Transcript for:
Enforcement of International Law

hello this lecture introduces the topic of  enforcement of international law over the   next few sessions i will explain different  strategies the states and non-state actors   use to instigate compliance with  international law international   lawyers because they are lawyers tend to focus  on legal approaches that are by their own nature   adversarial and many times in international law  textbooks you will only find references in on   when you are looking at this topic to counter  measures and very particularly to the role and   functions of the security council my approach is  going to be much wider i think it reflects better   the practice of states and non-state actors in  international relations and i will have a broader   approach if you want and i will cover both  confrontational approaches to compliance   to compliance such as naming and shaming  sanctions conditionalities countermeasures   legal proceedings but also more the plethora  of that are of more cooperative mechanisms that   are often missing as i say from manuals and  the literature on enforcement and compliance   this includes confidence building measures  peer review mechanisms or technical assistance because there is no centralized or even  decentralized structure to impose the compliance   of international law in a manner that seems  similar to enforcement powers at domestic level   and because the existence of law is premised  on its possible enforcement international   lawyers are frequently confronted with the  presumption that international law cannot be   enforced many times that because of this  international law does not even exist so perhaps because they are eager to respond to  this claim and to contest them many international   lawyers and international law books focus as i  said the explanations on strategies to instigate   compliance on to the closest approximation to a  standing body of enforcement that you can find in   international law the united nations security  council considering the unrepresentative and   democratic composition of the security council  and its role in preserving peace and security   this approach reinforces rather than contest the  impression that international law can only be   enforced exceptionally when a few countries  with lots of power are interested in that   result but in reality states and non-state  actors use a wide range of mechanisms to   instigate the compliance of international law they  might not look like putting someone in prison or   giving a fine or punishing them by force  but they are still mechanisms of enforcement   and international law is not only followed by  states spontaneously it is followed because they   know that some unwanted negative consequences will  follow if they behave otherwise on other occasions   they respond better to positive incentives  designed to ensure adherence to international law   so over the next few minutes my first video  will outline the logic that leads to an   excessive focus on confrontational approaches in  general and the security council in particular   then a second recording will  introduce some of the most   used strategies to prompt compliance that are  based on negative consequences for the wrongdoer   this will be followed by a third video focusing  on cooperative strategies and i will end   with the explanations on the topic of  enforcement by referring to the role of   the united nations security council and  also the general assembly in this field lets start exploring the reasons that underpin  an excessive focus on confrontational approaches   in general and the security council in particular  in my opinion they are linked to misleading   conceptions of the rule of law in international  law as well as what i call judicial fetishism   along with a fascination  for the extraordinary powers   of the security council and the use of armed force lacking central structures monopolizing power  to create and enforce norms the politicization   of international law defies the logic that  associates law with a system of rules and   enforcement mechanisms that are able to deliver  the same consequences for equivalent events this   is not a flaw of international law but an inherent  characteristic derived from the sovereignty of   states who remain the main actors but not the  only ones creating and enforcing international   regulations other non-state actors especially  international organizations such as those   composing the world bank group the wto or the  european union have an immense power and leverage   in the creation and enforcement of rules too  for all of them the consent of the state remains   central in any norm creating an enforcement  process so despite some grand declarations   claiming otherwise the concept of an international  rule of law is largely vacuous in the   international space states and non-state actors  do not abide with the principle of supremacy of   the law equality before the law fairness in  its application and independent adjudication these elements remain subject to the  consent of the state and therefore   unrestrained by conventional conceptions of the  rule of law in international law politicization   understood as the application  of double standards that   undermine the essence of the rule of law  is a feature of the legal regime not a malfunction if the rules that are part  of what we call international law have   normative force some degree of penalty ought to be  associated with a failure of compliance otherwise   what is the difference between binding and  non-binding rules if there's no difference between   breaching a rule that's binding and not binding  because there's no difference in the consequence   then there's no difference between binding and  not binding and pretty much law it doesn't exist and in addition this general principle of law  prescribes that there is always a right where   there is a remedy so law should provide a remedy  to protect the right that is damaged or lost   legal scholars and practitioners are prone to what  i call judicial fetishism and too often there is a   tacit understanding that the norm is not really  a norm until articulated by a judicial body   this is linked to the theoretical primitivism  of international law in comparison with   national law justiciability of norms is often made  a condition of legal status and the perfection   of international law is measured against a more  evolved imaginary model of national jurisdiction   with centralized judicial administrative  and legal measures of implementation   following these premises it is often deduced  logically that any step to get closer to this more   perfect model is desirable this logic is probably  behind the proliferation or the increasing number   of international tribunals first and a more  and the more recent backlash against them uh   currently in summary while the progressive  institutionalization of international law through   the proliferation of international organization  has implied some delegation of sovereign powers   states remain the principal actors when it comes  to enforcing international rules even when states   decide to bring a dispute to an international  court the judicial body will settle the dispute   without normally dictating how the final result  should be reached at the national level the vast   majority of disputes between states are resolved  outside legal quarters and the mechanisms to   enforce international law don't follow a model  of rights breach responsibility process sanction   leading to punishment of every violator fiiting  the same category or at least to redress victi any   all the victims suffering from the same harm  deriving from a breach of international law   international law has its own rules to protect  the integrity of its rules and we should not   limit our views on how they are replicated  in the imaginary more perfect domestic system the implementation and enforcement machinery of  international standards cannot be expected then   from a centralized impartial supranational  international body seeking to put pressure   on the state to compel a change of behavior  respectful of international law although many   times that's what people uh legal scholars and  even states expect from the security council   the next sessions will examine the main measures  used to instigate compliance by separating them   in two categories confrontational  and cooperative approaches so here   i highlighted confrontational approaches  and i listed them and also cooperative approaches