Welcome to the Armenian News Network Room Week in Review for the week of September 1, 2024. We're recording this podcast on September 2, the day of the Declaration of Independence of Artsakh. 347 days have passed since the war of September 2023, which culminated in the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. And even now, dozens of Armenians remain in Azerbaijani captivity, and their suffering continues to be met with widespread indifference by global governments and the which unfortunately includes the regime in Yerevan as well. Today we're talking with Benjamin Borossian.
Hello, Benjamin. Welcome to the show. Benjamin Borossian Hello, Asmed.
Hello, Hobik. It's always a great pleasure to be with you. Asmed Borossian Benjamin, the past 10 days were memorable with two notable anniversaries. On August 23, specifically August 23, 1990, the Declaration of State Sovereignty was adopted in the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Essentially, that is a declaration of independence that is so contentious and so talked about recently.
And on September 2, a year later, 1991, the Republic of Artsakh declared its independence from the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that the August 23 declaration in Armenia referred to the desire to unify the Armenian SSR, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, NKAO, and the region of Shahumyan. Meanwhile, A year later, the authorities of Artsakh changed course and decided to go for full independence with their Declaration of Independence.
And here we are 33 years later from that date with an ethnically cleansed Artsakh, which I hope is temporary, and Azerbaijan demanding that Armenia's own constitution be changed to remove any vestiges or reminders that there ever has been something called Artsakh or Karabakh. And of course, we have a regime in Yerevan that appears to be yielding to one demand after another. At best, sometimes Pashinyan tries to make wordplay to say this is not an important issue.
And this was no different recently when, in a publicized statement on the occasion of the August 23 Declaration of Independence of Armenia, Pashinyan tried to make the argument that the entire Declaration of Independence need not be taken literally, and therefore Azerbaijan's demands are not pertinent. So... I know that was a long-winded introduction, Benjamin, but what are your thoughts about the significance of these days, essentially, the both independence days, Pashinyan statements, attempts to change the constitution, etc., etc.? Thank you, Hobik. I'll try to be brief.
First of all, Declaration of Independence, August 23, 1990. This is the beginning of Armenian independent journey, so this is a significant document, and definitely if... you think about like our state there is some sort of pyramid which goes up up up every year this is the base of the pyramid and of course if you are destroying the base then you are destroying the pyramid yes there are a lot of talks that okay we should destroy third republic and to create fourth republic or third republic was destroyed by complete destruction of Nagorno-Karabakh republic and cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh but Frankly speaking, I don't see any real thoughts or ideas behind this rhetoric. It's all rhetoric.
Okay, let's destroy the Third Republic. Let's create a Fourth Republic. But what is the Fourth Republic? What does it mean?
Maybe we will have a situation when we are destroying the Third Republic and creating nothing. So again, this is a declaration of independence. August 23, 1990 is like a base of our statehood.
And destroying it will... destroy our statehood with no clear path forward. Again, all talks that let's have fourth republic, I don't know, fifth republic or whatever, comparison with France.
I think these are all rhetorics with less content. So definitely my understanding is that we should not touch declaration of independence. Of course, it's not like a Bible.
Every document is a document. Touching the declaration of independence will mean that we are destroying the a pyramid of the Third Republic. And as far as there is no clear understanding why, first of all, why we are going to destroy Third Republic.
Second, what does it mean to have Fourth Republic? And this should not be only like political statements or one sentence or one page documents. You need like philosophical understanding of what does it mean Fourth Republic, why we are going to destroy Third Republic. As far as there is no like clear move forward, like destroying or...
pulling away the Declaration of Independence, it simply will mean destroying of a third republic without any real alternative or even any idea what to do. September 2, 1991, Declaration of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. And why this happened?
As you mentioned, in December 1, 1989, the Supreme Council of Soviet Armenia made a joint decision with the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh about the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region with Soviet Armenia. It was on December 1, 1989, and then September 2, 1991, Declaration of Independence. Why?
As far as I can understand, the idea was to prevent any potential accusation against Armenia annexation. Probably at that time, both Karabakh leaders and Republic of Armenia leaders, they thought that if Armenia will declare Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia, this will be perceived as annexation and this will automatically transform the conflict as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. and depict Armenia as an aggressor or as a country which is violating international law or international rules and annexing territories. While the declaration of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic independence transformed the struggle, not as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but as a fight or struggle for people's self-determination.
And let's not forget that Nagorno-Karabakh Republic declared its independence. fully in line with Soviet Union laws, because Soviet Union was still existing in September 1991. Officially, it ceased to exist on December 21, 1991, when its Almaty Declaration was adopted. So this is my understanding, of course.
Now we may argue that, okay, maybe Armenia should be the opposite way and declare Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia. But frankly speaking, I see the logic not to transform the conflict. or to depict the conflict or give Azerbaijan a chance to depict the conflict as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and depict Armenia as an aggressor state or as a state who just annexed the territory of its neighbor, but depicted as a conflict between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan as a classic example of struggle or fight for people's self-determination. So this is my understanding why September 2nd, 1991 happened. Okay.
Let's talk a little bit about the press conference that Pashinyan gave just a couple of days ago on August 31st. We would like to review a couple of the points from that event. Pashinyan said that on Friday, the 30th of August, Armenia proposed to Azerbaijan to sign the latest draft of the so-called peace treaty, as is, with 13 out of the 17 points of the agreement fully agreed upon.
The rest would be worked on going forward, he said. He offered to meet Aliyev on the border between the two countries to discuss bilaterally. Of course, Azerbaijan immediately rejected this idea, saying that the Pashinyan team had simply deleted the contentious references, including the demand to change Armenia's constitution.
It's really interesting to note here that these so-called bilateral negotiations that the sides appear to be having is simply emailing each other a Microsoft Word document with track changes turned on. Benyamin, do you think that there is enough trust or goodwill between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or just between Pashinyan and Aliyev, I guess, that bilateral negotiations can yield any positive results for Armenia? Frankly speaking, I think there is zero trust and zero goodwill between Armenia and Azerbaijan and even between leaders.
For me, it's clear that this Azerbaijani demand or preconditions change constitution if you want peace deal. then okay dissolve OFTA means group if you want peace deal all these are pretexts because Azerbaijan has and never had any intention to sign peace agreement with Armenia and if you ask why I believe Azerbaijan wants to keep the current situation of no peace no war because it will keep the window open for Azerbaijan to make another military escalation and reached their second strategic goal. First strategic goal was the destruction of Nagorno-Karabakh and kicking out all Armenians from there.
