Overview
This lecture examines Kant's theory of transcendental idealism, focusing on the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, the debate over phenomenalism, and various influential interpretations and objections from Kant's contemporaries and later scholars.
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: Core Claims
- Space and time are forms of our sensible intuition, not properties or things in themselves.
- Objects in space and time are appearances, not independent things in themselves.
- We can only cognize appearances, not things in themselves, though we can think about things in themselves with the categories.
- Things in themselves affect our sensibility, but we cannot know their nature.
Key Distinctions: Realism, Idealism, and Appearances
- Transcendental realism: space/time exist independently; objects are things in themselves.
- Transcendental idealism: objects in space/time exist only as appearances dependent on our forms of intuition.
- Empirical idealism: doubts the reality of external objects; Kant distances himself from this view.
Interpretations of Kant: Phenomenalism Debates
- Phenomenalist reading: objects in space are collections or products of our representations (akin to Berkeley).
- Three types of phenomenalism: identity (objects = representations), strong (existence wholly in representations), qualified (existence partly in representations).
- Kant responds: Only the form, not the matter, of experience is mind-dependent; sensory content arises from things in themselves.
Things in Themselves and Appearances: Relation and Issues
- Kant says things in themselves ground appearances but cannot be known in themselves (humility thesis).
- Problems: how can things in themselves cause appearances if we can’t apply causality to them?
- Appearance/thing-in-itself distinction: debated as either ontological (two entities) or adverbial (two perspectives on one entity).
Dual Aspect and Other Modern Readings
- Dual aspect (anti-phenomenalist): Appearance/thing-in-itself is a distinction in perspective, not objects.
- Epistemic reading: Difference comes from how we, as discursive intellects, are conditioned to know objects.
- Metaphysical readings: Appearances are extrinsic (relational) properties, things in themselves are intrinsic (substantial) properties.
One Object or Two? Interpretive Issues
- Debate over whether appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical or distinct.
- Content and warrant for identity claims are challenged except in moral contexts (e.g., freedom).
Noumena, Phenomena, and Transcendental Object
- Noumena: objects as they might be for an intellect with non-sensible intuition.
- Negative noumena: objects not accessible through sensible intuition (things in themselves).
- The transcendental object: the abstract concept of “object in general” that unifies experience.
Key Terms & Definitions
- Transcendental Idealism — Doctrine that space, time, and appearances are mind-dependent forms, not independent realities.
- Appearance — An object as it is intuited through our forms of perception; not a thing in itself.
- Thing in itself — The reality independent of our perception, unknowable to us.
- Phenomenalism — View that objects are collections or products of sensory experiences or representations.
- Noumenon — Object as it would be for a non-sensible (intellectual) intuition.
- Transcendental Object (=X) — The indeterminate concept of an object required for cognitive unity, not itself knowable.
Action Items / Next Steps
- Review Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, focusing on the Aesthetic, Paralogisms, and postulates on idealism.
- Compare different interpretations of transcendental idealism.
- Consider how the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction impacts other areas of Kant’s philosophy.