local difficulties by sheer labour of engineering. At the same time they were pushing forward covered mines from the mantlets to the head of the spring; and this kind of work involved no risk, and could be done without suspicion on the part of the enemy. The ramp was built up to a height of sixty feet, and upon it was set a turret of ten stories, not, indeed, to reach the level of the walls, for no siege-works could effect that, but to overtop the level of the spring. When the artillery from the turret began to discharge missiles upon the line of approach to the spring, and the townsfolk could not get water without danger, not only cattle and beasts of burden, but even the great host of the enemy, were like to die of thirst. Terror-struck by this trouble, the townsfolk filled tubs with grease, pitch, and shingles, and rolled them burning on to the works, at the same time engaging with the utmost ferocity in order that the danger of the fight might prevent the Romans from extinguishing the fire. A mighty flame suddenly shot forth in the midst of the works; for everything that was discharged over the escarpment was held up by the mantlets and the ramp, and set fire to the particular object which checked its course. On the other hand, our soldiers, though handicapped by the dangerous character of the fighting and by the disadvantage of position, none the less endured every difficulty in the most gallant spirit. For the action went on at a considerable height and in sight of our army, and great shouting arose on both sides. So each man, in as conspicuous a fashion as he could the better to make his valour known and approved faced alike the missiles of the enemy and the flames. Seeing not a few of his men wounded, Caesar ordered cohorts to climb the height from every side of the town and under pretence of attacking the walls to raise a shout all round. This action terrified the townsfolk, and in their uncertainty as to what was going on in the other quarters they recalled their men-at-arms from the attempt on the works and set them along the walls. So our men, when the fighting ceased, speedily extinguished or cut away the parts of the works which had caught fire. Although the townsfolk continued to resist stoutly, and stuck to their resolve, even when they had lost a great part of their number through thirst, at last by means of the mines the feeders of the spring were cut off and diverted. This caused the perpetual spring suddenly to dry up And so necessity forced them to surrender (BG 8.4142). The archaeological identification of Uxellodunum was based essentially on the account of this crucial episode. The narration of this stratagem fuelled the military literature of the time. Napolon IIIs excavators haphazardly investigated other sites before finally > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 109 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War Figure 6.14 Arrowheads discovered at Uxellodunum (after Girault 2013). This content downloaded from 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 110 turning to Le Puy dIssolud. Neither the camps nor the siegeworks are known to date. The Second Empire excavations concentrated around the Fontaine de Louli, where the initial digging by J.-B. Cessac in 1865 had revealed a spring, galleries leading to its head, catapult bolts at the foot of the oppidum and layers of burning. After being continued and then resumed in the 1990s by J.-P. Girault the research has recently been published (Girault 2013). The main outcome of these recent campaigns is to accord credence to this 19th-century localization by revealing a whole complex of saps, the plan of which is not always clear, associated with a considerable amount of Roman militaria similar to what has been found at Alesia, primarily arrowheads and catapult bolt heads. We can add helmet parts, spearheads, pila , tools, hobnails, shield rims, coins and ceramics that fit perfectly with the archaeological context of the mid-1st century BC (Figure 6.14). Sapping techniques had been practised for centuries by the time of the events. They are expounded by Aeneas Tacticus in the middle of the 4th century BC in his Art of Siege (Poliorketika 37.12) and then by Philo of Byzantium in his Compendium of Mechanics (Mechanike Syntaxis 5, C 7; Garlan 1974, 307). They applied essentially to attacking ramparts. Specialized sappers ( cunicularii ) featured besides under the command of the praefectus fabrum , the prefect of workmen, if the testimony of Vegetius is to be believed ( de Re Militari 2.10). The finest archaeological example known is provided by the mine dug by the Sassanids under the rampart of Dura-Europos, which Simon James has recently shown to have been the theatre of an underground combat with chemical weapons, after a counter-mine dug by the besieged burst into the gallery (James 2011). These techniques borrowed from miners were not exclusive to Mediterraneans: the Gauls besieged at Avaricum, Caesar tells us ( BG 7.22), toppled the Roman earthworks by mining beneath them. The concentration of missiles over a small surface area of a few hundred square metres is exceptional. It is all the more remarkable as a number of projectiles are lodged in the ground. Conclusion The archaeological record of Caesars time in Gaul is both very scant and very rich. It is scant indeed considering that all those years of conflict have yielded just four sites of battles or sieges that have been truly identified and explored, although so much fighting went on! But it must also be considered, conversely, that without them archaeology would have no material traces of that war, made famous by the account of the great Latin writer who waged it and won it. Had the proconsuls account not been written and preserved, would we be able to identify and understand the sites of the war? First of all, it is far from certain that we would even have looked for them; and we would not necessarily know how to interpret some of the remains that have been brought to light. It is the overlapping of both literary and archaeological sources that has enabled us, at Alesia, to look for what was not known and to interpret it, to relate some of the evidence uncovered > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 111 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War in the field with the text, and in return to understand the literary mechanisms by which the account was drafted and matters were simplified. Obviously, we must allow for the circumstances in which the ancient historians wrote, their motives, their sources, and the discrepancy between their conception of history and our own. In the cases of Alesia and Gergovia, told by the main protagonist, Caesar himself, we cannot ignore the political circumstances of the time: the Roman general was grappling with substantial military difficulties, at a time when a struggle for power was raging in Rome and the account of the Gallic War, told to the Senate and the Roman people, was by no means an academic exercise seeking to be scientifically objective, but a work designed to further Caesars political career and justify his actions. The imperator , as careful studies have shown, made a habit of twisting the truth for his own benefit, although naturally without completely misrepresenting it, so as to hide his failures, ensure his political propaganda, and hone his image for posterity (Rambaud 1953). It should not be forgotten, either, that the idea of objectivity in history is a recent one, and a world away from the practice of the ancients, save a few notable exceptions such as Thucydides and Polybius. Cicero himself explains that history is a rhetorical art, meant to move the reader and depict events as drama ( de Legibus I.2). It is this interplay between the various sciences used in investigating the ancient world that today provides us with fresh and fertile insights into classical sources. Notes 1 For discussion of these sites see the chapters by Hornung, Krausz and Kaenel in this volume. 2 The titulum was a straight-line obstacle (ditch and fence or embankment) in front of a gateway to block it off. Bibliography Deberge, Y., Baucheron, F., Cabezuelo, U., Caillat, P., Gatto, E., Landry, C., Leguet, D., Pasty, J.-F., Pertlweiser, T., Vermeulen, C. and Vernet, G. (2014) Tmoignages de la Guerre des Gaules dans le bassin clermontois, nouveaux apports. Revue archologique du Centre de la France 53, 2014. Available at http://journals.openedition.org/racf/2071 (accessed 15 June 2017). Deberge, Y., Foucras, S., Pasty, J.-F., Hulin, G., Jud, P., Leguet, D., Millet, M. and Simon, F.-X. (2018) Prsence militaires romaines dans le bassin clermontois. In M. Redd (ed.), Larme romaine en gaule lpoque rpublicaine. Nouveaux tmoignages archologiques. 73112. Glux-en-Glenne, Collection Bibracte 28. Garlan, Y. (1974) Recherches de poliorctique grecque. Paris, Bibliothque des coles Franaises dAthnes et de Rome 223. Girault, J.-P. (2013) La fontaine de Louli au Puy dIssolud. Le dossier archologique du sige dUxellodunum. Glux-en-Glenne, Collection Bibracte 23. Guichard, V. and Deberge, Y. (2006) La Roche-Blanche / Gergovie / Gergovia. In M. Redd, R. Brulet, R. Fellmann, J.K. Haalebos and S. von Schnurbein (eds), Larchitecture de la Gaule romaine. Les fortifications militaires , 371373. Paris/Bordeaux, Documents dArchologie Franaise 100/ Ausonius ditions. James, S. (2011) Stratagems, Combat, and Chemical Warfare in the Siege Mines of Dura-Europos. American Journal of Archaeology 1151, 69101. > This content downloaded from > 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC > All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 112 Lambot, B. and Casagrande, P. (1997) Une monnaie dEbusus sur loppidum de Vieux-Lan Saint-Thomas (Aisne). Nouvelles donnes archologiques sur Bibrax et le camp de Mauchamp (Csar B.G. II ). Bulletin de la Socit Archologique Champenoise 902, 1529. Le Gall, J. (1989) Fouilles dAlise-Sainte-Reine 18611865. Paris, Mmoires de lAcadmie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres 9. Napolon III (18651866) Histoire de Jules Csar. Paris, Champion. Olivier, L. and Redd, M. (2015) LAlbum des fouilles dAlise redcouvert dans les archives de la Commission de la Topographie des Gaules. Antiquits nationales 45, 6979. Pertlwieser, T., Deberge, Y. and Ott, I. (2010) Das sdliche Befestigungswerk des Oppidums von Gergovia (Puy-de-Dme). In S. Fichtl (ed.), Murus Celticus: architecture et fonctions des remparts de lge du Fer, 281296 . Glux-en-Glenne, Collection Bibracte 19. Peyre, C. (1979) Le champ de bataille de lAisne ( Csar, B.G. II, 89 ). Revue des tudes Latines 56, 175217. Poux, M. (ed.) (2011) Corent: Voyage au cur dune ville gauloise . Paris, Errance. Poux, M., Demierre, M., Garcia, M. and Laurenson, R. (2015) Le sanctuaire de Corent (Puy-de-Dme, Auvergne): vestiges et rituels. Paris, Gallia supplment 62. Rambaud, M. (1953) Lart de la dformation historique dans les Commentaires de Csar. Paris, Les belles Lettres. Redd, M. (1995) Titulum et clavicula. A propos des fouilles rcentes dAlsia. Revue Archologique de lEst 46, 349356. Redd, M. and von Schnurbein, S. (eds) (2001), Alsia . Fouilles et recherches franco-allemandes sur les travaux militaires romains autour du Mont-Auxois (19911997). Paris, Mmoires de lAcadmie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 22. Trment, F., Rialland, Y., Prat, B., Milcent, P.-Y., Mennessier-Jouannet, C., Marinval, P., Macaire, J. J., Lopez Saez, J.-A., Loison, G., Liabeuf, R., Fournier, G., Fourmont, A., Dousteyssier, B., Cabanis, J M., Brhret, G. and Argant, J. (2007) Un ancien lac au pied de loppidum de Gergovie (Puy-de-Dme): interactions socits-milieux dans le bassin de Sarlive lHolocne. Gallia 64, 289351.

