Hi everyone, I hope you guys have read the synopsis which I have sent related with case number 28. Before we start with the discussion of case number 28, let me just once again revise the explanation because I guess there's some confusion or doubt related to it it says for the purpose of this section dependency of a suit or proceeding so you have to correlate the explanation with the first essential ingredient have already discussed. So it says for the purposes of this section dependency of a suit or proceeding shall so it's mandatory shall be deemed to commence when it will start or when it will begin shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of a competent jurisdiction. We have already discussed that when it will be deemed that the plaint is presented or the suit is instituted the order the section that we have already discussed.
in a court of a competent jurisdiction. So competent jurisdiction here they are trying to talk about the pecuniary or the territorial jurisdiction and to continue and so that means both the criterias are important. So it says and to continue until the suit or the proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree. So that means when the matter is filed before the court the ultimate order is passed so then only you will presume that this suit is complete.
completely disposed of. Continue until the suit or the proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order. So stages need to recall presentation of the plaint.
So plaint, then comes the summons, then comes the written statement. Then I mean in a very layman manner I'm telling you first will be the plaint, then comes the summons, then comes the written statement, then comes the first hearing, affidavits, then admissions then cross-examination then order depending upon the situation or it can be a judgment or the on last it will be the decree and in order to execute that decree so the final stage will be called as the execution so it all comprises of so it says for the purposes of this section dependency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plain or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction and to continue until the suit or the proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete now please pay attention and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained or has become unoptimized so complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree so they are trying to say here that once the court has passed the decree obviously the party will be called as the decree holder in whose favor the decree will be passed and against whom it will be passed that person will be called as the judgment debtor so here it says and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree so the decree holder has to separately file an application for the execution of the decree unless and until that decree the the proceedings for the execution of the decree is not disposed of it will be considered as as if that the suit is still pending or the litigation is still pending so it says and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained or so or situations they have mentioned it can be either one or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of the limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being enforced so here they are trying to say that as far as the Indian limitation act is concerned there is a separate time period provided for the execution of the proceedings so if for example because i know i do not have the indian limitation act so we are taking a hypothetical situation that for example under the limitation act if it says 30 days or one year one year depending upon the situation so the moment a degree is passed in favor of a degree holder then the law says that he has 30 days of time to file an application for the execution of the decree according to the limitation act so if he is not able to file the application for the execution of the decree before the executing code so separate hearing will be conducted so if he is not able to file that that's a that separate application for the execution of the the decree on the even on the last day of that particular limitation period then it will be deemed that he has exhausted all his opportunities and even if the court has passed the decree in his favor but the remedy will not be provided to him so it says or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of the limitation prescribed for the execution thereof thereof means the decree which is passed so in order to execute that decree separate execution proceeding will be conducted by any law for the time being enforced so it has become time but so unless and until these situations are not arising we will not say that the suit is completed so it will be deemed that there is a pendency of the litigation so we have revised once again the explanation which is correlated with the essential ingredient number one now once again we have to start with the essential ingredients the remaining one under section 52 so let me once again read it says during the appendix in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding the state of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond the limits by the central government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which so today in this video I'm going to discuss this third essential ingredient first which says and in which any right or right to immovable property is direct directly and specifically in question the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party. So they are trying to say here that as far as the third essential ingredient is concerned which says which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. So the first and the foremost point which you have to remember.
