section seven the phenomenological method of investigation in provisionally characterizing the object which serves as the theme of our investigation the being of entities or the meaning of being in general it seems that we have also delineated the method to be employed the task of ontology is to explain being itself and to make the being of entities stand out in full relief and the method of ontology remains questionable in the highest degree as long as we merely consult those ontologies which have come down to us historically or other essays of that character since the term ontology is used in this investigation in a sense which is formally broad any attempt to clarify the method of ontology by tracing its history is automatically ruled out when moreover we use the term ontology we're not talking about some definite philosophical discipline standing in interconnection with the others here one does not have to measure up to the tasks of some discipline that has been presented beforehand on the contrary only in terms of the objective necessities of definite questions and the kind of treatment which the things themselves require can one develop such a discipline with a question of the meaning of being our investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy this is one that must be treated phenomenologically thus our treatise does not subscribe to a standpoint or represent any special direction for phenomenology is nothing of either sort nor can it become so as long as it understands itself the expression phenomenology signifies primarily a methodological conception this expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject matter but rather the how of that research the more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves and the father it is removed from what we call technical devices though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines thus the term phenomenology expresses a maxim which can be formulated as to the things themselves it is opposed to all free floating constructions and accidental findings it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as problems often for generations at a time yet this maxim one may rejoin is abundantly self-evident and it expresses moreover the underlying principle of any scientific knowledge whatsoever why should anything so self-evident be taken up explicitly in giving a title to a branch of research in point of fact the issue here is a kind of self-evidence which we should like to bring closer to us so far as it is important to do so in casting light upon the procedure of our treatise we shall expound only the preliminary conception faber cliff of phenomenology this expression has two components phenomenon and logos both of these go back to terms from the greek phenomenon and logos taken superficially the term phenomenology is formed like theology biology sociology names which may be translated as science of god science of life science of society this would make phenomenology the science of phenomena we shall set forth the preliminary conception of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the terms two components phenomenon and logos and by establishing the meaning of the name in which these are put together the history of the word itself which presumably arose in the wolfian school is here of no significance a the concept of phenomenon the greek expression phenomenon to which the term phenomenon goes back is derived from the verb finestai which signifies to show itself thus phenomenon means that which shows itself the manifest thus the psychedelic itself is a middle voiced form which comes from fino to bring to the light of day to put in the light fino comes from the stem far like force the light that which is bright in other words that wherein something can become manifest visible in itself thus means keep in mind that the expression phenomenon signifies that which shows itself in itself the manifest accordingly the phenomena or phenomena are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light what the greeks sometimes identified simply with the word entities now an entity can show itself from itself from in many ways depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not when it shows itself in this way it looks like something or other zits this kind of showing itself is what we call seeming shinen thus in greek two the expression phenomenon phenomenon signifies that which looks like something that which is semblant semblance thus shine phenomenon means something good which looks like but in actuality is not what it gives itself out to be if we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of phenomenon phenomenon as that which shows itself and what is designated in the second phenomenon as semblance are structurally interconnected only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself that is of being a phenomenon can it show itself as something which it is not only then can it merely look like so and so when phenomenon signifies semblance the primordial signification the phenomenon as the manifest is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded we shall allot the term phenomenon to this positive and primordial signification of phenomenon and distinguish phenomenon from semblance which is the privative modification of phenomenon as thus defined but what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what is called an appearance or still lesser mere appearance this is what one is talking about when one speaks of the symptoms of a disease kang keith's er shinungan here one has in mind certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which in showing themselves as thus showing themselves indicate indeed something which does not show itself the emergence of of such occurrences they're showing themselves goes together with the being present at hand of disturbances which do not show themselves thus appearance as the appearance of something does not mean showing itself it means rather the announcing itself by fun something which does not show itself but which announces itself through something which does show itself appearing is a not showing itself but the not we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative not which we used in defining the structure of semblance what appears does not show itself and anything which thus fails to show itself is also something which can never seem all indications presentations symptoms and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing even though they differ among themselves in spite of the fact that appearing is never a showing itself in the sense of phenomenon appearing is possible only by reason of a showing itself of something but this showing itself which helps to make possible the appearing is not the appearing itself appearing is an announcing itself thus melden through something that shows itself if one then says that with the word appearance we allude to something wherein something appears without being itself an appearance one has not thereby defined the concept of phenomenon one has rather pre-supposed it this presupposition however remains concealed but when one says this sort of thing about appearance the expression appear gets used in two ways that wherein something appears