Part of what I do as we move forward with subject material here on The Cold War is go back and re-evaluate events and documents and ideas from earlier time periods that we may have already covered. I do this as part of my ongoing learning process. As I find out more about things that I was unfamiliar with, I'm able to see certain connections to earlier events that I may have overlooked in the past.
This is, after all, how the study of history actually works. I'm your host David and today we are going to be looking at an early Cold War document that was instrumental in guiding how the Cold War was to be waged. We are going to look at National Security Council Paper NSC 68. This is the Cold War. It's been more than 30 years since the Cold War ended.
It was a conflict that was waged across every corner of the Earth, touching every facet of society and even expanding into space. How this conflict began though is still up for debate. Was it happenstance or deliberate policy, or perhaps a combination of both?
United States National Security Council Document Number 68, NSC 68, a 58 page memorandum, explained not only why the United States was fighting the Cold War, but how to do so. First, some broader context. The United States National Security Council was established as part of a broader post-war reorganization of the US defense and national security apparatus. The NSC was meant to replace the ad hoc circle of advisors who had previously counseled the President on American foreign policy.
The NSC was also meant to enhance coordination between various US agencies and help to smooth over inter-service and inter-agency rivalry. The success of this is still debatable, but by 1950, thanks to the determination of President Truman, and his administration, the National Security Council had become the primary coordinating body for US foreign policy. In that role, it began to debate how the US should respond to the perceived aggression of the USSR.
It's worth noting that by 1950, when the drafting of NSC-68 began, the debate over how to respond had been ongoing for some time in other documents such as the Long Telegram and Article X, both written by George Kennan. Kennan, for those of you who have not yet seen our episode on the Long Telegram, was a career diplomat who had lived and worked in the USSR for years and who had gone on to be the head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and was thus part of the new National Security Council's State Department contingent when the NSC was established in 1947. He would remain at that post until 1949. In his public and private writings, Kennan had argued that while was partly influenced by the party and ideology, Soviet behaviour was primarily grounded in the traditional insecurity and goals of Russian leaders. Kennan argued in his 1946 long telegram that the so-called party line of the USSR quote, "...does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. They are by and large friendly to outside world, eager and experienced of it, eager to measure against its talents, and are conscious of possessing, eager above all, to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labour. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a republic often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts." Kennan also noted that whatever the attitude of common people, "...party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power, party, secret police and government, and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal." Kennan further expanded his thesis on Soviet behaviour, arguing that at the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.
He explained that this feeling of insecurity was developed not only from their history of living on a vast exposed plain in neighbourhood of fierce nomadic peoples, but of competing with the more economically advanced West as well. It was this insecurity that primarily affected Russian leaders. Quote Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.
Essentially, Kennan was arguing that Soviet ideology was just a new face of traditional Russian imperialism, imperialism that appeared to be expansive and aggressive from the outside but was driven by deep paranoia and insecurity rather than an overarching ideological mission. Kennan's prescription was to confront and contain the USSR, but still maintain it. dialogue.
He believed that since the USSR was behaving in the same pattern as Imperial Russia, the same solutions should apply. Kennan's perspective though was not universally held. Many Americans saw the USSR in purely ideological terms and among these was the man US Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose to replace Kennan as head of the policy planning staff, Paul Nitze. Nitze had a long career in government and business, but unlike Kennan, he had never lived in the USSR nor had prolonged exposure to Russian culture. Nitze and others believed that the United States could not return to its pre-war isolation, but also that any challenge presented by the USSR was one of existential survival and not just power politics.
It was with that in mind that Nitze and his staff began drafting NSC 68, which was presented to President Truman on April 7, 1950. NSC-68 was not a subtle document to begin with. It argued the present state of the world presented a tremendous challenge, quote, "...involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this republic but of civilization itself." The document then went on to frame US-Soviet relations in a purely ideological format. Section 2, The Fundamental Purpose of the United States, cites the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence to argue the US is an inherently good nation, one that is bringing freedom to all peoples everywhere.
