“Captain, Do you know where we are”? “ No I don't. I can't see anything."
"Attempting to land…. I am just flying blindly”… Trivandrum, Kerala. The pilots and passengers of this Jet
Airways flight from Qatar to India, are now in a desperate fight for survival. Terrible weather, and the lack of ILS has made
it impossible for the pilots to spot the runway. The pilots have tried to land this plane, not
once, not twice, not thrice, but 6 times already. They have been circling the airports for well over
2 hours. And NOW, they are critically low on fuel. They literally have JUST 10 minutes
of fuel left. In Zero visibility, they are so close to the ground that
the GPWS warnings start blaring, “TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP ” and if they cannot
land this plane in the next 10 minutes, there is a very real possibility that they’ll
crash in the heart of Trivandrum City. How did they let things get so so bad? This is the real story behind the Bollywood
movie Runway 34. It’s a story about how one poor decision by one person can put the lives
of 150 people in danger of imminent death. This is the story of Jet Airways Flight 555. It’s August 17, 2015, and this is Hamad
(Pronounced HAMAADH) International Airport in Doha, Qatar. A Jet Airways Boeing
737-800 is preparing for a four hour flight to Cochin International Airport
in the southern Indian state of Kerala. The pilots rostered for today’s flight had flown
this plane from Cochin to Doha the previous day, and they have had more than 24 hours
of rest between the two flights. The Doha-Cochin sector is one of Jet Airway’s
most popular routes, and today’s flight was no different. The plane was carrying 142
passengers and 8 crew members on board. The plane used today is a Boeing 737-800, the
world's most widely used narrow-body aircraft. It is powered by two GE CFM-56 turbofan engines,
which consume approximately 500 kilograms of fuel every 10 minutes. Keep this in mind, as this story
is about to turn into a MAJOR fuel nightmare. This four hour flight was flown by two
pilots. The captain was pilot flying and the first officer was pilot monitoring. The
captain was 40 years old, and he had around 6700 hours of total flying experience, with
most of his experience being on the type. The First officer is much younger. He is 25 years
old. He only had around 1500 hours of total flying experience with around 600 hours on the type.
Notice the steep discrepancy in the age and relative experience of the two pilots. This power
gradient will soon become an issue in this story. This flight was a night flight, scheduled
to depart at around 10.30pm local time. Now this entire flight was going to occur in the
window of circadian low. Its the time between 2am and 6am, the time when people are usually
sleeping, where the body’s alertness drops. You’d have noticed this when you try to work late
into the night. During this period, the pilots may experience drowsiness and their decision
making skills and alertness might be compromised. The crew met up two hours prior to prepare for
the flight. When they received the weather report, they realized that the weather
report was created 10 hours ago, and they didn’t have a more recent one. They
had to plan their trip based on old information. And THAT report indicated that Cochin had
good weather with visibility at 4000m, a mild 5 knot cross-wind, and scattered clouds
at 1500 feet and broken clouds at 9000 feet. Their chosen alternate was Bengaluru. Now
although closer airports like Tiruvanandhapuram and Kozhikode exists, the cities on the western
side of the Western Ghats tend to have similar weather due to the effects of the mountain range.