means that wherein something announces itself and therefore does not show itself and in the words without being itself an appearance appearance signifies the showing itself but this showing itself belongs essentially to the wherein in which something announces itself according to this phenomena are never appearances though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena if one defines phenomenon with the aid of a conception of appearance which is still unclear then everything is stood on its head and a critique of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking so again the expression appearance itself can have a double signification first appearing in the sense of announcing itself as not showing itself and next that which does the announcing thus melding that which in its showing itself indicates something which does not show itself and finally one can use appearing as a term for the genuine sense of phenomenon as showing itself if one designates these three different things as appearance bewilderment is unavoidable but this bewilderment is essentially increased by the fact that appearance can take on still another signification that which does the announcing that which in its showing itself indicates something non-manifest may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest and which emanates australt from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest when that which does the announcing is taken this way appearance is tantamount to a bringing forth or something brought forth but something which does not make up the real being of what brings it forth here we have an appearance in the sense of mere appearance that which does the announcing and is brought forth does of course show itself and in such a way that as an emanation of what it announces it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself on the other hand this not showing which veils is not a semblance [ __ ] uses the term appearance in this two-fold way according to him appearances are in the first place the objects of empirical intuition they are what shows itself in such intuition but what thus shows itself the phenomenon in the genuine primordial sense is at the same time an appearance as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance an emanation which announces insofar as a phenomenon is constitutive for appearance in the signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself though such a phenomenon can privatively take the variant form of semblance appearance two can become mere semblance in a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the being present at hand of a fever which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism phenomenon the showing itself in itself signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered appearance on the other hand means a a reference relationship which is an entity itself and which is such that what does the referring or the announcing can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a phenomenon both appearance and semblance are founded upon the phenomenon though in different ways the bewildering multiplicity of phenomena designated by the words phenomenon semblance appearance mere appearance cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself if in taking the concept of phenomenon this way we leave indefinite which entities we consider as phenomena and leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its being then we have merely arrived at the formal conception of phenomenon if by that which shows itself we understand those entities which are accessible through the empirical intuition in let us say [ __ ] sense then the formal conception of phenomenon will indeed be legitimately employed in this usage phenomenon has the signification of the ordinary conception of phenomenon but this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception if we keep within the horizon of the kantian problematic we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a phenomenon with reservations as to other differences we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the phenomenon as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case can even though it thus shows itself unthematically be brought thematically to show itself and what thus shows itself in itself the forms of the intuition will be the phenomena of phenomenology for manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way they must be able to become phenomena if [ __ ] is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori inside which of an ordering if however the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is to be understood at all regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of phenomenon and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification but before setting up our preliminary conception of phenomenology we must also define the signification of logos word discourse so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a science of phenomena at all be the concept of the logos in plato and aristotle the concept of the logos word discourse has many competing significations with no basic positively taking the lead in fact however this is only a semblance which will maintain itself as long as our interpretation is unable to grasp the basic signification properly in its primary content if we say that the basic signification of logos is discourse then this word for word translation will not be validated until we have determined what is meant by discourse itself the real signification of discourse which is obvious enough gets constantly covered up by the later history of the word logos and especially by the numerous and arbitrary interpretations which subsequent philosophy has provided logos gets translated and this means that it is always getting interpreted as reason judgment concept definition ground or relationship but how can discourse be so susceptible to modification that logos can signify all the things we have listed and in good scholarly usage even if logos is understood in the sense of assertion but of assertion as judgment this seemingly legitimate translation may still miss the fundamental signification especially if judgment is conceived in a sense taken over from some contemporary theory of judgment logos does not mean judgment and it certainly does not mean this primarily if one understands by judgment a way of binding something with something else or the taking of a stand whether by acceptance or by rejection logos as discourse means rather the same as de lune to show to make clear to make manifest what one is talking about in one's discourse aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as apophenesta the logos lets something be seen finestai namely what the discourse is about and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking the medium or for persons who are talking with one another as the case may be discourse lets something be seen apple from that is it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about in discourse apophasis so far as it is genuine what is said thus is drawn from what the talk is about so that discursive communication in what it says in iran makes manifest what it is talking about and thus makes this accessible