Understanding Judicial Impartiality and Canon 3

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Impartiality with respect to the decision itself, and impartiality with regard to the process of arriving at a decision as decided in EDATIO v. ASDALA AM No. RTJ-06-1974, July 2007. The Code Neutrality of an Impartial Judge Judges should not only be impartial, but they should also appear impartial. Party litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process like notice and hearing, they would become meaningless if the ultimate decision of the court is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, but they must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, free of any suspicion as to their impartiality, free of any suspicion as to their integrity, or all three. In the case of Cezanne Barrias v. Rubia, AM number RTJ 14-2388 June 2014. Now let's move on with the sections under Canon 3. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, without bias, without prejudice. A judge sitting in a case must at all times be wholly free, be wholly disinterested. Be wholly impartial and be wholly independent. Due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. As decided in Diotina v. Gonzalez, GR No. L26310, September 30, 1971. Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public. maintains and enhances The confidence of the legal profession maintains and enhances the confidence of the litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. Thus, no judge should handle a case which he might be perceived rightly or wrongly. to be susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest in that case. Preservation at all times of the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party To the litigation is the most important rule as decided under Urbanes v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 11-2884, August 1994. In the case of Montemayor v. Bermejo, AM No. MTJ 04-1535, it says there, it is decided under that case that the judge should behave at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice. In another case, prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself in order not to spawn suspicions of bias and unfairness. The judge's language, both written and spoken, in current times, offline and online, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. This is decided in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro. AM number RTJ 99-1460, March 2006. So in one case, the mere presence of the responded judge in the dinner with the complainant, a litigant that has several cases pending before that judge, provides already a ground for administrative... liability against that judge. The defense that a settlement was being brokered by the judge at that time is improper being done in a dinner. It should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative. Thus, the respondent judge's action failed to assure The sure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge, as decided in Cisunbarias v. Rubia. Now we move on with section 3. Judges, so far as reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases. So in here is the doctrine of duty to sit by a judge in a case. It says under the new Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary annotated, the duty to sit. is imperative. It is imperative that judges ensure that they would not unnecessarily be disqualified from a case. Reason is the duty to sit is imposed because permitting judges to disqualify themselves easily for frivolous reasons, tripping reasons, groundless reasons, or for no reason at all, would contravene public policy by unduly delaying proceedings, increasing the workload of other judges, and fostering the impermissible judge shopping. Another issue is the possibility that no judge should be available to decide a case because judges with jurisdiction over the case would opt to recuse from the case. In this section, we also highlight the doctrine of rule of necessity. The rule of disqualification of judges must yield to the demands of necessity. A judge is not disqualified to sit in a case if there is no other judge available to hear and decide a case. And while all judges will be disqualified, disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises or the judicial region. Reason for this is the doctrine operates on the principle that a biased judge is better than no judge at all, and under that particular circumstances, it is the duty of that disqualified judge to hear and decide the controversy no matter how disagreeable it may be. Now we move on to section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue so this is where the sub judici rule comes in as well It restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. As decided in Tormiz vs. Paredes, AM No. RTJ, 13-2366, February 2015. So it says in The annotated of new code of judicial conduct for the Philippine judiciary that judges should avoid side remarks, should avoid hasty conclusions, should avoid loose statements, should avoid gratuitous utterances that suggest that they are prejudging a case. Not only there is danger of being misquoted but also of compromising the rights of the litigants in the case. In one decided case, Supreme Court held that courts and juries in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence, that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court, and that the determination of such facts should be an influence by bias, an influence by prejudice. or an influence by sympathies or all three in nestle philippines versus sanchez gr 75209 september 30 1987. now we move on with to section 5. judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include but are not limited to. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings. 2. The judge previously served as lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy. Number three, the judge or a member of his or her family has economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy. 4. The judge serve as executor, administrator, guardia, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge serve as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein. 5. The judge ruling in a lower court is the subject of review. 6. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree. In 7, the judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest as heir, as legatee, as creditor, as fiduciary or otherwise in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding. any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings. So let's focus first on the paragraph 1 of this section. While litigants are entitled to a judge who will decide on the merits of the facts presented, strained personal relationship, animosity, and hostility between a judge and a party or a council are not grounds for disqualification. As cited in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary annotated. Actual bias or prejudice must have a finding or there must be a finding of clear and convincing evidence with respect to actual bias or prejudice by a judge. As bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially if a judge sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person and to give equal right to the poor and rich. In this particular case, Supreme Court decided that there should be a clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and prejudice against the judge. The mere suspicion of partiality is not sufficient. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the judge acted regularly and impartially, as decided in Lorenzana v. Austria, AM No. RTJ-09-220, April 2014. In another case, in Salcedo v. Bulliosos, the fact that the judge and the attorney are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the judge acted with bias and partiality already. Bias and partiality, again, can never be presumed. It must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While there may be par palpable error that may be inferred upon the judge when he issued the writ, there's no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality and bias. Salcedo v. Bellosos, AM No. RTJ, 10-2236, July 2010. Number 2. Paragraph 2. in here in one of the case Andres versus Maa Ducon am number rtj03 dash 1762 december 2008 violated this canon when a former lawyer now appointed as a presiding judge dispensed with the raffling of the case and he took cognizance of the case and outrightly dismissed the case because one of the parties in that case is his former clients. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his impartiality and objectivity. Another case, a former notary public then Appointed as a judge in the past, notarized the affidavit of a person who is now standing as a witness in one of the cases before his sala. He, the judge, is already disqualified from hearing the case. Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz, GR Numbers. L-34756259, March 1973. Paragraph 3. In the case of Octobre v. Velasco AM No. MTJ-02-1444, July 2004, a particular judge who filed a criminal complaint in his own court for the case of robbery and malicious mischief for the purpose of protecting the property interest of his relatives and upon filing a complaint in his own court he self-servingly issued a warrant of arrest against the accused He was found guilty of serious misconduct and ordered to be dismissed from the bench. Another case in Sindon v. Judge Alsate AM No. RTJ-20-2576 January 2020 when this presiding judge sit. In the hearing for the petition for application of notarial commission of her own wife, lawyer wife, the judge should have disqualified and should have inhibited himself from sitting in the case involving such application. We move on to paragraph 4. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or lawyer in the case in the matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein. I find this as straightforward, quite similar with the cases that I cited. Same goes with paragraph 5 when the judge ruling in a lower court is the subject for review. Number 6. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6th civil degree or counsel within the 4th civil degree. One case is that In Villaluz v. Mijares, AM No. RTJ-98-1402, April 1998, a judge presided over a petition for correction of a birth record when the petitioner is his daughter. in Paderanga versus Judge Paderanga, AM number RTJ. 14-2383, August 17, 2015, when Judge Paderanga, having animosity probably with her own sister, issued a warrant of arrest against her own sister is an outright violation on the compulsory disqualification of judges in this particular circumstance. Number seven also is quite straightforward. Now we move on to section six. A judge disqualified as stated above me instead of withdrawing from the proceeding disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement signed by all parties and lawyers shall be incorporated in the records of the proceeding. So to effectively merit disqualification, a judge must disclose on the record the basis of the disqualification. and ask the parties and lawyers to consider out of the presence of the judge whether to waive the disqualification. As long as a disqualification is not based upon personal bias or prejudice, the parties and lawyers may all agree that the judge should not be disqualified. If all parties and judges agree that the judge or he or she should participate, as the judge, then he may participate and must incorporate the agreement into the record of the proceeding. So section 6 is a waiver upon parties and lawyers after the full disclosure of the judge upon his about his disqualification. So that's just about it for canon 3. We move on to the next cut.