remember in order to apply the doctrine of the list pendants is that the subject matter of the dispute is an immovable property so first there is a pending suit or a litigation between the parties so they will be called as the plaintiff and the defendant so for both the litigating parties the rule says that till the time the matter is pending till the time the litigation is there they do not have a right to alienate that respective property that is the a respective subject matter which is in dispute because they never know that in whose favor the court is going to give the judgment so it says uh and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question so they are trying to say here that there are two parties x and y so the dispute is between x and y so subject matter is the property z so neither x nor y is having a right to further alienate this property z property to some r person so it says and if tomorrow if one of the parties alienate this r property to some third person he will be called as the eleni because the right is created in his favor so they are trying to say here that the property which is transferred to him and the property which is a subject matter of the dispute between the litigating parties the property property must be the same one itself it says directly and specifically in question so the property should be same one for example landlord and tenant so landlord has filed a suit against the tenant because there was an areas of rent so the issue the question was with respect to the areas of the rent now what happened this during the pendency of the litigation, the landlord has transferred the property to some Y person. So here, because the right which was in question, the subject matter, the nature of the claim was different in first suit, it is with respect to the areas of the rent. Whereas, when he has actually transferred the property, he has transferred the property keeping in mind that the Let the court decide about the areas of the intent. So the nature of the claim is different in both the cases. So you need to remember that as far as this third essential ingredient is concerned, there is a test.
So let me just read this. It says that the test whether a suit or a proceeding involves any question of right in immovable property should be the nature of the claim. and the decree passed rather than the property mentioned in the plane so on the basis of your claim that what are you actually asking from the court that should be the same question involved however the following suits have been held to involve the question of rights in immovable property and are within the scope of this section so there are certain examples that when we will consider that the Right to immoral property is directly and specifically in question.
A suit for partition, a suit on martigage, a suit for preemption, easement suits, etc. So this is about that in both the proceedings, one with respect to the pending one and the other one in which one of the parties has entered into. So in both.
the property should also be the same but the nature of the claim is somewhere directly and specifically in question so this is about the third essential ingredient let me just start with the case keeping in mind that you guys have read the synopsis so in case if you have not read the synopsis please stop the video here only read synopsis first and then once again watch the remaining part of the video okay now the next case that is case number 28 which we have to discuss the name of the case is supreme general films exchange limited versus hh maharaja sir bridgenath singhji deo now if you can see the citation of this case it says ar 1975 supreme code 1810 now you can keep my notes along with the case material so that you can correlate whatever i have written in the notes now if you can see the name of the case it says supreme general films exchange limited so supreme general film exchange limited they are the lessee in our present case or you can say the appellant or you can say the defendant at the lower level and hh maharaja sir brijnath singhji dio they are the decree holders or you can say the plaintiff in the lower court or the respondent in the present supreme court case now let's start once again it says and you have to keep on correlating whatever words they have written here the plaintiff respondent so please see the citation respondent is h.h maharaja and he was the plaintiff also so it says the plaintiff respondent had filed a suit in the district judge code at jabalpur claiming a declaration so he's basically seeking he's asking for the declaration from the court claiming a declaration that a lease executed in favor of the defendant apparent see the name supreme general firms limited so he's asking from the court that you please declare that the lease which is executed in the favor of supreme general firm exchange limited or you can say plaza talkies it should be declared as null and void. So, the plaintiff respondent had filed a suit in the district judge court at Jabalpur claiming a declaration that a lease executed in favor of the defendant Appelant Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange and Amateur, the company, in respect of Sundar Villa's theater known as Plaza Talkies by its former owners. So, that means lessors are Jeevan Das Bhatia and they have executed this particular lease deed in favor of Supreme General Femmes Exchange Limited and the subject matter of that lease deed was the Plaza Talkies Theatre. By its former owners, Jeevan Das Bhatia and his sons, here and after referred to as the Bhatias, is void and ineffective against, underline, against the plaintiff's right. So if you can see the name of the case, it says.
Supreme General's Film Exchange Limited vs HH Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singh Deo So HH Maharaja Sir Bijna Singh Deo, they are the plaintiffs in our present case, they are the decree holders in our present case. So you have to see the position also. So is void and ineffective against the plaintiff's right under decrees. So decree is already passed in favor of the respondent.
And now he is actually basically here. He has filed the suit. at the lower level basically he has filed the suit so the decree is already passed in his favor now the lessee those lessee is actually filing the suit filing the this application against the decree holder in the present case so it says is void and ineffective against the plaintiff's right under the decrees obtained in civil suit number 15a of 9 So you have to remember that as far as the suit is concerned, it was filed in 1954. So it says dated 7th May 1960. So it was decreed on 7th May 1960 and in civil suit number, so there were two civil suits and in civil suit number 3B of 1952 dated 28th April 1954 in execution of which the creator had been attached.