to the other party this is the structure of the logos as a francis discourse as making clear this mode of making manifest in the sense of letting something be seen by pointing it out does not go with all kinds of discourse requesting eugene for instance also makes manifest but in a different way when fully concrete discoursing letting something be seen has the character of speaking vocal proclamation in words the logos is phoney voice utterance and indeed fone metaphantasias an utterance in which something is cited in each case and only because the function of the logos as apophagis discourse is making clear lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out can the logos have the structural form of synthesis synthesis here synthesis does not mean a binding and linking together of representations a manipulation of psychical occurrences where the problem arises of how these bindings as something inside agree with something physical outside here the sun has a purely epiphanical signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness by someone with something letting it be seen as something furthermore because the logos is a letting something be seen it can therefore be true or false but here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of agreement this idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of aletheia truth the being true of the logos as a lithuanian speak the truth means that in ligane as apophynesthai talking is making clear the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness one must let them be seen as something unhidden alethes that is they must be discovered similarly being false su destai amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up fedex putting something in front of something in such a way as to let it be seen and thereby passing it off as something which it is not but because truth has this meaning and because the logos is a definite mode of letting something be seen the logos is just not the kind of thing that can be considered as the primary locus of truth if as has become quite customary nowadays one defines truth as something that really pertains to judgment and if one then invokes the support of aristotle with this thesis not only is this unjustified but above all the greek conception of truth has been misunderstood isis perception the sheer sensory perception of something is true in the greek sense and indeed more primordially than the logos which we have been discussing just as seeing aims at colors isis aims at its idia things which are peculiar to it those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it and to that extent this perception is always true this means that seeing always discovers colors and hearing always discovers sounds pure noin perceiving is the perception of the simplest determinant ways of being which entities as such may possess and it perceives them just by looking at them this no ain't perceiving is what is true in the purest and most primordial sense that is to say it merely discovers and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up this perceiving can never cover up it can never be false it can at worst remain a non-perceiving agnoin not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access when something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen but is always harking back to something else to which it points so that it lets something be seen as something it does requires a synthesis structure and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up the truth of judgments however is merely the opposite of this covering up a secondary phenomenon of truth with more than one kind of foundation both realism and idealism have with equal thoroughness missed the meaning of the greek conception of truth in terms of which only the possibility of something like a doctrine of ideas can be understood as philosophical knowledge and because the function of the logos lies in merely letting something be seen in letting entities be perceived in for and because moreover logos is used not only with the signification of legend showing but also with that of lagominon that which is exhibited as such and because the latter is nothing else than the huppo came in on that which is exhibited what is underlying which as present at hand already lies at the bottom some grunder of any procedure of addressing oneself to it or discussing it logos que le gominon that which is exhibited means the ground the ratio and finally because logos that which is exhibited can also signify that which as something to which one addresses oneself becomes visible in its relation to something in its relatedness logos acquires the signification of relation and relationship this interpretation of epiphanical discourse may suffice to clarify the primary function of the logos c the preliminary conception of phenomenology when we envisage concretely what we have set forth in our interpretation of phenomenon and logos we're struck by an inner relationship between the things meant by these terms the expression phenomenology may be formulated in greek as legend phenomena showing the phenomena where legend means a profane esta showing means making clear thus making clear the phenomena select that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself this is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself phenomenology but here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above to the things themselves thus the term phenomenology is quite different in its meaning from expressions such as theology and the like those terms designate the objects of their respective sciences according to the subject matter which they comprise at the time in iraq phenomenology neither designates the object of its researches nor characterizes the subject matter thus comprised the word merely informs us of the how with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled to have a science of phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly the expression descriptive phenomenology which is at bottom total logical has the same meaning here description does not signify such a procedure as we find let us say in botanical morphology the term has rather the sense of a prohibition the avoidance of characterizing anything without such demonstration the character of this description itself the specific meaning of the logos can be established first of all in terms of the thinghood height of what is to be described that is to say of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it phenomenally the signification of phenomenon as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself may be called phenomenology with formal justification now what must be taken into account if the formal conception of phenomenon is to be deformalized into the phenomenological one and how is this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception what is it that phenomenology is to let us see what is it that must be called a phenomenon in a distinctive sense what is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly manifestly it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all it is something that lies hidden in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense or which relapses and gets