Since an alternate airport needs to have better weather than your primary destination, they
chose Bengaluru, which is on the other side of the mountains, and had a visibility of 8000
meters, wind at 290 at 10 knots, scattered clouds at 1200 feet and broken clouds at 8000 feet. They
chose Coimbatore as their secondary alternate. So on this channel, we discuss serious aviation
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care is a sign of strength, not weakness. They then calculated how much fuel they’d require for this trip. There are guidelines
and regulations that govern how much fuel needs to be onboard the plane before
take-off. Here’s how that’s calculated. You start by computing the kilos of fuel
required to taxi the plane at both the origin and destination. For 18 minutes of
taxi, they added 216 kilos of fuel. To this they added the trip fuel. The trip fuel is the
amount of fuel required from accelerating down the runway at Doha, flying all the way to
India, and to exiting the runway at Cochin. The trip fuel was 11, 112 kilos giving them
around 4 hours and 7 minutes of fuel burn. To this they added 14 minutes of contingency
fuel to give them a buffer in case something goes wrong along the way - for example
an unplanned rerouting by ATC to avoid thunderstorms. Jet Airways mandated the
contingency fuel to be 5% of the trip fuel. To this they added the alternate fuel
of 2178 kilos to give them 44 minutes of flying time to get to Bengaluru airport
in case they are unable to land at Cochin. To this they added the final reserve
fuel. Final reserve fuel is the amount of fuel requried to fly for 30 minutes at
1500 feet over their alternate airport, in this case, Bengaluru. For this flight,
that was calcuated to be 1128 kilos. They also added 105 kilos for the APU
burn as required by the airline. This brought the Absolute Minimum Fuel to
15,295 kilos. Due to the possibility of poor weather over Cochin, the Captain considered
that additional hold time maybe required, and hence added an additional 750 kilos
of fuel for an additional 19 minutes. In all, they took on 16100
kilos of fuel giving them a total engines-on time of 6 hours and 13 minutes. Now, let’s get back to Doha, Qatar. The passengers
have boarded and the plane is ready to depart. The plane pushed back at 1920
UTC and departed Doha at 1937 UTC headed to Kochi, India. A four
hour flight was ahead of them. 3 and a half hours later, they
arrived near India’s west coast, and got in touch with Kochi ATC. The time now
is 4.30am IST. The ATC informed them that the latest weather at Kochi was visibility
at 3500 metres, in hazy conditions, with few clouds at 1500 feet and scattered
clouds at 8000 feet. This was not too different from what the pilots expected to hear and so
they continued their approach towards Cochin. Let’s get familiar with Kochi airport.
This is a single runway airport with runways 09/27. The active runway this morning
was 27. The approach for runway 27 requires the pilots to fly over the runway to a
VOR, fly out east at a heading of 097, and then turn around to a heading of 271
to position themselves for a landing. The plane arrived overhead
at Kochi airport at 5.20am, and they were cleared by ATC to approach 27. At
this time, they had 4844 kilos of fuel available. This is going to be their first landing attempt
for the day. The ATC reached out with updated weather information. The visibility had reduced
to 3000m and it was trending lower. There was fog all over the runway and on the approach path. The
plane entered the cloud layer, and the captain’s forward visibility dropped dramatically. They
couldn’t see anything outside the window. As they continued to land, they
checked their approach charts. The minimum visibility for this runway
was 650m. And the decision altitude was 320 feet. If they couldn’t see the runway
at 320 feet, they’ll HAVE to go-around. The crew continued with the approach, hoping
to see the runway in due course. They extended their flaps and brought the gear down. As the
plane continued to descend down the glideslope, the weather continued to worsen. As the plane
dropped below 1000 feet, nothing was visible. They then hit their Decision Altitude. The runway was
nowhere to be seen. So at 256 feet they pressed the Toga switch, applied max power, and executed
their first go-around. The time was 5:28am IST. The Pilot Flying then followed
the missed approach procedure and joined the holding pattern over Cochin. The fuel onboard dropped to 4699 kgs. The minimum fuel required for a diversion
