Title:
URL Source: blob://pdf/54958467-052c-4b16-a425-eebdc83b0127
Markdown Content:
Welcome Letter 4
Chairperson Intr oductions 5
Head Chairperson: Meredith 5
Deputy Chairperson: Cheng Yu 5
Deputy Chairperson: Jia Jin 5
Intr oduction to the Council 6
Intr oduction to the Topic 9
Historical Backgr ound 12
Timeline of Resource Exploitation in Africa 12
Past Actions 14
African Mining Vision 14
Key Terms and Definitions 15
Scope of Debate 18
Resource Ownership Structure 18
Extent of Reliance on Foreign Capital 21
Establishment of Environmental and Social Protection Standards 23
Addressing Existing Resource Mismanagement 25
Potential Solutions 28
Developing a Skilled Local Workforce 28
Strengthening Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms 29
Key Stakeholders 32
Resource-blessed Countries 32
Resource-cursed Countries 33
Multinational Corporations 35
Case Studies 37
Tanzania s Resource Nationalism and the Mining Act Reforms 37
Botswana s Diamond-driven Development 38
Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) 41
Conclusion 42
Intr oduction to the Topic 44
Historical Backgr ound 46
Timeline of Key Milestones and Events 46
Protocols of the AfCFT A 47
Operational Tools of the AfCFT A 48
Pan-African Payment and Settlement System(P APSS) 48
AfCFT A non-tarif f barriers online reporting, monitoring and eliminating mechanism 49
Key Terms and Definitions 50
Scope of Debate 52
2Supporting vs Formalising Informal trade 52
Maintaining a Balance of Trade Surplus 55
Resolving Overlapping Memberships in Multiple RECs 57
Potential Solutions 60
Digital Identification and Civil Registration System 60
Regional Industrial Planning and Shared Projects 61
Harmonising Educational Standards 62
Key Stakeholders 64
Protectionist Bloc 64
Liberal Bloc 65
Informal Traders 66
Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) 69
Conclusion 70
Bibliography 71
Topic 1 71
Topic 2 84
3Welcome Letter
Dear Delegates,
A very warm welcome to the annual summit of the African Union (AU) at Raf fles Model
United Nations (RMUN) 2025! We are Meredith, Cheng Yu, and Jia Jin, your Dais for AU.
As representatives from 38 member states gather to address the pressing issues of natural
resource exploitation and barriers to economic integration in Africa, it is essential that delegates
strive to find common ground while upholding the African Union s core principle of consensus.
In a world that is increasingly polarised and divided, maintaining unity within the AU is now
more important than ever . At the same time, delegates should also remain steadfast in
representing their country s positions with clarity and conviction and not shy away from
constructive opposition that challenges them.
With that, the Dais looks forward to fruitful discussions from you in council, and our
inbox (
[email protected]) will always be open to any council-related queries that you may
have. For administrative or general queries, you can reach out to the Secretariat at
[email protected].
Do follow our Instagram account @rmun2025 for conference updates. Thank you and we
look forward to seeing you at RMUN 2025!
Best regards,
Meredith, Cheng Yu and Jia Jin
Dais of AU
4Chairperson Intr oductions
## Head Chairperson: Meredith
Introducing Meredith, a Year 6 student thrilled to be part of this AU-some council, filled with
diverse perspectives, as she wraps up her HST A journey on a high note. In between the hectic
moments of school life, youll probably find her binge-watching C-dramas, indulging in sweet
treats with a warm cup of cof fee in hand, or capturing snapshots of food and scenic spots for the
memories. Meredith hopes all delegates keep an AU-pen mind and have an enjoyable and
enriching time in council!
## Deputy Chairperson: Cheng Yu
Cheng Yu enjoys writing in a quirkier , blog-like style, which is helped by the impersonal yet
surprisingly charming requirement of Chair Introductions that the first-person must never be
used. He also enjoys writing pretentiously and therefore semi-reflectively , so he can fill out the
word count without revealing too many of his personal interests, or spending too much time
thinking which hobbies he would like his delegates to know about. Hopefully , this spiel does
accomplish the goal of sharing about his personality without explicitly doing so. Cheng Yu hopes
all delegates find valuable experiences in council and looks forward to seeing them at RMUN
2025.
## Deputy Chairperson: Jia Jin
Jia Jin is a Year 5 student taking the hybrid subject combination of PMEH who wishes he had
taken HELM instead. He is also an avid Manchester United supporter , who, despite often
swearing that he is giving up on them, can still be found watching every single one of their
matches and crying afterwards. In order to amplify the depression that supporting Manchester
United causes, he likes to listen to sad indie rock in his free time. Jia Jin hopes that delegates will
find RMUN 2025 and the AU to be a meaningful and valuable experience.
5Intr oduction to the Council
The African Union (AU) is a consultative continental or ganisation consisting of 55 member
states. It was established to foster unity , promote development, and address common challenges
among African states. Of ficially launched on July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, the AU
succeeded the Or ganisation of African Unity (OAU), reflecting a broader focus on human rights,
environmental concerns, and economic integration. 1 With a more economic orientation than its
predecessor , the AU is designed to expedite collaboration and integration among member states
while driving Africa s economic and sustainable development. Additionally , it seeks to protect
human rights and improve living standards through cooperation, research, and innovation. 2
For these goals to be achieved, member states progress is monitored through the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM), a structured process involving self-assessment, review missions,
and peer evaluations. Data is first collected by national focal points and validated by APRM
Country Review Missions, which consult with the government, civil society , and private sector
stakeholders. The findings are then evaluated by the APR Panel and discussed at the APR
Forum, where recommendations are made. Monitoring occurs through periodic reviews every
four years, with progress on National Programmes of Action (NPoA) reported annually . To
ensure compliance with continental agreements, the APRM Secretariat provides administrative
and technical support to member states. 3
In this council, delegates will dive into two major topics: The Question of Management of
Natural Resources and the Question of Economic Integration in Africa. Natural resource
management is vital to achieving sustainable development a core objective of the AU
given the continent s rich endowment of resources and the challenges posed by their exploitation.
The AU plays a pivotal role in formulating policies to ensure equitable resource distribution,
environmental protection, and the prevention of resource exploitation by foreign stakeholders.
Similarly , the AU's focus on economic integration is evident through flagship initiatives like the
> 3AfricanUnion,AfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM)|AfricanUnion,AfricanUnion,accessedFebruary
> 23,2025,https://au.int/en/organs/aprm.
> 2AfricanUnion,AbouttheAfricanUnion,AfricanUnion,accessedFebruary12,2025,https://au.int/en/overview.
> 1EghosaOsaEkhator,RegulatingtheActivitiesofMultinationalCorporationsinNigeria:ACasefortheAfrican
> Union?,InternationalCommunityLawReview20,no.1(March5,2018):3068,
> https://doi.org/10.1163/18719732-12341365.
6African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFT A), which seeks to boost intra-African trade and
foster economic collaboration to reduce disparities between member states. 4 The AU critically
enables seamless Pan-African trade to transition from an ambitious vision to a tangible reality .
> 4AfricanUnion,TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea|AfricanUnion,AfricanUnion,2024,
> https://au.int/en/african-continental-free-trade-area.
7Topic 1: The Question of Natural Resource
# Management
> 8
# Intr oduction to the Topic
Africa is home to a lar ge portion of the world s most valuable natural resources. It collectively
holds 40% of global gold, nearly 90% of chromium and platinum and about a third of the world s
known critical minerals supply . On top of that, the continent accounts for roughly 12% of global
oil reserves and 8% of natural gas reserves. 5 With development goals driving industrial growth,
many African states have seen notable increases in manufacturing output. For instance,
manufacturing output in South Africa, Rwanda, and Nigeria rose by 39.3%, 30.2%, and 4.6 %
respectively in 2021. 6 This rising industrialisation has led to growing demand for resource
extraction, both within Africa and internationally .7 However , the mismanagement of these natural
resources has created significant challenges for the continent.
One major issue is the Dutch disease, where over -reliance on resource exports undermines other
sectors of the economy . The influx of revenue from natural resources often leads to currency
appreciation, making non-resource exports less competitive and stifling diversification. This
phenomenon has left many African economies vulnerable to global commodity price
fluctuations, exacerbating poverty and inequality .8 For instance, despite exporting $232 billion
worth of minerals and oil in 2015, two-thirds of Africans still live on less than $3 a day .9 This
economic imbalance is further compounded by weak governance and a lack of investment in
sectors like agriculture and manufacturing, which could provide more stable and inclusive
growth.
> 9
Rasna Warah, Multinational Companies Reaping from Africas Natural Resources, Including from Illicit Financial
Flows, While Locals Benefit Only Marginally, Says Columnist, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, July
10, 2017,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/multinational-companies-reaping-from-africas-natural-resourc
es-including-from-illicit-financial-flows-while-locals-benefit-only-marginally-says-columnist/.
> 8
Seedwell Hove, Why Africa Must Shift from Dependence to Diversification, Now, African Development Bank
Group (blog), March 21, 2018,
https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/industrialisation-and-trade-corner/post/why-africa-must-shift-from-dependence-to-diversific
ation-now-17962.
> 7
Forbe Hodu Ngangnchi, Nkwetta Ajong Aquilas, and Mukete Emmanuel Mbella, Natural Resource Use,
Industrialization and Climate Change in Africa: Blueprints for Sustainable Regional Development, Research in
Globalization 9 (December 2024): 100245, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resglo.2024.100245.
> 6
Jaime Moll de Alba and Valentin Todorov, Measuring Green Industrial Performance: A Regional Outlook of
Eastern Asia and Europe, Economic Change and Restructuring 56, no. 4 (August 10, 2022): 32813307,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-022-09436-x.
> 5
UN Environment Programme, Our Work in Africa, UNEP - UN Environment Programme (UNEP, October 25,
2017), https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa.
9State and corporate corruption further exacerbate the inequitable distribution of resource wealth.
Government corruption diverts profits away from public investment, leading to erosion of trust,
economic decline and failure to attract foreign capital. 10 Multinational corporations (MNCs)
exploit tax incentives and engage in illicit financial flows, with an estimated $88.6 billion
illegally moved out of Africa annually according to a 2020 UNCT AD report. 11 These practices
deprive African nations of critical revenue needed for infrastructure, education, and healthcare.
Additionally , resource-backed loans often place countries at a disadvantage, complicating debt
resolution and compromising future economic growth. 12 Local communities bear the brunt of
these practices, facing forced evictions, loss of farmland, and human rights abuses including
violence and sexual assault as land is cleared for extraction projects. 13
Resource depletion and environmental degradation are also significant consequences of
mismanagement. Unsustainable extraction practices, driven by MNCs and inadequate
government regulation, have led to the rapid degradation of land, water , forests, and wildlife.
Sub-Saharan Africa s natural resource depletion rate increased from 5% of GNI in 1990 to 6% in
2020. 14 A 2024 ScienceDirect study found that natural resource extraction in Africa contributes
10.87% to climate change, with a linear relationship between extraction and carbon dioxide
emissions. 15 This environmental damage not only threatens biodiversity but also undermines
livelihoods, particularly for rural communities dependent on natural resources.
> 15
Forbe Hodu Ngangnchi, Nkwetta Ajong Aquilas, and Mukete Emmanuel Mbella, Natural Resource Use,
Industrialization and Climate Change in Africa: Blueprints for Sustainable Regional Development.
> 14
Paul Adjei Kwakwa, Hamdiyah Alhassan, and George Adu, Effect of Natural Resources Extraction on Energy
Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emission in Ghana, International Journal of Energy Sector Management 14, no.
1 (January 9, 2020): 2039, https://doi.org/10.1108/ijesm-09-2018-0003.
> 13
Amnesty International, Forced Evictions at Industrial Cobalt and Copper Mines in the DRC, Amnesty
International, September 12, 2023,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/drc-cobalt-and-copper-mining-for-batteries-leading-to-human-right
s-abuses/.
> 12
African Development Bank Group , Africas $824 Billion Debt Burden and Opaque Resource-Backed Loans
Hinder Its Potential, African Development Bank President Warns, African Development Bank Group, April 19,
2024,
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/africas-824-billion-debt-burden-and-opaque-resource-backe
d-loans-hinder-its-potential-african-development-bank-president-warns-70183.
> 11
Carol Guensburg, Africa Bled by Illicit Cash Outflows - Report, ed. Eric Manirakiza, VOA Africa, September
18, 2022, https://www.voaafrica.com/a/africa-bled-by-illicit-cash-outflows---report/6750772.html.
> 10
Hyacinthe Sarassoro, Corruption of Public Officials in Africa - a Comparative Study in Criminal Law, U.S.
Department of Justice (Economica , 1980), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/81952NCJRS.pdf.
10 If current trends continue, Africa faces severe economic and environmental losses. The continent
already loses an estimated $195 billion annually due to unregulated fishing and environmental
degradation. 16 Climate change, intensified by unsustainable extraction, could reduce GDP per
capita by 66% to 90% by 2100. 17 Addressing these challenges requires stronger governance,
transparent resource management, and enforceable environmental standards to ensure that
Africa s natural wealth benefits all its citizens and supports sustainable development.
> 17 TrevorHouseretal.,EconomicRisksofClimateChange,ColumbiaUniversityPressEBooks(DeGruyter,2015),
> 1351,https://doi.org/10.7312/hous17456.
> 16 UNEnvironmentProgramme,OurWorkinAfrica.
11Historical Backgr ound
## Timeline of Resource Exploitation in Africa
The issue of resource management in Africa is deeply rooted in the continent s colonial legacy .