Unfortunately for us, they reached the first strategic goal. Second strategic goal is to establish a land border with Turkey. And even if Azerbaijan signs framework agreement with Armenia, framework agreement, I mean only principles, which does not regulate any issue. Nezha, these communications, corridors, border delimitation, probably Azerbaijan believes that it will be complicated, like to attack Armenia six months after you are signing even framework peace agreement.
While if there is no agreement, at least from Azerbaijani perspective, and maybe they are right, if there is no agreement and we are in a situation of no war, no peace, it makes Azerbaijan or makes for Azerbaijan easier to escalate when there is a window of opportunity. But again, I think it's clear, and I believe everyone who follows the negotiation process or Azerbaijani tactic. By the way, not only after the 2020 war, but starting from 2001, Key West.
I don't want to go deep into history, but let's remember 2001, Key West. Heidar Aleev, Robert Kocharyan, agreed on something. Then Heidar Aleev rejected the sign. Jumping 10 years later, 2011, Kazan Summit, based on Madrid documents, two-year intensive negotiations mediated by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
At the last minute... President Aliyev, this time Ilham Aliyev, rejected. So all these talks about Armenia should change constitution, etc., these clear are pretexts, but Azerbaijan just want to have good pretexts to blame Armenia for failing to sign anything.
Because what Azerbaijan is now doing, and they are publicly stating, look, we are ready to sign PIF agreement, but Armenia should change constitution. And if Armenian government... is afraid that changing constitution before elections will jeopardize the electoral victory. That is why now Armenia is telling that, okay, we will change constitution in 2027, which means after scheduled parliamentary elections in summer 2026, then it's not Azerbaijani fault, it's Armenia's fault that we should wait for approximately another three years.
But essentially, again and again, and I think I told this also during your podcast and also I wrote some papers, I strongly believe that Azerbaijan does not want to sign any agreement because Azerbaijani strategic goal is not these four villages in Talbush region. Azerbaijani strategic goal is not even this enclave. They all are peanuts. The key prize is a corridor and land border with Turkey.
Second key prize again. The first key prize was Nagorno-Karabakh with zero Armenians. Second key prize is common border with Turkey.
Everything else, this is a routine. Like negotiations, you are right. Like people sending 10s or 11s variant, I don't know, using track change via Word or PDF or Adobe Acrobat or whatever. People are meeting, calls, coming, going. All these are diplomatic routine.
But strategic goal of Azerbaijan is Azerbaijan and Turkey should have common. border. And I don't think that anyone is possible to convince Azerbaijan that forget about your strategic goal.
Of course, Armenia and some other external factors, they might prevent Azerbaijan from reaching that goal. But no one, I think, can convince Azerbaijan that, look, your goal is a bad thing. You are wanting to occupy territory of independent country like Armenia. This is a bad thing. You should forget about that.
Your strategy should be to have friendship and brotherhood with Armenia, etc. No, this is not going to happen. And frankly, I don't see anyone even attempting to say that, unfortunately, which means essentially in this global power rivalry, some states might actually find this situation advantageous for them. Benyamin, do we know what the 17 points are in this document and which 13 points have been fully agreed upon, allegedly? The document is not published.
And frankly speaking, I had no access to the text. But based on these discussions or leakages or even public statements or... expert statements or expert discussions, we are speaking about framework agreement.
And these 13 articles, I only may like speculate that probably the first article, Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other's territorial integrity. Second article, Armenia and Azerbaijan agree not to intervene into each other's like domestic or internal affairs. Third article, Azerbaijan and Armenia agree not to allow any forces to use each other's territory to make harm against each other.
each other and some other principles like probably armenian azerbaijan agreed to border delimitation and demarcation fifth article azerbaijan and armenia agreed to restore communications probably this all will be principles then you may ask okay but if this is on the basic level of principles then why there is no agreement of these last four articles frankly speaking i'm not sure but i will be surprised if this forced article like for example i will be surprised if Article number 15, let's assume article number 15 is not agreed, I will be surprised if in article number 15, Azerbaijan demands to put in these articles that half a million Azerbaijanis should return to Armenia. and then Azerbaijani Turkish troops should be deployed in Armenia to protect these half million Azerbaijanis. Armenia does not agree.
That is why they cannot agree. No, I don't think that even these four non-agreed articles have such fundamental issues solved, because everything important has been taken out of the agreement. But the fact that even if all important issues are taken out of the agreement, which itself makes this document a very weak one, which will solve nothing. But the fact that Azerbaijan does not want even to sign this weak document, again, from my perspective, means that Azerbaijan believes that even a very weak peace agreement, which only consists of principles, does not solve anything, but still it will complicate the potential future of Azerbaijan against Armenia.
And that is why Azerbaijan, like, now they are speaking about a change of constitution. Let's assume, let's assume, like Pashinyan... organizing snap parliamentary elections in spring 2025, not waiting until summer 2026. This is possible, at least potentially this is possible.
Okay, Armenia is having snap parliamentary elections in spring 2025. Civil contract again have majority and be able to form one party government. Then Armenian government is organizing constitutional referendum in summer 2025 and including many changes. there is also the change which is kicking out the reference to the Declaration of Independence from the preamble of constitution.
Again, all these are speculations, but let's assume that summer 2025, referendum and we have a new constitution with no reference to the Declaration of Independence. I am pretty much sure that then if Armenia will say, okay, look, this was a main obstacle to sign this very weak document. Now there is no such obstacle.
Okay, let's sign something on... I don't know, September 1st, 2025, then Azerbaijan will find something else. Okay, they will tell, okay, let's dissolve OSCE Minsk Group. If Armenia agree to dissolve OSCE Minsk Group, then Azerbaijan will say, as on September 2nd was stated by Hikmet Hajiyev, that because Armenia was an aggressor country for the last 30 years, there should be restrictions on Armenian army.
Like Armenian army should have no more than 25 tanks. Then Azerbaijan will say, OK, you have not 25 tanks, but I don't know, 55 tanks. Destroy these 35 tanks if you want us to sign this very weak agreement.
