Well, Israel just attacked Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Obviously, that is going to drive a news cycle. However, we need to put this particular attack in context, because it is unprecedented. I do not mean that in the sense that no country has ever attacked another would-be nuclear power before. That has happened a bunch. Rather, the timing of this is incredible. It is very late in the game, and we do not have a great comparison for what the short run effects here will be. Let’s back up a second. The basic premise of Israel’s attack is straightforward. If Iran were to ever acquire a nuclear weapon, it would tilt the balance of power in the region toward Tehran’s direction. That would allow Iran to take actions that Israel, Saudi Arabia, or the United States would otherwise militarily block. You know the idea with the lines on maps, or in this case more of a lines along an amorphous policy space. The white line represents what is currently the balance of power in the region between Iran and your pick of the opponent. It does not look too great for Iran at the moment, because it has no nuclear weapons. In contrast, this black line represents what Iran could expect from a conflict in the future. The space in between represents the shift in the balance of power between Iran and the opponent. There are plenty of reasons to negotiate a resolution both now and in the future, as fighting a war is costly. However, if those costs are relatively small compared to the shift in the balance of power, fighting is better for Iran’s opponent now, while Iran is weak. What we have seen overnight is a bet from Israel that the shift in fact was relatively large as compared to those costs of the war, and so the bombs came raining down. Now, it is way, way too early to be doing a damage assessment to see whether that is correct. But I think it is worth asking more broadly when the shift in the balance of power is large versus when it is small—because that will inform us better about what will happen next. You might be tempted to say that the expected shift becomes increasingly large as a state gets closer and closer to a nuclear weapon. If, for example, you knew that Iran would have a nuclear weapon tomorrow, then the shift between today and tomorrow is apparently massive. So that seems like a very good time to strike, if that is the route you want to pursue. On the opposite end of the spectrum, when a country first starts developing nuclear technology, the shift may seem rather small. Any shift that could happen would be way, way off into the future, and that is assuming the country does not have any major setbacks as it is trying to develop a nuclear weapon, aside from your own attacks. Put those two pieces of information together, and clearly you would expect the value of counterproliferation efforts to maximize the closer a country gets to the bomb. Right? Well, not so fast. The tricky part here is that you do not just get to snap your fingers and terminate a country’s nuclear program. You have to actually destroy the would be nuclear power’s infrastructure and technological base. Here’s the thing: that is much easier to do earlier on in a nuclear program’s life cycle. There may literally only be one facility you need to hit. Indeed, if you look at the closest historical parallels to the Iran strikes, Israel also struck Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. In both of those cases, it was a single facility, really early on in the program’s life cycle. Neither country was able to do much after. Iran, in contrast, is on the complete opposite end of the spectrum today. And that is why this attack is so unprecedented. Iran has a ton of facilities. It has enriched a large quantity of uranium and is close to what is necessary for a nuclear weapon. Some estimates put Iran weeks away from constructing a bomb if the political decision were ever made to do so—and, presumably, there are not major disruptions in the meantime. Of course, you should take those estimates with a grain of salt. But at such a late point, the difference between the expected outcome of a war today and the expected outcome of a war post-proliferation are rather similar. That is because a war today may very well see the would-be proliferator build a nuclear weapon in the middle of the conflict, and so all that the rival state is doing is getting a small head start. Let me show you what I mean. If you have been following this saga for a long time, you already would know that what you are looking at—or perhaps not looking at—is one of Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow. It is buried under a mountain. You should keep it in mind because one of the first things that we will want to know once damage assessments come in is whether Israel was able to inflict meaningful damage on it despite the dirt in between. The main drama that the world will be watching unfold over the next few days is whether Iran tries to race toward a bomb, especially if active military exchanges continue for the foreseeable future. Israel would have to stay ahead of the game, constantly trying to figure out where Iran may be shifting elements of its nuclear program, where it might be trying to design the delivery mechanism, and where it may be assembling a finished weapon. Because one mistake there means that Iran will successfully acquire a nuclear bomb, and all of the coercive power that comes with it. Now, to be clear, there is no guarantee that if Israel fails during this process that Iran would actually use a nuclear weapon. States with nuclear weapons get involved in military disputes with decent frequency. Heck, Ukraine recently invaded Russia without a nuclear blowback, while India and Pakistan had that flare up that has not gone any further … so far. Still, though, the only times that nuclear weapons have been used in a military context were at the end of World War II, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is reasonable to think that if Iran reaches the point where it acquires a nuclear bomb and it becomes well known to everyone that Iran has a nuclear bomb, then the parties may decide that now would be a great time to negotiate a settlement and avoid all of the costs that may come along with a nuclear exchange between the two. But perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran manages to scrounge together a single nuclear warhead. That is not what we call in the business a secure second strike. It is an incredibly valuable asset that Israel would want to hunt down and eliminate as fast as possible. Consequently, there will be a temptation for Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon as soon as it has one ready. Not a guarantee, but a temptation. Israel still has its own nuclear arsenal, and it could choose a nuclear response. But there is a major geographic difference here: Iran is a much larger country than Israel. A couple of bombs on, say, Tel Aviv and parts of Jerusalem would knock out a major portion of Israel’s political base and economy, never mind send the world into a tailspin. And on that happy note, it seems that the interesting times will not end. I will see you tomorrow on Lines on Maps Extra with a discussion about what Israel’s strategy may be here in the broader context of geopolitics and the United States. Until then, if you enjoyed this video, then please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you next time. Take care.