Title: Recent archaeological research on Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

URL Source: file://pdf.cd1384ebdee9ee705ccc89e820262f7a/

Markdown Content:
Chapter Title: Recent archaeological research on Roman military engineering works of the

Gallic War

Chapter Author(s): Michel Redd

Book Title: Julius Caesars Battle for Gaul

Book Subtitle: New Archaeological Perspectives

Book Editor(s): Andrew P. Fitzpatrick and Colin Haselgrove

Published by:

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv13nb9k6.12

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide

range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and

facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Julius Caesars Battle for

Gaul

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

# Chapter 6 Recent archaeological research on Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

# Michel Redd

Caesars account of the Gallic War teems with the names of places and peoples that

are often hard to identify. This is particularly true of battlefields, which the procon -

sul generally describes succinctly. Sometimes just a few words suffice. On the siege of the hillfort of Vellaudunum, which we cannot locate for certain  it was possibly

Nevers  the proconsul writes oppugnare instituit idque biduo circumvallavit (He deter-

mined to assault the place and in two days invested it, BG 7.11). There is nothing more.

But that was enough, because everyone understood what was going on when a Latin

technical term like circumvallavit was used, indicating the building of fortifications to encircle a stronghold. In contrast, no fewer than twenty-one chapters are given over to the episode of Alesia, which is by far the lengthiest in the entire account. But then again it was the final victory that was to ensure Caesar of glory  the duel with

the opponent the imperator had picked out for himself. This difference in treatment

is obviously a bias for the modern historian who does not always have the necessary information to identify any particular one of the numerous sites of battle in this war of conquest.