During the colonial era in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the lar ge-scale extraction of
Africa s natural resources, driven by European powers, led to the fragmentation and destruction
of African economies. A new structure was established, positioning African economies within
the global economic system as suppliers of raw materials for the advancement of other nations,
primarily imperial Europe. This has relegated most parts of the continent to a political economy
structure of primary commodity export dependence. Within this structure, Africa became a
single-resource economy that relied heavily on small baskets of barely processed minerals,
timber , and agricultural products for economic growth, a pattern that has persisted till today . By
focusing solely on resource extraction, the domestic production chain was disrupted, eroding the
expertise, knowledge and processes associated with these goods. Consequently , the region s
productive capacities and capabilities have deteriorated, laying the foundation for unequal
development and distribution of benefits. 18 Under colonial rule, resources were also extracted
rapidly with little regard for their long-term conservation, the economic advancement of the local
populations, or broader social welfare benefits. 19
After achieving independence in the 1950s and 1960s, resource nationalisation ef forts sur ged
across the continent to undo the colonial economic legacy . Political elites sought to reclaim
sovereignty over natural resources by establishing state-owned enterprises, joint ventures with
foreign companies under stringent regulations, or complete takeovers of private entities. These
initiatives sought to reform the resource extraction landscape, strengthen governmental
supervision, and promote a fairer allocation of wealth across the country .20 However , rather than
transforming the political and economic dynamics of the sector , resource nationalisation became
more of a political tool to quell dissent by satisfying popular demands. Moreover , operational
> 20 TheSudanTimes,AfricasResourceNationalisationtoReclaimControlPost-Independence-theSudanTimes,
> TheSudanTimes,December15,2023,
> https://thesudantimes.com/africa/resource-nationalization-to-reclaim-control-post-independence/.
> 19 MateuszBrodowicz,ColonialismandtheExploitationofAfricanResources,Aithor,July2,2024,
> https://aithor.com/essay-examples/colonialism-and-the-exploitation-of-african-resources#21-scramble-for-africa.
> 18 TettehHormeku-AjeiandCamdenGoetz,AHistoryofResourcePlunder,AfricaIsaCountry,2021,
> https://africasacountry.com/2021/04/a-history-of-resource-plunder.
12 inef ficiencies and corruption plagued the nationalised extractive sectors. 21 This was because
political elites governing African states often had intertwined political and commercial interests.
The only source of wealth for these corrupted of ficials could be found in mines and oilfields.
Consequently , they monopolised the revenues generated from oil and mining resources for their
own benefit. 22 The lack of funding and expertise further undermined ef forts to improve Africa s
capacity to harness valuable resources. 23 Falling consumer demand and commodity prices drove
many African states dependent on these commodity exports into a debt crisis in the 1980s and
1990s. 24
In response to the debt crisis, economic policy changes were implemented. Structural adjustment
programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank reshaped
Africa s resource landscape. Under their guidance, many African countries liberalised their
economies and privatised their resource sector . The economic reforms in Africa exposed many
African countries to multinational corporation investments, resulting in human rights violations
and resource exploitation. 25 These MNCs still wield significant economic and political power in
post-independent Africa, establishing a clear connection between colonial exploitation and
modern-day exploitation. 26
> 26
Kieron Monks, Workers Extracting Cobalt from a Lake in Katanga Province, DR Congo.
> 25
Drew Weider, Structural Adjustments Complex Legacy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
> 24
Drew Weider, Structural Adjustments Complex Legacy in Sub-Saharan Africa Michigan Journal of
Economics, Michigan Journal of Economics, April 29, 2024,
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2024/04/29/structural-adjustments-complex-legacy-in-sub-saharan-africa/.
> 23
Japhace Poncian, Adopting and Practicing Resource Nationalism in Africa: A Case of Tanzanias State Mining
Corporation.
> 22
Kieron Monks, Workers Extracting Cobalt from a Lake in Katanga Province, DR Congo., CNN, January 2,
2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/18/africa/looting-machine-tom-burgis-africa/index.html.
> 21
Japhace Poncian, Adopting and Practicing Resource Nationalism in Africa: A Case of Tanzanias State Mining
Corporation, Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8, no. 1 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2023.100678.
13 Past Actions
African Mining Vision
African member states soon realised that existing global regimes for mineral sector governance
did not address issues such as low-value addition, inef ficient collection of rents and the enclave
nature of mining. 27 These factors sparked a discussion on the necessity of an alternative policy
framework that links mineral extraction to structural transformation. Thus, in 2009, to tackle the
paradox of great resource wealth existing alongside pervasive poverty , the AU established the
African Mining Vision (AMV), a holistic policy framework created to encourage development
policies at the local, national and regional levels for mining to benefit locals without
compromising the environment. The AMV also sought to integrate mining into industrial and
trade policy for Africa, allowing the continent to transition from an exporter of cheap raw
materials to a supplier of knowledge-based services. 28
Although 24 out of the 54 AU member states are at various stages of nationally implementing the
AMV , progress has been slow . Several barriers account for this. First, significant technical,
financial, and political resources for implementing the AMV are currently lacking in many
African states. Second, AMV implementation mechanisms are overly state-centric, leaving
insuf ficient room for civil society to influence national-level processes. Additionally , the AMV
does not explicitly ensure free public access to critical policy information about the mineral
sector . Moreover , the AMV's environmental regulations primarily emphasise the initial stages of
mineral extraction, lacking provisions to address the ongoing social and ecological disruptions
caused by mining, as well as long-term challenges like water conservation and acid mine
drainage. Furthermore, the AMV s applicability to oil and gas governance has not been fully
explored despite the potential syner gies. Lastly , the AMV is not widely known among key
stakeholders in the mineral sector , but broad-based participation is crucial to hold governments
accountable for AMV implementation and build social consensus on mineral sector governance
in Africa. 29
> 29 Oxfam,FromAspirationtoReality:UnpackingtheAfricaMiningVision
> 28 AfricanUnion,AbouttheAfricanUnion,AfricanUnion,February12,2010,https://au.int/en/overview.
> 27 Oxfam,FromAspirationtoReality:UnpackingtheAfricaMiningVision(Oxfam,March2017),
> https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620208/bp-africa-mining-vision-090317-en.pdf?se
> quence=1.
14 Key Terms and Definitions
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting A tax planning strategy by MNCs to exploit gaps and
mismatches in tax rules, shifting profits to low or no-tax
locations where they have little or no economic activity or
eroding tax bases through deductible payments like interest
or royalties. 30
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) An investment from a party in one country into a business
or corporation in another country with the intention of
establishing a lasting interest. 31
Illicit Financial Flows The movement of money across borders that is illegal in its
source (e.g. corruption, smuggling), its transfer (e.g. tax
evasion), or its use (e.g. terrorist financing). 32
Pan-Africanism An overarching term for various movements across Africa
that share the common goal of uniting Africans and
eradicating colonialism and white supremacy from the
continent. 33
Historically , Pan-Africanism has often advocated for
political or cultural unity .34 However , rather than focusing
solely on identity , a wave of new Pan-Africanism has
> 34
Peter Kuryla, Pan-Africanism, in Encyclopdia Britannica, April 29, 2016,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Africanism.
> 33
Dominican University, Pan-Africanism, Dominican University , accessed February 12, 2025,
https://research.dom.edu/AfricanAmericanStudies/panafricanism.
> 32
International Monetary Fund, The IMF and the Fight against Illicit Financial Flows, IMF, 2023,
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Fight-against-illicit-financial-flows.
> 31
CFI, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Corporate Finance Institute, November 27, 2022,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/foreign-direct-investment-fdi/.
> 30
OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), OECD, 2024,
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps.html.
15 emer ged, emphasising democracy , good governance, and
economic development. 35
Resource-backed loans Resource-backed loans (RBLs) refer to loans granted to
governments or state-owned companies where repayment is
tied to natural resources. This can occur in the following
ways:
1. Repayment is made directly in natural resources,
such as oil or minerals, or through future income
streams derived from these resources.
2. Repayment is secured by a resource-related income
stream or backed by a natural resource asset serving
as collateral. 36
Resource Blessing A situation where resources in resource-abundant countries
yield greater financial rewards for the country .37
Resource Curse The failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully
from their natural resource wealth. Instead, there is a
tendency for natural resource abundance to immiserate
growth and development. 38
Trade Mispricing A method for moving money illicitly across borders
involving the deliberate falsification of the value, volume,
and/or type of commodity in an international commercial
> 38
Natural Resource Governance Institute, The Resource Curse the Political and Economic Challenges of Natural
Resource Wealth, Natural Resource Governance Institute (Natural Resource Governance Institute, March 2015),
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf.
> 37
Lingcai Liu et al., Exploring Resource Blessing Hypothesis within the Coffin of Technological Innovation and
Economic Risk: Evidence from Wavelet Quantile Regression, Energy Economics 137 (July 30, 2024): 107802,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107802.
> 36
David Mihalyi, Aisha Adam, and Jyhjong Hwang, Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential, Natural
Resource Governance Institute (Natural Resource Governance Institute, February 2020),
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-executive-summary.pdf.
> 35
Oscar Kimanuka, What Pan Africanism Means in the Context of Regional Integration - Tralac Trade Law
Centre, tralac, August 14, 2015,
https://www.tralac.org/news/article/7900-what-pan-africanism-means-in-the-context-of-regional-integration.html.
16 transaction of goods or services by at least one party to the
transaction. 39
Transfer Mispricing A technique used by MNCs to shift profits out of the
countries where they operate into tax havens. 40 This occurs
when one company sells goods or services to another
related company at an inflated or deflated price in order to
allocate profits to a lower -tax jurisdiction. 41
> 41
Intergovernmental Forum, Transfer Pricing - Intergovernmental Forum, Intergovernmental Forum, April 2,
2024, https://www.igfmining.org/financial-benefits/global-mining-tax-initiative/transfer-pricing/.
> 40
Tax Justice Network, What Is Transfer Pricing?, Tax Justice Network, accessed January 2, 2025,
https://taxjustice.net/faq/what-is-transfer-pricing/.
> 39
Global Financial Integrity, Trade Misinvoicing, Global Financial Integrity, accessed January 2, 2025,
https://gfintegrity.org/issue/trade-misinvoicing/.
17 Scope of Debate
## Resource Ownership Structure
Countries vary with respect to the control rights regimes of their main natural resources. 42 This
af fects the governance of resources and resource wealth distribution among dif ferent
stakeholders. Some African member states have opted for centralised national ownership of
resources. As resources are tied to ethnic identity , nationalising resources would depoliticise
ethnicity and promote harmony , thus for ging a stronger and more unified national identity .
Moreover , the centralisation of resources also enables revenue earned from its extraction to be
equitably distributed throughout the country .43 Returns from resource extraction stay within the
economy and the government can use them to fund investment, social spending, and tax cuts. 44
However , the centralisation of resources grants the government exclusive authority to make
unilateral decisions that states describe as being in the "interest" of the nation and its people. 45
This approach ef fectively excludes host communities from participating in or influencing
national decisions regarding these resources. When such communities advocate for involvement
in decision-making processes, the principle of national ownership is often invoked as a reminder
that resources belong to all citizens, not just those in host regions. As a result, national ownership
can serve as a propaganda tool to dismiss and suppress host community ef forts to gain a voice in
resource-related decisions. 46 Moreover , state-owned enterprises (SOEs) serve as a breeding
ground for corruption. 47 SOEs are poorly managed, frequently bypassing parliaments and
national budgets, making them vulnerable to perilous deals. In 40% of resource-backed loans, the
> 47
Carole Nakhle, The Energy Transition and the Risk of Resource Nationalism, GIS Reports, May 12, 2023,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/resource-nationalism/.
> 46
Japhace Poncian and Jim Jose, National Resource Ownership and Community Engagement in Tanzanias Natural
Gas Governance, Energy Policy 133 (October 2019): 110903, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.110903.
> 45
Japhace Poncian, Extractive Resource Ownership and the Subnational Resource Curse: Insights from Tanzania,
The Extractive Industries and Society 6, no. 2 (April 2019): 33242, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.08.013.
> 44
Jason P. Brown, Timothy Fitzgerald, and Jeremy G. Weber, Asset Ownership, Windfalls, and Income: Evidence
from Oil and Gas Royalties, SSRN (Social Science Research Network (SSRN), May 4, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2963775.
> 43
Linda Starke, Breaking New Ground, Routledge EBooks, 1st ed. (2002; repr., Taylor & Francis, 2016), 1480,
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315541501.
> 42
Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse, Google Books (Cambridge University press,
2010),
https://books.google.com.sg/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YidGtiVuvjEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=Q1_oJd0bYr&sig=Rxc3
bWTR9ewe67b1whZpTRpYsvk&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
18
> -
borrowing entity within the country is a SOE, which often becomes a source of opacity and
of f-budget spending. 48
On the other hand, several African member states have privatised their resource extraction
operations, often outsourcing them to MNCs. However , MNCs have created discontent and
provoked local resentment in these countries. Without ef fective state regulation, foreign mining
or oil companies lack the incentive to comply with environmental regulations, leading to
violations of regulations and issues such as pollution and water shortage. Furthermore, foreign
companies are less sensitive towards the needs and interests of the local community and are
therefore less concerned with employing a local labour force. 49 Presently , this is especially true
for Chinese companies, which hire Chinese nationals for resource-extraction projects.
Consequently , African labour has not benefited from Chinese investment. 50 In these African
states, transnational extractive corporations are frequently viewed by the local people as a new
form of imperialism, and their activities have given rise to neocolonialist rhetoric. 51
Despite the aforementioned negative impacts of foreign corporations operations on host states,
OECD-based multinationals tend to employ cleaner technology and possess more sophisticated
environmental management systems than many domestic firms in developing countries. 52
Additionally , due to their size and the pressure from international non-governmental
or ganisations, multinational oil and mining corporations are often more inclined to adopt
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices compared to local firms. 53 To mitigate the
> 53
Tim Wegenast and Gerald Schneider, Ownership Matters: Natural Resources Property Rights and Social Conflict
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
> 52
Matthew A. Cole, Robert J.R. Elliott, and Eric Strobl, The Environmental Performance of Firms: The Role of
Foreign Ownership, Training, and Experience, Ecological Economics 65, no. 3 (April 15, 2008): 53846,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.025.
> 51
Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Material Constraints to Popular Imaginaries: The Extractive Economy and
Resource Nationalism in Bolivia, Political Geography 31, no. 4 (May 2012): 22535,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.03.002.