So, the court has given the judgment in favor of the plaintiff that is why he is a decree holder and in those decrees the court has given the remedy that in order to pay the principal as well as the interest the only remedy available is to attach the immovable property which was the subject matter of the lease deed. So, it says in execution of which the theater had been attached the The plaintiff wanted, so in our present case he is the decree holder as well as the respondent. The plaintiff wanted the declaration also to make it clear that an auction purchaser, at the moment the theatre will be sold.
So here he is saying to make it clear that an auction purchaser purchasing the theatre in the execution of either of the two decrees, one passed in 1960 and the other one in 1954, gets... rights free from any obligation towards the defendant appellant under the voiley so that means they're trying to say there should no be uh there should not be any covenant or any obligation attached and without any obligation the person who's going to purchase this particular theater he should the right should be transferred in his favor now let's start with the second paragraph it says the former owners of the theater the bhatia so you can put an arrow and you can can write that they are the judgment debtors or the mortar gauges so the former owners of the theater the bhatiyas had borrowed rupees two lakh fifty thousand from the plaintiff respondent ahmar raja against the security of the bales of cotton so the owner had actually borrowed this particular amount on the strength of the bales of the cotton that is b so if you can see the synopsis I have written here. Keep on looking.
Then it says on December 29, 1951. So the dates are important. I have marked here also. You can see 1951. So it says on 29 December 1951, they executed a registered mortgage deed in respect of the plaza. theater in favor of the plaintiff as the price of the pledged goods was insufficient to satisfy the dues now as far as this statement is concerned please mark registered mortgage so that means under the concept of the mortgage section 58 58 59 60 this is the part and parcel of the concept of the mortgage it is a written document so registration is required depending upon a situation what kind of a mortgage in which the parties have entered so here it says they executed so that means there is no technical issue in this particular mortgage deed in which the parties have entered so they executed a registered mortgage deed in respect of the plaza theater in favor of the plaintiff As the price of the pledged goods was insufficient to satisfy the dues. So if you can see again the synopsis here, I have written that as security was not sufficient.
A, that means the mortgagee, try to recall section 58, who is the mortgagee and who will be the mortgagee. So the one who's going to transfer, the one who's in a need of a money. So he has to actually transfer his property. So as to keep it as a.
debt in order to secure a debt so a is the mortgagor and b the one who has given the money he is the mortgagee so a the mortgagor i've written here mortgage the immoral property theater that is the plaza talkies date i have mentioned here 1951 so a is a mortgagor and b is the mortgagee now let's read once again it says the plaintiff unable to recover the amount due principal and the interest had brought civil suit number 15A of 1954. So first suit which was filed between I mean the parties that is the mortar gauger and the mortar gaugee that suit was filed in 1954. So this also I have written here so mark it. So it says 1954 in which a compromise decree was passed on 7th May 1960. In terms of an agreement between the parties that the amounts due will be realized by the sale of the Plaza Theatre. So decree is passed. In that decree, clearly the court has mentioned that the theatre will be attached. So that means you have to first sell off the theatre and whatever amount will be realized after selling the theatre, that will be paid to the decree holder.
So explanation, again correlate with the explanation. Explanation clearly says, that as far as the pendency of the suit or the proceeding is concerned it will commence from the presentation of the suit and it will continue unless and until there is a full satisfaction of the decree or the order so here the execution is still remaining so this i have already written in the notes so you can see yourself so read further then it says third paragraph the central bank of india so this third paragraph as such is not important for the exam point of view but we need to read So the Central Bank of India, another creditor of the Bhatia's, had bought Civil suit number 3B of 1952 and obtained a decree for Rs. 124,000 on 29th April 1952. Rights under this decree were assigned. As far as assigned is concerned, there is a concept of the assignment or actionable claims that you can say under the TPA. So assignment is that means that you are actually creating a right in favor of some third person so you're transferring your rights so here it says assigned in favor of the plaintiff respondent now plaintiff responded as a decree holder so they have actually assigned their rights to the plaintiff respondent itself the plaza theater together with other properties of bhatia's who's a judgment letter in our present case was attached on may 4th 1955 in the course of the execution of that decree.