Another difficulty is that the narrative is extremely succinct and the geographical descriptions are only cursory. This can be explained both by Caesars personal style of writing, his brevitas (concision) and by the fact that ancient military accounts were to be read without any maps or sketches. To weigh them down with detailed descriptions was not only contrary to good literary taste but also contrary to common sense. It was enough to set out the gist of the matter for it to be understood by the reader.

Needless to say, these were all accounts composed after the event by the victor. These preliminary indications explain why it is so difficult for archaeologists to identify the battle sites of the Gallic War. In the 19th century, Napolon III spent substantial sums on this, launching French archaeologys first great programmes

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 92

of works, with undeniable successes and incontrovertible failures (Napolon III 18651866). Today we still take that pioneering research as our starting point, to confirm, clarify and possibly challenge it. Here I shall review recent research on the subject, emphasizing first that the following examples, which number just four in all, are all that we can present with certainty today, apart from the recent discovery of Hermeskeil, in Germany. For example, so major an episode as the siege of Bourges has still not yielded an archaeological context categorically related to Caesars account.

The sites of the battles against the Helvetii in 58 BC or the Germans of Ariovistus that same year remain to be proved. 1

The battle of the Aisne and the camp of Mauchamp

This episode relates to the campaign of the year 57 BC. Caesar was attempting to subdue

the Belgae who, except for his allies the Remi, were leagued against him. The event took place in the Aisne valley, not far from the oppidum of Bibrax, which was under

siege from the coalition of the Belgae. Caesars arrival lifted the siege; there followed

a pitched battle in the valley against the Gallic forces (Figure 6.1):

Figure 6.1 Plan of Mauchamp, Aisne, from Napolon IIIs Histoire de Jules Csar, pl. 7.

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

93 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

> At first Caesar determined, because of the vast numbers of the enemy and their excellent reputation for valour, to avoid an engagement. By cavalry combats, however, he sought daily to prove what the valour of the enemy could do and what our men could dare. Then, perceiving that our men were not inferior, he chose a ground before the camp naturally
> suitable and appropriate for forming line of battle; for the hill where the camp had been
> pitched, standing up but a little from the plain, offered to the front as broad a space as a line deployed could occupy; on either flank it fell away, while in front by a gentle slope it came down gradually to the level of the plain. On either flank of that hill he dug at right angles a protecting trench of about four hundred paces, and at the ends of the trenches he constructed forts and there posted his artillery, so that, when he had formed line, the enemy might not be able, because of their great superiority of numbers, to surround the Romans fighting on the flanks ( BG 2.8).

Caesars position is clear, then: a hill on the northern bank of the Aisne. On the strength of these indications, Napolon III and Stoffel, his aide de camp , had long trenches dug out from the road that crosses the site along the crest. The excavations eventually brought to light a series of ditches forming an almost square complex measuring 658 655 m (about 42 ha), with rounded corners, the north-east side being at an angle. Five gateways, two of which were to the west, provided access. These gateways were

defended by internal claviculae , that is, semi-circular ditches barring the way and forcing any assailant to present his unshielded, right-hand side. Two large ditches some 750 m long ran one from the north-west corner of the camp to a small stream, the Miette, that it virtually joined up with; and the other from the south-east corner towards the river Aisne, so that Mauchamp hill was completely barred off and any outflanking manoeuvre rendered impossible. Some smaller ditches, the layout of which is unclear, cut off crosswise the tip of the northern arm; no equivalent ditches have been found to the south, perhaps having been eroded by a change in the course of the Aisne, but they are dotted on Napolons map. The archaeologists who have worked on the case generally debate three points: the consistency between the published map

and Caesars description; the material character of the remains discovered; and the chronology of the site.

On the first point, it has to be observed that the plan drawn up by Napolon does

bear similarities to the details in de Bello Gallico . Peyre (1979) proved convincingly that each of the topographical indications given by Caesar matches a feature on the

ground; but even if some interpretation or other of the Latin text is challenged, the account and the excavations are strikingly consistent on the main point: the presence of long ditches on either side of the hill (Figure 6.2). True, the Roman redoubts have not been found, but these castella , which were necessarily made of wood, would only have left postholes, and around 1860 it was barely known how to recognize such features. Aerial photographs taken by Bernard Lambot have revealed a clavicula , and recent excavations at Alesia attest that these were already in use in Caesars time (Redd 1995). It therefore seems a sound hypothesis today to attribute the camp at Mauchamp to the battle against the Belgae in the year 57 BC, particularly because the identification of the oppidum of Bibrax with the site of Vieux-Laon, 12 km from

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 94

Mauchamp, has recently been confirmed by the exceptional discovery of a Balearic coin attributed to Caesars slinger auxiliaries (Lambot and Casagrande 1997). It was

not the usual type of coinage in circulation in northern Gaul.

The siege of Gergovia

In 52 BC, the seventh year of the war, Caesar had to face the emergence of a vast coalition led by a young noble of the Arverni, Vercingetorix. After a brilliant start to his campaign, in which he systematically avoided confronting the legions directly, Vercingetorix had to fall back before the end of the summer on Gergovia, the oppidum

of the Arverni, which was threatened by the Roman army. The proconsuls description

of the stronghold is cursory and has fuelled much controversy.

Having reconnoitred the position of the city, which was set upon a very lofty height, with difficult approaches on every side, he despaired of taking it by storm, and he determined not to attempt a blockade until he had secured his corn-supply. Vercingetorix, for his part, had pitched camp near the town, and posted the contingent of each state separately at short

intervals around himself. Every eminence on the ridge from which a birds-eye view was possible

had been seized, and the appearance was formidable  Opposite the town there was a hill at the very foot of the mountain, an exceedingly strong position, precipitous on every side. If our troops secured this they thought they could cut off the enemy at once from a great part of their water-supply and from freedom of foraging. The post was held, however, by the enemy

Figure 6.2 Air photograph of Mauchamp (courtesy Bernard Lambot).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

95 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

> with a garrison, albeit not a very strong one. None the less, Caesar marched out of camp in the silence of night, dislodged the garrison before it could be reinforced from the town, and made himself master of the position. He posted two legions there, and ran a double ditch, twelve feet broad in each case, from the greater to the lesser camp, so that even single soldiers could
> pass to and fro safe from a sudden onset of the enemy ( BG 7.35).