> 50
Kinfu Adisu, Thomas Sharkey, and Sam C. Okoroafo, The Impact of Chinese Investment in Africa,
International Journal of Business and Management 5, no. 9 (August 19, 2010): 17,
https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v5n9p3.
> 49
Tim Wegenast and Gerald Schneider, Ownership Matters: Natural Resources Property Rights and Social Conflict
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Political Geography 61 (November 2017): 11022,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.07.007.
> 48
David Mihalyi, Aisha Adam, and Jyhjong Hwang, Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential, Natural
Resource Governance Institute (Natural Resource Governance Institute, February 2020),
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-executive-summary.pdf.
19
> -
challenges of being foreign entities, ensure smooth operations, and prevent protests fueled by
neo-imperialist sentiment, foreign companies may invest more in the welfare of local
communities, similar to what Canadian multinational firm Barrick Gold have done. 54
In response to the demands for better resource management and equitable sharing of their
dividends, some African countries are looking towards decentralised resource management,
where locals can participate directly in managing resources. This has several advantages, such as
greater ef ficiency , equity , and superior indigenous knowledge. 55 However , key challenges
remain. Bureaucratic hurdles such as inadequate technical expertise, costly permits, complex
management plans, and limited property rights, which only grant the local communities access to
land without managing it, hamper their ability to benefit economically from forest products. 56
Furthermore, while most African countries have required a significant portion of mining
procurement spending to remain in the country to stimulate local economies, most mining
operations are located in remote areas with limited local capacity to meet procurement needs,
creating a mismatch. Once developed, local supply chains often become overly reliant on a
mining operation, which is inherently temporary due to the finite nature of resource extraction.
This dependency makes these supply chains unsustainable once the mining operation ends. 57
Given the contrasting views on the best resource ownership structure, delegates must weigh the
merits and drawbacks of each option, reach a consensus on the most suitable resource
management structure and devise solutions to tackle its flaws. Delegates should also propose
measures to build capacity at both national and local levels to ensure ef ficient and equitable
resource management.
> 57 ChristopherVandomeandLawrenceDechambenoit,AfricanAgencyinMineralResourceGovernance,
> ChathamHouse,February24,2023,
> https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/african-agency-mineral-resource-governance.
> 56 LauraGermanetal.,ForestGovernanceandDecentralizationinAfrica:LinkingLocal,RegionalandGlobal
> Dialogues,TheCenterforInternationalForestryResearchandWorldAgroforestry(CIFOR-ICRAF),accessed
> January1,2025,
> https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/events/documentations/durban/papers/Paper01Laura.pdf.
> 55 PratyusnaPatnaik,AsianReviewofSocialSciencesDecentralizedNaturalResourceManagement:AReviewof
> DevolutionofPropertyRightsandPeoplesParticipationPratyusnaPatnaik,AsianReviewofSocialSciences(The
> ResearchPublication,2019),
> https://trp.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ARSS-Vol.8-No.1-January-March-2019-pp.-92-96.pdf.
> 54 AfricanEnergyChamber,TotalEnergies:DrivingEconomicDevelopmentbeyondOil&Gas-AfricanEnergy
> Chamber,AfricanEnergyChamber,July4,2024,
> https://energychamber.org/totalenergies-driving-economic-development-beyond-oil-gas/.
20 Extent of Reliance on Foreign Capital
Many African countries depend heavily on foreign capital to spur their countries economic
growth. This capital takes various forms, including the inflow of capital through foreign direct
investment, and loans from governments of international countries. 58 One example is
resource-backed loans that some African countries enter with more powerful states. Several
African countries take up resource-backed loans with China and several Western countries to
show their citizens tangible signs of economic progress new dams to generate electricity and
power homes; new roads to improve local commutes. 59 Moreover , resource-backed loans are the
only viable source of funding that African countries can turn to to fuel their economic
development when faced with budgetary pressures, economic recessions, and challenges in
accessing financial markets due to their high risks. 60 FDI is also highly appealing to
policymakers in Africa as it is believed to provide technology , marketing expertise, and
management skills that can address domestic capital shortages. Additionally , FDI can promote
ef ficiency and technology transfer to local firms while facilitating access to foreign markets. 61
However , foreign capital has its perils too. Firstly , MNCs frequently advocate for tax breaks as
incentives to establish or maintain their operations in African nations. As a result, many African
countries grant wasteful tax breaks to these corporations, resulting in huge revenue losses for
them. 62 Secondly , MNCs also engage in strategies such as trade mispricing and transfer
mispricing to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. According to research by the African Union,
Africa loses around USD 89 billion annually to illicit financial flows (IFFs), equating to 3.7% of
> 62 OxfamInternational,MultinationalCompaniesCheatAfricaoutofBillionsofDollars,OxfamInternational,
> June1,2015,https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/multinational-companies-cheat-africa-out-billions-dollars.
> 61 HanyBesada,ForeignInvestmentinAfrica:ChallengesandBenefits,SouthAfricanJournalofInternational
> Affairs13,no.1(January26,2010):15968,https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460609556793.
> 60 YacoubaCoulibaly,Resource-BackedLoansandEcologicalEfficiencyofHumanDevelopment:Evidencefrom
> AfricanCountries,EcologicalEconomics224(October1,2024):125,
> https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108295.
> 59 MarkA.Green,AfricasNaturalResourcesforAfricans?WilsonCentre,May29,2024,
> https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-natural-resources-africans.
> 58 AhmadZubaidiBaharumshah,LySlesman,andEvelynShyamalaDevadason,TypesofForeignCapitalInflows
> andEconomicGrowth:NewEvidenceonRoleofFinancialMarkets,JournalofInternationalDevelopment29,no.
> 6(April8,2015):76889,https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3093.
21 its GDP , while tax incentives contribute to a further loss of $220 billion. 63 These capital outflows
have grievous ef fects on Africa. They reduce the domestic income in Africa, making African
countries more reliant on foreign aid for development financing and poverty reduction
programmes. Thirdly , contracts with revenue-sharing agreements often fail to account for the
need to compensate for the significant social, economic, and environmental harms caused by
resource exploitation. 64 This oversight allows MNCs to extract resources without adequately
addressing the destruction of ecosystems, displacement of communities, or long-term economic
instability their operations may create, leaving host countries to bear the burden of these negative
impacts.
Furthermore, resource-backed loan negotiations that African countries enter are often
asymmetric, giving lenders, such as more powerful countries or big commercial banks, the upper
hand in most deals. Lenders dictate terms that place borrowers at a disadvantage. Hence, under
many of these financing arrangements, if interest rates rise or commodity prices become unstable
over the life of the loan, borrower countries either fall into default or end up devoting nearly all
the income from their pledged resources to pay of f debt. 65 Repaying the debt burden may force
highly indebted economies to increase pressure on the natural environment to boost public
revenues, leading to heavy deforestation and depletion of natural resources, thereby negatively
impacting sustainable development and ecological ef ficiency in African countries.
While these issues have been recognised, they remain unresolved for several reasons. Firstly ,
power imbalances between weak national governments and powerful MNCs enable a weak
system of resource governance. 66 Extractive industries demand a high level of expertise, resulting
in relatively low competition and the formation of oligopolies, in which a small number of lar ge
> 66 AmaniAfrica,DiscussiononEnhancingMechanismsforCurbingIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesby
> ArmedandTerroristGroupsinAfrica,AmaniAfrica,November25,2024,
> https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-enhancing-mechanisms-for-curbing-illegal-exploitation-of-natural-resources
> -by-armed-and-terrorist-groups-in-africa/.
> 65 MarkA.Green,AfricasNaturalResourcesforAfricans?
> 64 OxfamInternational,LiftingtheResourceCurse,OxfamInternational,December2009,
> https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp134-lifting-the-resource-curse-011209_4.pdf.
> 63 AfricanUnion,3rdSub-CommitteeonTaxandIllicitFinancialFlowsoftheSpecializedTechnicalCommitteeon
> Finance,MonetaryAffairs,EconomicPlanning,andIntegration.|AfricanUnion,AfricanUnion,May8,2024,
> https://au.int/en/newsevents/20240508/3rd-sub-committee-tax-and-illicit-financial-flows.
22 firms consolidate lar ge market shares. 67 These companies then work together to export illicit
capital outflows. 68 This issue is compounded by limited state presence, inadequate law
enforcement capacity , porous borders, and insuf ficient legal frameworks for resource
management in many African states. 69 Given that African states depend on MNCs for their
technologies, expertise, jobs and revenue, many are reluctant to penalise them for environmental
violations and frequently overlook the ecological damage caused by multinational companies
extractive activities. 70 Moreover , the race-to-the-bottom mentality adopted by many African
states means that in a bid to secure foreign investments, several African countries have lowered
regulatory barriers and taxes, stoking unhealthy regional competition that eventually hurts all
African states. 71
Although foreign capital can of fer short-term benefits, depending on them excessively exposes
African countries to the risk of exploitation by foreign companies and other countries. Thus,
delegates should focus on balancing the need for foreign investment with the pursuit of
self-reliance and regional cooperation to ensure sustainable resource management in the long
run.
## Establishment of Environmental and Social Protection Standards
Environmental and social protection regulations are important for Africa because they help
ensure that resource extraction and industrial activities are conducted responsibly , minimising
harm to ecosystems and local communities. For instance, in several African countries, cyanide
and mercury use has been banned in gold mining while gas flaring and venting, which contribute
> 71
Giorgia Albertin, Dan Devlin, and Boriana Yontcheva, Countering Tax Avoidance in Sub-Saharan Africas
Mining Sector, International Monetary Fund , November 5, 2021,
https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/11/05/blog-countering-tax-avoidance-sub-saharan-africa-mining-sector.
> 70
Christopher Oyier, Multinational Corporations and Natural Resources Exploitation in Africa: Challenges and
Prospects, The Journal of Conflict Management and Sustainable Development 1, no. 2 (2017): 6971,
https://journalofcmsd.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OYIER-MNCs-PAPER-20-December-2017.pdf.
> 69
Amani Africa, Discussion on Enhancing Mechanisms for Curbing Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources by
Armed and Terrorist Groups in Africa.
> 68
Philippe Le Billon, Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial Flows: What Role for Revenue Governance
Initiatives?, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2025,
https://www.u4.no/publications/extractive-sectors-and-illicit-financial-flows-what-role-for-revenue-governance-initi
atives.pdf.
> 67
A. Timothy Martin and J. Jay Park, Global Petroleum Industry Model Contracts Revisited: Higher, Faster,
Stronger, The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 3, no. 1 (February 9, 2010): 443,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwp022.
23 significantly to greenhouse gas emissions, have also been prohibited under stricter environmental
regulations. Environmental and social protection regulations can foster innovation in
environmentally friendly technologies, thus accelerating the pace towards sustainable resource
extraction. 72 Conversely , there has also been research that suggests that stringent laws
disincentivise firms from undertaking more research on ef ficient resource extraction methods and
equipment, as research breakthroughs will only be met with new sets of restrictions on the
improved technique and instruments, resulting in a waste of monetary resources. 73 Therefore, in
navigating this issue, delegates must deliberate on ways to establish robust environmental and
social protection regulations while simultaneously incentivising firms to invest in research and
development (R&D) initiatives that can contribute to more ef ficient methods of extracting
resources.
In Africa, traditional environmental regulations and social protection measures in extractive
industries typically include environmental and social impact assessments, pollution control and
rehabilitation plans, and inclusive public consultation. 74 However , strict environmental and social
protection standards often face resistance from firms, as seen in how mining companies were
deterred from actively participating in the AMV because it required substantial long-term
investments in managing projects that uphold the environmental and social integrity of the
regions where they operate. 75 To overcome stringent standards, extractive companies may
underreport environmental damages or shift operations to countries with more lenient regulations
to minimize compliance costs, forcing African countries to compromise their environmental
> 75 PeterArthur,ReimaginingNaturalResourcesGovernanceinAfrica:IsDigitalizationtheGameChanger?,ed.
> KorblaP.PuplampuandKobenaT.Hanson,InternationalPoliticalEconomySeries,August22,2023,71100,
> https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32164-1_4.
> 74 NationalEnvironmentalManagementAuthority(NEMA),EnvironmentalandSocialImpactAssessment(ESIA)
> GuidelinesfortheMiningSector,NationalEnvironmentalManagementAuthority(NEMA),accessedFebruary12,
> 2025,
> https://www.nema.go.ke/images/Docs/Guidelines/Signed%20ESIA%20Guildelines%20for%20the%20Mining%20s
> ector%20-%20Final-min.pdf.
> 73 JessicaCoriaandThomasSterner,NaturalResourceManagement:ChallengesandPolicyOptions,Annual
> ReviewofResourceEconomics3,no.1(October2011):20330,
> https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-083110-120131.
> 72 AntoineDechezleprtreandMisatoSato,TheImpactsofEnvironmentalRegulationsonCompetitiveness,
> LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience(LSE),November2014,
> https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Impacts_of_Environmental_Regulations1.pdf.
24 requirements in order to attract foreign investors. 76 Thus, delegates should debate on ways to
ensure that environmental and social protection laws are met with compliance from firms.
Additionally , environmental and social protection regulations increase the operating costs for
companies, af fecting the competitiveness of domestic industries, thus placing domestic firms at a
disadvantage against foreign companies. 77 Moreover , according to the IMF , strict environmental
regulations increase firms production costs, causing a fall in output to maintain profitability ,
thereby reducing firms demand for labour . This will cause substantial job losses for locals. 78
Therefore, delegates should discuss how to cushion the impact of environmental and social
protection regulations on small domestic firms and the local community .
## Addressing Existing Resource Mismanagement
Currently , many African countries believe that they have to protect foreign direct investors, but
not labourers, giving rise to exploitation by MNCs. 79 To combat existing resource exploitation by
foreign companies, African countries need to take swifter and more decisive action against
multinational companies. Several African countries, such as South Africa, have enacted domestic
legislation empowering their governments to hold businesses accountable for addressing adverse
environmental impacts. These laws also allow individuals to seek judicial intervention on behalf
of af fected persons or the public in cases of legal violations, including those involving corporate
entities. 80 In some African regions, mining activities by foreign companies were also put to a halt
> 80
O. B. Igbayiloye, Hameenat Bukola Ojibara, and Anthonia Omosefe Ugowe, Legal Response to Human Rights
Challenges of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and
Jurisprudence 6 (2015): 10619,
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Legal-response-to-human-rights-challenges-of-in-Igbayiloye-Ojibara/e2ee8a
6d1fd6a0f51ccb76f19b292d9862c266bc.