to Bengaluru was 3306 kilos. While holding, they checked what the weather was
like at their planned alternates, Bengaluru and Coimbatore. The crew also requested the ATC to
provide them with the weather for Trivandrum. So, Why Trivandrum? The captain reasoned that If they decided to
divert to Trivandrum instead of Bengaluru, that would give them an additional
20 minutes of holding time at Cochin, maybe allowing them to do two
more approaches if needed. Since Trivandrum wasn’t in their original
plans, The First officer checked the NOTAMS for that airport. NOTAMS are Notices to
Air Missions which lists all the restrictions at a given airport. The NOTAM stated that the
ILS at Trivandrum was down for maintenance. This meant that the crew needed good visibility
at Trivandrum if they were to land there. The visibility at Trivandrum was
reported to be 3000 meters with clouds at 1500 feet. This was above the
mimimums required for a VOR approach and so the Captain was confident that he could
land there if they decided to divert there. Whilst they were in their holding pattern,
two Air India Express planes were on final approaches into Cochin. The first one landed and
reported sighting the runway at 1400 feet. The second one attempted to land, but couldn’t
see the runway at their decision altitude. They reported clouds as low as 600 feet,
and informed the ATC that the visibility had dropped to 2400 meters. The ATC relayed
this information to the Jet Airways crew. Given that the first Air India Express plane
was able to land, the Jet Airways crew decided to begin their second attempt. As the plane
descended and reached it’s decision altitutde, just like the first attempt, they
still couldn’t see the runway. So they executed their second go around for the day
at 5.47am and entered the holding pattern again. the fuel onboard had dropped to 3919 kilos. The Minimum fuel required to go
to Bangalore was 3306 kilos. A third attempt to land at Cochin would cost
them around 800 kgs of fuel placing them under the minimum fuel for Bangalore. So, if they were
to divert to Bangalore, they Should divert NOW. Remember the Captain wanting to go to
Trivandrum to gain some additional holding time at Cochin? The captain discussed
this plan with the FIrst Officer. However, the First officer was concerned that
since the ILS wasn’t available at Trivandrum, and since the the visibility at Trivandrum wasn’t
much better than Cochin, and since could drop further by the time they get there, and they
might not be able to land at Trivandrum either. He was also concerned that the presence of haze,
and the rising sun might make visibility worse. The Captain assured him that
if Trivandrum got worse, they could then divert to
Coimbatore as their alternate, as it is was closer to Cochin. But curiously,
they never checked the weather for Coimbatore. The crew then informed the ATC that
they were re-designating Trivandrum as their alternate. At the same time, a
Kuwait Airways plane attempted to land, but executed a go-around because
it couldn't spot the runway either. Based on updated information from the Kuwait
plane, The ATC informed the Jet Airways crew that the visibility was now 1500 metres with low clouds
at 400 feet. The weather had furhter detoriated. The ATC asked the Jet airways
crew to state their intentions. The Captain informed the ATC that he wanted
to attempt to land at Cochin one more time, and if that landing was unsuccessful,
then they’d divert to Trivandrum. Now, many airlines around the world
would have mandated their pilots to divert to an alternate airport
after two go-arounds to avoid get-there-itis and possible crew errors. But
Jet Airways didn’t have any official policy and the decision to attempt a third
landing was entirely upto the pilot. The plane spent an additional 30 minutes
holding over Cochin, burning fuel all along. The ATC then advised them of the latest weather “Tempo visibility reducing to 1500m in
mist and low clouds now at 400 feet”. The weather had further detoriated. At this
time, the weather is worse than either of the previous two attempts. No plane has landed
on the airport in the past 30 minutes. But despite this, the captain decides to begin
the third attempt to land. Landing gear down, flaps out, minimas reached, and
they couldn’t see the runway. So, they executed a third go around for the day. The ATC vectored them to intercept
the 180 radial for Cochin and to climb to 4000 feet. This heading
would get them to Trivandrum. Their current fuel onboard
is 2644 kilos. The Minimum fuel for Bangalore is 3306 kilos.