Napolon III and Stoffel proposed to identify the site of Gergovia with the volcanic plateau of Merdogne (70 ha), south of Clermont-Ferrand, and their excavations

revealed a large camp of 35 ha to the east of the oppidum and a small camp of

about 5.5 ha to the south of it, on the hill of La Roche Blanche. Traces of a linear fortification were recognized joining the two. This evidence has, though, long been contested, like all the work of the Second Empire. It must be said that, while the plateau of Merdogne was enclosed, it does not seem to have been inhabited at the end of the Iron Age. The confusion has recently been intensified by the discovery

of very dense protohistoric settlement at two nearby oppida (Figure 6.3): Gondole, immediately east of Merdogne plateau, and Corent, a few kilometres south of Gon -

dole. While Gondole had a rampart, although not yet necessarily dated with any certainty, Corent did not, at least as far as we know for now, but the two sites were inhabited at the time of the Gallic War, even if Corent lost some of its importance after the conquest (Poux 2011; Poux et al . 2015, 505530). Might not one of these settlements have been the Arvernian capital, rather than the plateau of Merdogne? Very recent excavations, though, have shown beyond doubt that the rampart of Merdogne, dating to the late Hallstatt period, had been substantially remodelled, with a dry-stone rampart erected towards the middle of the 1st century BC, at the

time of the Gallic War (Pertlwieser et al . 2010). So what is to be concluded from

this? A programme of recent research conducted over more than 20 years around Gondole in particular, but also research into the remains identified by Napolon III as Caesarian military engineering works, has been synthesized recently and I will summarize it here (Deberge et al . 2014; 2018) (Figure 6.4).

The existence of the large camp, almost square in shape, has been confirmed by a series of trial excavations on its western and eastern sides, and its north-western

and south-eastern corners. Its perimeter takes the form of a V-shaped ditch with

a very regular profile that is often extremely eroded. In the south-east corner, the scant material found comprises a few pottery vessels and an iron fibula associated

with a skeleton. The iron rim of a shield was recovered from the northern ditch. It

seems that all of the finds can be attributed to the middle of the 1st century BC,

given the known typologies.

The existence of the small camp has also been confirmed by a series of excavations

that traced its north-eastern side over some 250 m. The ditch was 3.5 m wide

and 1.8 m deep. Unfortunately the small scale of the excavations meant it was impossible to look for a rampart. Various Dressel 1 amphora bodies, two iron catapult bolts, and three granite projectile balls attest to the use of the site by the Roman military (Guichard and Deberge 2006).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 96

The trace of the intermediate fortification has also been verified and established in four places. The single ditch, which is often truncated by erosion, had an asymmetric fill, suggesting a rampart on its southern side. It is not known how

this engineering work connected up with the two camps.

Various other ditch-type engineering works, unknown to the Second Empire excavations, have recently been unearthed in the lowlands and at the foot of the

oppidum . These include a ditch associated with a wooden palisade to the north of

the large camp in the ancient lake of Sarlive, which was cultivated land at the time, before the paludization (development of marshy conditions) of the lake, which

Figure 6.3 Map of Celtic oppida and Roman siegeworks in the Limagne, Puy-de-Dme (after Poux 2011, 243, courtesy Mathieu Poux).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

97 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

occurred shortly afterwards, in the early Roman period (Trment et al. 2007). This type of arrangement is very much like that discovered in the Roman siegeworks of

Alesia at the foot of Mont Ra. Another identical ditch segment over 200 m long

has been discovered opposite the oppidum of Gondole. It is irregular in form, even if it is predominantly V-shaped with relatively steep sides and a flat bottom. A final trace of linear engineering work has been identified opposite the exit from the oppidum where it bars access routes to the fortification. Finally, the entire site contains a series of finds of militaria that are entirely consistent in their typology with those from Alesia (Figure 6.5). A scorpio (catapult) tip lodged in the south-western rampart of Merdogne is especially noteworthy. Can it be concluded from this set of old and new evidence that a positive

identification has been made? It will be observed first that the archaeological works of the Second Empire have indeed been confirmed. The location of the small camp at La Roche Blanche is an excellent argument for locating the Gauls stronghold at Merdogne rather than Gondole. As for Corent, which was not fortified, it obviously

does not count any more than other fanciful sites suggested in recent years. Was

Gondole itself even fortified? The question is apparently still under debate, but it is clear that Merdogne offered a far more daunting defensive position, above all because, as said, its rampart had been rebuilt. The position of the large camp on the low-lying land at the centre of the arrangement, between the two high points, and its

protection by ditches lined with fences to the north and east are good arguments for

seeing this as effective protection against an attack from the rear. This threat, which

Figure 6.4 The Roman siegeworks between Gergovia (top left, in blue) and Gondole (on the right, in blue), Puy-de-Dme (courtesy Y. Deberge).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 98

Caesars text accounts for since the Aedui had then gone over to Vercingetorixs side

and were attacking Caesar in his back was real enough ( BG 7.3840). As the position of the Gauls was too strong, the Roman troops were forced to lift the siege after several

fruitless assaults and to move back north.

Although not completely elucidated, much headway has been made with the

Gergovia dossier in recent years. The physical identity of the capital of the Arverni

and the settlement does, however, remain a problem that has not been definitively solved. It could not have been Merdogne, which may just have been a stronghold brought back into service at the time of the Gallic War, in anticipation of threats to come. M. Poux has argued for a multi-polar Gergovia (Corent + Gondole +

Merdogne) around a fertile plain, which is a brilliant and attractive hypothesis,

because the locations are so close. But it is a novel and unproven hypothesis to

date (Poux 2011).