> 79
United Nations, Speakers Stress Need to Address Exploitation of Africas Resources, Urging Paradigm Shift, as
Economic and Social Council Concludes Segment, United Nations, May 10, 2017,
https://press.un.org/en/2017/ecosoc6831.doc.htm.
> 78
Adil Mohommad, Employment Effects of Environmental Policies Evidence from Firm-Level Data,
International Monetary Fund 21, no. 140 (May 14, 2021): 129, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513573618.001.A001.
> 77
Antoine Dechezleprtre and Misato Sato, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness.
> 76
Maxwell Chukwudi Udeagha and Marthinus Christoffel Breitenbach, Can Fiscal Decentralization Be the Route
to the Race to Zero Emissions in South Africa? Fresh Policy Insights from Novel Dynamic Autoregressive
Distributed Lag Simulations Approach, Environmental Science and Pollution Research 30, no. 16 (January 31,
2023): 4644674, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-023-25306-z.
25 to restore peace. 81 Taking a heavy-handed approach towards MNCs would compel businesses to
take environmental and social standards seriously and enforce behaviours that promote
sustainable resource extraction.
However , as previously mentioned, many African countries which depend on MNCs for jobs and
revenue streams may be unwilling to do so, as they fear that such hard measures would deter
foreign investment and result in foreign companies shifting their operations to other
neighbouring African states with more business-friendly regulations. 82
As such, some African countries have instead adopted a more incentive-based approach to
encourage MNCs to adopt sustainable practices that are both people-centred and environmentally
conscious. For instance, Senegal has introduced certification programs, issuing sustainability
labels to recognise companies that are committed to CSR to encourage multinational companies
to practise sustainable resource extraction. In Gabon, preferential tax treatments are given to
companies that engage in wood processing, encouraging MNCs to increase value-added
production in the host country , thereby creating more job opportunities for the locals. 83 In
Botswana and Ghana, regulatory incentives were introduced for companies meeting higher ESG
standards. 84
Nonetheless, significant obstacles, such as regulatory hurdles, remain. Inconsistent or lax
enforcement of environmental regulations creates uncertainty for businesses seeking to
implement sustainability initiatives. A report by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) found that only 26% of African countries have comprehensive environmental laws, and
even fewer enforce them ef fectively . Weak national regulations and the absence of strong
> 84 ChambersandPartners,ESGinMining:ShapingtheFutureofAfricasMetalsandMinerals|Article|Chambers
> andPartners,ChambersandPartners,October1,2024,
> https://chambers.com/articles/esg-in-mining-shaping-the-future-of-africa-s-metals-and-minerals.
> 83 AllisonSoilihi,ESGInvestments:TheMiddleEasternandAfricanRegulatoryPerspectivePart2,Morgan
> Lewis,August14,2024,
> https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2024/08/esg-investments-the-middle-eastern-and-african-regulatory-perspective
> -part-2.
> 82 ChristopherOyier,MultinationalCorporationsandNaturalResourcesExploitationinAfrica:Challengesand
> Prospects.
> 81 Aix-MarseilleSchoolofEconomics,ViolenceinAfrica:MultinationalsTakeSomeoftheBlame,
> Aix-MarseilleSchoolofEconomics,April26,2019,
> https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/ecodialog/violence-africa-multinationals-take-some-blame.
26 international mechanisms mean that CSR protocols depend solely on companies' willingness to
act responsibly . Since mining companies are not development agencies, most CSR initiatives
have concentrated on easily achievable projects with limited long-term developmental impact,
often failing to scale up to benefit the national level ef fectively .85 As such, the usefulness of CSR
protocols is debatable. 86
During the conference, delegates should discuss comprehensive strategies to ef fectively address
resource exploitation by MNCs while balancing the need to continue to attract foreign
investment in the short run. To mitigate existing resource exploitation, a balance between
punitive and incentive-based solutions needs to be achieved. Delegates should also discuss ways
to improve regulatory ef forts at a regional level.
> 86 HanyBesada,FranklynLisk,andPhilipMartin,RegulatingExtractioninAfrica:TowardsaFrameworkfor
> AccountabilityintheGlobalSouth,GovernanceinAfrica2,no.1(2015):112,https://doi.org/10.5334/gia.ah.
> 85 KenOpalo,HowtoHelpAfricasResourceSector,WorldEconomicForum,October30,2014,
> https://www.weforum.org/stories/2014/10/help-africas-resource-sector/.
27 Potential Solutions
## Developing a Skilled Local Workforce
Given the downsides of foreign capital that place African countries at a disadvantage, African
member states should gradually reduce their reliance on foreign capital and strengthen their
self-suf ficiency in the long run. To do so, it is important to equip citizens with the relevant skill
sets and knowledge to engage in resource processing so that Africa can move up the production
value chain and diversify its economy . While the AMV has advocated for enhancing local
content and value addition in local economies, many local firms lack the capability to provide
direct or indirect services to extractive industries. Hence, local content and value-addition
policies have to be matched with aggressive investment in the development capacity of local
companies. For smaller resource-rich African countries, such initiatives are more likely to
succeed when implemented regionally , enabling local firms to take advantage of economies of
scale. 87
Developing local expertise is also important in tackling the dangers of foreign capital highlighted
in SOD 2, such as IFFs and tax evasion by MNCs. Currently , African member states face limited
administrative capacity and dif ficulty in navigating the complexities of the digital economy ,
making it dif ficult for African tax administrators to capture revenues from digital businesses
contributing to tax losses. 88 Additionally , due to a lack of expertise and experience, many African
countries find it dif ficult to negotiate favourable tax treaties. To ef fectively curb tax evasion in
Africa, member states must strengthen their administrative capacity by hiring competent tax
of ficials and training them on complex base erosion and profit shifting issues. 89
However , there are a few obstacles that may prevent African nations from developing their own
local workforce. Some obstacles they may face would be their brain drain as well as the
insuf ficient education quality across dif ferent regions of Africa. This hinders the development
> 89 FahdAzaroualandOtavianoCanuto,FiscalSpaceinAfricanEconomiesandBaseErosionandProfitShifting
> (BEPS)CenterforMacroeconomicsandDevelopment,CentreForMacroeconomics&Development,August29,
> 2023,https://www.cmacrodev.com/fiscal-space-in-african-economies-and-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/.
> 88 NaraMonkam,AfricanStrategiestoCombatIllicitFinancialFlows,CarnegieEndowmentforInternational
> Peace,November12,2024,
> https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/illicit-financial-flows-africa-tax?lang=en.
> 87 KenOpalo,HowtoHelpAfricasResourceSector.
28 and retention of local talent which is critical to the success of reducing the reliance on foreign
capital.
## Strengthening Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms
Africa currently faces an implementation gap in laws surrounding resource governance, making
it vital for transparency and accountability provisions to be strengthened. Currently , there are
existing measures such as the international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to
oversee the disclosure of government and company data in resource-rich countries. These figures
are then reviewed and reconciled by an independent administrator appointed by the
Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG), with any discrepancies being thoroughly investigated. 90
However , not all African member states are part of the EITI initiative. Thus moving forward, a
similar mechanism in Africa could be established to publicise resource data to enable suf ficient
checks and balances by civil societies. This will reduce the harms of foreign capital. For
instance, resource contracts could be fully disclosed by the government and companies to
facilitate comparisons across countries, strengthening the government s position during
negotiations and enabling civil society to understand and monitor company obligations.
Moreover , annual data on revenues, production and reserves could be made available and easily
accessible online to improve oversight by civil society and expert analysts. This also helps the
government by reducing information asymmetry and developing fiscal models, placing the
government in a better position when negotiating with international companies. Additionally ,
companies, sectoral and environmental authorities should publish impact assessments and
ecological management mitigation plans online in addition to making them accessible in local
government and communities. By making critical information accessible, this will build public
trust. Stakeholders can hold both governments and companies accountable, thereby fostering a
more equitable and transparent resource governance framework. 91
> 91 KaisaToroskainen,ResourceGovernanceIndex:FromLegalReformtoImplementationinSub-SaharanAfrica,
> NaturalResourceGovernanceInstitute,April14,2019,
> https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/rgi-from-legal-reform-to-implementation-sub-saharan-a
> frica.pdf.
> 90 NaturalResourceGovernanceInstitute,TheExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative(EITI):UsingEITIto
> PromotePolicyReform,NaturalResourceGovernanceInstitute,March2015,
> https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_EITI.pdf.
29 Besides transparency provisions, monitoring and enforcement ef forts could be implemented to
ensure accountability and address existing issues of resource mismanagement. This can be done
through various ways, which delegates should discuss. One of the ways is through information
and communications technology (ICT). ICT tools such as sensors, drones, and satellite imagery
provide real-time data on environmental factors like deforestation, pollution levels, and wildlife
populations. This information is invaluable for environmental monitoring, enabling governments
to track and report illicit activities more ef fectively .92
Furthermore, technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) can play a critical role in detecting and
preventing financial crimes such as money laundering, tax evasion, and trade mispricing. By
processing vast amounts of data rapidly , AI tools can identify irregular financial activities and
uncover patterns of corruption. Corruption is a major driver of IFFs in Africa, and AI can be
particularly ef fective in revealing hidden transactions or financial anomalies that may otherwise
go unnoticed. 93 To harness the potential of AI in enhancing public service delivery , including tax
collection through anomaly detection, the African Union (AU) has developed a Continental
Artificial Intelligence Strategy . Yet, the adoption of AI for public service delivery remains in its
early stages. To fully realize its benefits, increased awareness of AI's potential and
capacity-building ef forts must be prioritised and expanded. 94
However , MNCs may push back against transparency and accountability mechanisms for several
reasons. One of the most important reasons is that disclosing excessive information risks
exposing strategic insights, future plans, or proprietary processes. This could undermine their
competitive advantage, giving competitors the opportunity to predict moves and possibly
replicate or counter their strategies. 95 Certain member states may also resist such a solution,
citing concerns such as about exposing trade secrets and compromising national economic
> 95 KaraAnderson,DoesTransparencyBenefitorHarmYourCompany?,Greenly,October23,2023,
> https://greenly.earth/en-us/blog/company-guide/does-transparency-benefit-or-harm-your-company.
> 94 AmaniAbou-Zeid,ContinentalArtificialIntelligenceStrategy:HarnessingAIforAfricasDevelopmentand
> Prosperity,AfricanUnion,July2024,
> https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44004-doc-EN-_Continental_AI_Strategy_July_2024.pdf.
> 93 NaraMonkam,AfricanStrategiestoCombatIllicitFinancialFlows.
> 92 FortuneGanda,AnalysingtheImpactsofFDI,MaterialFootprintandICTontheLoadCapacityFactorin
> Sub-SaharanAfricanCountries,ed.MuhammadRamzan,FrontiersinEnvironmentalScience12(July18,2024):
> 117,https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1419307.
30 interests. Concerns related to transparency , privacy and fairness also limit the uptake of digital
tools. 96
> 96
Nara Monkam, African Strategies to Combat Illicit Financial Flows.
31 Key Stakeholders
## Resource-blessed Countries
These countries are blessed with abundant natural resources, ranging from minerals to marine
resources. These countries advocate for a transparent and accountable government that ensures
the wealth generated from the abundant natural resources would benefit the broader population.
Due to good institutions governing these resources with prudence and foresight, these countries
have managed to enjoy the fruits of their natural resource wealth. 97 Despite their remarkable
successes in managing natural resources, resource-blessed countries in Africa still encounter
several challenges.
Firstly , overdependence on resource exports continues to plague these countries. While
resource-blessed countries have converted natural resource wealth into development gains, they
remain heavily reliant on resource extraction as the backbone of their economies. This leaves
them vulnerable to the volatility of commodity prices and the uncertainty of global demand. To
combat this, the governments of resource-blessed countries are currently seeking investment to
explore and exploit other types of minerals. Additionally , these countries are working to capture
more of the production value chain by engaging in resource processing. 98
However , inadequate infrastructure and skills gaps are currently preventing these countries from
pursuing economic diversification. While some of these countries have tried to compel
international companies to set up resource-processing facilities to create more local employment
opportunities, the lack of infrastructure, skilled workforce, and other resources needed to expand
its manufacturing capacity has hindered the establishment of manufacturing activities and the
development of downstream industries. 99 Therefore, more infrastructural and human resource
capacity support is essential for these resource-blessed countries to diversify their economies and
move up the production value chain.
> 99 InternationalTradeAdministration,Namibia-MiningandMinerals,InternationalTradeAdministration,
> February29,2024,https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/namibia-mining-and-minerals.
> 98 InternationalTradeAdministration,Botswana-Mining&Minerals,InternationalTradeAdministration,
> February28,2024,https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/botswana-mining-minerals.
> 97 FrederickVanDerPloeg,NaturalResources:CurseorBlessing?,Econstor(Econstor,July2010),
> https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/38934/1/631864989.pdf.
32 Furthermore, resource-blessed countries still face significant challenges in the area of tax
compliance. A persistent issue is the ability of MNCs to exploit loopholes in tax regimes and
shift profits away from the countries where the resources are extracted. 100 This is done through
various strategies, including transfer mispricing, trade mispricing, and tax avoidance. These
mechanisms allow MNCs to artificially reduce their tax liability , often by shifting profits to
jurisdictions with lower tax rates, or by mispricing goods and services traded between
subsidiaries to understate taxable profits. As a result, substantial amounts of revenue that could
have been used for public investment in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and other
development priorities have been lost. 101 Therefore, countries in this bloc would seek regional
cooperation to harmonise tax policies, share tax information across regions, and build the
capacity of African tax administrations to tackle this issue ef fectively .