Bangalore was no longer an option. The Minimum Fuel for Trivandrum was 2614
kilos. They had no room for error in Trivandrum. Those additional 30 kilos gives
them 1 extra minute of flying time. Also, because they were heading towards Trivandrum,
Coimbatore was no longer an option as well. While they were on the way to Trivandrum,
they were cleared to climb to FL210. 5 minutes later, Trivandrum ATC informed
Cochin ATC that the visibility at Trivandrum had dropped to 1500m and asked them to
relay this to Jet Airways 555. Cochin ATC acknowledged it, but failed to pass this
information on to the Jet Airways plane. The crew were flying towards Trivandrum unaware of the detoriated conditions there. The weather
at Trivandrum was now no different to that of Cochin, but atleast in Cochin, the ILS was
available. Trivandrum only had a VOR approach. Time to familiarize ourselves with Trivandrum
airport. The Trivandrum airport is located in the heart of the city, just a couple of
kilometers inland from the Arabian Sea. Like many Kerala airports, Trivandrum
has a single runway - runway 14/32. And the active runway this morning was
runway 14, approaching from the North. At 6.30am local time, as they neared Trivandrum, the crew got in contact with Trivandrum
ATC. The ATC relayed the current weather, visibility at 1500m, wind at 290, scattered
clouds at 1500 feet and at 2500 feet. The ATC cleared then them for
the VOR approach into runway 14. The 1500 meter visibility was an issue, because
the minimas to begin a VOR approach in Trivandrum was 2100 meters. The Minimum decision
altitude is 650 feet. This meant that, legally, the pilots cannot begin
the approach at this runway in the current conditions. But remember,
the fuel continues to be an issue. The crew then asked the ATC whether
they had High Visibility Lighting, because they wanted to use a workaround
called “Converted Meterological Visibility”. When the approach lights are much brighter,
the pilots can see the runway from much further away. And in those cases, the pilots can use
this table to convert the reported visibility into a Converted Met Visibility to
obtain a higher visibility number. However, this conversion can and should
only be done if High Visibility ligjhting exists at the airport. But the
ATC responded to the crew that the runway only had basic lighting
and had NO high visibility lighting. But despite the lack of high visibility lighting,
the captain made the calculations and obtained a Converted Met Visibility value of 2250m.
This was higher than the 2100m required for the VOR approach. So, he checked the
box and continued towards Trivandrum. When the plane was 25nm from Trivandrum
airport, the captain realized that they were too high to begin the approach,
and requested for a right 360 orbit to reduce the height. The crew spent time and fuel
completing this turn to reduce their altitude. This unplanned manuveur further
reduced the available fuel and sent the plane into a 'MINIMUM FUEL.'
state. While not yet an emergency, a MINIMUM FUEL call signifies that an emergency
situation could arise if further delays occur. The ATC then vectored Jet Airways
555 for a straight in approach to Runway 14 with a visibility
of 2000m. At 650am local time, the plane approached the minimum
decision altitude, but once again, they weren’t able to spot the runway. They
executed their fourth go-around for the day. The fuel on board dropped to 1324 kilos. The
final reserve fuel is 1300 kilos. When the plane goes under the Final reserve fuel,
the crew need to declare an emergency, which opens up all airports and and all
approaches for them. After 2 minutes, the fuel dropped below 1300 kilos, and the first
officer made the emergency call to the ATC. “May Day May Day, Jet Airways 555, Due Fuel”. Things are going to get very interesting. With their options reducing, The
captain requested permission from the ATC to conduct a visual approach into
runway 14. Now, to do a visual approach, you need clear visibility of the
runways and of the approach path. This plane has just done an instrument approach
and couldn’t see the runway. But he was requesting permission to do a non-instrument approach in
zero visibility. The reason he’s asking for this is because in Visual approaches,
you can take a much tighter path, reducing the amount of time required to
land, thus saving fuel. But under the current visibility conditions,
this was a significant gamble. At this point, the pilots had been flying this
plane for more than 5 hours right through the window of circadian low, and with almost
no fuel in the plane, panic is setting in and the crew are making some questionable
calls. But they are almost out of options. Since this was an emergency plane, The ATC
cleared them for a visual approach into runway 14. The crew made a right hand turn and stabilized the
plane at 1000 feet. This is much lower than the usual altitude to begin a visual approach. On the
downwind leg, As they flew abeam the threshold for Runway 14, they informed the ATC that they
are initiating a right hand turn to land. The ATC was concerned that this was way too
close for them to be able to turn into final, and asked the crew to confirm that they
could actually see the runway. The crew continued descending and turned
the plane towards the airport. However, during the approach, the crew
were not in visual contact with the runway at any time. They turned into final
blindly. And by the time they sighted the runway they realized that they were way
too high to be able to land the plane. Unfortunately, they had to initiate
their fifth go-around for the day. Things are going to get even worse. The
fuel depleted to 898 kilos. They had around 15 minutes of flying time left
before they would completely run out. The captain then again requested the ATC
for another visual approach to Runway 14.