It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. So impartiality as defined by Albano is the capacity of a judge to apply the law and to render justice fairly, without favor, without bias, without prejudice as well, or all three, without all three, favor, bias, or prejudice. So there are two concepts of impartiality. Impartiality with respect to the decision itself, and impartiality with regard to the process of arriving at a decision as decided in EDATIO v. ASDALA AM No. RTJ-06-1974, July 2007. The Code Neutrality of an Impartial Judge Judges should not only be impartial, but they should also appear impartial.

Party litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process like notice and hearing, they would become meaningless if the ultimate decision of the court is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, but they must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, free of any suspicion as to their impartiality, free of any suspicion as to their integrity, or all three.

In the case of Cezanne Barrias v. Rubia, AM number RTJ 14-2388 June 2014. Now let's move on with the sections under Canon 3. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, without bias, without prejudice. A judge sitting in a case must at all times be wholly free, be wholly disinterested. Be wholly impartial and be wholly independent.

Due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. As decided in Diotina v. Gonzalez, GR No. L26310, September 30, 1971. Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public. maintains and enhances The confidence of the legal profession maintains and enhances the confidence of the litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

Thus, no judge should handle a case which he might be perceived rightly or wrongly. to be susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest in that case.

Preservation at all times of the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party To the litigation is the most important rule as decided under Urbanes v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 11-2884, August 1994. In the case of Montemayor v. Bermejo, AM No. MTJ 04-1535, it says there, it is decided under that case that the judge should behave at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice. In another case, prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself in order not to spawn suspicions of bias and unfairness.

The judge's language, both written and spoken, in current times, offline and online, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. This is decided in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro. AM number RTJ 99-1460, March 2006. So in one case, the mere presence of the responded judge in the dinner with the complainant, a litigant that has several cases pending before that judge, provides already a ground for administrative... liability against that judge.

The defense that a settlement was being brokered by the judge at that time is improper being done in a dinner. It should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative. Thus, the respondent judge's action failed to assure The sure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge, as decided in Cisunbarias v. Rubia. Now we move on with section 3. Judges, so far as reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

So in here is the doctrine of duty to sit by a judge in a case. It says under the new Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary annotated, the duty to sit. is imperative.

It is imperative that judges ensure that they would not unnecessarily be disqualified from a case. Reason is the duty to sit is imposed because permitting judges to disqualify themselves easily for frivolous reasons, tripping reasons, groundless reasons, or for no reason at all, would contravene public policy by unduly delaying proceedings, increasing the workload of other judges, and fostering the impermissible judge shopping. Another issue is the possibility that no judge should be available to decide a case because judges with jurisdiction over the case would opt to recuse from the case.

In this section, we also highlight the doctrine of rule of necessity. The rule of disqualification of judges must yield to the demands of necessity. A judge is not disqualified to sit in a case if there is no other judge available to hear and decide a case. And while all judges will be disqualified, disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises or the judicial region.

Reason for this is the doctrine operates on the principle that a biased judge is better than no judge at all, and under that particular circumstances, it is the duty of that disqualified judge to hear and decide the controversy no matter how disagreeable it may be. Now we move on to section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue so this is where the sub judici rule comes in as well It restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. As decided in Tormiz vs. Paredes, AM No. RTJ, 13-2366, February 2015. So it says in The annotated of new code of judicial conduct for the Philippine judiciary that judges should avoid side remarks, should avoid hasty conclusions, should avoid loose statements, should avoid gratuitous utterances that suggest that they are prejudging a case. Not only there is danger of being misquoted but also of compromising the rights of the litigants in the case.

In one decided case, Supreme Court held that courts and juries in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence, that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court, and that the determination of such facts should be an influence by bias, an influence by prejudice. or an influence by sympathies or all three in nestle philippines versus sanchez gr 75209 september 30 1987. now we move on with to section 5. judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include but are not limited to.

The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings. 2. The judge previously served as lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy. Number three, the judge or a member of his or her family has economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy.