## Resource-cursed Countries
Resource-cursed countries, like their resource-blessed counterparts, are endowed with rich
natural resources. However , instead of harnessing these resources to drive sustainable economic
and social development, they often find themselves stuck in a cycle of stagnation or even
decline. They face a paradox where their natural wealth leads to poor economic growth and
social development. The root cause of these issues lies in resource mismanagement, where
wealth in a resource-rich economy accumulates in the hands of a few companies and oligarchs
who control the resources, enriching a few elites instead of the masses. 102
The core issue of the resource curse lies in weak governance. In many af fected countries, natural
resource wealth is often mismanaged, plagued by inef ficiency and a lack of transparency and
accountability .103 Instead of being used to benefit citizens, resource revenues are frequently
> 103 NailaErumetal.,Governance,FiscalExpenditure,andEconomicGrowthinOICCountries:RoleofNatural
> ResourcesandInformationCommunicationTechnology,ResourcesPolicy90(March2024),
> https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2024.104717.
> 102 TerenceHo,AvoidingtheResourceCurseIstheKeytoSingaporesSustainedGrowth,LeeKuanYew
> SchoolofPublicPolicy,November12,2023,
> https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/avoiding-the-resource-curse-is-the-key-to-singapore-s-sustained-growth.
> 101 OxfamInternational,MultinationalCompaniesCheatAfricaoutofBillionsofDollars.
> 100 JiaLiu,HowMultinationalsAvoidTaxesinAfricaandWhatShouldChange,UniversityofPortsmouth(blog),
> April5,2022,
> https://www.port.ac.uk/news-events-and-blogs/blogs/building-an-inclusive-and-growth-led-economy-and-society/ho
> w-multinationals-avoid-taxes-in-africa-and-what-should-change.
33 diverted to finance conflicts, suppress dissent, and entrench those in power .104 As a result, little
remains for critical investments in public services such as education, stalling social progress. To
break this cycle, it is crucial to strengthen transparency and accountability mechanisms that are
present in resource blessed nations in these countries, ensuring that resource wealth truly benefits
the broader population. However , this is challenging as these measures will conflict with political
leaders personal interests, such as accumulating personal wealth. Therefore, the leaders in a
resource-cursed country would likely push back against the introduction of measures to improve
transparency to maintain their power and wealth. 105
Another critical challenge facing resource-cursed countries is their reliance on resource-backed
loans financial arrangements in which countries pledge revenues from resource-related
income streams or future resource assets as collateral to secure loans. Due to a lack of foresight
and often under immense financial pressure, governments in these nations enter into such loans
without fully understanding or negotiating the long-term consequences. These loans are
frequently opaque, with little transparency about the loan collateral arrangements, repayment
terms, or schedule of repayment. 106 The loans are also highly exploitative due to asymmetric
negotiation processes, with imbalances of power between lender and borrower .107 As a result,
there is an unfair distribution of revenue from these loans. 108 Moreover , under many of these
financing arrangements, fluctuations in interest rates or instability in commodity prices over the
loan's duration often lead to borrower countries either defaulting or allocating nearly all the
income from their pledged resources to debt repayment. 109 This will lead to overexploitation and
> 109 MarkA.Green,AfricasNaturalResourcesforAfricans?
> 108 OxfamInternational,LiftingtheResourceCurse.
> 107 AfricaNews,AfDBChiefSaysAfricanCountriesShouldPutEndtoNaturalResource-BackedLoans,Africa
> News,August13,2024,
> https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/12/afdb-chief-says-african-countries-should-put-end-to-natural-resource-backe
> d-loans//.
> 106 DavidMihalyi,AishaAdam,andJyhjongHwang,Resource-BackedLoans:PitfallsandPotential.
> 105 TerenceHo,AvoidingtheResourceCurseIstheKeytoSingaporesSustainedGrowth,LeeKuanYew
> SchoolofPublicPolicy,November12,2023,
> https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/avoiding-the-resource-curse-is-the-key-to-singapore-s-sustained-growth.
> 104 TingZhangandManuellaAppiah,ManuellaAppiahLL.M.ResearcherandEscapingtheResourceCursein
> Sub-SaharanAfricaPolicyBrief|4,TheHagueInstituteforGlobalJustice,August2013,
> https://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/PB4-Escaping-Resource-Curse-Sub-Sahara
> n-Africa.pdf.
34 depletion of natural resources, af fecting forest cover .110 To overcome this hurdle, countries in this
bloc may look towards the AU to equip them with the expertise and skills to examine and
renegotiate resource-based contracts.
## Multinational Corporations
MNCs prioritise profit maximisation as their core objective, driving their ef forts to secure
favourable investment climates across Africa. 111 A central focus of their strate gy is negotiating
advantageous terms for resource extraction. This includes lobbying governments for tax breaks
as an incentive for retaining their businesses in African states. 112 Additionally , MNCs frequently
seek lower royalties on natural resource extraction, ensuring a lar ger share of the revenue
remains with them. 113 They may also pre ss for long-term concessions required to cover their high
sunk costs of extraction, which lock host countries into terms that may not reflect the increasing
value of resources over time. 114
Another key area of interest for MNCs is environmental regulation. Strict environmental
standards are often seen as an impediment to profit maximisation, prompting MNCs to advocate
for relaxed regulations or weak enforcement mechanisms. They may push governments to adopt
weakened environmental standards, 115 delay the implementation of new rules, 116 or expedite
approval processes for lar ge-scale projects, often bypassing thorough reviews of environmental
> 116
Sandra Laville, Top Oil Firms Spending Millions Lobbying to Block Climate Change Policies, Says Report,
The Guardian, March 22, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/22/top-oil-firms-spending-millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-cha
nge-policies-says-report.
> 115
Tommy Reggiori Wilkes, Top Companies Lobbying Undermines Their Climate Pledges, Study Finds, ed.
Barbara Lewis and Sharon Singleton, Reuters, November 17, 2023, sec. Environment,
https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/top-companies-lobbying-undermines-their-climate-pledges-study-fin
ds-2023-11-16/.
> 114
Rajneesh Narula, Multinational Firms and the Extractive Sectors in the 21st Century: Can They Drive
Development?, Journal of World Business 53, no. 1 (January 2018): 8591,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2017.09.004.
> 113
Jack M Mintz, Taxes, Royalties and Cross-Border Resource Investments, ed. Michael Keen and Victor T
Thuronyi, IMF ELibrary, September 22, 2016, 1380, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475539660.071.ch012.
> 112
Oxfam International, Multinational Companies Cheat Africa out of Billions of Dollars.
> 111
Dawda Adams et al., Social and Environmental Practices and Corporate Financial Performance of Multinational
Corporations in Emerging Markets: Evidence from 20 Oil-Rich African Countries, Resources Policy 78 (September
2022): 102756, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.102756.
> 110
Yacouba Coulibaly, Resource-Backed Loans and Ecological Efficiency of Human Development: Evidence from
African Countries.
35 and social impacts. This allows corporations to reduce compliance costs, often at the expense of
the local environment and communities.
To advance their interests, MNCs exploit competition among African governments vying for
FDI. They strategically play member states against one another to compete with each other in a
race to the bottom on issues such as royalties and social and environmental safeguards. 117
These tactics enable MNCs to maintain their competitive edge while limiting the negotiating
power of individual governments.
Finally , to counter criticism, many MNCs engage in CSR initiatives, such as building schools or
healthcare facilities, to create a positive public image. However , the profit maximisation
prospects of MNCs within oil-rich African countries impede their CSR commitment. 118 Ef forts
undertaken by MNCs often do not of fset the broader financial and environmental consequences
of the concessions they secure, leading to greenwashing, child labour , and human rights abuses
instead. 119
> 119 LwangaElizabethNanziriandGiftyAbban,CorporateSocialResponsibilityofMultinationalCorporationsin
> theOilandGasSector,inSustainabilityManagementintheOilandGasIndustry,ed.JoshuaYindenabaAborand
> AminKarimu(Routledge,2023),https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003309864-18.
> 118 DawdaAdamsetal.,SocialandEnvironmentalPracticesandCorporateFinancialPerformanceofMultinational
> CorporationsinEmergingMarkets:Evidencefrom20Oil-RichAfricanCountries.
> 117 OxfamInternational,LiftingtheResourceCurse.
36 Case Studies
## Tanzanias Resource Nationalism and the Mining Act Reforms
Tanzania, a country rich in mineral resources such as gold and uranium, has long struggled with
the challenge of resource exploitation and the limited economic benefits accruing to its citizens.
For decades, the country s mining sector was dominated by MNCs that extracted resources under
contracts deemed unfavourable to the nation. The government earned minimal royalties and had
limited oversight over the operations of these foreign entities. In 2017, President John Magufuli s
administration took decisive steps to address these challenges through a series of mining law
reforms under the Mining Act. 120
The reforms began with the renegotiation of contracts with foreign mining companies, which had
previously enjoyed extensive tax exemptions and limited obligations to share profits. The
Tanzanian government introduced a new mining law . Under the new legal framework, the state
was entitled to a mandatory 16% equity stake in all mining projects, with the possibility of
increasing this stake to 50% in certain cases. The government also raised royalty rates on gold
from 4% to 6%. Furthermore, the government gained the authority to dissolve or renegotiate
contracts related to natural resources and to reject international arbitration in disputes concerning
these resources. 121 These actions aimed to grant the government greater control over its mineral
resources and ensure that more of the revenue stayed within the country .
Additionally , to encourage value addition, the Tanzanian government banned the export of
unprocessed gold and copper concentrates. This was accompanied by spot checks undertaken by
the government to clamp down on MNCs, which led to alleged proof of Tanzanian company
Acacia Mining s underreporting activities. 122 Simultaneously , a local content policy was
> 122 DanPaget,Tanzania:MagufulisMiningReformsAreaMasterclassinPoliticalManoeuvring,African
> Arguments,July17,2017,
> 121 JonesDay,TanzaniaOverhaulsMiningLaws,FinesInvestorUS$190Billion:IsYourInvestmentProtected?,
> JonesDay,August4,2017,
> https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/08/tanzania-overhauls-mining-laws-fines-investor-us190-billion-is-your
> -investment-protected.
> 120 BurureNgochoandSadockMagai,MininginTanzania:EffectsoftheMiningLegalFrameworkOverhaul,
> DLAPiper,August10,2020,
> https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2020/08/africa-connected-issue-4/6tanzania-mining-legal-framew
> ork-overhaul.
37 introduced to boost the involvement of Tanzanian companies and citizens in the mining sector ,
while also facilitating the transfer of intellectual capital and expertise from foreign firms to local
businesses. This initiative aimed to support the growth of indigenous service industries and
contribute to the creation of local value in Tanzanian s economy .123
Tanzania s reforms yielded mixed results. The country saw increased mining revenues, as
royalties and taxes collected from the sector grew . However , the Tanzanian new mining law
changed the investment climate of the country , increased the operational costs for foreign mining
companies, and significantly reduced investment protections that investors had previously
enjoyed. Disputes rose between the government and foreign mining companies, which ultimately
led to international arbitration against Tanzania. Moreover , the enforcement of local content
requirements proved dif ficult due to a limited domestic capacity , lack of necessary technical
skills, challenges in joint ventures, data gaps and regulatory challenges. 124 Critics ar gued that the
reforms, while bold, were implemented hastily and impulsively without suf ficient consultation
and thinking, leading to uncertainty in the investment climate of the country .125
## Botswanas Diamond-driven Development
In the 1960s, shortly after gaining independence, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in
the world, with limited infrastructure and economic activity . The discovery of diamonds at Orapa
in 1967 marked a turning point. However , given the historical precedent of resource exploitation
in other African nations, there was significant concern about whether the country could leverage
its newfound wealth ef fectively . The challenges included ensuring local benefits from diamond
revenues, managing foreign corporate interests, and avoiding corruption and mismanagement.
To combat these problems, Botswana adopted various strategies. Firstly , instead of pursuing
extreme "resource nationalism" by nationalising mining companies, Botswana chose to form
strategic partnerships with multinational mining corporations. These partnerships allowed the
> 125 DanPaget,Tanzania:MagufulisMiningReformsAreaMasterclassinPoliticalManoeuvring.
> 124 TanzaniaDigest,DiggingDeeper:LocalContentChallengesinTanzaniasMiningSector.,TanzaniaDigest,
> August22,2023,https://www.digest.tz/digging-deeper-local-content-challenges-in-tanzanias-mining-sector/.
> 123 Wentworth,TanzaniaLocalContentPolicy,April2019,
> https://wp-wentworth-2020.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/media/2021/04/19151741/WEN_LCP_FW.pdf.
> https://africanarguments.org/2017/07/tanzania-magufulis-mining-reforms-are-a-masterclass-in-political-manoeuvrin
> g/.
38 government to secure ownership stakes in all major mining projects, ensuring a role in managing
the prospecting, development, and operation of mines. Adopting a long-term perspective,
Botswana created a stable, transparent, and corruption-free policy environment attracting private
investment. Carefully negotiated agreements balanced revenue generation with risk management,
enabling investors to operate freely while maximising benefits for the country .126
Secondly , to generate revenue from its mineral wealth, Botswana implemented modest royalty
rates that were fair to both mar ginal and highly profitable mining operations and acquired small
equity stakes in mining ventures. This generated revenue and gave the government a direct role
in managing its mineral resources. The collaborative relationship between the government and
multinational mining companies fostered mutual understanding, enabling the government to
address any issues early and maintain stability in the mining sector .127
Furthermore, to promote local beneficiation, Botswana established the Pula Fund, a sovereign
wealth fund to invest proceeds from non-renewable sources for the benefit of citizens. 128 In
addition, a Diamond Hub was created in 2008, to attract diamond technology companies and
engage in diamond cutting and polishing, diamond trading, and diamond jewellery
manufacturing. 129 Through this, Botswana aimed to create more employment opportunities and
foster the growth of secondary industries.
Nevertheless, challenges remain for Botswana. Firstly , Botswana s economy is highly dependent
on its diamond industry , which serves as a barrier to long-term, sustainable economic growth.
