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Overview of the Battle of Westerplatte

It can be said without the slightest exaggeration that the word , "Westerplatte" is familiar to every Pole. It is a symbol of the defensive war, and at the same time of the unyielding attitude of the Polish crew, who, despite the overwhelming pressure of German forces, defended themselves bravely for a whole week, although only 6 hours were required of them. What was the backstage of this event like? Welcome to the next episode. Polish struggles for access to the sea began at the dawn of Polish statehood. In fact, it can be argued that it was in the Piast era that they were most fierce, and the Baltic Sea was perhaps the most serious arena for the clash of Polish and German interests. This rivalry was ended in 1466 with the signing of the Peace of Torun. By virtue of it, Poland received from the Teutonic Order, among others, Elblag and Torun and, most importantly, Gdańsk. For the next 300 years the situation did not change much. With the exception of the 17th century wars, access to the sea remained firm. The situation changed only in the 18th century, when, due to the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Polish-Lithuanian state ceased to exist. Poland lost its own state and thus access to the Baltic Sea for more than 120 years. Regaining independence in 1918, however, created new conditions. For at the threshold of the reborn Republic stood the fourteen points of President Thomas Wilson, where under the thirteenth point was written: The creation of an independent Polish state [...] with free access to the sea. The rebirth of ties with the Baltic went very pompously, even romantically, and its expression was the so-called "wedding of Poland to the sea," during which Jozef Haller rode into the Baltic on horseback and threw a commemorative ring into the water. However, dark clouds immediately appeared over the regaining of access to the sea very soon. The narrow strip of land that accrued to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth separated East Prussia from Germany. Called Der Polnische Korridor - the Polish corridor - by Berlin, it was problematic from the very beginning. For several years, these emotions subsided, which was the result of Adolf Hitler's conscious policy. Indeed, the freshly minted Führer did not seek a confrontation with Warsaw, which culminated in a non-aggression pact and the stabilization of the situation on the Polish-German border. Gradually, however, his attitude became radicalized. Intoxicated by such successes as the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss of Austria and the dismantling of Czechoslovakia - Adolf Hitler turned his gaze to the hated "Polish corridor". Initially, however, the Führer made various gestures towards Warsaw, proposing to run an extraterritorial highway through the disputed area. This was because he continued to trust that the first German strike would fall to the West. With Warsaw's subsequent refusals, however, it was becoming clear that Poland would be Hitler's next target. The turnaround was sealed by Poland itself, which accepted British guarantees on March 31, 1939. This angered Hitler, who ordered the preparation of a plan for war against Poland, codenamed Fall Weiss - or Plan White. The directive was issued on April 11, but the first disturbing movements in the Baltic, occurred earlier. On March 18, the Polish navy was placed on partial war alert. Four days later, a strong navy unit, intended for the seizure of Lithuania's Klaipeda, was forefronted along the Polish coast, sailing from Germany to East Prussia. It included an armored ship of the "Deutschland" type, with Hitler himself on board. The Reich threatened to bomb Kaunas on the Lithuanian side, which had asked for help from France and Britain, a request which the powers brushed aside with silence. Alone, Lithuania had no other choice. Wanting to preserve its independence, Klaipeda County was annexed to Germany on March 23, 1939. An ever-widening grip was tightening over Poland, which largely determined the policy turn toward an alliance with England. After seizing Klaipeda, the German navy returned via the same route, which caused further tension, and a high alert was ordered at Westerplatte itself in case of confrontation. German ships were not looking for any provocation, there was no official reason for it - directives related to Fall Weiss were issued a dozen days later. The spring went fairly quietly - not counting the acceptance of British guarantees. The Polish side, however, was not limited to diplomacy. In fact, some purchases were made, and the Polish navy was joined by, among others, the "Vulture," a Dutch-made submarine. The Hel Peninsula was also prepared for defense, where shelters and defensive positions were built. Requests were also made to our allies - a battery of artillery was wanted from the French, and when this failed - the English were asked to send a monitor armed with 381mm guns to the Baltic. This request was also denied. More weeks passed, among which the biggest event on the Polish coast was the Celebration of the Sea. This time, a solemn vow to defend Poland's rights to the Baltic Sea was manifested in Gdynia and Warsaw. The beginning of summer brought movement to the coast, and it wasn't even about Poles taking a vacation. Polish sailors noted the constant movement of German ships and vessels bound for East Prussia and carrying soldiers. On July 30, 1939, the