The siege and battle of Alesia

Few ancient battlefields are as well documented as Alesia both through Caesars writ -ings ( BG 7.6869) and archaeological excavations. The events occurred at the end of

Figure 6.5 Types of weapons discovered around Gergovia (courtesy Y. Deberge).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

99 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

the summer of 52 BC, after those of Gergovia. The account closes Caesars book and is its climax, earning the imperator an unprecedented 20 days of official thanksgiving in

Rome as if the conquest were already complete. That at any rate was what the con-

queror wanted people to believe, concerned about good propaganda at a time when his political adversaries in Rome were becoming a threat. In point of fact, the fighting

was to go on for another two years.

The circumstances are common knowledge: having been thwarted at Gergovia, the Roman army moved north and rebuilt its strength around Langres during the summer, before setting off back for southern France. It was a considerable military force of 10 to 12 legions or 40,000 to 60,000 men, allowing for losses in previous engagements. The army of the Gallic coalition, including the Aedui, blocked his path somewhere in the Sane valley. There ensued a first battle between Caesars German cavalry and Vercingetorixs cavalry. At the end of this indecisive fight, Vercingetorix took refuge

in the oppidum of the Mandubii at Alesia. For once, Caesar gave a relatively detailed description (Figures 6.6, 6.7) 69: The actual stronghold of Alesia was set atop of a hill, in a very lofty situation, apparently

impregnable save by blockade. The bases of the hill were washed on two separate sides

by rivers. Before the town a plain extended for a length of about three miles; on all the other sides there were hills surrounding the town at a short distance, and equal to it in height. Under the wall, on the side which looked eastward, the forces of the Gauls had entirely occupied all this intervening space, and had made in front a ditch and a rough wall six feet high. The perimeter of the siege-works which the Romans were beginning had a length of eleven miles. Camps had been pitched at convenient spots, and three-

and-twenty forts had been constructed on the line. In these pickets would be posted by day to prevent any sudden sortie; by night the same stations were held by sentries and

strong garrisons 72: [Caesar] dug all round [the Gallic stronghold] two trenches, fifteen feet broad and of equal depth; and the inner one, where the ground was level with the plain or sank below it, he filled

with water diverted from the river. Behind the trenches he constructed a ramp and palisade

twelve feet high; to this he added a breastwork and battlements, with large fraises [stakes] projecting at the junction of screens and ramp, to check the upward advance of the enemy; and all round the works he set turrets at intervals of eighty feet 73: Caesar thought proper to make a further addition to these works, in order that the lines might be defensible by a smaller number of troops. Accordingly, trunks or very stout branches of trees were cut, and the tops thereof barked and sharpened, and continuous trenches five feet deep were dug. Into these the stumps were sunk and fastened at the bottom so that they could not be torn up, while the bough-ends were left projecting. They were in rows of five fastened and entangled together, and anyone who pushed into them must impale himself on the sharpest of stakes. These they called markers. In front of these, in diagonal rows arranged like a figure of five [V], pits three feet deep were dug, sloping inwards slightly to the bottom. In these, tapering stakes as thick as a mans thigh, sharpened at the top and fire-hardened, were sunk so as to project no more than four fingers breadth from the ground; at the same time, to make all strong and firm, the earth was trodden down hard for one foot from the bottom, and the

remainder of the pit was covered over with twigs and brushwood to conceal the trap. Eight

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 100

Figure 6.7 Air photograph of Alesia, from the west (courtesy R. Goguey).

Figure 6.6 Plan of Alesia, Cte-dOr, from Napolon IIIs Histoire de Jules Csar, pl. 23.

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

101 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

> rows of this kind were dug, three feet apart. From its resemblance to the flower the device was called a lily. In front of all these, logs a foot long, with iron hooks firmly attached, were buried altogether in the ground and scattered at brief intervals all over the field, and these they called spurs. 74: When all these arrangements had been completed Caesar constructed parallel entrenchments of the same kind facing the other way, against the enemy outside, following the most favourable ground that the locality afforded, with a circuit of fourteen
> miles. This he did to secure the garrisons of the entrenchments from being surrounded by
> a host, however large it might chance to be.

Then comes the account of the siege, which breaks down into several episodes and probably lasted several weeks, while a sizeable army of Gauls marched to support Vercingetorix. In a final battle that probably involved the entire theatre of operations and during which the Romans, caught in crossfire, risked annihilation, Caesars army, which was well protected by its defences, won out. The following day Vercingetorix

was handed over by his troops and the Gauls surrendered.

Despite this account, the site of the siege would probably not have been easy

to identify if an old historical tradition had not associated it with Alise-Sainte-

Reine, near Montbard, in Burgundy. It should be added that the discovery in 1839

of a large stone inscription in the Gaulish language mentioning the place-name

ALISIIA (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XIII, 2880) supported this traditional location. Extensive excavations were therefore undertaken from 1861 to 1865 under the Second Empire and were resumed more recently by a Franco-German team from 19911997 (Redd and von Schnurbein 2001). So what, then, is the current archaeological state of play? First it should be recalled that the Second Empire excavation work proceeded

by cutting narrow sections across uneven ground that was strewn with ancient

vineyard trenches on the slopes and palaeochannels in the floodplain. Despite

inevitable mistakes among these various types of natural and man-made structures

and despite hesitations and changes of heart, Napolon IIIs men managed to identify most of the Roman military installations: a number of camps and the two main linear defensive systems set up by the Roman army, and known as the contravallation for

the inner line besieging the oppidum and the circumvallation for the outward-facing

defensive line designed to hold off the relief army. At the same time, a substantial quantity of finds was unearthed, of which only the coins and weapons were kept in the 19th century. Commendable records (Figure 6.8) were kept at the time, especially plan views and cross-sections (Le Gall 1989; Olivier and Redd 2015). Even so, the classical method of the day was unable to identify small features that were difficult to interpret, especially postholes and traps. It should be added that the terrain has

been unevenly eroded since the events of the year 52 BC and the structures have not

all been conserved identically everywhere. The ancient soil horizons, in particular, have only been preserved in rare locations, meaning that the shallow traps described by Caesar are not always observable in the field. Lastly, Napolon III himself often imposed his own views and choices, considerably simplifying the complexity of the excavation data in the publication of the finds.