The country s heavy reliance on diamond exportsaccounting for 80% of exports, 50% of
government revenue, and 30% of GDPhas exposed the economy to vulnerabilities. Fluctuating
commodity prices, subdued global demand for diamonds, and rising competition from synthetic
alternatives have slowed Botswana s economic growth, particularly following the COVID-19
pandemic. To address this, Botswana is taking steps to diversify its economy . It aims to capture
> 129 InternationalTradeAdministration,Botswana-Mining&Minerals.
> 128 InternationalForumofSovereignWealthFunds,ThePulaFund,InternationalForumofSovereignWealth
> Funds,accessedJanuary15,2025,https://www.ifswf.org/members/botswana.
> 127 KeithJefferis,TheRoleofTNCsintheExtractiveIndustryofBotswana.
> 126 KeithJefferis,TheRoleofTNCsintheExtractiveIndustryofBotswana,UnitedNationsDigitalLibrary
> (TransnationalCorporations,2009),https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/668770?ln=en&v=pdf.
39 more value from its diamond industry by investing in trading, cutting, and polishing activities.
Beyond diamonds, the government is exploring other mineral resources such as copper , nickel,
silver , coal, manganese, soda ash, gold, semi-precious stones, and granite. 130 Additionally , it is
focusing on developing mining-related subsectors, such as mining equipment manufacturing,
exploration, consulting, and base metal processing, which could provide more employment
opportunities. 131 However , a shortage of skilled labour remains a significant barrier to
diversification. Reskilling the workforce is now a key priority to support these ef forts. 132
Another critical challenge for Botswana is the lack of locally-owned firms in the mining
industry , which leaves the country dependent on FDI. 133 In light of this, Botswana has proposed
the Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill, which requires mining companies to sell a 24% stake
of their mines to local citizens or citizen-owned companies if the government does not opt to
acquire a 15% stake. 134 However , the lack of experienced local managers and technical experts,
the high cost of manufacturing, as well as lack of project financing are obstacles to achieving
greater local participation in the mining sector . Therefore, greater local ownership of the mining
sector may require further ef forts on the part of the government. 135
> 135
International Trade Administration, Botswana -Market Challenges | International Trade Administration,
International Trade Administration, February 28, 2024,
https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/botswana-market-challenges.
> 134
Brian Benza, Botswana Proposes Law for Locals to Acquire 24% Stakes in Mines, ed. Nelson Banya and
Emelia Sithole-Matarise, Reuters, July 23, 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/botswana-proposes-law-locals-acquire-24-stakes-mines-2024-07-23/.
> 133
Keith Jefferis, The Role of TNCs in the Extractive Industry of Botswana.
> 132
Sundesh Ramchurn, Reskilling and Upskilling in Africas Workforce Transformation - Talenteum, Talenteum,
accessed March 25, 2025, https://talenteum.com/reskilling-and-upskilling-in-africas-workforce-transformation/.
> 131
Daniele Schilir, Botswanas Economy and the Question of Diversification (Munich Personal RePEc Archive,
December 2022), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/115608/1/MPRA_paper_115608.pdf.
> 130
International Trade Administration, Botswana - Mining & Minerals.
40 Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)
1. What is the most ef fective and equitable resource ownership structure for African
countries to balance national interests, host community needs, and environmental
sustainability?
2. How should African countries balance achieving self-reliance and strengthening regional
cooperation for sustainable resource management in the long run?
3. What strategies can be adopted to ensure that environmental and social protection
standards are complied with by all companies?
4. What are some ways to ensure that environmental and social protection standards do not
negatively impact R&D ef forts, as well as the growth of domestic companies?
5. How should existing resource exploitation by MNCs be ef fectively addressed while
continuing to attract foreign investment?
41 Conclusion
To conclude, resource management must move beyond short-term economic gains and adopt a
holistic approach that considers environmental sustainability and social well-being. To fully
harness the value of Africa's resources, it is imperative for member states to prioritise long-term
benefits and adopt policies that balance economic, environmental, and social factors. This
requires collaborative ef forts to reverse the "resource curse" by reclaiming control over resource
governance from foreign stakeholders and ensuring that resource management is guided by
transparency , accountability , and inclusivity . Wishing all delegates a fun and fruitful time
debating!
42 Topic 2: The Question of Economic
# Integration
> 43
# Intr oduction to the Topic
Recently , the global economic landscape has been increasingly shaped by the rise of nationalism
and growing protectionism. Major economies are shifting away from the rules-based system that
has long governed global trade toward a new mercantilist model, where a country's economic
performance is lar gely measured by its trade surplus. 136
Against the waning confidence in multilateral trading regimes and growing concerns about loss
of sovereignty , unequal distribution of benefits and burdens, decision-making inef ficiency , and
politicisation of global governance, African countries are now turning towards regional
integration and cooperation. Ef forts to deepen economic integration and promote the Pan-African
idea of one single African market gave rise to the AfCFT A. Intra-African trade presents immense
benefits for Africa. Firstly , it mitigates the impact of global economic shocks by forming a lar ger ,
more integrated domestic market of 1.3 billion people that can buf fer against disruptions in
global trade. This reduces risks and helps African countries avoid traditional reliance to Western
donors, building self-suf ficiency and achieving greater sovereignty over their economic
development. 137 Moreover , economic integration boosts economic growth by fostering regional
competition, attracting foreign investment, facilitating the transfer of skills and technology from
foreign companies to domestic firms, and helping African countries diversify their economies.
Lastly , economic integration improves regional stability by increasing economic dependence and
cooperation. 138
Despite the wide benefits of economic integration, recent research by the African Development
Bank shows that intra-African trade is the lowest of all global regions, standing at approximately
15% compared to 54% in the North American Free Trade Area, 70% within the European Union
> 138 ChatibBasri,CanEconomicCooperationandIntegrationPromoteRegionalPeaceandSecurity?,EastAsia
> Forum,May2,2022,
> https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/05/02/can-economic-cooperation-and-integration-promote-regional-peace-and-securit
> y/.
> 137 HippolyteFofack,ACompetitiveAfrica.
> 136 HippolyteFofack,ACompetitiveAfrica,InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),December2021,
> https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2018/12/afcfta-economic-integration-in-africa-fofack.
44
> want buy own
> countries goods
> Xmore tax etariff
# -and 60% in Asia. 139 This highlights the ur gency to facilitate economic integration in Africa for all
countries to enjoy its gains. Recognising this, regional economic integration was a central topic
of discussion at the African Union summit in 2023. 140 The success of these discussions
culminated in the establishment of the AfCFT A, which aims to create a single continental market
for goods and services in Africa.
Although the AfCFT A agreement has been formulated and ratified by many member states, its
implementation faces several challenges. First, informal trade was not recognised by drafters of
the AfCFT A and the parties that have acceded to it, which limits the full economic potential of
Africa from being harnessed. 141 Moreover , the simultaneous membership of countries in multiple
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with dif fering trade norms further complicates this
issue by creating overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, regulations that increase administrative
burdens. This makes it more dif ficult for businesses to navigate the regional market landscape.
Additionally , the neglect of informal trade, which holds significant economic potential, has left
key issues for informal traders unaddressed. 142 Lastly , the AfCFT A could exacerbate income
disparities between lar ge and small economies and result in an unequal distribution of benefits
from trade. 143 Therefore, member states must address these obstacles to facilitate intra-African
trade and realise the vision of an economically integrated Africa.
> 143
Teniola Tayo, Will Africas Free Trade Area Increase Inequalities?, London School of Economics and Political
Science(LSE) (blog), June 18, 2021,
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/06/18/will-african-continental-free-trade-area-afcfta-increase-inequalities-iss
ues/.
> 142
Gerhard Erasmus, Regional Economic Communities and the AfCFTA Investment Protocol, Tralac (blog), April
16, 2021,
https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15173-regional-economic-communities-and-the-afcfta-investment-protocol.html.
> 141
Thomas Kwasi Tieku and Afua Boatemaa Yakohene, Analyzing the African Continental Free Trade Area (the
AfCFTA) from an Informality Perspective: A Beautiful House in the Wrong Neighborhood, Global Studies
Quarterly 3, no. 3 (July 1, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad043.
> 140
African Union, Theme of the Year 2023: Acceleration of Afcfta Implementation, African Union, 2023,
https://au.int/en/theme/2023/acceleration-of-afcfta-implementation.
> 139
African Development Bank, Importance of Regional and Continental Integration for Africas Development,
African Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow, December 3, 2018,
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/importance-of-regional-and-continental-integration-for-africas-developme
nt-18773.
45
# -
> &
# Historical Backgr ound
## Timeline of Key Milestones and Events
Africa has experienced five phases of economic integration, with each phase reflecting an
evolving approach to continental trade. During the third phase (1991-2006), when states adopted
the Abuja Treaty in an ef fort to establish the African Economic Community (AEC)the most
advanced form of economic integration, there was a belief that sub-regional integration was
essential for continental integration. 144 However , the creation of more RECs and the
simultaneous membership of countries in multiple RECs ultimately led to the failure of the
Abuja Treaty .145
Frustrated by the limited success of earlier attempts at continental economic integration, African
states took a more accelerated approach during the fourth phase of integration (20062015) by
launching the Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIA T) initiative. This phase marked a strategic shift
in how integration was envisioned and implemented. Instead of bringing the continent closer
together by uniting the existing REC customs unions, as was done previously , African states
re-envisioned African integration as a lar ge-scale free trade area built by RECs mer ging their
free trade zones. BIA T thus proposed the creation of an AfCFT A by mer ging the existing RECs
into two lar ger super -RECs. 146
The concept of a continent-wide free trade area gained traction as African states recognised the
stark disparity between intra-African trade levels and those of other regions. In 2012, this
realisation prompted the African Union Assembly to set a tar get of establishing a Continental
Free Trade Area by 2017. Negotiations began in 2015, and on May 21 2018, the AfCFT A
of ficially came into existence when 44 African Union member states signed the agreement in
> 146 DuniaP.Zongwe,TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea(AfCFTA):TheLaw,theEconomics,andthe
> Research-GlobaLex.
> 145 DuniaP.Zongwe,TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea(AfCFTA):TheLaw,theEconomics,andthe
> Research-GlobaLex,NewYorkUniversity,February2024,https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/AfCFTA.html.
> 144 GerhardErasmus,ComparingtheAbujaTreatyandtheAfCFTAAgreement,Tralac(blog),February29,2024,
> https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/16331-comparing-the-abuja-treaty-and-the-afcfta-agreement.html.
46 Kigali, Rwanda. It subsequently came into ef fect on May 30, 2019, marking a historic milestone
in Africa s pursuit of economic integration. 147
Despite the formalisation of the AfCFT A agreement, its implementation remains slow . Although
trading formally began on 1 January 2021, no trade has occurred under the scheme yet.
COVID-19 has impacted the progress of implementation, and 60 years of market fragmentation
in Africa, with diver ging economic interests and policies as a consequence, remain a significant
hurdle to economic integration. 148
## Protocols of the AfCFTA
The AfCFT A consists of three key protocols: the Protocol on Trade in Goods, which aims to
boost intra-African trade by progressively eliminating tarif f and non-tarif f barriers; the Protocol
on Trade in Services, which seeks to liberalise the market for services across the continent; and
the Protocol on the Free Movement of People, which facilitates visa-free travel, residency rights,
and the right to work for citizens of all member states. 149
While these protocols are beneficial for formal businesses, they have overlooked the informal
economy . The 3 protocols have no provisions on the informal sector and its unregistered
enterprises, and this has contributed to a lack of serious discussions on the informal economy . As
a result, the elimination of tarif f lines and non-tarif f barriers focuses almost exclusively on goods
and services transported through of ficial channels, while informal trading routes are ignored. The
absence of binding provisions on the informal sector in the AfCFT A agreement and its
operational protocols means that there are no AfCFT A rules specifically drawn up to resolve
issues that informal traders face regularly .150 Consequently , informal cross-border traders are not
> 150 ThomasKwasiTiekuandAfuaBoatemaaYakohene,AnalyzingtheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea(the
> AfCFTA)fromanInformalityPerspective:ABeautifulHouseintheWrongNeighborhood.
> 149 InocentMoyo,TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeAreaandInformalCrossBorderTrade,LondonSchoolof
> EconomicsandPoliticalScience(LSE)(blog),September21,2023,
> https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/09/21/the-african-continental-free-trade-area-and-informal-cross-border-trade
> /.
> 148 NellLewis,Intra-AfricaTradeCouldDoubleinnextFiveYears,SaysSecretaryGeneralofAfricanContinental
> FreeTradeArea,CableNewsNetwork(CNN),October7,2024,
> https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/07/africa/afcfta-secretary-general-mene-interview-spc/index.html.
> 147 DuniaP.Zongwe,TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea(AfCFTA):TheLaw,theEconomics,andthe
> Research-GlobaLex.
47 empowered to meet their economic potential, which will negatively impact the continent s
inclusive socio-economic development. 151
## Operational Tools of the AfCFTA
Pan-African Payment and Settlement System(P APSS)
PAPSS, an operational tool introduced under the AfCFT A initiative, is a cross-border payment
system designed to make continental trade within Africa easier and more cost-ef fective. It works
by allowing buyers to make payments in their local currency , which their bank or payment
service provider then sends to PAPSS. Once verified, PAPSS forwards the payment instructions
to the seller's bank, which credits the seller's account in their local currency . The process is quick
payments are completed in about two minutes, and currency settlements are finalised within
24 hours. By cutting out the need for third-party currency conversions, which currently cost the
continent around $5 billion annually , PAPSS helps reduce transaction costs significantly . Unlike
traditional money transfer operators or mobile money platforms, it also supports a wider range of
transactions, making it especially beneficial for small and medium-scale informal traders. With
these features, PAPSS has huge economic benefits for informal traders.
However , for PAPPS to truly benefit informal traders, several challenges need to be addressed.
Firstly , PAPPS needs to be more financially inclusive and accessible for informal traders.