role of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces issued an order for the defense of the Coast, which primarily provided for the defense of Gdynia and Hel. The forces were divided into three parts: the Maritime and Land Coastal Defense and units directly subordinated to the Command. The German troops were vigilantly watched by the Polish navy. When the ships approached each other, they were usually both on battle alert and had the barrels of their guns pointed at the enemy. In fact, this was a convenient pretext for various exercises. The atmosphere was really tense. On the night of August 22-23, 1939, the chief state authorities decided on an immediate emergency mobilization involving about 70% of the entire army. On August 24 came another order, this time to mobilize most of the units on the Coast. It proceeded calmly and, above all, very effectively, which was certainly due to the fact that for many weeks they had been aware of the impending war. The clearest example of this occurred on August 25. It was on this day that a German battleship - the Schleswig-Holstein - entered the Gdansk Bay with a "courtesy visit". This German battleship was produced in 1906, and 30 years later was converted into a training ship. However, this did not take away its combat qualities, as evidenced by the fact that originally another ship named Konigsberg was to enter the Gdansk Bay, but it was considered too weak. The ship arrived in Gdansk at the direct invitation of the Senate of the Free City. The purpose of the visit was to commemorate the German sailors from the cruiser "Magdeburg" who died in the Baltic and were buried in Gdansk in August 1914. The visit, which did not seem like a ruse on the surface, was approved by the embassy of the Republic. Only the secret plans of the ship's commander concealed the real purpose of the visit - that is, to attack the Polish depot at Westerplatte. Originally, the attack was to take place on August 26, and there was little chance that this was the date in the history books. A month after the Fall Weiss plan was drawn up, Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief Admiral Erich Raeder issued an order related to its implementation. It consisted of separating part of the naval forces by establishing the East Group command, headed by Admiral Conrad Albrecht. Albrecht carried out the order and ordered the development of a campaign plan. In turn, on August 21, he issued operational orders to execute the White Plan. Its realization, the outbreak of war, was originally scheduled to begin on August 26, 1939. In fact, everything pointed to the fact that the conflict would actually break out that day - German troops were deployed, and the ship's commander on August 25 at 15:02 received orders to begin hostilities the following day at 04:30. The decision to go to war depended in part on provoking an incident that could show that the German forces were merely defending themselves. However, nothing of the kind happened. The signing of an alliance between Britain and Poland on August 25 also played a major role in the rescheduling. The order was postponed until September 1. Until that day, however, the ship theoretically could not remain in the bay - the officially reported deadline for the visit was August 28. Schleswig, however, remained in port beyond that date. Neither side commented on this fact - everyone was well aware of what was about to happen. Although Polish sailors cannot be denied courage, which, by the way, they proved throughout the defensive war, it should be emphasized that the superiority of German forces was enormous, and it was simply impossible to hold the coast. In addition, the Polish navy was reduced by the squadron of destroyers, consisting of three modern Polish destroyers: "Burza", "Blyskawica" and "Grom". On August 30, in an action code-named , "Pekin", it was decided to withdraw them to Great Britain. This is because the Polish command decided that - despite their high combat qualities - these ships would not be able to turn the tide of coastal defense. Their confinement to the Baltic by German forces would result in the destruction of Polish destroyers, which, however, by evacuating to Great Britain, would be able to participate in further battles. And indeed, all of them subsequently took part in naval battles under the Polish flag. The first two survived the conflict. The third - ORP Grom - was sunk by German aviation on May 4, 1940. Returning to September 1939, the balance of forces in the Baltic was as follows: Polish forces: ca. 18,000 soldiers, 137 guns, 1 mine-layer , "Gryf", Non-combatant destroyer , "Wicher". 6 minesweepers: ,,Lapwing", ,,Swallow", ,,Gull", ,,Tern", ,,Heron", ,,Crane", 5 submarines: ,,Vulture", ,,Eagle", ,,Lynx" ,,Wildcat" and ,,Wolf". 