So it has been attached. Now obviously the decree holder has to separately file an application in order to execute the decrees, in order to sell off the respective properties which are attached. So separate hearing will be conducted.
So it will be deemed that as if the matter is pending. Now you can see on the second page of the notes, I've written here that theatre was in the occupation of the tenants Supreme General Films Exchange Limited. who had its possession since 1940 so whatever is happening here it is on like the year which you have to remember is 1954 and prior to all this institution of the suit the property was in the occupation of the tenant that is the supreme general films exchange limited who had its possession since 1940. now let's read the next fourth paragraph and i've already uh marked in the notes the term unregistered lease which is very important here so here it says under paragraph number four the appellant company claim to be a lessee in occupation of the theater where it had carried on the business of running a cinema under underline an unregistered lease obtained on february 27th 1940 see the date 27th february 1940 much prior to the filing of the suit so they are trying to say here that on that respective plaza theater already the appellant was uh you know running his business of cinema carried on the business of running a cinema yeah so he's obviously running this cinema but that deed the lease deed which was actually entered it is an unregistered lease so we have already started or in case you cannot recall right now so you can very well see section number 105 106 and 107 of your dpa which talks about the concept of the lease over there it clearly says that if a lease is executed for more than one year then it has to be compulsory registered so if it is of less than one year or then no need to get it registered otherwise the effect will be that it is it is void so it is an invalid lease so here it says the appellant company claimed to be a lessee in the occupation of the theater where it had carried on the business of running a cinema under an unregistered lease and a line obtained on february 27 1940. this is very important the lease of 1940 had expired on 10th april 1946 so more than one year so that is why it says the emphasis should be on the term unregistered lease the company continued as a tenant holding over underline holding over please put an arrow and write that they are talking about section 116 of the tpa so there is a concept of holding over under holding over the basic cook concept you need to understand because it's a part of fifth semester in holding over i mean the concept of holding over is like this that once our tenancy expires so the general rules say that the tenant has to vacate the premises so if he's not vacating the premises he's still residing on that same premises that means if he has still occupied then that tenancy which was a valid tenancy or the lease which was a valid lease it is converted into a holding over that means without the consent of the remember assent of the tenant plus the assent of the lesser equals to consent so it is only the assent of the tenant to stay or to occupy that possession on the other hand the assent of the landlord is missing it's absent so here it says that the company continued as a holding over until the impugned lease deed of 30th March 1956 was executed.
So once again, see the notes I've written here. First lease deed got expired in 1946. It was entered in 1940, unregistered lease. Then again on the compulsion, I mean, there's a compulsion on the side of the tenant that they Bhatia's company that is the judgment letter in our present case they have once again entered into a lease agreement with the same company and that took place in 1956 this also I have written and it is a second lease so once again start reading it says the appellant company claimed to be a lessee in the occupation of the theater where it had carried on the business of running a cinema under an unregistered lease obtained on February 19 27th 1940 the lease of 1940 had expired on 10th april 1946 the company continued as a tenant holding over until the impugned lease deed of 30th march 1956 was executed please underline this is very important if this was a valid lease so 56 they are talking about if this was a valid lease It would have conferred upon the company the right to be a tenant of the property under the lease for 8 years from 10 February 1956 to 10 February 1964 with an option for the renewal until 10 February 1970. So hypothetical situation that if this is a valid then it is giving you much more rights. then it says this lease was executed underline very important this lease was executed after the company had filed a suit on 20th november 1954 so that is why the dates in this particular case are important in order to know that whether the doctrine of the list pendants will be applicable or not so for your ready uh material i have already written the important facts.