The ATC informed the crew that the
visibility remained unchanged and it was still at 2000 metrers asking them
to confirm whether they wanted to try immediately. But with just 15 minutes of
fuel left, they HAD to attempt it again. They initiated the 6th landing attempt. Since they were too high on the previous approach,
the crew compensated by descending to 1000 feet, and then further descending to 500 feet on the
base turn. This is very low for a standard visual approach. On the base leg, they were still
not able to make contact with the runway, and once again turned blindly onto
final. When they spotted the runway, this time they were too low and they were further
to the right. The captain manhandled the yoke and turned ito the left. The plane banked so hard that
they got a “BANK ANGLE BANK ANGLE” wanring. They were too close to the runway to stabilize the
plane in time and so they had to conduct their 6th go-around for the day. The fuel was now at 662
kilos. They have 10 minutes of flying time left. The Captain climbed to 700 feet. Both
pilots realize that they don’t have time to do a full circuit to approach runway
14 anymore. The captain informs ATC that he intends to do a 180 degree turn to land
on the opposite runway, runway 32 instead. Like it or not, this is their final landing
attempt. Because if they don’t land the plane this time, they WILL run out of fuel.
And since they are flying over the heart of the capital city of Kerala they’ll
inevitably crash in a populated area. The ATC approves it the 180 degree turn and
at 7:07 am clears them to approach runway 32. But the plane is still inside the clouds. The
captain can’t see anything irrespective of which runway he is landing on. Without
being able to see where they were, they blindly start descending down to
the ground. The Ground Proximity warning “TERRAIN TERRAIN” blares in the cockpit. They
were so low that the captain was able to see houses and people on the ground under him. But
the forward visibility was still poor and the runway was still not in sight. Once again the
“TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP” come on. The first officer inhibits the warning. A minute
later the first officer asks the captian “Can you see the runway?
Do you know where it is?”. The captain responds “I can’t see anything. I am flying blindly”, and they continue their approach. They disconnect
the autopilot. As they fly closer they can see a vague outline of the runway over to their
left. They are again not aligned. They bank hard to the left. The “BANK ANGLE BANK ANGLE”
wanring echoes in the cockpit. They are just 50 feet above the runway at that point. 50 feet
is about the height of a 5 story building. The approach lights become visible and
they finally find themselves aligned with the center line. The captain
forces the nose of the plane down, and at At 7:10 am, they finally land on runway 32. As the plane rolled down the runway,
the final fuel was 349 kilos. They had around 5 minutes of fuel left. They then
taxied and parked the plane at a gate. The plane and the crew landed safely. After this
incident, a few hours alter, the weather improved. They fueled up, the passengers boarded the plane,
and the same crew took off again towards Cochin. The FInal report attributed the cause
to an absence of company policy about the number of approaches/go-arounds that
a crew can attempt at an airport. It also attributed it to the lack of policy around
the re-designation of an alternate airport during inclement weather. The poor decisions
made by the crew to redesignate Trivandrum as an alternate airport when the airport had
similar weather and worse navigational aids were also highlighted. The AIBB also
recommended that low fuel scenarios and decision making training exercieses be
added to the training sessions for pilots. Jet Airways ceased operations in Summer 2019, and the airplane involved in
this incident was sold to Brazilian operator GOL. In poor weather, just because you’ve landed,
doesn’t mean you are safe, as this crew and passengers on United 1448 found out, when they
found themselves on the middle of an active runway with a massive jet hurtling towards them. Click
here to watch that video - I’ll see you there.