Transcript for:
Aristotle's Insights on Moral Virtue

Book two starts by narrowing down the focus from virtue, which is a very broad term, especially when used by Socrates or Plato, and means everything from wisdom to justice, truth, honor, goodness. Anyways, Aristotle here wants to talk specifically about moral virtue. Aristotle states that moral virtue is not something that's inherent in the nature of humans, but rather that nature bestows us with certain capacities. that are actualized by our habits. Aristotle is taking the middle path on the question of nature versus nurture. He's saying that nature bestows us with a certain range of possibilities and that nurture our life experiences then determine exactly where we fall in that range. In this way, somebody becomes just by performing just actions, brave by performing brave actions, and so on and so forth. Furthermore, the virtues that are linked with these actions aren't acquired before or after somebody acts. Rather, the virtue is acquired during the action itself. Now, he's not saying that a single act of bravery makes someone a brave person. What he means is that our habits determine our character, and that it's therefore very important to keep an eye on one's habits. Next, Aristotle shifts gears to talk about how one should act in order to build good habits, and out of good habits, good character. He notes once again that any answers we get from this are bound to be very general, because we're working from general premises. Also remember that Aristotle is assuming our agreement to first principles. The fact that things like virtue, justice, bravery, and the like are good, while their opposites are bad. Next, Aristotle clarifies that just looking at a man's actions isn't really enough to tell you about his character. After all, no one... calls a man brave if he only faces danger with great pain and reluctance. In order to truly gauge somebody, you have to look at the pleasure or pain that goes along with their actions. Aristotle says that virtues are inherently tied to feelings, and feelings are in turn tied to pleasure and pain. Virtue, then, lies in responding to pleasure and pain in an appropriate way. This also means that a man who flees from danger is not necessarily a coward. provided that the danger he flees from is sufficient to provoke that response. Next, Aristotle sets a concrete definition of what virtue is. He says that they are necessarily states of the soul, meaning that they are either emotions, capacities, or dispositions. Now, emotions don't carry with them any moral judgment. An angry man isn't considered bad, so long as his anger is justified. Capacities, too, don't deal in morals. No man is said to be bad. because he's capable of extreme anger. Dispositions, though, can and do carry moral weight. Someone with a disposition towards anger, who becomes angry at the slightest provocation, could and would be considered bad, or at least his disposition would be considered bad. This isn't enough detail, though. I mean, obviously some dispositions are good and some dispositions are bad, and how are we to delineate between them? Aristotle's claim is that any kind of excellence, both renders its subject good in and of itself, and causes it to function well. So then in relation to virtues, an excellent disposition would be one that both makes someone good, and causes him to perform his function, living, well. And how is one to accomplish this? By aiming for the mean. That is to say, by aiming for a state in between excess and deficiency, which we would call in this case vices. For instance, if someone is confronted with some kind of danger. To have excessive fear, or deficient bravery, would be the mark of a coward, a vice. But conversely, to ignore the danger entirely, experiencing less fear than is appropriate, or too much bravery, would be the mark of a rash person, another vice. Courage, Aristotle says, is found in feeling an appropriate amount of fear and bravery, and that average place lies somewhere between rashness and cowardice. Note that Aristotle isn't claiming here that courage lies directly in between cowardice and rashness, but rather he's saying that it depends on the situation. There really isn't any hard and fast rule, but rather morality exists on a sliding scale, so to speak. And Aristotle doesn't apply this logic to every trait or disposition. Things like malice, shamelessness, and jealousy are given as emotions that are by definition evil. And he doesn't say this, but I think it would be fair to assume that the same thing applies to other traits that are strictly defined as good, like benevolence, for instance. Also on Aristotle's list of always bad things are certain actions, like adultery, theft, and murder. The specific reasons vary. Some things are always bad because their very definitions imply excess or deficiency. such as shamelessness, some because they require the breaking of contracts, promises, or laws, such as murder, theft, and adultery. In these cases, there's simply no mean to observe. The acts themselves carry a moral judgment. So virtues exist in a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. Now Aristotle recognizes the difficulty here in identifying a proper mean. Because like I said, it isn't necessarily smack dab in the middle between the two vices. So at the end of book two, he gives three pieces of advice. He says to stay away from the extreme that more opposes the mean. For instance, temperance is found between overindulgence and underindulgence. But overindulgence is a more serious offense, hence we should steer away from it. He says to recognize your own personal tendencies, and steer away from those errors you most naturally drift towards. So if you tend to be more cowardly than rash, focus on avoiding cowardice. And if you tend to be more rash than cowardly, focus on avoiding rashness. And finally he says to be wary of things that bring or take away pleasure. Because when pleasure's on the line, we don't tend to think straight, and we have to try all the harder to remain in control.