So it says this lease was executed after the company had filed a suit on 20th November 1954 for the specific performance of an agreement to lease contained in a letter dated July 19, 1948. Do not get confused. if you read once again it says this lease was executed after the company had filed a suit so that means first lease which was an unregistered lease it was executed in 1940 got expired in 1946 he was remaining in the he was remaining on that respective property without having a valid right so again he filed the suit against the landlord and in that respective suit there was a compromise which took place between the parties so once again they have entered into a fresh lease deed which was executed in 1956 so they are trying to tell you that how this second lease was executed between the parties so say that this lease was executed after the company had filed a suit number this is on 20th November 1954 for the specific performance of an agreement to lease contained in a letter dated July 19, 1948. A compromise decree was passed on 24th March 1956 in this suit also. The lease deed of 30th March 1956 purported to carry out the terms of that compromise decree. passed in a suit in which the plaintiff was not underlined.
So there was a compromised decree passed in because of which a new lease deed was executed and this happened in 1956. Already the matter was filed in 1954. Decree passed in 1960. Execution proceedings are remaining. It's still pending and when this compromised decree was passed between the lesser and the lessee, the plaintiff that is the decree holder in our present case he was not impleted at all so he was not impleted at all they are trying to say that he was not made the party in this respective compromise uh degree which was passed now next paragraph it says the plaintiff's case that means the decree holder in our present case was that the lease and this is very important the plaintiff case was that the lease of march 30 1956 was void you As it was struck by three statutory provisions, so he is giving the contention that on the basis of these three sections, that lease deed, the second lease they are trying to talk about here, it should be declared as null and void. So it says, namely section 52, that is the doctrine of correspondence, section 65, capital A, and section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. Now section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code says that during the...
pendants during the execution proceedings i mean if the execution proceedings are pending if the judgment debtor yeah if the judgment debtor he tries to sell off the property to some someone else then he has to pay the compensation and you can check yourself also so it says three sections should be applicable that is 52 64 of the cpc and section 65 capital a of the dpa now let me just read section 65 capital a of the dpa it is related with mortgage only yeah section 65 capital a the marginal heading of section 65 capital a says mortgages power to lease so mortgage and mortgagee try to recall so his power to lease so the direct clause which is relevant for this particular case is section 65 clause a sub clause number a so i am directly reading sub clause a it says in the case of a lease of building whether leased with or without the land on which they stand now here it is written whether leased with or without the land so there are types of motor gates simple motor gauge use of luxury motor gauge english motor gauge so depending upon the situation so whether leased with or without the land on which they stand the duration of the lease shall in no case exceed three years so they're trying to say here that that lease video should not exceed three years so it's the maximum time and the lease shall contain a covenant it's an obligation a term should be there or stipulation should be there for the payment of the rent and a condition of re-entry on the rent not being paid if there's an area of rent within the time specified then so it is giving a right to the lesser that if there is a non-compilation non-compilation of the rules from the side of the lessee then it does give a right to the lesser to once again enter in the premises So, let me just read again paragraph from paragraph number 5. It says, the plaintiff case was that the lease of March 30, 1956 was void as it was struck by three statutory provisions. That is 52 of TPA, 65 capital A of the TPA, section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. The defendant's appellant company. So, the judgment data he is trying to say here that the defendant appellant company in addition. to denying the alleged rights of the plaintiff to the benefits of these provisions pleaded that the suit of the nature filed by the plaintiff did not lie at all underline as it fell outside the purview of section 42 of the specific relief act 1877 altogether so he has relied on section 42 of the specific relief act you need to check section 52 of the specific relief act sorry 42 of the specific relief act now section 42 of the specific relief act talks about it if there are negative covenants as well as the positive covenants then even if the there is there is a difficulty from the side of the court to enforce the positive positive covenants which are attached then it will not preclude that means it will not bar the bar the code from enforcing the negative negative covenants or which are there or negative injunction negative points which are there so i don't have sra right now so you can check yourself then please mark paragraph number six now these are the remaining paragraphs are all important so paragraph number six says the trial code and the high court because we are discussing the supreme court case right now the trial court and the high court after having overruled the overruled the pleas of the defendant appellant so that means at the trial court level also at the high court level also his contention was not at all accepted that this particular lease deed should be uh i mean this uh this particular decree order or the person decree order he is not having any right so The trial court and the high court after having overruled the pleas of the defendants Appelan had decreed the plaintiff's suit.