covered up again or which shows itself only in disguise is not just this entity or that but rather the being of entities as our previous observations have shown this being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning thus that which demands that it become a phenomenon and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its own most content as a thing is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision only as phenomenology is ontology possible in the phenomenological conception of phenomenon what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the being of entities its meaning its modifications and derivatives and this showing itself is not just any showing itself nor is it some such thing as appearing least of all can the being of entities ever be anything such that behind it stands something else which does not appear behind the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else on the other hand what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden and just because the phenomena approximately and for the most part not given there is need for phenomenology covered upness is the counter concept to phenomenon there are various ways in which phenomena can be covered up in the first place a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it is still quite undiscovered it is neither known nor unknown moreover a phenomenon can be buried over this means that it has at some point been discovered but has deteriorated for feel to the point of getting covered up again this covering up can become complete or rather and as a rule what has been discovered earlier may still be visible though only as assemblance yet so much semblance so much being is covering up as a disguising is both the most frequent and the most dangerous for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn within a system perhaps those structures of being and their concepts which are still available but veiled in their indigenous character may claim their rights for when they have been bound together constructively in the system they present themselves as something clear requiring no further justification and thus can serve as the point of departure for a process of deduction the covering up itself whether in the sense of hiddenness burying over or disguise has in turn two possibilities there are coverings up which are accidental there are also some which are necessary grounded in what the thing discovered consists in art this interdectin whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion it gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on losing its indigenous character and becoming a free-floating thesis even in the concrete work of phenomenology itself their lurks the possibility that what has been primordially within our grasp may become hardened so that we can no longer grasp it and the difficulty of this kind of research lies in making it self-critical in a positive sense the way in which being at its structures are encountered in the modern phenomenon is one which must first of all be rested from the objects of phenomenology thus the very point of departure austral for our analysis requires that it be secured by the proper method just as much as does our access to the phenomenon or our passage gang through whatever is prevalently covering it up the idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is original and intuitive and intuitive is directly opposed to the naivete of a haphazard immediate and unreflective beholding now that we have delimited our preliminary conception of phenomenology the terms phenomenal and phenomenological can also be fixed in their signification that which is given and explicable in the way the phenomenon is encountered is called phenomenal this is what we have in mind when we talk about phenomenal structures everything which belongs to the species of exhibiting and explicating and which goes to make up the way of conceiving demanded by this research is called phenomenological because phenomena as understood phenomenologically are never anything but what goes to make up being while being is in every case the being of some entity we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that being should be laid bare and we must do this in the right way these entities must likewise show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them and in this way the ordinary conception of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant if our analysis is to be authentic its aim is such that the prior task of assuring ourselves phenomenologically of that entity which is to serve as our example has already been prescribed as our point of departure regards to its subject matter phenomenology is the science of the being of entities ontology in explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontological optically distinctive design in order to confront the cardinal problem the question of the meaning of being in general our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation the logos of the phenomenology of diazine has the character of a hermeneugen to interpret through which the authentic meaning of being and also those basic structures of being which designed itself possesses are made known to darzine's understanding of being the phenomenology of darzyne is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word where it designates this business of interpreting but to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of being and the basic structures of design in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of design this hermeneutic also becomes a hermeneutic in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends and finally to the extent that design as an entity with the possibility of existence has ontological priority over every other entity hermeneutic as an interpretation of darzan's being has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence and this is the sense which is philosophically primary then so far as this hermeneutic works out darzein's historicality onto logically as the ontological condition for the possibility of historiology it contains the roots of what can be called hermeneutic only in a derivative sense the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character being as the basic theme of philosophy is no class or genus of entities yet it pertains to every entity its universality is to be sought higher up being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess being is the transcendence pure and simple and the transcendence of darzan's being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation every disclosure of being as the transcendence is transcendental knowledge phenomenological truth the discloseness of being is veritas transcendentalis ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others these terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of darzan which as an analytic of existence has made fast the guiding line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns the following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by edmund hussall with whose logistics phenomenology first emerged our comments on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical movement higher than actuality stands possibility