By contrast, Section 3, titled Fundamental Design of the Kremlin, assumes that the USSR was in full control of communism everywhere and went on to, quote, calls for the complete subversion of forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to... and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end, Soviet efforts are now directed towards the domination of the Eurasian landmass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design." End quote. Okay. So clearly, Nizza was using NSC 68 to advance the idea of monolithic communism, the notion that the Kremlin was the control centre for communist movements everywhere. Nizza was also arguing that the singular goal of the USSR was world domination. Now, keeping in mind that while this was being drafted, McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare was in full swing, this was a pretty safe political position to take, but also reflected the view of many American government officials that the US and USSR were ideological incompatible enemies. NSC 68 went on to lay out four potential courses of action for the US to address the threat of the USSR. One, continuation of current policies, two, isolation, three, war, and four, a more rapid building up of the political, economic and military strength of the free world. So, let's go through them. The first option was to keep military spending and foreign policy the same. Course 2 was to return to pre-World War 2 isolation. And Course 3 was to launch a preemptive attack against the USSR. All three of these were argued against in the document. Continuing current policies, it argued, would see the US gradually fall behind the USSR in conventional military capabilities, political influence and economic competitiveness. The USSR had detonated their first atomic bomb the year before, breaking the US nuclear monopoly meaning the US could not afford to allow the Soviet Union to continue to catch up. The second course of action was to revert to the United States' traditional geopolitical position, isolation. This was actually a fairly popular option in American politics, with Senator Robert Taft, a potential Republican nominee for President in 1952, being a leading advocate. Of isolation, NSC 68 said, with the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability That Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our own power which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it, and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order to the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Ok, so continuing things as they were was out and isolating the US or even the Western Hemisphere from the rest of the world wasn't a great option based on Nitz's assumption that the USSR's ultimate goal was world domination. So why not launch a preemptive war? NSA 68 addresses this question directly saying quote, It goes without saying that the idea of preventative war, in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies, is generally unacceptable to the Americans. The document then goes on to note that aside from the moral implications of launching a pre-emptive war, the US and its allies were not able to match the USSR and its perceived allies conventionally. Atomic strikes would likely cause great damage to the USSR, but would still be insufficient to prevent the USSR from being a threat to the United States. and other communist nations from overrunning Eurasia, thus heralding a long and grim war that would likely end in either stalemate or mutual destruction. NSC-68 therefore recommended the best option for the United States was to expand its military, economic and scientific capabilities and investments and be prepared to deter and if necessary, confront the USSR with armed force. Now, in hindsight, this seems like a perfectly reasonable course of action. given that's how it played out. But it's important to note that this was quite a radical idea at the time. Before the Second World War, the US had relied on its geographic isolation to protect it, keeping a relatively small standing army that was then expanded when war began, using conscripts and volunteers. And SC-68 in effect argued that the US needed to be put on a permanent war footing, keeping its military and industry at levels of mobilization, close to those seen during the Second World War. It also involved investing in securing a network of international security alliances, including aid to friendly states and the construction of permanent overseas garrisons. All very familiar, in hindsight. NSC 68 concludes by arguing, In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it. with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance." NFC 68 was submitted to President Truman in April of 1950 and it was greeted by some mixed reactions within its administration. Some felt that America had no need of an almost war footing to counter the Soviet Union, while others, including Truman, were interested in the ideas but needed to know the specific costs and details involved.
The document and the policy, however, were handed the ultimate gift on June 25th, as North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, sparking the Korean War. With that, debate over NSC-68 quickly fell to the wayside. America's unpreparedness to halt the North Korean advance seemed to reinforce the ideas outlined in NSC 68, only to be further reinforced by the Chinese entry into the war in late 1950. Although Truman did demand some revision, he eventually approved the document in 1951. Defense spending soared and continued at high levels throughout the Cold War, as the US pursued a policy of confronting any possible expansion of communism around the world.
Now, as we move to wrap this week up, I am sure you are wondering who was the better analyst, Nitze or Kennan? Whose perspective was closer to reality? Well, as it turns out, archival documents made available after the fall of the Soviet Union show that neither was entirely correct or incorrect in their assessment, although Kennan's interpretation should be considered substantially closer to reality. A telegram sent by Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Novikov to the Soviet leadership in 1946 argues that "...reflecting the imperialistic tendency of American monopoly capital, U.S. foreign policy has been characterized in the post-war period by a desire for world domination. This is the real meaning of repeated statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles that the U.S. has a right to world leadership. All the forces of American diplomacy, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, industry, and science have been placed at the service of this policy. With this objective in mind, broad plans for the expansion have been developed, to be realized both diplomatically and through the creation of a system of naval and air bases far from the US, an arms race, and the creation of newer weapons." The Telegram goes on to add that the US had tried to allow its rivals, Germany, the UK and the USSR, to destroy each other before becoming involved in the Second World War. Essentially, Novikov is taking the mirror opposite position of Nizza, arguing it was the US that sought world domination for ideological reasons, and the USSR had to protect itself from that.
Though how exactly it was to do that is unclear, as Novikov, as the good apparatchik, would likely not have dared to try to tell Stalin how to guide foreign policy. The adoption of NSC-68, which the Americans viewed as nominally defensive measures, increasing military readiness and expanding US bases, would in turn convince the USSR that the US was preparing, if not for a preemptive strike against the USSR itself, then to invade or overthrow friendly regimes. Thus, the cycle of mistrust and escalation that would define the entirety of the Cold War began with each side pouring more resources into armed conflicts and economic and political competition convinced they had to do so to prevent their rival from overtaking them. Although competition would spur some great advances, like the space race and even the development of computing, much of the legacy of the Cold War, from Latin America to Africa and the Middle East to Southeast Asia would be war, deprivation and destruction. All stemming from one government paper.
We hope you've enjoyed today's episode and to make sure you don't miss all of our future episodes, please make sure you subscribe to our channel, have pressed the like button, and have created a 50-page government submission outlining why a massive increase in defence spending is necessary to press the bell button. A huge thank you to all of our Patreon Patrons and if you aren't already, please consider supporting us on Patreon at patreon.com slash thecoldwar or through YouTube membership. We can be reached via email at thecoldwarchannel at gmail.com. This is the Cold War Channel and as we think about the Cold War, please remember that history is shades of grey and rarely black and white.