Currently , many informal traders lack access to banking services and find it dif ficult to navigate
complex documentation processes. Therefore, it is essential to register non-banking service
providers on PAPPS. Additionally , service providers have to provide their services in multiple
languages and simplify their documentation processes to reach informal traders of dif fering
education and digital literacy levels. Furthermore, African countries have varying regulations
regarding which products qualify for direct currency transactions under PAPSS, potentially
excluding traders of certain goods from utilising the platform. To address this, member states
will have to harmonise regulatory and operational frameworks for consistent implementation
across Africa. 152
> 152 FunkeAderonmu,FormalizingAfricasInformalSectorthroughtheAfCFTA:AnOpportunityforEconomic
> Transformation,JournalofPublicandInternationalAffairs,September11,2023,
> https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/formalizing-africas-informal-sector-through-afcfta-opportunity-economic-transforma
> tion.
> 151 InocentMoyo,TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeAreaandInformalCrossBorderTrade.
48
> -
AfCFT A non-tariff barriers online reporting, monitoring and eliminating mechanism
The AfCFT A non-tarif f barriers online reporting, monitoring, and eliminating mechanism is a
platform developed to boost continental trade by removing non-tarif f barriers. It enables traders
to report non-tarif f barriers encountered when trading products across intra-African borders.
Subsequently , government authorities will investigate the matter and resolve any issues
identified. 153 While an online reporting platform has increased awareness of the challenges of
non-tarif f barriers, they have had limited success in resolving ongoing and recurring barriers
such as policy-related non-tarif f barriers, inadequate infrastructure, and persistent bribery and
corruption. Due to their inability to of fer adequate and long-term solutions to specific non-tarif f
barrier problems, this has discouraged traders from using these systems. Therefore, alongside
these platforms, policy reforms, infrastructural development, and actual enforcement of
governments commitments are needed for this online reporting platform to be successfully
utilised by traders. 154
> 154 WilliamViljoen,TheIntra-AfricaNon-TariffBarrierDilemma-theChallengesFacingtheAfCFTAApproach,
> Tralac,March2019,
> https://www.tralac.org/documents/events/tralac/2739-tralac-brief-the-intra-africa-ntb-dilemma-the-challenges-facing
> -the-afcfta-approach-march-2019/file.html.
> 153 UnitedNationsTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),Non-TariffBarriers:Monitoring,Reportingand
> EliminatingMechanisms,UnitedNationsTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),accessedJanuary5,2025,
> https://unctad.org/topic/trade-analysis/non-tariff-measures/NTMs-policy-support/monitoring-and-reporting.
49
Key Terms and Definitions
Balance of trade The dif ference between the value of a country s exports and
the value of a country s imports for a given period. 155
Informal Economy Activities that have market value and would add to the tax
revenue and GDP if they were recorded. They are a
diversified set of economic activities that are not regulated
or protected by the state. 156
Non-tarif f barriers Trade barriers that restrict the import or export of goods
through means other than tarif fs. This includes import
licensing, customs delays, pre-shipment inspections, rules of
origin, and other mechanisms that restrict trade. 157
Spaghetti Bowl A metaphor for Africa s overlapping memberships in RECs,
which leads to too many crisscrossing and unaligned free
trade agreements and complications in applying rules of
origin. 158 This can lead to countries adopting discriminatory
trade policies, undermining free trade.
Tarif f barriers A type of trade barrier implemented by countries to increase
the cost of imported goods relative to domestic products.
Typically applied as taxes or duties levied on importers,
these costs are often passed on to consumers. Tarif fs are
widely used in international trade as a protectionist tool to
support domestic industries and generate government
> 158
Levious Chiukira, The Effectiveness of AfCFTA Rules of Origin as a Build-up from Different Existing RECs in
Africa, ON POLICY Africa, December 19, 2022,
https://onpolicy.org/the-effectiveness-of-afcfta-rules-of-origin-as-a-build-up-from-different-existing-recs-in-africa/.
> 157
Corporate Finance Institute, Non-Tariff Barriers, Corporate Finance Institute, accessed January 7, 2025,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/non-tariff-barriers/.
> 156
Simon Torkington, What Is the Informal Economy and How Many People Work in It?, World Economic
Forum, June 4, 2024, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/06/what-is-the-informal-economy/.
> 155
Will Kenton, Balance of Trade (BOT), Investopedia, June 27, 2024,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bot.asp.
50 revenue. 159
> 159
Brent Radcliffe, The Basics of Tariffs and Trade Barriers, ed. Robert C. Kelly and Yarilet Perez, Investopedia,
June 26, 2024, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/tariff-trade-barrier-basics.asp.
51 Scope of Debate
## Supporting vs Formalising Informal trade
Informal trade plays a crucial role in Africa s economy . Firstly , informal trade makes up the
majority of Africa s trading activities, accounting for 60-70% of total trading activities on the
continent. 160 Additionally , informal trade is an important source of employment and income,
employing as much as 90% of Africa s population and generating revenue for 43% of
Africans. 161 Furthermore, informal trade enhances food security by making a wide range of food
products more accessible and af fordable for many Africans. 162 Despite the significant economic
benefits informal trade brings to Africa, it has been overlooked in the AfCFT A agreement. The
AfCFT A, just like conventional free trade regimes, does not have any meaningful provisions for
the informal sector , especially unregistered small-scale enterprises. As a result, small businesses
are excluded from the framework. 163 Informal traders do not benefit from the elimination of tarif f
and non-tarif f barriers, and there are no specific AfCFT A rules to address the dif ficulties they
face. These include limited knowledge of interstate trade rules, lack of formal documents like
passports required by border of ficials, insuf ficient access to market information, dif ficulty
securing capital, lack of trade-related information, harassment during travel, and safety concerns
on the road, among others. Therefore to support the informal economy , the AfCFT A agreement
may have to prioritise informal traders needs and implement a regional legal framework
designed to address these obstacles ef fectively . This is pivotal in unlocking the productive
potential of African businesses and fostering inclusive intra-African trade opportunities. 164
> 164
Thomas Kwasi Tieku and Afua Boatemaa Yakohene, Analyzing the African Continental Free Trade Area (the
AfCFTA) from an Informality Perspective: A Beautiful House in the Wrong Neighborhood.
> 163
Shola Lawal, Can Africas New Free Trade Treaty Boost Business on the Continent?, Al Jazeera, February 16,
2024,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/afcfta-can-africas-new-trade-treaty-boost-business-on-the-continent.
> 162
Francis Ikome and Christopher Otieno Omolo, Free Movement of Persons, Informal Trade and the African
Continental Free Trade Area, United Nations ILibrary, March 26, 2024,
https://doi.org/10.18356/9789292687908c007.
> 161
Jos Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs and Assane Diop, The Informal Economy in Africa: Promoting Transition to
Formality: Challenges and Strategies (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2009),
https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_policy/documents/publication/wcms
_127814.pdf.
> 160
African Export-Import Bank, African Trade Report 2020 Informal Cross-Border Trade in Africa in the Context
of the AfCFTA, African Export-Import Bank, January 19, 2020,
https://media.afreximbank.com/afrexim/African-Trade-Report-2020.pdf.
52 Instead of supporting the informal economy , some African countries may opt to formalise the
informal sector . This is because the informal economy undermines long-term economic growth
and development by enabling tax evasion, which deprives governments of crucial public revenue
needed for investments in infrastructure and healthcare. Additionally , informal trade poses risks
to food safety and contributes to the spread of diseases across borders, as products involved in
informal cross-border trade (ICBT) often bypass sanitary controls. 165 Furthermore, informal trade
presents unfair competition to domestic industries, as ICBT products are usually counterfeit
goods that are exempted from import taxes and are therefore sold at lower prices compared to
locally produced equivalents. 166 Formalising the informal sector can bring several benefits, such
as enhanced safety and health quality standards for traded goods, as well as improved working
conditions and protections for informal workers. Moreover , this increases access to financing for
informal businesses, and enables better revenue and data collection to support the development
of trade infrastructure and processes. 167
However , there are several hurdles that complicate the formalisation of informal trade. Firstly ,
African states have to reach a consensus on ways to compel informal employers, and formal
employers who hire workers through informal employment arrangements or sub-contracts, to
comply with labour regulations and of fer informal workers formal benefits and protections. This
can take several forms, such as providing incentives for self-employed individuals in the
informal sector to register their businesses and of fering benefits once they comply . Alternatively ,
a combination of incentives and penalties can be implemented to encourage both formal and
informal employers to extend benefits to their informal workers. 168 Delegates should discuss
which approach would be the most ef fective and feasible.
> 168 WomeninInformalEmployment:GlobalizingandOrganising(WIEGO),RethinkingFormalization,WIEGO,
> July30,2024,https://www.wiego.org/informal-economy/articles/rethinking-formalization/.
> 167 FunkeAderonmu,FormalizingAfricasInformalSectorthroughtheAfCFTA:AnOpportunityforEconomic
> Transformation.
> 166 GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,FormalizationofInformalTradeinAfrica-Trends,
> ExperiencesandSocio-EconomicImpacts,GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,April1,2017,
> https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/formalization-of-informal-trade-in-africa-trends-experiences-and-socio-economic
> -impacts/.
> 165 FrancisIkomeandChristopherOtienoOmolo,FreeMovementofPersons,InformalTradeandtheAfrican
> ContinentalFreeTradeArea.
53 Moreover , the dif ficulties that informal traders face in entering the formal sector need to be
addressed. Informal traders face numerous barriers that discourage formalisation, such as high
tax rates and complex tax administration. Burdensome business registration, licensing, and
inspection processes further hinder informal traders in the formalisation process. Additional
challenges include dif ficulty obtaining travel documents or trading licenses, prolonged border
waiting times, overchar ging by customs of ficials, and limited awareness of of ficial procedures.
Access to capital is also a significant constraint for those operating in the informal sector ,
compounded by inadequate skills, education, and training. Furthermore, limited access to
technology and poor infrastructure further hinder the transition to formal sector activities in
Africa. 169 Therefore, to facilitate the integration of informal traders into the formal economy ,
delegates will have to discuss ways to address these myriad problems.
Lastly , the AU Free Movement of Persons protocol needs to be ratified and implemented to
formalise informal trade. Currently , the complex immigration process in Africa has driven many
small-scale traders into informal trade. Informal traders living at the borders have to travel long
distances to the cities to acquire the pertinent documents which is inconvenient for them, and
those documents tend to be too costly for these traders. Despite significant measures like
visa-free travel, visas on arrival, and the easing of travel restrictions, progress in ratifying the
AU's Free Movement of Persons Protocol has been notably slow among member states. This can
be attributed to several factors. Firstly , many African states are concerned about maintaining
their sovereignty and the ability to regulate the entry , exit, and stay of individuals. Moreover , the
security concerns that states have regarding the uncontrolled free movement of persons further
complicate the matter . There are legitimate concerns among member states about the risks
associated with violent extremism, human traf ficking, and money laundering when the protocol
is implemented. Without adequate protective infrastructure to manage a lar ge influx of
immigrants, states are unlikely to soften their stances. 170 In light of this, delegates should weigh
the benefits of free movement and trade with potential security risks.
> 170 FrancisIkomeandChristopherOtienoOmolo,FreeMovementofPersons,InformalTradeandtheAfrican
> ContinentalFreeTradeArea.
> 169 GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,FormalizationofInformalTradeinAfrica-Trends,
> ExperiencesandSocio-EconomicImpacts.
54 In navigating this issue, delegates should understand that formalisation may not be practical or
desirable for all informal enterprises or informal wage workers. Instead, it should be
acknowledged that many informal businesses and workers will likely remain informal or
semi-formal in the near future. Thus, other challenges that delegates have to resolve include
ways to increase the benefits and reduce the costs and risks for those who continue to operate
informally or semi-formally .171
## Maintaining a Balance of Trade Surplus
A challenging task that member states have to confront is the unequal distribution of gains from
the AfCFT A, which arises as a result of dif ferences in sizes, level of development and
diversification of economic activities of African states. 172 The AfCFT A agreement risks widening
income disparities by enabling major economies of higher production capacity , such as Egypt,
South Africa, and Nigeria, to dominate trade, leaving smaller and landlocked economies at a
disadvantage. 173 Additionally , Africa s most diversified economies, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda,
and Cte dIvoire, are likely to benefit most from the free-trade zone in the near future as well.
In contrast, resource-dependent economies, such as Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Zambia
face limited income growth and the potential loss of their competitive edge. 174 As more
diversified economies enhance productivity and human capital, they could dominate industries
that smaller , less developed nations depend on. For these smaller economies, the AfCFT A could
initially exacerbate extreme poverty , as scarce resources are redirected towards capital-intensive
projects that favour high-skilled labour .175 Small family farms in small economies are unable to
> 175 BlessingChipandaandJakkieCilliers,TheAfCFTA,ISSAfrica,January14,2025,
> https://futures.issafrica.org/thematic/08-afcfta/.
> 174 AbdoulSalamBelloandJonathanGass,WhoAretheWinnersandLosersofAfricasNewFreeTrade
> Agreement?,AtlanticCouncil,April3,2018,
> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/who-are-the-winners-and-losers-of-africa-s-new-free-trade-agree
> ment/.
> 173 YvonneEzekielandFehintoluwaAjayi,FromVisiontoReality:HighlightingtheChallengesofAfCFTA,
> Mondaq,October11,2023,
> https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/international-trade-investment/1375774/from-vision-to-reality-highlighting-the-ch
> allenges-of-afcfta.
> 172 PSCReport,AfCFTA:PotentiallyCostlyatFirst,butPromisingGreatRewards,ISSAfrica,May22,2024,
> https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/afcfta-potentially-costly-at-first-but-promising-great-rewards.
> 171 WomeninInformalEmployment:GlobalizingandOrganising(WIEGO),RethinkingFormalization.