we can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility with regard to the awkwardness and inelegance of expression in the analyses to come we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities but another to grasp entities in their being for the latter task we lack not only most of the words but above all the grammar if we may allude to some earlier researchers on the analysis of being incomparable on their own level we may compare the ontological sections of plato's parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of aristotle's metaphysics with a narrative section from two cities we can then see the altogether unprecedented character of those formulations which were imposed upon the greeks by their philosophers and where our powers are essentially weaker and where moreover the area of being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which was presented to the greeks the harshness of our expression will be enhanced and so will the minuteness of detail with which our concepts are formed formed formed formed formed section 8 design of the treatise the question of the meaning of being is the most universal and the emptiest of questions but at the same time it is possible to individualize it very precisely for any particular design if we are to arrive at the basic concept of being and to outline the ontological conceptions which it requires and the variations which it necessarily undergoes we need a clue which is concrete we shall proceed towards the concept of being by way of an interpretation of a certain special entity design in which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of being and for the possibility of interpreting it the universality of the concept of being is not belied by the relatively special character of our investigation but this very entity design is in itself historical so that its own most ontological elucidation necessarily becomes an historiological interpretation accordingly our treatment of the question of being branches out into two distinct tasks and our treatise will thus have two parts part one the interpretation of design in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being part two basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology with the problematic of temporality as our clue part one has three divisions one the preparatory fundamental analysis of design to design and temporality three time and being part two likewise has three divisions one kant's doctrine of schematism and time as a preliminary stage in the problematic of temporality two the ontological foundation of descartes cogito sum and how the medieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the res cogitans three aristotle's essay on time as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology part one the interpretation of design in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being division one preparatory fundamental analysis of design in the question about the meaning of being what is primarily interrogated is those entities which have the character of design the preparatory existential analytic of darzan must in accordance with its peculiar character he expounded in outline and distinguished from other kinds of investigation which seemed to run parallel adhering to the procedure which we have fixed upon for starting our investigation we must lay bear a fundamental structure in design being in the world in the interpretation of design this structure is something a priori it is not pieced together but is primordially and constantly a whole it affords us however various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it the whole of this structure always comes first but if we keep this constantly in view these items as phenomena will be made to stand out and thus we shall have as objects for analysis the world in its world hood being in the world as being with and being oneself and being in as such by analysis of this fundamental structure the being of darzen can be indicated provisionally its existential meaning is care chapter one exposition of the task of a preparatory analysis of darzyne section nine the theme of the analytic of diazine we are ourselves the entities to be analyzed the being of any such entity is in each case mine these entities in their being comport themselves towards their being as entities with such being they are delivered over to their own being being is that which is an issue for every such entity this way of characterizing darzan has a double consequence the essence vasen of this entity lies in its to be susan it's being what it is thus ein essentia must so far as we can speak of it at all be conceived in terms of its being existential but here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the being of this entity as existence existence this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term existentia ontologically existential is tantamount to being present at hand a kind of being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of darzan's character to avoid getting bewildered we shall always use the interpretative expression presence at hand for the term existentia while the term existence as a designation of being will be allotted solely to design the essence of design lies in its existence accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not properties present at hand of some entity which looks so and so and is itself present at hand they are in each case possible ways for it to be and no more than that all the being as it is zorzine which this entity possesses is primarily being so when we designate this entity with the term design we're expressing not it's what as if it were a table house or tree but it's being to that being which is an issue for this entity in its very being is in each case mine thus design is never to be taken onto logically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present at hand to entities such as these their being is a matter of indifference or more precisely they are such that their being can be neither a matter of indifference to them nor the opposite because design has in each case mainness kite one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it i am you are furthermore in each case darzan is mine to be in one way or another darzan has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine ye minus that entity which in its being has this very being as an issue comports itself towards its being as its own most possibility in each case design is its possibility and it has this possibility but not just as a property eigen chapter as something present at hand would and because darzan is in each case essentially its own possibility it can in its very being choose itself and win itself it can also lose itself and never win itself or only seem to do so but only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic that is something of its own can it have lost itself and not yet won itself as modes of being authenticity and in authenticity these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense are both grounded in the fact that any design whatsoever is characterized by mindness but the in authenticity of design does not signify any less being or any lower degree of being rather is it the case that