So this is as far as Azerbaijan thinks that any agreement, even very weak, will create complications for new aggression against Armenia. And as far as Azerbaijan believes that in near or midterm future, like, I don't know, a few, two, one, two, three, four, five years, there are chances that Azerbaijan may attack Armenia. open the corridor by force, I think we will have no peace agreement even if Armenia changes constitution in 2025 and Armenia officially calls OFE to dissolve YCM group again in 2025. Another issue that we caught during Pashinyan's conference was he blasted Artsakh officials in Armenia who have demanded that Armenia stand up for their right to return home.
He said that their demands go counter to Armenia's national security, and that the 1996 Lisbon Principles turned the Artsakh problem into an Armenia problem, blah, blah, blah, blah, and he's not going to entertain any such notion. He conveniently avoided discussing his washing of hands of the 150,000 Armenians and their homeland, and their rights to security, and their other rights, when he one-sidedly signed the Prague Agreement. in 2022 with the joyful watching of macron among other eu officials and with aliyev not even bothering to come the lisbon principles that he mentioned stipulated territorial integrity of armenia and azerbaijan legal status for artsakh and rights and security for them again rights and security for them then came the madrid principles as you mentioned benjamin which the the sides almost had agreed upon, which stipulated territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, self-determination of Artsakh, and the right and return of all IDPs, and again, rights and security and so forth.
So how reasonable do you think this Pashinyan blame game is? What is the logic of Pashinyan blaming Artsakh for its own ethnic cleansing and claiming that their rights and security which Aliyev had agreed upon, at least in principle, the wrong counter to Armenia's national security. What is this national security argument? Okay, just first of all, if we speak about Lisbon principles, and if we refer to the OFC Lisbon summit, I think in December 1996, let's not forget that Armenia vetoed the decision as all OFC member countries had the veto power.
So Armenia, under Levantar Petrosyan's presidency, who itself was pushing for like compromise or concession-based resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but even Levantar Petrosyan vetoed this. Lisbon summit declaration in December 1996. Okay, as far as I can understand Prime Minister logic, he believes that if Armenia speaks about the right of collective return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh, this will provide Azerbaijan more basis to demand the return of so-called, I don't know, 100 or 200 or 300,000. Azerbaijanis to Armenia. But here I think there is a fundamental problem.
First of all, Azerbaijan continues to speak about Western Azerbaijan, like Armenia being Western Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan continues to demand the return of these Azerbaijanis into Armenia, even after complete destruction of Nagorno-Karabakh and forced displacement of all Armenians. I remember very well that in 2022 and in the first half of 2023, even during expert dialogues, and in some expert dialogues I was part of, Azerbaijan experts were telling, oh, we invented this notion of Western Azerbaijan, and the right of return of several hundred thousand Azerbaijanis to Armenia, only to create leverage against you in Nagorno-Karabakh case. Like if you will demand international guarantees or special rights for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, we invented this concept of Western Azerbaijan.
just to balance your claims on Nagorno-Karabakh. And if there is no Nagorno-Karabakh, we immediately will forget about Western Azerbaijan. No one will tell even a single word about Western Azerbaijan.
And from this logic, if this logic was true, then after September 28, 2023, when Nagorno-Karabakh Republic President Samuel Shah Ramayana signs a decree to dissolve Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the end of 2023, or at least starting from January 1st, 2024, we shouldn't have heard anything about Western Azerbaijan from Azerbaijani officials, Azerbaijani expert community, Azerbaijani media. But I can recall tens or hundreds of statements from Azerbaijani officials and experts after January 1st, 2024, about Western Azerbaijan and about hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis right to come to Armenia. So this connection point that okay let's allow Azerbaijan to destroy Nagorno-Karabakh and hope that they will forget about Western Azerbaijan this was wrong because it simply did not work and yes Azerbaijanis were telling sending these messages to Armenia like allow us to destroy Nagorno-Karabakh and you will never heard about Western Azerbaijan anymore but this was a really real trick because facts are facts that again after January 1st 2024 when our government forget completely about Nagorno-Karabakh. They don't speak about right of return.
They even deleted all the links from the official prime minister or president websites, any links about Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan continues at the level of President Aliyev, demands the return of Azerbaijanis into Armenia. And they continue to speak about Western Azerbaijan. So I think this logic, which probably, as far as I understand, is behind this prime minister's thoughts, that if now we will speak about return of... Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia is to Azerbaijan, then Azerbaijan will demand even more the return of Azerbaijanis into Armenia.
This does not work. Because even if, again, let's start from January 1st, 2024, in the last eight months, Armenian government was speaking nothing about Nagorno-Karabakh or about Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia's rights, and Azerbaijan continued to push forward the notion of Western Azerbaijan. Why doesn't Pashinyan's team point to the appropriate parallels here? If Azerbaijan wants Azeris who left Armenia in the 90s to settle in Armenia, then similarly Azerbaijani Armenians who left Baku, Sumgeit, Shahumyan in the 90s under conditions of pogroms and murder should also be allowed to return and in equal numbers.
How can they work with this absurd comparison between the displaced people of the 90s and the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Artsakh one year ago? A very good question because even EU officials And if you read the last interview... former EU Special Representative in the South Caucasus, Toivo Klar.
I guess he gave this interview like two weeks ago. From September 1st, we have new EOSR and we discussed it. And now Mr. Klar is EU ambassador in Uzbekistan. But in his last interview, Toivo Klar clearly stated that there is a difference between the case of hundreds of thousands of Armenians who left Baku, Sumgayit, Kirovabad and other Soviet Azerbaijan cities in late 1980s.
and Azerbaijanis who left Soviet Armenia in late 1980s. There is a clear and huge difference between these two cases and the case of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who were forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. And it's fundamentally wrong to mix this, to mix the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians with the issue of Azerbaijanis who left Soviet Armenia or Armenians who left Soviet Azerbaijan. And why our government is not clearly stating that, first of all, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians issue has nothing to do with Azerbaijanis issue first. And again, I'm not sure why they are not doing that. But again, even from their logic, if they believe that if they will not speak about right of return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, somehow Azerbaijan will say, OK, good Armenians, good boys.
And now I will not speak about Western Azerbaijan. This is simply not happening. Again, eight months.