The defendant company obtained special leave to appeal to this court under article 136 of the constitution. So that means the lessee has filed the special leave to appeal before the supreme court in order to compel them or not I mean there's a prayer which he has made that this leaves the should be declared i mean the deck there should be a declaration that uh the decree holder is not having a right over this lease deal and should be declared as null and void now para 18 is again important let's see the contentions it says the contention that the case fell outside obviously it is the appellant who is containing here that means the lessee so i hope now you can correlate the suit is between the lessee and the decree holder. So, it is lessee versus decree holder. So, the contention that the case fell outside the purview of section 52 of the TPA as the lease was executed in purported satisfaction of an antecedent claim rest upon the terms of an agreement of 1948 embodied in a letter on the strength of which the defendant appellant had filed.
He sued for specific performance. So here they're trying to say that already there was a lease deal. which was executed in 1948 and keeping in mind that i mean it got expired in 1948 and there was a letter which was filed by the lessee in 1948 and keeping in mind that letter it's in it's in the right is in the continuation of the first days itself so no new right is created during the pendency of the litigation we find that the court is saying we find that the terms of the compromise decree in that suit and the lease deed of 1956 that is the second lease they're talking about here and the lease deed of the 1956 purported to confer upon the defendant underline defendant appellant new rights they're trying to say here this second lease deed which was executed in 1956 it will amount as if there is a creation of a new right it has no connection with the first deed even though that firstly is an unregistered one so it has no connection then it says you can leave in between two lines same paragraph number 18 it says we are unable to accept i hope you'll find here we are unable to accept the agreement sought to be supported by the citation of bhishan singh khadjan singh air 1958 that the lease was merely an enforcement of an antecedent or a pre-existing right so court is not accepting this plea we think that it purported to create entirely new rights pendente live so that means during the pendency of the litigation the party have actually created a new right in favor of some third person it was therefore struck by the doctrine of less pendence as explained by this quote in jayaram muddler versus ayya swami air 1973 you Embodied in section 52 of the TPA.
Last paragraph is again important. An alternative argument of the appellant was that a case falling within section 65 capital A clause 2 sub clause E of the TPA confining the duration of a lease by a mortgagor to three years being a special provision displaces the provision of 52 of the TPA. That because 65 capital A clause C talks about the maximum period of that lease period should be three years.
So 52 becomes redundant. Then it says this argument overlooks the special objects of the doctrine. Now the court is saying that this argument overlooks the special objects of the doctrine of list pendants, which applies to a case in which litigation relating to property in which rights are sought.
to be created pendentalite by act of parties is pending moreover keep on underlining moreover for the purpose of this argument the defendant appellant assumes that the provision of section 65 capital A's subclass 2 sub subclass 8 tpa are applicable so he is actually presuming if that was so It would make no substantial difference to the rights of the defendant Appellant, which would vanish before the suit was filed if Section 65 applies. We however think, keep on underlining, we however think that as the special doctrine of list pendants is applicable here, the purported lease of 1956 was invalid from the outset because already a matter is pending. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the applicability of 65A2, which the defendant appellant denies to the facts of this case.
For the reasons given above, we dismiss this appeal with cost. So, that means the court has not accepted this plea and clearly it says that it dismissed the appeal with the cost. Now, with respect to first lease.
Though it is not mentioned here but you have to remember that it was an unregistered lease though it got expired so it will not be considered as a valid lead in itself also and it will not be considered as an as an antecedent claim or a kind of a continuation of that respective lease because the first lease was an unregistered one and the second lease was a registered lease that took place in 1956 itself. So this is about Supreme General Films Exchange Limited versus HH Maharaja case. We have covered this case also. So in the next video I will cover the remaining essential ingredients and the last case for this unit that is case number 32, the LeapCore versus Jeevan Ram.
And after that we will cover this topic number 9 and I will start with the next unit. Thank you.