even in its fullest concretion darzine can be characterized by inauthenticity when busy when excited when interested when ready for enjoyment the two characteristics of diazine which we have sketched the priority of existentia over essentia and the fact that darzein is in each case have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we're facing a peculiar phenomenal domain darzine does not have the kind of being which belongs to something merely present at hand within the world nor does it ever have it so neither is it to be presented thematically as something we come across in the same way as we come across what is present at hand the right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its being no matter how provisional our analysis may be it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly in determining itself as an entity design always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which in its very being it somehow understands this is the formal meaning of darzan's existential constitution but this tells us that if we are to interpret this entity ontologically the problematic of its being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence this cannot mean however that design is to be construed in terms of some concrete possible idea of existence at the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that design should not be interpreted with the differentiated character difference of some definite way of existing but that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has approximately and for the most part this undifferentiated character of darzan's everydayness is not nothing but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity out of this kind of being and back into it again is all existing such as it is we call this everyday undifferentiated character of design averageness and because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity it has again and again been passed over in explicating design that which is optically closest and well known is ontologically the farthest and not known at all and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked when augustine asks what is closer to me than myself and must answer without doubt i labor here and labor within myself i have become a land of trouble to myself and excess sweat this applies not only to the optical and pre-ontological opaqueness of design but even more to the ontological task which lies ahead but not only must this entity not be missed in that kind of being in which it is phenomenally closest but it must be made accessible by a positive characterization darzine's average everydayness however is not to be taken as a mere aspect here to and even in the mode of inauthenticity the structure of existentiality lies a priori and here too darzein's being is an issue for it in a definite way and darzyne comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof but the explication of design in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness anything which taken often is in an average way can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics the stimulant of an authentic being of design all explicator to which the analytic of design gives rise are obtained by considering designs existence structure because darzan's characters of being are defined in terms of existentiality we call them existentialia these are to be sharply distinguished from what we call categories characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of design here we are taking the expression category in its primary ontological signification and abiding by it in the ontology of the ancients the entities we encounter within the world are taken as the basic examples for the interpretation of being no aim perceive or the logos as the case may be is accepted as a way of access to them entities are encountered therein but the being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of lagane letting something be seen so that this being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is and as that which it is already in every entity in any discussion of entities we have previously addressed ourselves to being this addressing is categorist i assigning categories this signifies in the first instance making a public accusation taking someone to task for something in the presence of everyone when used ontologically this term means taking an entity to task as it were for whatever it is as an entity that is to say letting everyone see it in its being the category i categories are what is cited and what is visible in such a seeing they include the various ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in a logos may be determined a priori existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of being the entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively any entity is either a who existence or a what presence at hand in the broadest sense the connection between these two modes of the characters of being cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of being has been clarified in our introduction we've already intimated that in the existential analytic of design we also make headway with the task which is hardly less pressing than that of the question of being itself the task of laying bare that a priori basis which must be visible before the question of what man is can be discussed philosophically the existential analytic of design comes before any psychology or anthropology and certainly before any biology while these two are ways in which diazine can be investigated we can define the theme of our analytic with greater precision if we distinguish it from these and at the same time the necessity of that analytic can thus be proved more incisively proved more incisively proved more incisive section 10 how the analytic of design is to be distinguished from anthropology psychology and biology after a theme for investigation has been initially outlined in positive terms it is always important to show what is to be ruled out although it can easily become fruitless to discuss what is not going to happen we must show that those investigations and formulations of the question which have been aimed at design heretofore have missed the real philosophical problem notwithstanding their objective fertility and that as long as they persist in missing it they have no right to claim that they can accomplish that for which they are basically striving in distinguishing the existential analytic from anthropology psychology and biology we shall confine ourselves to what is in principle the ontological question our distinctions will necessarily be inadequate from the standpoint of scientific theory simply because the scientific structure of the about mentioned disciplines not indeed the scientific attitude of those who work to advance them is today thoroughly questionable and needs to be attacked in new ways which must have their source in ontological problematics historiologically the aim of the existential analytic can be made plainer by considering descartes who is credited with providing the point of departure for modern philosophical inquiry by his discovery of the cogito sum he investigates the kojitari of the ego at least within certain limits on the other hand he