4. The judge serve as executor, administrator, guardia, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge serve as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein. 5. The judge ruling in a lower court is the subject of review. 6. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree. In 7, the judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest as heir, as legatee, as creditor, as fiduciary or otherwise in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.

any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings. So let's focus first on the paragraph 1 of this section. While litigants are entitled to a judge who will decide on the merits of the facts presented, strained personal relationship, animosity, and hostility between a judge and a party or a council are not grounds for disqualification.

As cited in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary annotated. Actual bias or prejudice must have a finding or there must be a finding of clear and convincing evidence with respect to actual bias or prejudice by a judge. As bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially if a judge sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person and to give equal right to the poor and rich. In this particular case, Supreme Court decided that there should be a clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and prejudice against the judge. The mere suspicion of partiality is not sufficient.

The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the judge acted regularly and impartially, as decided in Lorenzana v. Austria, AM No. RTJ-09-220, April 2014. In another case, in Salcedo v. Bulliosos, the fact that the judge and the attorney are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the judge acted with bias and partiality already. Bias and partiality, again, can never be presumed.

It must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While there may be par palpable error that may be inferred upon the judge when he issued the writ, there's no evidence on record that would justify a finding of partiality and bias. Salcedo v. Bellosos, AM No.

RTJ, 10-2236, July 2010. Number 2. Paragraph 2. in here in one of the case Andres versus Maa Ducon am number rtj03 dash 1762 december 2008 violated this canon when a former lawyer now appointed as a presiding judge dispensed with the raffling of the case and he took cognizance of the case and outrightly dismissed the case because one of the parties in that case is his former clients. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his impartiality and objectivity. Another case, a former notary public then Appointed as a judge in the past, notarized the affidavit of a person who is now standing as a witness in one of the cases before his sala. He, the judge, is already disqualified from hearing the case. Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz, GR Numbers.

L-34756259, March 1973. Paragraph 3. In the case of Octobre v. Velasco AM No. MTJ-02-1444, July 2004, a particular judge who filed a criminal complaint in his own court for the case of robbery and malicious mischief for the purpose of protecting the property interest of his relatives and upon filing a complaint in his own court he self-servingly issued a warrant of arrest against the accused He was found guilty of serious misconduct and ordered to be dismissed from the bench. Another case in Sindon v. Judge Alsate AM No.

RTJ-20-2576 January 2020 when this presiding judge sit. In the hearing for the petition for application of notarial commission of her own wife, lawyer wife, the judge should have disqualified and should have inhibited himself from sitting in the case involving such application. We move on to paragraph 4. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or lawyer in the case in the matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein. I find this as straightforward, quite similar with the cases that I cited.

Same goes with paragraph 5 when the judge ruling in a lower court is the subject for review. Number 6. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6th civil degree or counsel within the 4th civil degree. One case is that In Villaluz v. Mijares, AM No. RTJ-98-1402, April 1998, a judge presided over a petition for correction of a birth record when the petitioner is his daughter. in Paderanga versus Judge Paderanga, AM number RTJ.

14-2383, August 17, 2015, when Judge Paderanga, having animosity probably with her own sister, issued a warrant of arrest against her own sister is an outright violation on the compulsory disqualification of judges in this particular circumstance. Number seven also is quite straightforward. Now we move on to section six.

A judge disqualified as stated above me instead of withdrawing from the proceeding disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement signed by all parties and lawyers shall be incorporated in the records of the proceeding.

So to effectively merit disqualification, a judge must disclose on the record the basis of the disqualification. and ask the parties and lawyers to consider out of the presence of the judge whether to waive the disqualification. As long as a disqualification is not based upon personal bias or prejudice, the parties and lawyers may all agree that the judge should not be disqualified. If all parties and judges agree that the judge or he or she should participate, as the judge, then he may participate and must incorporate the agreement into the record of the proceeding. So section 6 is a waiver upon parties and lawyers after the full disclosure of the judge upon his about his disqualification.

So that's just about it for canon 3. We move on to the next cut.

Transcript for:Understanding Judicial Impartiality and Canon 3

Transcript for:
Understanding Judicial Impartiality and Canon 3