Nothing about Nagorno-Karabakh, nothing about Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Hundreds of statements, I don't know, conferences, workshops, decisions about Western Azerbaijan. So here, frankly speaking, I understand the logic probably behind prime minister or government activities, but this logic is not working. And why they don't see that this logic is not working, I'm not sure.
Because clearly the logic is not working. I mean, like, this is the facts. This is not even analyzed. Like, we can argue, okay. Benjamin analyzes it right, Ospet analyzes it wrong.
We don't know enough facts, so we cannot analyze? No. These are clear facts on the ground. So another point. You mentioned that Aliyev has said that both Armenia and Azerbaijan should apply to the OSCE Minsk Group to jointly dissolve it.
And Pashinyan has, and his various mouthpieces have reportedly agreed in principle to do this, except they have said that they will do it. Armenia has said that it will do it after the peace treaty is signed. So let me just ask even a more basic question.
Does Pashinyan have the right internationally to do this, single-handedly, essentially, on behalf of the people of Artsakh? Okay, of course, I'm not a legal expert, but my understanding is that Armenia is an OSCE means group country, probably has a right to apply to OSCE, calling for the dissolution of OSCE means group. Legally, I think it's like every country can apply.
apply even Azerbaijan. Only Azerbaijan can apply to OFD in telling that, okay, I believe that conflict is over, so why to keep this OFD means group? So legally I think, yes, Azerbaijan can apply theoretically. Maybe I am wrong, but I believe every OFD member country theoretically can raise this issue. Let's dissolve this OFD means group because conflict is over.
So from this perspective, I believe yes. Armenia can apply even without Azerbaijan, but if both Armenia and Azerbaijan jointly apply, then I think it will be very difficult for any country to oppose this, because, okay, OSCE Minsk Group was established to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and this conflict, also Armenia and Azerbaijan were significant parts of the conflict. And now, if there is no Nagorno-Karabakh, and two other parts of the conflict are jointly applying to dissolve this OSCE Minsk Group, telling that there is no conflict, Probably it will be difficult for any country to say, no, no, no.
Despite Armenia and Azerbaijan are telling that there is no conflict, I believe there is conflict. So legally, I think they can do that. Armenia is a country or Armenia-Azerbaijan jointly. And frankly, speaking from current government logic, if from their perspective, Nagorno-Karabakh is finished, and Armenia should not speak about Nagorno-Karabakh for whatever reason, if Nagorno-Karabakh issue is closed, is finished, And if there is a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, then from that logic, we have to accept that, yes, okay, why we need OFC Minsk group if Armenia and Azerbaijan have a peace agreement, both agree that there is no Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because there is no Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia and Azerbaijan have signed peace agreements, then why to have OFC Minsk group?
So from this logic, if you really believe that, okay, we should forget about Nagorno-Karabakh, we should forget about these 32 years of... self-proclaimed, non-recognized, but still Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 1991-2023. And if Armenia and Azerbaijan have peace agreements, then yes.
Why to have OFE means group? So from current government logic, I understand why they are telling that, okay, after signature of peace agreement, yes, no need to have this OFE means group. The only question then is whether Armenia uses this as a bargaining chip and is able to use this as a bargaining chip. And so far, you know, we're not seeing that at all, even.
Let's go back to the constitution. Pashinyan stated that the Armenian constitution does not contain claims on Azeri territory or Azerbaijani territory, but Azerbaijan's constitution does contain significant claims to Armenia as well as Georgian territories. He pointed out that Azerbaijan lays claim to 45,000 to 46,000 additional square kilometers of area in the South Caucasus, but that he does not bring up this issue in the negotiations because it would block the talks.
supposedly he's relying on a clause in the agreement that stipulates that domestic law may not be used to block any part of the agreement i believe that is the vienna convention that applies to all international treaties does this uh stipulation in the agreement about domestic laws give you the warm and fuzzies about living securely in armenia by i mean okay as i mentioned we can discuss like if this agreement signs will it bring any security to armenia but as i mentioned first the agreement as far as i understand They are discussing framework agreement, which is not solving anything, keeping all issues open. But again, as I mentioned, Azerbaijan, as far as I understand, does not want even to sign this very weak agreement, because Azerbaijan probably believes that even this very weak agreement, the signed agreement, will complicate or may become an obstacle for its potential plans to attack Armenia and open the corridor by force. So if... There is not going to be any agreement.
And I believe even international community and even United States will spend some efforts in spring and summer 2024 to reach some agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And we discussed that U.S. main hope is that even this framework agreement, which means nothing for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it probably will allow the opening of Armenia-Turkey border and then it will change. once more the balance of power in the South Caucasus, making Russia weaker, making Turkey stronger.
But I have a feeling that even the United States now, they understood that Azerbaijan is not going to sign anything. And probably they will not come back to this issue until at least when we will have a new president in the White House in late January 2025, like either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump. But again, I think to discuss about the agreement and what this agreement may mean or does not mean is a case when we receiving more and more signals from Azerbaijan that even this agreement is not going to be signed. I'm not sure that any of this agreement, again, as I mentioned, this agreement will solve nothing, but I have great doubt that even this agreement will be signed. Benyamin Pashinyan also said that Armenia does not seek to restore its sovereignty over the 200 square kilometers of territory currently occupied by Azerbaijan.
He doesn't plan to do it through military force, he said. He believes that this can be done through peaceful negotiations. Do you expect that Azerbaijan will peacefully move out of Armenian territory when the so-called peace treaty is signed, if it's ever signed? Okay, frankly speaking, I have doubt that even the prime minister believes that Azerbaijan will ever be through peacefully from any territory which now it controls. And given all the history of Armenian-Azerbaijan relations, starting from 1991, when both gained their independence, we have zero base to believe that...
Azerbaijan will peacefully or voluntarily give back any territory which it controls. So no, I don't think that, I don't believe it. And I hope that no one, even in government, believes it.
Like why prime minister is telling that this is possible? Okay, because probably he has no other option. Look, if you're a prime minister or you are a leader of the country, and one of your constitutional duties is to protect territorial integrity of your country, because Prime Minister also is a commander-in-chief, I believe.