leaves the sum completely undiscussed even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito our analytic raises the ontological question of the being of the sum not until the nature of this being has been determined can we grasp the kind of being which belongs to cogitationis at the same time it is of course misleading to exemplify the aim of our analytic history logically in this way one of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an i or subject as that which is proximally given we shall completely miss the phenomenal content the stunt of darzein ontologically every idea of a subject unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character still posits the subjectum who pokemon on what is underlying along with it no matter how vigorous ones optical protestations against the soul substance or the raiification of consciousness the thing hood itself which such rafication implies must have its ontological origin demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively when we think of the unreified being of the subject the soul the consciousness the spirit the person all these terms refer to definite phenomenal domains which can be given form but they are never used without a notable failure to see the need for inquiring about the being of the entities thus designated so we are not being terminologically arbitrary when we avoid these terms or such expressions as life and man in designating those entities which we are ourselves on the other hand if we understand it rightly in any serious and scientifically minded philosophy of life this expression says about as much as the botany of plants there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of designs being what is conspicuous in such a philosophy and here it is defective in principle is that here life itself as a kind of being does not become ontologically a problem the researchers of wilhelm dilfy were stimulated by the perennial question of life starting from life itself as a whole he tried to understand its experiences in their structural and developmental interconnections his geistus this enchantment is one which no longer seeks to be oriented towards psychical elements and atoms or to piece the life of the soul together but aims rather at gestalt and life as a whole its philosophical relevance however is not to be sought here but rather in the fact that in all this he was above all on his way towards the question of life to be sure we can also see here very plainly how limited were both his problematic and the set of concepts with which it had to be put into words these limitations however are found not only in delphi and bergson but in all the personality movements to which they have given direction and in every tendency towards a philosophical anthropology the phenomenological interpretation of personality is in principle more radical and more transparent but the question of the being of darzan has a dimension which this too fails to enter no matter how much hussell and shayla may differ in their respective inquiries in their methods of conducting them and in their orientations towards the world as a whole they are fully in agreement on the negative side of their interpretations of personality the question of personal being itself is one which they no longer raise we have chosen shayla's interpretation as an example not only because it is accessible in print but because he emphasizes personal being explicitly as such and tries to determine its character by defining the specific being of acts as contrasted with anything psychical for shayla the person is never to be thought of as a thing or a substance the person is rather the unity of living through aliens which is immediately experienced in and with our experiences not a thing merely thought of behind and outside what is immediately experienced the person is no thing like and substantial being nor can the being of a person be entirely absorbed in being a subject of rational acts which follow certain laws the person is not a thing not a substance not an object here sheila is emphasizing what hussell suggests when he insists that the unity of the person must have a constitution essentially different from that required for the unity of things of nature what shayla says of the person he applies to acts as well but an act is never also an object for it is essential to the being of acts that they are experienced only in their performance itself and given in reflection acts are something non-psychical essentially the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts and is therefore essentially not an object any psychical objectification of acts and hence any way of taking them as something psychical is tantamount to depersonalization a person is in any case given as a performer of intentional acts which are bound together by the unity of a meaning thus psychical being has nothing to do with personal being acts get performed the person is a performer of acts what however is the ontological meaning of performance how is the kind of being which belongs to a person to be ascertained onto logically in a positive way but the critical question cannot stop here it must face the being of the whole man who is customarily taken as a unity of body soul and spirit in their turn body soul and spirit may designate phenomenal domains which can be detached as themes for definite investigations within certain limits their ontological indefiniteness may not be important when however we come to the question of man's being this is not something we can simply compute by adding together those kinds of being which body soul and spirit respectively possess kinds of being whose nature has not as yet been determined and even if we should attempt such an ontological procedure some idea of the being of the whole must be presupposed but what stands in the way of the basic question of designs being or leads it off the track is an orientation thoroughly colored by the anthropology of christianity and the ancient world whose inadequate ontological foundations have been overlooked both by the philosophy of life and by personalism there are two important elements in this traditional anthropology one man is here defined as a zoan logon echo and this is interpreted to mean animal rationale something living which has reason but the kind of being which belongs to a zone something living is understood in the sense of occurring and being present at hand the logos here reason is some superior endowment the kind of being which belongs to it however remains quite as obscure as that of the entire entity thus compounded the second clue for determining the nature of man's being and essence is a theological one god said let us make man in our own image and likeness genesis with this as its point of departure the anthropology of christian theology taking with it the ancient definition arrives at an interpretation of that entity which we call man but just as the being of god gets interpreted onto logically by means of the ancient ontology so does the being of the enz finitum and to an even greater extent in modern times the christian definition has been deprived of its theological character but the idea of transcendence that man is something that reaches beyond himself is rooted in