[Music] in world war ii the united states created 89 divisions to be the building blocks of the armies that were to attack and destroy the axis forces of germany italy and japan each division contained either organic or attached elements that made them all capable of combined arms warfare they all had to be trained and capable of executing many complex missions to include offensive defensive pursuit and even amphibious operations one division which could contain over 14 000 soldiers was the responsibility of a single major general he was expected to train them care for them and expertly command them in battle since the united states had only eight active division commanders in 1939 the army would have to produce these important leaders rapidly few would have the luxury of an organizational or strategic level leadership experience and most would learn by doing one of these officers was general norman dutch coda [Music] general coda's story began in 1893 in chelsea massachusetts after attending the worcester academy in the early 1900s where he received the nickname of dutch cota graduated from the united states military academy in 1917 along with mark clark jay lutton collins and matthew redgway commissioned in the infantry second lieutenant cota was assigned to the 22nd infantry regiment at fort j in new york harbor although he never participated in combat during world war one cota was promoted to major within 18 months of his commission commanded a company and supervised a basic training course that sent its graduates directly to france following the war coda returned to the united states military academy and back to the rank of captain after instructing tactics for two years at west point dutch followed a typical schooling and career progression for an army officer during the interwar period this included a second company command in hawaii as well as serving as an instructor in the weapons department at fort benning under major omar bradley as america prepared for world war ii newly promoted lieutenant colonel cota was transferred back to fort j new york where he became the executive officer of the 16th infantry regiment this began his close relationship with the first infantry division that lasted into world war ii as the division consolidated at fort devons in 1941 coda became an assistant g2 then assistant g3 at this time the first infantry division concentrated its training efforts on amphibious operations with divisional exercises on the beaches of massachusetts virginia and florida less than a week after the bombing of pearl harbor in 1941 dutch cota became a colonel and by the summer of 1942 became the first infantry division's chief of staff his first official act was to supervise the division's move to england there the division trained and prepared to conduct an amphibious operation in north africa colonel cota was tasked to be the primary liaison to the british as they planned the operation by november 1942 the division landed and captured the city of iran during operation torch colonel koda was responsible for the division command post and the logistical operations as supplies and reinforcements arrived on the beach he was therefore in the unique position to witness both the planning for and the results of america's first joint large-scale amphibious operation after operation torch concluded the first infantry division moved east towards tunisia but colonel kota returned to england arriving in february 1943. here he was promoted to brigadier general and was assigned as the chief of the american section within the combined operations headquarters this british organization was charged with two tasks executing amphibious raids on the german-occupied coastlines and preparing for the eventual large-scale amphibious invasion of europe their director lord mountbatten essentially served as the chief of joint planning for the invasion and was given a seat at the british chiefs of staff committee general kota came into the organization with a personal knowledge of the first infantry division's training for and execution of the invasion of north africa he also later observed the division conduct a much improved amphibious operation when it invaded sicily in july 1943 with this vast amount of first-hand knowledge coda became a key member of the combined operation headquarters while it developed the joint doctrine procedures and equipment necessary to accomplish a complex large-scale invasion by october 1943 as the invasion plans were beginning to solidify and units were being identified for operation overlord general kota was selected to be the assistant division commander of the 29th infantry division a national guard unit from maryland and virginia known as the blue and gray division major general charles gerhart the division commander recognized coda's experience and his no-nonsense approach to training gerhart placed coda in charge of all division training exercises in preparation for the invasion not only did koda constantly plan for and observe realistic training he was also responsible for the relocation of an entire english town to obtain the appropriate amphibious training ground in april as final preparations for operation overlord were being made the 116th regiment of the 29th infantry division was attached to the first wave of the first infantry division and assigned the western portion of the beach since the rest of the 29th would arrive in subsequent waves general kota became a provisional brigade commander and was to land with one of the initial waves known as the basta brigade it was to act as an advanced division headquarters cota formed an ad hoc staff of about 25 officers from the 116th infantry regiment and the 29th and 1st infantry divisions the week before embarkation the staff war-gamed a variety of contingencies and on 5 june the eve of the invasion coda reminded his officers you all must try to alleviate confusion but in doing so be careful not to create more powers is not the job of actually commanding but of assisting if possible always work through the commander of a group this is necessary to avoid conflicts and duplications of both orders and efforts coda and his bastard brigade landed on omaha beach at h 1 on 6 june 1944 cody immediately identified that the assault companies were stalled along the sea wall and that no unit had gained a foothold on the high ground beyond the beach he also observed that soldiers from many different units were mixed together lacking leadership and organization over the next 12 hours dutch coda traversed the beach a dozen times leading directing and encouraging hundreds of american soldiers to leave what cover they had on the beach and move to the high ground he also located and coordinated with the first and 29th division