So if you're a commander-in-chief and your territory is occupied, and you are telling that you do not plan to use military force to liberate these occupied territories for whatever reason, because your army is weak or your enemy is much stronger, then you should at least say that, okay, but I hope that these territories will be liberated through peaceful negotiation. Because if you will tell, okay... I don't plan to use military force to liberate these territories, but I strongly believe that Azerbaijan will never liberate these territories peacefully. It means that you actually will state that I, as a head of the state and as a commander-in-chief, I accept the fact that the part of my country will be occupied for indefinite period of time. So essentially you're saying he is signaling concession?
Yeah, and I think he's signaling that, I think he tries to signal to the domestic audience that, okay, I don't agree or I don't accept the fact that these territories can be under Azerbaijani control for indefinite period. I don't know, for another 15 or 20 years. From domestic political perspective, it will be very strange to say that, okay, again, I'm commander-in-chief of the country, I'm the leader of the country, and I'm telling you that part of the territory of our country will be occupied by our neighbor, essentially, for forever.
That is why he's telling that we will not use military force, but we will liberate it by peaceful means. Still, he's messaging to domestic audience that we will liberate it, like, we do not forget, we do not accept the occupation. We do not believe this is normal.
We will not accept this status quo. This is not new normal. We will do that by peaceful means. But again, I don't see any base to hope that there are even slight chances, like, I don't know, 1% chance that Azerbaijani troops will leave any territory which they control now inside, let's say, Armenia proper or inside the territory of former Soviet Armenia.
And definitely, I will be extremely happy if I am wrong. Like if, I don't know, tomorrow or in 2025, for example, Azerbaijani troops will peacefully withdraw from near Jermuk or from Gagarkunik region or Sunnik region, I will be extremely happy to be completely wrong in this case. Okay, let's take a quick break here, everyone. I want to remind our listeners that we would love to earn your support for our work.
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We would love to read your comments and thoughts under our videos on youtube.com slash grung. All right, let's go back to our show with Dr. Benyamin Boğazyan. Okay, let's move on from Pashinyan's two-hour press conference, which is actually the shortest conference that he has ever held. And in my opinion, in terms of content, all of them were short, but whatever. So two weeks ago, Russian President Putin was in Baku on a rare, and I would say very rare, but very lavish two-day state visit.
The number of state visits that he has made over the past five years can be counted, I believe, on a single hand. And he took with him a large contingent of government officials. joined Aliyev in his residence for dinner, lots of hugs and photo ops, statements backing up each other's points, and several agreements were signed to enhance economic, strategic, and political relations, and in particular, emphasizing and extending their strategic partnership under the Declaration of Allied Interaction until 2026. If our listeners remember this agreement, the original one was signed just two days before. Russia invaded Ukraine.
What were the main outcomes of Putin's visit to Baku? And how does the reinforced strategic partnership between Russia and Azerbaijan affect Armenia? I would differentiate geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons behind President Putin's state visit to Azerbaijan.
First, let's speak about geopolitics. I think two main issues. Issue number one, as Armenia is trying to let's call it diversify its foreign policy or pivot to the world or a little bit distance itself from russia or decrease dependence on russia whatever you may call it i think russian leadership starts to think that okay if we cannot pursue our interests in south caucasus through armenia which was the case in last probably 25 30 years at least before 2020 nagorno-karabakh war But still, the South Caucasus is a very important region for us, so we should somehow find a replacement for Armenia. Maybe this replacement could be Azerbaijan. So, reason number one, try to better understand if Azerbaijan can be the South Caucasian country through which mainly Russia could protect or push its interest in the South Caucasus.
And geopolitical issue number two, to balance Turkey's growing influence on Azerbaijan. Because I believe Turkey is the only country who may replace Russia as a dominant player in the South Caucasus. And to do that, one of the key tools is this Turkey-Azerbaijan Strategic Alliance and growing influence of Turkey over Azerbaijani law enforcement bodies like army, security, apparatus, etc.
Turkey. at the end of the day fully controls Azerbaijan, this will significantly boost Turkish chances to replace Russia as a dominant player in the South Caucasus. So you mentioned geo-economics, and I actually want you to not forget that. But this is an important point that you brought up, because the next question that we had for you was, for instance, was the recent agreement by Azerbaijan to defer Zangisur Corridor as a precondition to a later date, was that a concession to Putin?
Basically, And did that go against Turkey's interest? Because we know that the U.S. was touting the so-called middle corridor of which the Zangizer Corridor is part of. And U.S. sees Turkey playing that critical role. So did this deprioritization of the Zangizer Corridor in the Armenia-Azerbaijan talks, essentially, was that a nod to Putin from Aliyev as part of the Russian geopolitical direction? Frankly speaking, I'm not sure.
Because look what happened. Armenia-Azerbaijan agreed not to include... The issue of corridors or issue of restoration of communications is a text of peace agreement. But it absolutely does not mean that Azerbaijan deprioritized the opening of corridor or establishing direct border with Turkey.
As I mentioned, this is a strategic goal of Azerbaijan. Everything else, enclaves, I don't know, Davush, border delimitation, blah, blah. These are peanuts for Azerbaijan.
Strategic goal is corridor. And the fact that they agreed not to include it into the text of peace agreement. means nothing, because in any case, as I mentioned, most probably Azerbaijan is not going to sign it. So what is the difference? Do we have an article on restoration of communications, or we do not have, if you are not going to sign it in any case?
But I will counter the argument that Azerbaijan deprioritized the opening of Zangajur corridor. Well, I mean, deprioritized within the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan discussions, but definitely not as part of a strategic goal. And I agree with you that...
fully that Azerbaijan has this strategic goal, but there are many ways to reach it, right? For instance, it can use that as a bargaining chip right now in negotiations with Russia and say, see, I'm not pushing Turkey's control over it. I might temporarily agree with you, Russia, having control of this corridor, or I might defer that to a later date. But in the meantime, it is able to extract more concessions from Russia, essentially.
I'm trying to understand whether this was used as a bargaining chip. This aspect was in any way used as a bargaining chip by Azerbaijan, essentially. On corridors, my understanding is that all sides believe that at the end of the day, some sort of route will be opened via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Like, let's call it that this is almost inevitable. What the struggle is, like, who is going to control or at least to influence these routes? And unfortunately, after...
destruction of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia is too vulnerable and too weak to say that, okay, Armenia, I am able only alone to fully control this route because this is becoming like a big geopolitical game involving US, Russia, China, Central Asia. Like it's too significant to say that unfortunately, currently weakened Armenia is able to control this only alone. So at the end of the day, I believe we have several options.