christian dogmatics which can hardly be said to have made an ontological problem of man's being the idea of transcendence according to which man is more than a mere something endowed with intelligence has worked itself out with different variations the following quotations will illustrate how these have originated man's first condition was excellent because of these outstanding endowments that reason intelligence prudence judgment crucifies not only the government of this earthly life but but that by them he might ascend beyond even unto god and to eternal felicity calvin the two sources which are relevant for the traditional anthropology the greek definition and the clue which theology has provided indicate that over and about the attempt to determine the essence of man as an entity the question of his being has remained forgotten and that this being is rather conceived as something obvious or self-evident in the sense of the being present at hand of other created things these two clues become intertwined in the anthropology of modern times where the raised cognitions consciousness and the interconnectedness of experience serve as the point of departure for methodical study but since even the cogitationists are either left ontologically undetermined or get tacitly assumed as something self-evidently given whose being is not to be questioned the decisive ontological foundations of anthropological problematics remain undetermined this is no less true of psychology whose anthropological tendencies are today unmistakable nor can we compensate for the absence of ontological foundations by taking anthropology and psychology and building them into the framework of a general biology in the order which any possible comprehension and interpretation must follow biology as a science of life is founded upon the ontology of design even if not entirely life in its own right is a kind of being but essentially it is accessible only in design the ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative interpretation it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere aliveness life is not a mere being present at hand nor is it design in turn design is never to be defined onto logically by regarding it as life in an ontologically indefinite manner plus something else in suggesting that anthropology psychology and biology all failed to give an unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question about the kind of being which belongs to those entities which we ourselves are we are not passing judgment on the positive work of these disciplines we must always bear in mind however that these ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material but that they are always there already even when that empirical material simply gets collected if positive research fails to see these foundations and holds them to be self-evident this by no means proves that they are not basic or that they are not problematic in a more radical sense than any thesis of positive science can ever be ever be ever be section 11 the existential analytic and the interpretation of primitive design the difficulties of achieving a natural conception of the world the interpretation of design in its everydayness however is not identical with the describing of some primitive stage of design with which we can become acquainted empirically through the medium of anthropology everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness but is rather a mode of designs being even when that design is active in a highly developed and differentiated culture and precisely then moreover even primitive design has possibilities of a being which is not of the everyday kind and it has a specific everydayness of its own to orient the analysis of design towards the life of primitive peoples can have positive significance but oitung as a method because primitive phenomena are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of the design in question primitive design often speaks to us more directly in terms of a primordial absorption in phenomena taken in a pre phenomenological sense a way of conceiving things which seems perhaps rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint can be positively helpful in bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a genuine way but heretofore our information about primitives has been provided by ethnology and ethnology operates with definite preliminary conceptions and interpretations human design in general even in first receiving its material and insifting it and working it up whether the everyday psychology or even the scientific psychology and sociology which the ethnologist brings with him can provide any scientific assurance that we can have proper access to the phenomena we are studying and can interpret them and transmit them in the right way has not yet been established here too we are confronted with the same state of affairs as in the other disciplines we have discussed ethnology itself already presupposes as its clue an inadequate analytic of design but since the positive sciences neither can nor should wait for the ontological labors of philosophy to be done the further course of research will not take the form of an advance but will be accomplished by recapitulating what has already been optically discovered and by purifying it in a way which is ontologically more transparent no matter how easy it may be to show how ontological problematics differ formally from article research there are still difficulties in carrying out an existential analytic especially in making a start this task includes a designer item which philosophy has long found disturbing but has continually refused to achieve to work out the idea of a natural conception of the world the rich store of information now available as to the most exotic and manifold cultures and forms of design seems favorable to our setting about this task in a fruitful way but this is merely a semblance at bottom this plethora of information can seduce us into failing to recognize the real problem we shall not get a genuine knowledge of essences simply by the syncretistic activity of universal comparison and classification subjecting the manifold to tabulation does not ensure any actual understanding of what lies there before us as thus set in order if an ordering principle is genuine it has its own content as a thing which is never to be found by means of such ordering but is already presupposed in it so if one is to put various pictures of the world in order one must have an explicit idea of the world as such and if the world itself is something constitutive for design one must have an insight into darzin's basic structures in order to treat the world phenomenon conceptually in this chapter we have characterized some things positively and taken a negative stand with regard to others in both cases our goal has been to promote a correct understanding of the tendency which underlies the following interpretation and the kind of questions which it poses ontology can contribute only indirectly towards advancing the positive disciplines as we find them today it has a goal of its own even if beyond the acquiring of information about entities the question of being is the spur for all scientific seeking scientific seeking