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 102

The recent Franco-German project has identified anew Caesars siegeworks and checked the claims of the Second Empire investigators. Napolon III had identified several camps, located on the hills and in the low-lying areas of the site. Three have been confirmed by the recent excavations: Camps A, B and C. The last two, located facing one another to the north and south of the Roman installations, were also the largest (approximately 7 ha). Their shape followed the contours, which, contrary to what is often believed, was common in Caesarian and Augustan military engineering

works. Their siting on hilltops accounts for the form of construction with dry-stone

walls of locally extracted material. They are incontrovertibly Roman camps, because of the presence at their gateways of characteristic obstacles  the titulum and clavicula 2

and military material found in their ditches. Camp C has, moreover, been identified as that of Labienus, Caesars first lieutenant, because two pieces of slingshot marked with his name were found there (Figure 6.9, 1). Camp A, which was much smaller (2.3 ha), was protected by a sloping earth rampart topped by wooden posts. It has yielded quite rich finds (fibulae, coins, weapons, a ladle, pottery), and in particular a piece of leather tenting. The camps in the floodplain identified by Napolon IIIs excavators cannot be systematically confirmed because of modern development that has destroyed the western part of the site. In other instances, especially at the foot of Mont Ra (Camp D) and in the floodplain of Les Laumes (Camp I), it is clear that Napolon IIIs men came to mistaken conclusions. From this review, it can be concluded that a number of Caesars troop emplacements remain to be discovered, especially on Mont Ra to the north and Pennevelle to the east.

Figure 6.8 Excavations at the foot of Mont Ra. The plan records the location of the trenches and the

ditch profile, with annotations indicating where finds were made (drawing by P. Millot, March 1863;

from the Alesia archive).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

103 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

Figure 6.9 (1) Sling bullet with the name of T.LABI(enus) from Camp C; (2) Lilia with a Roman spearhead

at the foot of Mont Ra; (3) Cippi of the circumvallation near Camp C (Franco-German excavations, photos R. Collot and P. Barral).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 104 The forts ( castella ) were not excavated in the recent campaigns. A previously unknown fort was identified at lpineuse crossroads, at the eastern end of the town of Les Laumes. It was located between the two defensive lines and covered a square of about 100 m  100 m, blocking off the dangerous narrow corridor in which the Roman legionaries were massed. Other devices of this type are surely waiting to be discovered. The contravallation has been recognized in various places where Napolon III had identified it (Figures 6.10, 6.11); the circumvallation, however, is more problematic. It was the less complete of the two lines of defence, having been built subsequently

as protection from an attack from the rear. Some of the ditches were probably not

fully dug, and the system of traps was probably less developed; above all the line cannot be traced with certainty on the slopes of Mont Ra because of the erosion that has affected the Caesarian works on what is sometimes quite a steep slope. This is certainly one of the sectors where future research would be beneficial. The recent excavations have above all shown the extreme variability of the defensive system from one line and one sector to another (Figure 6.12). The topography

and the nature of materials available locally dictated the actual form the Caesarian

siegeworks took. They were in keeping with a general plan that examination reveals

Figure 6.10 German excavations (RGK) in the Plaine des Laumes (after Redd and von Schnurbein 2001, pl. hors texte 11).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

105 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

was not specific to Alesia but was based on familiar practice for the Romans. Numerous

applications of it are found over time, in particular at the siege of Numantia against the Celtiberians in 134133 BC. On the limestone plateaux, the construction method used for the defensive lines was identical to that of the camps: slabs known in French as lozes dug locally from the

ground were built into a dry-stone wall, some 5.4 m wide; in the floodplain, where clay and turf prevailed, unfired bricks or sods were assembled on the spot, much like breeze blocks, in a manner well-known in the Roman army. The rampart was as thick as that of the defensive lines on the plateau, and, judging from Caesars writings, stood about 3.5 m high, without the breastwork. The wall was flanked by wooden towers, which were clearly observed in the recent excavations, spaced at variable distances apart depending on how much of a threat

there was in each sector. The wall was generally protected by two or even three ditches

in part of the very exposed floodplain of Les Laumes. The types of obstacle fit Caesars description: metal spikes ( stimuli ), pits ( lilia ) (Figure 6.9, 2), and branches ( cippi ) planted

in several rows parallel to the ditches, have all been identified (Figure 6.9, 3). However,

the layout of these systems of traps is subject to marked variations according to the

extent of the threat locally. Can this divergence with Caesars writings be explained? A detailed description of

all the traps put in place by Caesar around Alesia would have taken up a great deal of space in the book with a wealth of unnecessary detail; it would have pointlessly

blurred the account for readers who, it should be remembered, had neither maps, nor

Figure 6.11 Reconstruction of the contravallation in the Plaine des Laumes (drawing J.-P. and C. Adam).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 106

plans, nor obviously photos! An understanding of events required a description that was not detailed like an archaeology book, but that was generic, so to speak, and in keeping with the historiographical tradition of the time. All told, each of the devices Caesar describes are indeed found in the field at Alesia, and that is the essential point.

Their practical implementation was a matter of detail of little interest to readers who would not readily have understood it for want of convenient topographical markers. Studies of the material unearthed both in the 19th century and in the recent

excavations have allowed useful comparison with chronologically similar collections. They confirm the material is essentially homogeneous, barring a few obvious exceptions. This provides a valuable reference context for the middle of the 1st century BC. The Franco-German studies of 19911997 have provided a renewed scientific basis for the study of the Caesarian siegeworks at Alesia, that have now been exhaustively published, which was not the case for the Second Empire excavations (Redd and von Schnurbein 2001). Obviously, this does not mean that all questions have been answered: on the contrary, the new research has highlighted the limits of our knowledge, especially when it comes to the sites topography.

Uxellodunum

The siege of Uxellodunum, the final stronghold of the Gauls, in 50 BC, is narrated by Hirtius, Caesars lieutenant and his literary continuator since he was the one who wrote

Figure 6.12 Types of Roman defences at Alesia (after Redd and von Schnurbein 2001, figs 296297).