Option number one, it will be purely controlled by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Option number two, it will be somehow shaped or controlled by the West through, I don't know, maybe some private organization or whatever. Option number three, this will be influenced or controlled by Russia. I think now the whole discussion and struggle and rivalry is between these three options.
Purely Turkish-Azerbaijani control, and this may happen if Azerbaijan simply opens a corridor by force. Some sort of Western control. or some sort of Russian control. And because now we have Russia-West rivalry, or not rivalry, we have Russia-West war, or proxy war at least, in Ukraine, unfortunately, there is no possibility, like, if Russia and West come to some agreement and say, okay, there will be joint Russia-West control over these routes.
As far as proxy war between Russia and West continues in Ukraine, I don't believe that any agreement between Russia and West is possible, which means that this is becoming some sort of zero-sum game. Like Russia says, okay, zero Western influence, better to have no root than to have a root with Western influence or Western control. West tells that, okay, no Russian control. It's better to have no route than to have it under Russian control. But Azerbaijan is telling, okay, I need the route.
At the end of the day, I don't care. It will be partly Russian, Western. Of course, this is important for Azerbaijan.
It's basically a scenario to have fully under Azerbaijani control the route. But Azerbaijan is telling, okay, give me my route, and then probably I will try to come to deal either with Russia or with the West. So this is, now I understand, this is a...
situation around the corridors if you jump back into geoeconomics i think two issues first this international north-south corridor which should connect russia with india via iran and definitely one of the key part of this route should pass through azerbaijan because azerbaijan is located between russia and iran and logically azerbaijan may play a pivotal role here connecting india with russia again india feeling iran Azerbaijan, Russia. So most probably this was discussed. And second, I believe Russia and Azerbaijan discussed how to continue their semi-merky deals to sell Russian gas to Europe, disguising it as an Azerbaijani gas.
Because they are doing it already. Because you know that now Azerbaijan, the Ural Azerbaijan imports Russian gas to use it for domestic consumption to a free... more volumes of Azerbaijani gas to be exported to Europe via Southern gas corridor.
I mean, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, then Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, Greece, and then up to Italy. And currently, 10 European countries are receiving this gas, like Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia. They all are receiving Azerbaijani gas with different volumes.
But No one can argue that there is also no Russian gas flows through Trans-Anatolian and then Trans-Adriatic pipelines into Europe. It's impossible to check even like what sort of gas entering Greece territory at the end of TANAP or the beginning of Trans-Adriatic pipeline. But also we know that the Russian Ukraine signed an agreement on Russian gas transit via Ukraine to Europe.
They signed this agreement in 2019. An agreement. will expire on December 31, 2024, four months from now. And President Zelenskyy several times stated that in no condition, Ukraine will sign a new transit deal with Russia.
Then suddenly, the European Union approached Azerbaijan, telling that, OK, we would like to receive Azerbaijani gas via Ukraine. OK, anyone who knows even basic geographic may raise the question. How the hell Azerbaijani gas may reach Ukraine? The only way Azerbaijani gas may reach Ukraine, it's via Russia.
Like to use these pipelines, which come from Russia to Azerbaijan, in a reverse, and push Azerbaijani gas first to Russia, and then from Russia to Ukraine, and then to reach Europe. But here there are two big problems. I would say even one big problem.
The big problem is that Azerbaijan has not enough gas even to pump these 20 billion cubic meters. per year gas to Europe via southern gas corridor via trans-Anatolian and trans-Aderatic pipeline. It's just basically an accounting trick, right? Yeah.
So my understanding is that, and probably some European countries are part of this trick and maybe even Ukraine, that starting from January 1st, 2025, probably, again, I cannot say this will happen 100%, but probably starting from January 1st, 2025, some Russian gas again will flow via Ukraine to EU. but legally it will be called azerbaijani guys like they will say okay we signed agreement with azerbaijan so some azerbaijani guys now from azerbaijan enters russia then from russia to ukraine then from ukraine to eu and this will be excellent solution maybe for everyone probably except ukraine but for example europeans will say okay yes finally we cut any pipeline gas from russia we punish russia we deprive president putin from money to boost its war efforts while simultaneously receiving necessary gas to survive russia will be happy because still it will have money azerbaijan will be happy because definitely he will have some money also some as a result of this intermediary semi-legal intermediary role frankly speaking i don't understand why ukraine should be interested to continue russian transit of russian gas via its calling it legally Azerbaijani gas, but I don't know, maybe there are some interests, or maybe there are some personal or financial interests. But I think that along with this international north-south corridor, probably this potential... gas issues to increase or at least continue export of Russian gas, pipeline Russian gas to Europe while calling it legally Azerbaijani gas, probably this was the second geoeconomic reason or issues discussed during President Putin's state visit.
Interesting. I mean, it's plain for us to see and we just laugh about it. And it's all being done. You mentioned at the expense of possibly Ukraine, but also we forgot about Armenia. Or we didn't mention Armenia.
And it seems like this is yet another leverage for Aliyev geopolitically in terms of his weight versus Europe. Benny, I mean, there are two points if you could address about this corridor issue. First of all, you mentioned all the people who are interested in controlling the corridor that goes through Sunniq, the so-called Zankizr corridor. What about Iran? Because de facto, Iran actually controls that corridor right now because it is not allowing anybody else to control it.
and has said it is crossing one of its red lines if somebody controls it. And number two, can you talk just a little bit about what control means? Is it the fear that Armenia would suddenly stop economic traffic between Turkey and Azerbaijan that people are afraid of?
Why would Armenia do that? Or is it because with the creation of the Zankizru corridor, with the creation of adjacency between Azerbaijan and Turkey, the expectation is that NATO is going to start projecting arms. and power all the way to Central Asia.
And then they're afraid that Russia and Armenia would stop that. On Iran, I think Iran probably, as I mentioned, like both Russia and West and Azerbaijan, Turkey, would be happy to see the routes open. They are competing who will control it or what will be the modalities. Probably Iran is the only country which is absolutely against this route.
Iran is telling, okay, I don't want this route open at all. Yet publicly they are telling if route under Armenian sovereignty, like crossroads of... peace or whatever, we will welcome it. But also Iranians are smart enough to understand that this is not going to happen. There could not be only Armenian sovereignty because again, this is a too important issue to depend on, unfortunately, such a vulnerable and weak state as Armenia.