commanders and directed his staff to organize units and reduce the chaos near the sea wall general kota's actions on d-day earned him the u.s distinguished service cross and the british distinguished service order although kota's efforts on d-day were exhausting he had no time to rest as the 29th division expanded the beachhead dutch reverted to being the assistant division commander over the next few weeks coda was constantly on the front line leading the 29th as they fought through the hedgerows at normandy eventually wounded in the arm during the fighting to take st low coda received a silver star for his actions following d-day after two weeks in the hospital general kota was elevated to command the 28th keystone division known to the germans as the bloody bucket due to their unique red unit patch this pennsylvania national guard unit had been performing poorly since landing in theater although coda had never commanded anything larger than a company he was expected to improve its faltering leadership unfortunately for koda he had to make do with the existing leaders as the allies broke out of normandy and began a pursuit of the germans across france pausing briefly to lead a victory parade through the streets of paris the 28th then covered 270 miles in 10 days coda's division captured luxembourg on 10th september and became the first allied unit to reach the german border by september the allies faced a regroup german army occupying the fortifications and obstacles of the siegfried line additionally there were critical limitations on logistics especially fuel and ammunition attacks had to be limited and focused on the areas with the best terrain and the highest chance of success until the logistical effort could catch up for the first army that area was the akan corridor at the end of october 1944 lieutenant general courtney hodges first army commander designated the seventh corps as the main effort in this attack but he was very concerned with the terrain to the south of the corridor to hodges hurricane force represented a threat to his main effort the germans could potentially conduct a flank attack on seventh corps if this area was not secure thus he ordered his fifth core to secure it major general leonard gero the fifth corps commander ordered the 28th infantry division into the hurricane located in reserve position to rest and refit after a major attack in september the 28th division was seemingly ready for a major operation the newly promoted major general coda felt otherwise most of his replacement soldiers had little to no proper training and there was poor unit cohesion additionally coda was given a plan that left limited flexibility the first army in fifth corps gave cotis 28th division explicit instructions on how to deploy their three infantry regiments general giroux had a reputation of being overly controlling which left koda and the other subordinates no ability to adapt conversely general hodges was a hands-off commander who rarely visited his units yet he did not accept failure preferring to fire commanders instead of attempting to develop them overall the first army's command climate was a caustic one with division commanders required to show drive and obedience or else the 28th division was moving into one of germany's largest wooded tracks the hurtkin forest was 30 kilometers in length and 16 kilometers in width containing some of the most rugged terrain in europe the khal river ran through the two main ridgelines bisecting the forest the forest was so dense it impeded both foot and vehicular movement made land navigation difficult and even blocked out the sun from the forest floor the siegfried line made u.s movement even worse as it ran through the center of the hurtgun the germans had turned the forest into a labyrinth of well-camouflaged pillboxes with interlocking fields of fire thick belts of barbed wire and dense minefields the few roads and trails that traverse the forest were covered by indirect fires in depth directed by the first army and fifth corps the 28th was to attack into this twisted labyrinth by sending one regiment to the north and one regiment to the south protecting the division flanks the main effort the 112th infantry regiment was to attack through the center of the forest with the ultimate objective being the town of schmidt prohibited from waiting the main effort with a second regiment kota made three fateful decisions that worsened his situation first he did not direct subordinate units to patrol the forest had this been done they may have discovered that there were three german divisions in the area rather than the two identified by intelligence these patrols might have also identified that koda's second decision assigning the cal trail as the division's main supply route was a grave mistake as the trail was narrow and incapable of heavy traffic without significant engineer improvement finally coda did not commit two of the four tank companies and an entire self-propelled tank destroyer battalion that had been assigned to the division as reinforcement as he felt that they would not be able to operate in such a dense forest thus the keystone division advanced to the hurricane forest on 2 november since they were attacking several days prior to the seventh corps the germans were able to concentrate their efforts on the sole division moving toward their fortified line both the north and south regiments stalled against fierce german resistance and counter-attacks the 112th regiment however made good headway in the center their second battalion reinforced by a tank company captured the town of vasanak by the end of 2 november the following day the third battalion captured schmidt and the first battalion moved forward to occupy commercecite cota ordered the first battalion forward to reinforce the third battalion but canceled the order on the regimental commander's request to create a defense in depth at the end of 3 november the 28th division had the following disposition three battalions were dispersed in the center unable to support each other a company of tanks and route to schmidt were mired in the mud of the treacherous kyle trail closing it off to further traffic two regiments were fixed on the division flanks kota committed his reserve battalion early to these supporting efforts and never assigned another the uncommitted tank companies and tank destroyer battalion were well to the rear and unable to move forward without a proper road network thus on 4 november the keystone division exhausted from two days of difficult fighting was about to face the expected german counter-attack however it was in no condition to repulse the attack 28th unofficial nickname bloody bucket was about to take on a far more literal meaning [Music] [Music] you