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

107 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

Figure 6.13 The Roman siegeworks at Uxellodunum, Lot, from Napolon IIIs Histoire de Jules

Csar, pl. 30.

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 108

the final book of the Commentaries . It will be recalled that after Alesia, the proconsul had to quell uprisings throughout the country. One of the noteworthy final episodes was among the Cadurci (in the Cahors region): Caesars legates, C. Caninius and C. Fabius, came to grips with the Gallic chieftains Drappes and Lucterios, who had taken refuge in

the naturally well-defended oppidum of Uxellodunum. C. Caninius began by setting up

three camps on the high land around the site and constructing siegeworks. This is the classic scheme already seen at Alesia. Then Caesar himself came to direct operations that focused on a spring below the Gallic stronghold which was the water supply for

the besieged. Caesar decided to cut off access to it (Figure 6.13). He began, just opposite the place, to push up mantlets against the hill and to build a ramp with great effort and continual fighting; for the townsfolk ran down from the higher ground and engaged without risk at long range, wounding many men as they doggedly worked upwards. However, our troops were not to be deterred from thrusting the mantlets forward and from defeating the local difficulties by sheer labour of engineering. At the same time

they were pushing forward covered mines from the mantlets to the head of the spring; and

this kind of work involved no risk, and could be done without suspicion on the part of the enemy. The ramp was built up to a height of sixty feet, and upon it was set a turret of ten stories, not, indeed, to reach the level of the walls, for no siege-works could effect that, but

to overtop the level of the spring. When the artillery from the turret began to discharge

missiles upon the line of approach to the spring, and the townsfolk could not get water without danger, not only cattle and beasts of burden, but even the great host of the enemy, were like to die of thirst. Terror-struck by this trouble, the townsfolk filled tubs with grease, pitch, and shingles, and rolled them burning on to the works, at the same time engaging with the utmost ferocity in order that the danger of the fight might prevent the Romans from extinguishing the fire. A mighty flame suddenly shot forth in the midst of the works;

for everything that was discharged over the escarpment was held up by the mantlets and

the ramp, and set fire to the particular object which checked its course. On the other hand, our soldiers, though handicapped by the dangerous character of the fighting and by the disadvantage of position, none the less endured every difficulty in the most gallant spirit. For the action went on at a considerable height and in sight of our army, and great shouting arose on both sides. So each man, in as conspicuous a fashion as he could  the better to make his valour known and approved  faced alike the missiles of the enemy and the flames. Seeing not a few of his men wounded, Caesar ordered cohorts to climb the height from

every side of the town and under pretence of attacking the walls to raise a shout all round.

This action terrified the townsfolk, and in their uncertainty as to what was going on in

the other quarters they recalled their men-at-arms from the attempt on the works and

set them along the walls. So our men, when the fighting ceased, speedily extinguished or cut away the parts of the works which had caught fire. Although the townsfolk continued to resist stoutly, and stuck to their resolve, even when they had lost a great part of their number through thirst, at last by means of the mines the feeders of the spring were cut off and diverted. This caused the perpetual spring suddenly to dry up And so necessity forced

them to surrender (BG 8.4142). The archaeological identification of Uxellodunum was based essentially on the account

of this crucial episode. The narration of this stratagem fuelled the military literature of

the time. Napolon IIIs excavators haphazardly investigated other sites before finally

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

109 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

Figure 6.14 Arrowheads discovered at Uxellodunum (after Girault 2013).

This content downloaded from

71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Michel Redd 110

turning to Le Puy dIssolud. Neither the camps nor the siegeworks are known to date. The Second Empire excavations concentrated around the Fontaine de Louli, where the initial digging by J.-B. Cessac in 1865 had revealed a spring, galleries leading to its head, catapult bolts at the foot of the oppidum and layers of burning. After being continued and then resumed in the 1990s by J.-P. Girault the research has recently been published (Girault 2013). The main outcome of these recent campaigns is to accord credence to this

19th-century localization by revealing a whole complex of saps, the plan of which is not always clear, associated with a considerable amount of Roman militaria similar to what has been found at Alesia, primarily arrowheads and catapult bolt heads. We can add helmet parts, spearheads, pila , tools, hobnails, shield rims, coins and ceramics that fit perfectly with the archaeological context of the mid-1st century BC (Figure 6.14).

Sapping techniques had been practised for centuries by the time of the events.

They are expounded by Aeneas Tacticus in the middle of the 4th century BC in his

Art of Siege (Poliorketika 37.12) and then by Philo of Byzantium in his Compendium of Mechanics (Mechanike Syntaxis 5, C 7; Garlan 1974, 307). They applied essentially to attacking ramparts. Specialized sappers ( cunicularii ) featured besides under the command of the praefectus fabrum , the prefect of workmen, if the testimony of

Vegetius is to be believed ( de Re Militari 2.10). The finest archaeological example known is provided by the mine dug by the Sassanids under the rampart of Dura-Europos,

which Simon James has recently shown to have been the theatre of an underground

combat with chemical weapons, after a counter-mine dug by the besieged burst into the gallery (James 2011). These techniques borrowed from miners were not exclusive to Mediterraneans: the Gauls besieged at Avaricum, Caesar tells us ( BG 7.22), toppled

the Roman earthworks by mining beneath them. The concentration of missiles over

a small surface area of a few hundred square metres is exceptional. It is all the more

remarkable as a number of projectiles are lodged in the ground.

Conclusion

The archaeological record of Caesars time in Gaul is both very scant and very rich.