So while Iranians publicly are telling that we will welcome the opening of the route, if it's under fully Armenian sovereignty, it means that we will not welcome the opening of the route, because again, this is not going to happen. So Iran is against any route, even if it's under Russian control because it has fears that even if it's under Russian control, but it's opened and used by Azerbaijan and Turkey, that Russian control itself cannot be permanent. For example, Iranians may look to what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh when in November 2020, Russian peacekeepers were deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Many were telling that, OK, this new status quo will be intact for another 20 or 30 years because Russian soldiers never leave the territory which they entered. But less than four years? June 2024, last Russian peacekeeper left Azerbaijan. So probably from Iranian perspective, of course, Western or Turkish control is absolute disaster, but also if route is opened and there are some sort of Russian control or influence, then what are the guarantees that this influence will be there for a long period? How can anybody guarantee that at the end of the day, this will not end in a way that first it will be Russian, some sort of Russian control, FSB or border troops, but for whatever reason...
For whatever geopolitical changes, after a few years, Russians will leave, but the corridor will remain. So that is why I think Iran is against any route connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenia, telling Azerbaijan and Turkey, OK, you want to be connected? Why do you need Zangajor corridor?
I may offer Aras corridor. And we know that there are discussions between Azerbaijan and Iran, and even agreements were signed to construct some bridges, both highway and railroad. Bridges very close to Armenia-Iran-Azerbaijan border, which will allow, theoretically, Azerbaijan trains and cars to reach Armenia-Azerbaijan border along the Araks River. But instead of entering Armenia, via bridge enter Iran, drive this 44 kilometers on Iranian territory, and then again enter Nakhchivan by bridges.
But again, Iran is against any route. Regarding what does control mean is very interesting, or why everybody's interested in all this control. I think potentially West would like to use this.
First, at the end of the day, this is going to pass through Sunic. So if there is some sort of Western presence there, either like private companies or, I don't know, some observer or whatever, this means significant increase of Western presence in Sunic. And this itself means that the West will have some sort of ability, if not to control, at least to monitor Armenia-Iran border. But this is not only Armenia-Iran border. Let's not forget that Armenia-Iran border is the only land border between Eurasian Economic Union and Iran.
And very recently... The Eurasian Economic Union and Iran signed a free trade agreement, and Iran even applied to become observer, to obtain observer status at the Eurasian Economic Union. So if there is some sort of Western presence along this route...
Again, regardless if it's a private company, it's some observer mission or whatever, it means that the West will have significant more capacities and capabilities to monitor the Armenian-Iran border, what is entering from Iran to Armenia. And I don't think that this will make Russia happy, because at the end of the day, Russia would like to have this Eurasian Economic Union, Iran-only-led border, free of Western, let's use the term, monitoring. I'm not telling that the West will close the Armenia-Iran border, definitely no.
But again, the increased Western presence in the Sunni region to provide security for Azerbaijanis or Turks who will travel via Sunni, this automatically means increased Western capacities and capabilities to also monitor, first of all, Armenia-Iran border, Armenia-Iran trade, and also the Eurasian Economic Union-Iran trade. Plus, if this is fully under Turkish and Azerbaijani control, nobody can... clues that there will be like transfer of weapons or maybe illicit drugs it could be also human trafficking so in in any case all are interested to have some sort of presence there again to see what azerbaijan and turkey are doing russia would like to see okay what turkey is exporting to azerbaijan maybe from azerbaijan to central asia and of course it's a big big if because frankly speaking i think that all this talk about middle corridor is significant it's a hype it's significantly exaggerated And also there is this current route for this middle corridor, Azerbaijan-Georgia-Balaxi or Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey, Baku-Kablisi car. So I think that all these talks about that Zangajor corridor could be part of middle corridor, I don't believe that middle corridor will have so many goods or cargo that Azerbaijan-Georgia transit capacities will be overheld. And they will need to use Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey and then Zangajor corridor may play a role.
But let's assume I am wrong and if this route... or corridor via Sunic will become part of those bigger global logistic routes, of course, to be able to influence it, to see who is transporting what, etc., gets more significance. So it's actually more geostrategic, geopolitical than actual geoeconomics because there is a route there right now. I would agree with that assessment. Benyamin, the day after Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan immediately applied for membership in BRICS.
Clearly, this was a topic discussed between the two countries and Putin approved of the idea. So this would seem to put Azerbaijan in the first step of its membership application. Armenia, meanwhile, launched an Armenia BRICS business cooperation center.
This is not a formal stage of membership application. Where does Azerbaijan's application position the country within the various world economic alignments, whether the east, the west, the global south or otherwise? Does this seem to be a situation where.
Azerbaijan is expressing some interest to be independent of the Western economic platform? I would rather say that it means that Azerbaijan is interested to pursue its more or less, let's call it balanced foreign policy. Because what is BRICS? I don't agree that BRICS is something like anti-Western, because as far as India is there, BRICS cannot be anti-Western. Because India is not a pro-West, but also India is not anti-West, and Brazil is not anti-West.
So BRICS is not a geopolitically anti-West. But BRICS is like a loose club of emerging economies who all have some problem with the Western institutions, global economic institutions, because all these global economic institutions, they were created in 1944, Bretton Woods. And at that time, let's not forget that the United States was almost 50% of global GDP because all Europe was destroyed, et cetera, et cetera.
Now, many countries are not very happy with IMF, with World Bank. Like they're arguing why World Bank should be more or less under US influence. and IMF also under US influence, and et cetera, et cetera. So this is more or less like a loose club of emerging markets or emerging economic giants who are not very happy about the global economic governance because definitely current global economic governance was created to serve mainly United States interests or to protect the US leading or hegemonic role.
What Azerbaijan is doing, Azerbaijan is trying to continue its balanced foreign policy. Look, Azerbaijan is a member of non-aligned movement. Even he was able to become a chairman of this non-alliant movement. And because of COVID pandemic, his chairmanship lasts for three years. I think 2019, 2022. Then, but Azerbaijan is also trading with the West.