2 gunboats, a school gunship, 23 aircraft and, in addition, several miscellaneous ships, partially disarmed, and coastal or Coast Guard ships - of no combat value. German forces: 29,000 troops, 400 guns, 2 battleships - Schleswig Holstein and the twin ship Schlesien 11 destroyers, 2 gunships, 11 torpedo boats, 8 or 10 submarines, 24 minesweepers and 120 aircraft The power differential was therefore colossal - and unfortunately had to remain so. The German Trojan horse was watching and waiting to strike the historic blow of this war. The Baltic plunged into a tense silence. At about 4:00 a.m., the "Schleswig-Holstein" raised her moorings and moved to Five Whistles Bend, from where she had a more convenient field of fire. At 4:43 a.m., the ship's log recorded: "Ship goes to attack Westerplatte." Two minutes later, the first shot rang out. The war had become a reality. The Westerplatte crew was ordered to defend themselves for only 6 hours - but they held out for a full 7 days. This is particularly admirable when one considers the forces the Poles had at their disposal. When the Schleswig-Holstein attacked the Polish depot at Westerplatte at 4:45 a.m., 182 men equipped with 1 75mm field gun, 2 37mm anti-tank guns, 4 81mm mortars and 41 heavy and hand-held machine guns were assigned to defend it. Opposing it was German artillery: 280mm Schleswig cannon, plus dozens of medium and light artillery guns. In addition, one should remember the infantry: an assault company of the navy, units of the Danizger SS-Heimwehr, as well as units of the Danzig Schutzpolizei and a school infantry company. The 6 hours initially adopted should therefore not be particularly surprising. The first day saw as many as four German assaults - all successfully repulsed, with no small losses on the German side. Four soldiers were killed on the Polish side. The original combat task set for the crew had been completed - in accordance with the plan, there was now to be a relief from Gdynia, which, however, did not come. The intervention corps assigned to this task by Brigadier General Stanislaw Skwarczynski had already been withdrawn to the Skierniewice area on August 31. Even before the battle was undertaken, the situation of the crew at Westerplatte was in fact crossed. On the second day of fighting, two massive German assaults were successfully repulsed, culminating in the first heavy raid, during which 40 to as many as 60 Junkers dropped quarter-ton crushing bombs and a large number of incendiary bombs, against which the Polish defense was simply powerless. During the raid, the Germans destroyed Polish mortars, disrupted telephone communications, and at the same time damaged the barracks, while demolishing guardhouse No. 5. Eight soldiers were killed that day. The difficult situation prompted the command to destroy files and documents so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans. The next few days look very similar, with Westerplatte defending itself and more German ships joining the forces. The courage shown by the Polish crew eludes rational criteria. As Jerzy Pertek points out in his book The Great Days of the Small Fleet: Persisting in a hopeless situation on a lost outpost, without any prospect of relief, when church bells were ringing from Gdansk and the shouts of crowds demonstrating in honor of the encroaching Wehrmacht troops, was extraordinary heroism. It's hard to disagree with these words. It is also worth noting that the crew received - admittedly in limited form, but each time dramatic information from the depths of the country, as the map will make clear best. On the eve of the fall of Westerplatte, the Germans had managed to occupy all of Pomerania as well as Bydgoszcz and Torun, most of Greater Poland, the southwestern part of the country with Czestochowa, Katowice and Krakow. The Germans were already approaching Modlin, Skarżysko and Jasło. September 7 marked the last day of defense of Westerplatte. There was a final German attack, which was repulsed anyway! However, the crew was exhausted, further fighting - already beyond human capabilities for the last days - was stopped. At around 10:15 a.m., Major Henryk Sucharski, who had been experiencing a nervous breakdown since September 2, ordered the defense to cease. As a side note, it is worth noting that Sucharski's attitude was very critical; he reportedly ordered the white flag to be raised as early as the second day, but it was hastily removed, and Capt. Franciszek Dąbrowski was to take command of the crew as early as September 2. Apparently, some of the defenders expressed a desire to continue fighting, but this did not affect Sucharski's decision, who with two soldiers went to the Germans. During the acceptance of the surrender, a very telling situation occurred. The commander of the German army, General Friedrich Eberhardt, in recognition of the valor of the Poles, allowed the major to change into a gala uniform and keep his saber, nomen omen belonging to Dabrowski. The defense of Westerplatte resulted in the deaths of between a dozen and several dozen Polish soldiers. Older literature mentions 15 people, while more recent literature increases it to 20 and sometimes even 30 soldiers. Even greater discrepancies can be seen on the German side - in the first years after the war, it was indicated that the Polish defense took the lives of 300, while the crew itself indicated as many as 400 soldiers. The latest research reduces this number by up to 10 times. However, we must keep in mind that there were many wounded during the fighting, who may have died soon as a result of their injuries. Regardless of the numbers - they do not change either the folly of the Germans, who called Westerplatte , "a small Verdun", or the courage of the Poles, who from a doomed military depot created the Polish Thermopylae - another in our history. Westerplatte - despite its enormous overtones in Polish history - was only a part of the Polish struggle; first in defense of its own coast, and then in the ranks of the Allied forces. This story was presented in a very engaging way by Jerzy Pertek, whose book The Great Days of the Small Fleet was published by Znak Publishing House, which I heartily recommend to you from this place.