It is scant indeed considering that all those years of conflict have yielded just four sites of battles or sieges that have been truly identified and explored, although so much fighting went on! But it must also be considered, conversely, that without them archaeology would have no material traces of that war, made famous by the account of the great Latin writer who waged it and won it. Had the proconsuls account not been written and preserved, would we be able to identify and understand the sites of the war? First of all, it is far from certain that

we would even have looked for them; and we would not necessarily know how to interpret some of the remains that have been brought to light. It is the overlapping

of both literary and archaeological sources that has enabled us, at Alesia, to look for what was not known and to interpret it, to relate some of the evidence uncovered

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

111 6. Roman military engineering works of the Gallic War

in the field with the text, and in return to understand the literary mechanisms by which the account was drafted and matters were simplified. Obviously, we must allow for the circumstances in which the ancient historians wrote, their motives, their sources, and the discrepancy between their conception of history and our own. In the cases of Alesia and Gergovia, told by the main protagonist, Caesar himself, we cannot ignore the political circumstances of the time: the Roman general was grappling with substantial military difficulties, at a time when a struggle for power was raging in Rome and the account of the Gallic War, told to the Senate and the Roman people, was by no means an academic exercise seeking to be scientifically objective, but a work designed to further Caesars political career and justify his actions.

The imperator , as careful studies have shown, made a habit of twisting the truth for his own benefit, although naturally without completely misrepresenting it, so as to hide his failures, ensure his political propaganda, and hone his image for posterity (Rambaud 1953). It should not be forgotten, either, that the idea of objectivity in history is a recent one, and a world away from the practice of the ancients, save a few notable exceptions such as Thucydides and Polybius. Cicero himself explains that history is a rhetorical art, meant to move the reader and depict events as drama ( de Legibus

I.2). It is this interplay between the various sciences used in investigating the ancient world that today provides us with fresh and fertile insights into classical sources.

Notes

1 For discussion of these sites see the chapters by Hornung, Krausz and Kaenel in this volume.

2 The titulum was a straight-line obstacle (ditch and fence or embankment) in front of a gateway

to block it off.

Bibliography

Deberge, Y., Baucheron, F., Cabezuelo, U., Caillat, P., Gatto, E., Landry, C., Leguet, D., Pasty, J.-F., Pertlweiser, T., Vermeulen, C. and Vernet, G. (2014) Tmoignages de la Guerre des Gaules dans le bassin clermontois, nouveaux apports. Revue archologique du Centre de la France 53, 2014. Available at http://journals.openedition.org/racf/2071 (accessed 15 June 2017). Deberge, Y., Foucras, S., Pasty, J.-F., Hulin, G., Jud, P., Leguet, D., Millet, M. and Simon, F.-X. (2018) Prsence militaires romaines dans le bassin clermontois. In M. Redd (ed.), Larme romaine en gaule  lpoque rpublicaine. Nouveaux tmoignages archologiques. 73112. Glux-en-Glenne,

Collection Bibracte 28.

Garlan, Y. (1974) Recherches de poliorctique grecque. Paris, Bibliothque des coles Franaises

dAthnes et de Rome 223.

Girault, J.-P. (2013) La fontaine de Louli au Puy dIssolud. Le dossier archologique du sige dUxellodunum.

Glux-en-Glenne, Collection Bibracte 23. Guichard, V. and Deberge, Y. (2006) La Roche-Blanche / Gergovie / Gergovia. In M. Redd, R. Brulet, R. Fellmann, J.K. Haalebos and S. von Schnurbein (eds), Larchitecture de la Gaule romaine. Les

fortifications militaires , 371373. Paris/Bordeaux, Documents dArchologie Franaise 100/ Ausonius ditions. James, S. (2011) Stratagems, Combat, and Chemical Warfare in the Siege Mines of Dura-Europos.

American Journal of Archaeology 1151, 69101.

> This content downloaded from
> 71.95.191.4 on Fri, 14 Feb 2025 07:46:23 UTC
> All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Michel Redd 112

Lambot, B. and Casagrande, P. (1997) Une monnaie dEbusus sur loppidum de  Vieux-Lan   Saint-Thomas (Aisne). Nouvelles donnes archologiques sur Bibrax et le camp de Mauchamp

(Csar B.G. II ). Bulletin de la Socit Archologique Champenoise 902, 1529. Le Gall, J. (1989) Fouilles dAlise-Sainte-Reine 18611865. Paris, Mmoires de lAcadmie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres 9. Napolon III (18651866) Histoire de Jules Csar. Paris, Champion. Olivier, L. and Redd, M. (2015) LAlbum des fouilles dAlise redcouvert dans les archives de la

Commission de la Topographie des Gaules. Antiquits nationales 45, 6979. Pertlwieser, T., Deberge, Y. and Ott, I. (2010) Das sdliche Befestigungswerk des Oppidums von Gergovia (Puy-de-Dme). In S. Fichtl (ed.), Murus Celticus: architecture et fonctions des remparts de lge du Fer, 281296 . Glux-en-Glenne, Collection Bibracte 19. Peyre, C. (1979) Le champ de bataille de lAisne ( Csar, B.G. II, 89 ). Revue des tudes Latines 56, 175217. Poux, M. (ed.) (2011) Corent: Voyage au cur dune ville gauloise . Paris, Errance. Poux, M., Demierre, M., Garcia, M. and Laurenson, R. (2015) Le sanctuaire de Corent (Puy-de-Dme, Auvergne): vestiges et rituels. Paris, Gallia supplment 62. Rambaud, M. (1953) Lart de la dformation historique dans les Commentaires de Csar. Paris, Les belles Lettres. Redd, M. (1995) Titulum et clavicula. A propos des fouilles rcentes dAlsia. Revue Archologique de lEst 46, 349356. Redd, M. and von Schnurbein, S. (eds) (2001), Alsia . Fouilles et recherches franco-allemandes sur les

travaux militaires romains autour du Mont-Auxois (19911997). Paris, Mmoires de lAcadmie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 22. Trment, F., Rialland, Y., Prat, B., Milcent, P.-Y., Mennessier-Jouannet, C., Marinval, P., Macaire, J. J., Lopez Saez, J.-A., Loison, G., Liabeuf, R., Fournier, G., Fourmont, A., Dousteyssier, B., Cabanis, J M., Brhret, G. and Argant, J. (2007) Un ancien lac au pied de loppidum de Gergovie (Puy-de-Dme): interactions socits-milieux dans le bassin de Sarlive  lHolocne. Gallia 64, 289351.

Transcript for:Roman Military Engineering in Gallic War

Transcript for:
Roman Military Engineering in Gallic War