As I mentioned, Azerbaijani gas mostly goes to Europe. Of course, also to Georgia and Turkey, but also to Europe. And Azerbaijan oil goes to Europe and also to Israel. I believe like 35 or 40% of Azerbaijan oil export goes to Israel. Israel is in the Middle East, but geopolitically, Israel is a part of the West.
So I don't believe that Azerbaijan is interested to move away economically from the West because its main profit or income is coming from selling oil and gas and the main customers are in the West. But also, Azerbaijan would like, I think, to show that, again, he's trying to pursue balanced foreign policy, like, okay, we will be more or less okay with the West, economic relation, but also we'd like to have other players. They just very recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with China.
And interestingly, now only Armenia has no strategic partnership agreement with China because Georgia, I mean, in South Caucasus, because Georgia signed this type of agreement in 2023. So I would say that this is like another message. that Azerbaijan is interested to continue its balanced foreign policy, and Azerbaijan does not want to fully focus on the West, but also Azerbaijan does not want to be anti-West, which at the end of the day is in quite a smart position, at least until nobody knows what will be the new European security architecture. Because it's clear that the new European security architecture will be defined by the outcome of the Ukraine war, and then we will see like what country or what great power or potential great power will influence the European security architecture or what parts of Europe or greater Europe or Eurasia will be part of what great power, if not zone of influence, but at least some sort of zone of interest.
So I think Azerbaijan is quite clever trying to put its eggs in different baskets. Some eggs are in the Western basket. Some eggs are in Turkey basket.
Now some eggs will be put in BRICS basket, in China basket. which is, I would say, quite smart foreign policy, frankly speaking. Okay. Well, early in 2024, there were some talks about interest between Armenia and BRICS, but I don't know that anything's panned out.
Also, I haven't heard anything about Georgia and BRICS. Is there any kind of interest in the rest of the South Caucasus outside of Azerbaijan as far as BRICS goes? Non-officially.
I don't believe that Georgia officially applied to join BRICS, but also Georgia signed a strategic agreement with China, which... Of course, China is not BRICS, but somehow this is also a sign of Georgia also trying to balance. Georgia mostly was balancing between trying to use Turkey in the West, or Turkey-West Azerbaijan, balancing Russia.
Probably now Georgians would like also to use China both to balance probably Turkey, and also probably the West. But when you look at the current policy of Georgian-Dreamed government, again, I don't believe this is purely anti-Western. So we see a lot of criticism from the United States and the European Union against Georgia's current government. They canceled some aid.
European Union officially halted the accession process. We just started in December 2023 by granting Georgia candidate status. But again, I don't believe that Georgia would like to be anti-West. Like, I don't believe Georgia would like to be another, I don't know, Venezuela or Nicaragua.
But simply Georgia also trying to understand that, OK, if the world is going to be multipolar, and South Caucasus is not Central Europe, which means that the US and the EU will not be the only decisive players in the region. Even if there is going to be extended rivalry, but still other players, including Russia, Turkey, China, will have some role. So why to be only pro-Western?
Why to be like anti-Russia or some sort of anti-China? Let's be not anti against anyone. Somehow, I believe Georgia government is trying to do what Azerbaijan is trying to do. Like, okay, let's not... be against anti-anyone.
Again, I don't believe they would like to be anti-West, but also now they are trying to somehow shift the perception of Georgia as anti-Russian. Because under Saakashvili, especially starting from 2005, because during early six, seven months, Saakashvili met President Putin several times, but then for whatever reason, starting from late 24, early 25, Georgia became anti-Russian. And it was very clear, yes, that Saakashvili, Georgia is pro-West, anti-Russian.
Now, I believe Georgian government is also trying not to be anti-anything, not anti-Russia, not anti-West, not anti-China, not anti-Turkey. Strategically, I believe all don't want to be anti-anything until at least this new European security architecture will be more or less clear what does it mean. All right. Thank you for that. Let's be done for today.
Let me ask each of you if there's something on your mind that you want to share with our audience. Benyamin, what's on your mind? Okay, today we recorded our program on September 2nd, 33rd anniversary of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. I would say only one thing. Without Nagorno-Karabakh Republic or Nagorno-Karabakh Republic or the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic fully under Azerbaijani control, Armenia is extremely vulnerable, especially its southern part.
I mean, it's unique and valued regions. And as I mentioned, Azerbaijan has two strategic goals. One, no Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Second...
direct contact with Turkey via southern part of Armenia. So the southern part of Armenia situation is extremely vulnerable and we as a nation in Armenia, outside Armenia, like diaspora or anyone who is not only thinking about the personal or family interest, should think very carefully to see how we can decrease this vulnerability. Hovig, what's on your mind? Well, same topic, but I think that essentially I want to make the argument that September 2 should be one of the most important dates.
It is obviously very difficult to celebrate something that doesn't exist anymore, but it is a historic date. It is a remembrance of... what we were able to achieve.
And as Benjamin said, I think that it is at the core of this global Armenian nation with diaspora and Armenia constituting a single nation. And unless you are willing to give up even that concept, which is essentially an island of ex-Armenia with no ties to a diaspora, unless you're also willing up to give your connections to your brethren in Armenia, then you should, in my opinion. strive for the rights, at least, and security of Artsakh.
And let this not be a militant call, because I think we're far from being able to do that. But it should be a call for vigilance, and to always know that we should not shy away from keeping this at the top of our agenda, even if it's in the form of rights and security, and demanding at any international forum, including COP29, you know, you can use hashtag COP29 to talk about the injustice. that everyone in the world essentially is agreeing with, which is sweeping Artsakh under the carpet, giving Azerbaijan more prominence in exchange for receiving Azerbaijani gas and oil. You know, just a call for vigilance on this day, I think would be appropriate.
All right. We'll leave it there for today. Thank you, Ben Yamin, for joining us.
Thank you. Thank you, Aspet. Thank you, Hobik. It's always a pleasure to be with you. That was our show, recorded on September 2nd, 2024. We've been talking with Dr. Benyamin Boğazyan, who is a senior fellow at APRI Armenia, a Yerevan-based think tank, and he's also the chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies.
For more on Dr. Boğazyan, please check his page through our show notes at podcasts.grung.org. I'm Asped Bedrosyan. And this is Hovik Manu Çaryan. Please follow us on social media and follow us everywhere you get your Armenian news.
The links are in the show notes. Thanks for listening. We'll talk to you soon.