[Lecture 5] Understanding Rowhammer Vulnerability and Mitigation
Mar 30, 2025
Lecture on Memory Robustness and Rowhammer
Introduction
Lecturer: Giray Al
Background: Researcher, lecturer, recently got a PhD in memory robustness
Focus: Memory robustness, specifically Rowhammer
Rowhammer Vulnerability
Rowhammer is a significant vulnerability in memory devices.
Exploits include:
Gaining unauthorized access to data
Breaking out of virtual machine sandboxes
Corrupting data
Altering critical workload behavior
Stealing sensitive data (e.g., SSH keys)
Historical Context
Key Paper: "Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them" (ISCA 2014, Safari group)
Immediate impact demonstrated by Google’s Project Zero: Exploited Rowhammer to gain kernel privileges in Linux systems.
Technical Details of Rowhammer
Rowhammer occurs when repeated access to a row of memory causes bit flips in adjacent rows.
Exploits involve altering page table entries to gain access to larger memory areas.
Memory spraying technique: filling physical memory with page tables to exploit bit flips.
Mitigation Techniques
Error Correcting Codes (ECC): Found ineffective against Rowhammer.
Solutions like increased refresh rates, physical isolation, and memory access throttling have been proposed.
Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation (PARA) is a low-cost, effective solution that refreshes neighboring rows with low probability to prevent bit flips.
Recent Developments
Newer memory devices (DDR4, LPDDR4, HBM) are also vulnerable to Rowhammer.
Techniques like four-sided Rowhammer attack exploit limitations in existing countermeasures.
Rowhammer attacks have been demonstrated across multiple devices, including mobile phones.
Advanced Research and Future Directions
Recent research indicates Rowhammer vulnerability is worsening with technology scaling.
Strategies to mitigate Rowhammer include sophisticated memory refresh strategies and leveraging circuit-level insights.
New attack patterns continue to be discovered, necessitating ongoing research into more robust solutions.
Conclusion
Memory robustness, especially against Rowhammer, remains a critical area of research.
Ongoing advancements in mitigation techniques are necessary as technology scales.
Future memory systems need intelligent controllers for improved security, safety, and reliability.