55 compete with lar ge agri-businesses from higher -income African countries, 176 and their
manufacturing sector is likely to lose out as well. 177 Due to intense competition, this could lead to
industrial disruption, re-or ganisation of value chains, firm closures, higher unemployment rates
and revenue losses as initial investments shift to more competitive economies. 178 If left
unaddressed, this issue could hinder inclusive and equitable growth in Africa. Member states
may adopt protectionist economic policies to gain a comparative advantage in trade relations,
protect infant industries until they gain the capacity to compete favourably in the global market,
and maintain popularity among citizens, especially during election periods. 179
Unfortunately , there are no clear mechanisms at present to distribute gains or compensate losers
of the system. As such, some member states will likely resist full implementation of the AfCFT A
due to the unequal distribution of benefits from liberalisation. 180 While tarif f dif ferential
timelines have been mapped out to provide gradual tarif f reductions for Group of 6 and less
developed countries (LDCs), additional support and assistance should be provided to these
countries to cope with economic adjustments under the AfCFT A.
For instance, to help small economies cope with increasing trade deficits as they import more
goods from stronger economies within the free trade zone, safeguards, subsidies and preferential
trade terms can be provided for these vulnerable economies. Compensation funds can also be
provided to cushion initial losses for individuals and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in
smaller economies that are losing out. 181 Moreover , wealthier African states can provide
technical and financial assistance to small economies to support their economic transformation
and train workers to adapt their skills to new needs. However , these measures may be unpopular
> 181 BlessingChipandaandJakkieCilliers,TheAfCFTA.
> 180 KwabenaNyarkoOtoo,AfricasEconomicTrade-Off,IPSJournal,October18,2021,
> https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/african-continental-free-trade-area-5496/.
> 179 GbekeAdebowaleAdenuga,LereAmusan,andSamuelOyewole,AfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea
> (AfCFTA)andtheChallengesofProtectionistPoliciesonRegionalIntegration:InsightsfromNigeriaandSouth
> Africa,AfricanRenaissance,August1,2024,35773,
> https://doi.org/:%20https://doi.org/10.31920/2516-5305/2024/sin2a15.
> 178 PSCReport,AfCFTA:PotentiallyCostlyatFirst,butPromisingGreatRewards.
> 177 BlessingChipandaandJakkieCilliers,TheAfCFTA.
> 176 RilwanAkeyewale,WhoAretheWinnersandLosersinAfricasContinentalFreeTradeArea?,World
> EconomicForum,October17,2018,
> https://www.weforum.org/stories/2018/10/africa-continental-free-trade-afcfta-sme-business/.
56 among member states because of their financial costs and their tendency to create dependency
rather than fostering long-term self-suf ficiency and sustainable growth in smaller economies. 182
Furthermore, to reduce unemployment in shrinking sectors and meet labour demand in growing
industries, labour market flexibility will have to be increased. This will require the AfCFT As
Free Movement of Persons protocol to be ratified. However , due to concerns such as
employment disruption, brain drain and overwhelmed labour markets, not all member states are
committed to free movement of labour .183 In addition, as mentioned in the previous SOD,
security and sovereignty concerns further complicate this issue. 184
Ultimately , for the AfCFT A to benefit all countries in the long run, delegates should discuss and
agree on how , if at all, the AU can support small economies against external economic shocks
during the initial stages of implementation.
## Resolving Overlapping Memberships in Multiple RECs
Currently , African countries participate in multiple RECs to access diverse benefits, such as
market expansion, economic integration, protectionist measures, peace and security cooperation,
and opportunities for financing national projects. These memberships allow countries to pursue
their economic, political, and regional strategic interests. 185 However , the multiplicity of RECs
impedes economic integration in Africa. This is because a country that belongs to multiple RECs
will have to meet varying obligations imposed by dif ferent RECs. Currently , the AfCFT A does
not replace Africa s existing free trade agreements, with the treaty expressly recognising the
existence of 8 RECs, which are deemed as building blocks for the AfCFT A. However , some of
the obligations imposed by RECs, such as customs duties, tarif fs, rules of origins (RoOs) and
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures may contradict AfCFT A obligations. This results in
> 185 BruceByiersetal.,ThePoliticalEconomyofAfricasRegionalSpaghettiBowl,EuropeanCentrefor
> DevelopmentPolicyManagement(ECDPM),May2019,
> https://ecdpm.org/application/files/2716/5546/8685/ECDPM-synthesis-report-political-economy-Africas-regional-sp
> aghetti-bowl.pdf.
> 184 FrancisIkomeandChristopherOtienoOmolo,FreeMovementofPersons,InformalTradeandtheAfrican
> ContinentalFreeTradeArea.
> 183 BlessingChipandaandJakkieCilliers,TheAfCFTA.
> 182 ThandikaMkandawire,OnTaxEffortsandColonialHeritageinAfrica,JournalofDevelopmentStudies46,
> no.10(January10,2011):164769,https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2010.500660.
57 diver gent trade norms and practices as countries choose to prioritise their REC practices over
AfCFT A norms. 186
Furthermore, overlapping membership of RECs exemplify a classic case of a spaghetti bowl,
where dif ferent RoOs and dif ferent tarif fs under dif ferent RECs multiply and become more
complex, eventually complicating trade. In some cases, some RoOs have conflicting natures,
making their implementation problematic. According to a survey administered by the World
Customs Or ganisation to customs of ficials in developing economies, 67% of respondents in
sub-Saharan Africa agree that dealing with RoOs under overlapping trade agreements causes
problems, and a majority also agree that RoOs are more labour -intensive. Customs of ficials and
businesses must dedicate significant time and resources to navigate and enforce these rules,
making their lives more inconvenient and detracting from other trade facilitation objectives like
tax collection. 187 Moreover , overlapping agreements with dif fering RoOs, coupled with the need
to navigate multiple tarif fs in various free trade agreements, impose substantial costs on
businesses, particularly for labelling, certification, and overall transaction costs. 188 This burden is
especially challenging for SMEs. 189 Accordingly , the implementation of AfCFT A in Africa will
be slow because the spaghetti bowl ef fect leads to unhealthy multiplication and duplication of
ef forts, as well as the mismanagement of scarce resources. 190
To resolve this issue, member states should consider streamlining REC memberships. However ,
some African states may oppose this due to political sensitivities involved in rationalising
memberships and the entrenched interests of African countries. Dif ferent RECs provide dif ferent
economic and political benefits for African states that they may be unwilling to abandon.
> 190 OluwatosinBusayoIgbayiloye,HameenatBukolaOjibara,andAnthoniaOmosefeUgowe,LegalResponseto
> HumanRightsChallengesofMultinationalCorporationsinNigeria,NnamdiAzikiweUniversityJournalof
> InternationalLawandJurisprudence6(May30,2016):10619,
> https://www.ajol.info/index.php/naujilj/article/view/136270.
> 189 JagdishBhagwati,TermitesintheTradingSystem,1sted.,vol.52(2008;repr.,NewYork:OxfordUniversity
> Press,2008),1144,https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/261/.
> 188 TheEconomist,TheNoodleBowl,TheEconomist,September3,2009,
> https://www.economist.com/asia/2009/09/03/the-noodle-bowl.
> 187 LeviousChiukira,TheEffectivenessofAfCFTARulesofOriginasaBuild-upfromDifferentExistingRECsin
> Africa.
> 186 CollinsCAjibo,RegionalEconomicCommunitiesastheBuildingBlocsofAfricanContinentalFreeTrade
> AreaAgreement:ChallengesandWayForward,AfronomicsLaw,February4,2019,
> https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/02/04/regional-economic-communities-as-the-building-blocs-of-african-contin
> ental-free-trade-area-agreement-challenges-and-way-forward.
58 Moreover , RECs have dif ferent regulations that benefit member states dif ferently . For example,
stricter safeguarding measures in certain RECs enable agricultural economies to protect their
agricultural sectors from unfair competition. 191 In another instance, little competition in certain
RECs and tarif f advantages benefit industrialised economies that outcompete other states. 192 As
such, this makes reor ganising or reducing memberships to eliminate redundancies and harmonise
trade rules dif ficult. A possible solution to tackle this would be to adopt a phased strategy to
align policies and mandates across RECs, focusing first on resolving key overlaps and conflicts,
such as those related to customs unions and trade agreements. Strengthening the financial and
institutional capacity of both the AU and the RECs is also essential to prevent resource
limitations from undermining integration ef forts. 193
> 193
Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA), Understanding Human Mobility in Africa / the
Future of RECs and Human Mobility in the African Union, Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa
(SIHMA), 2022,
https://www.sihma.org.za/online-resources/understanding-human-mobility-in-africa-the-future-of-recs-and-human-
mobility-in-the-african-union.
> 192
Manoj Pant, The Costs and Benefits to South Africa of Joining the SADC EPA, Uk Department for
International Development(DFID), December 2009,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b8440f0b652dd000d12/Pant_EN_011209_DFID.pdf.
> 191
Bruce Byiers et al., The Political Economy of Africas Regional Spaghetti Bowl.
59 Potential Solutions
## Digital Identification and Civil Registration System
As mentioned in SODs 1 and 2, security concerns and fears about the unregulated influx of
migrant workers currently hold member states back from ratifying the AU Free Movement of
Persons Protocol, which is essential to reducing barriers for informal traders and facilitating the
movement of labour needed for developing regional value chains. To tackle this issue, regulatory
measures are crucial to manage the threats brought about by open borders and strengthen the
capability of states to control free movement. Such measures include a digital identification and
civil registration system that can help member states ef ficiently track migration and the free
movement of persons across borders, thus enhancing the capacity of states to manage migration
levels and curb illegal activities. 194
For this solution to truly work, it is also paramount for member states to develop a robust
national legal identity system alongside the digital identification and civil registration system.
This is because many informal traders do not have a legal identity . A robust national legal
identity system in compliance with human rights standards is therefore essential to ensure that
the identity information on a travel document reflects the legal identity of the individual it
belongs to, and prevents the national legal system from being exploited to create multiple or
fabricated legal identities. 195 Moreover , it also enables nationals to use their travel documents to
access regular migration pathways, making cross-border movements safe and orderly .196
However , some member states may not fully support this solution due to concerns related to data
security . Developing a digital identification and civil registration system involves collecting and
storing lar ge volumes of sensitive personal data. Some member states may resist sharing such
> 196 InternationalOrganizationforMigration,IOMInstitutionalStrategyonLegalIdentity,IOMUNMigration
> (InternationalOrganizationforMigration,2021),
> https://publications.iom.int/books/iom-institutional-strategy-legal-identity.
> 195 FrancisIkomeandChristopherOtienoOmolo,FreeMovementofPersons,InformalTradeandtheAfrican
> ContinentalFreeTradeArea.
> 194 FrancisIkomeandChristopherOtienoOmolo,FreeMovementofPersons,InformalTradeandtheAfrican
> ContinentalFreeTradeArea.
60 data across borders, fearing privacy breaches, misuse of information, and cybersecurity threats. 197
It is therefore imperative for delegates to consider whether this solution should be adopted, and if
so, how the issue of data security should be resolved.
## Regional Industrial Planning and Shared Projects
Regional industrial planning that allocates specific industries or sectors to less-developed regions
could also ensure a more equitable distribution of benefits under the AfCFT A. For instance,
certain industries could be strategically developed in underprivileged regions to create
employment opportunities, foster local economic linkages, and develop regional value chains.
Shared regional projects, such as the construction of cross-border dams, power grids, or railways,
can drive development in areas that would otherwise remain underdeveloped. 198 These initiatives
can help economically disadvantaged regions become active participants in continental trade.
This will then address the uneven distribution of benefits from the regional economic integration
and ensure that economic growth is inclusive.
However , it is important to note that the AU cannot directly implement such measures. Instead,
its role is to facilitate agreements among member states and provide a framework for
collaboration. This reliance on voluntary cooperation among countries may pose challenges, as
dif fering national priorities and resource constraints could slow progress. For instance, countries
which are industrial hubs may object to this solution, fearing that the development of strategic
industries in underdeveloped areas may cause them to lose their competitive edge. As such,
competition for investments may undermine such regional industrial initiatives. 199 Moreover ,
shared projects require financial contributions from member states, which may be unwilling to
fork out funds due to a lack of incentives to do so. Relying on external partners for support and
funding raises concerns about sustainability and the alignment of interests. 200 In addition,
> 200 JamesShikwati,AfCFTA:ABeaconofHopeoraFailedProject?,FriedrichNaumannFoundation,May2,
> 2024,https://www.freiheit.org/sub-saharan-africa/beacon-hope-or-failed-project.
> 199 BruceByiers,TowardsaContinentalIndustrialPolicy?,EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicy
> Management(ECDPM),August21,2024,https://ecdpm.org/work/towards-continental-industrial-policy.
> 198 MichaelTakudzwaPasara,AnOverviewoftheObstaclestotheAfricanEconomicIntegrationProcessinView
> oftheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea,AfricaReview12,no.1(November5,2019):117,
> https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2019.1685336.
> 197 ThapeloNdlovuetal.,DigitalRightsSouthernAfrica,ed.ReyhanaMastersandLisJordan,AfricanInternet
> RightsAlliance(AIRA)(Johannesburg,SouthAfrica:AssociationforProgressiveCommunications(APC),April
> 2024),https://africaninternetrights.org/sites/default/files/Digital%20Rights%20Southern%20Africa_ED3-2.pdf.
61 disputes between member states over which regions or countries to receive prioritised
investments may arise. Although these solutions have several drawbacks, it is worth delegates
exploring such a possibility , keeping in mind their national interests.
## Harmonising Educational Standards
Educational curricula and protocols need to be harmonised to ensure that professional skills,
knowledge, and certification are recognised beyond country borders. 201 This harmonisation
would involve aligning academic standards, training programs, and accreditation systems to
create a unified framework for education and professional development. By doing so, African
citizens qualifications would be accepted across the continent, thereby facilitating the free
movement of labour across Africa. This is needed to reduce unemployment rates, improve the
ef ficiency of labour markets, and address skills shortages that currently require hiring from
outside the continent. 202 Additionally , this measure would help address income inequality among
member states by enabling workers from less-developed regions to access opportunities in more
advanced economies, fostering a more equitable distribution of economic benefits under the
AfCFT A agreement.
However , the fragmentation of education systems in Africa poses a significant challenge to the
harmonisation process. 203 Many African countries have widely varying higher education systems,
heavily influenced by colonial legacies and strong ties to former colonial powers. As a result,
some nations prefer aligning their systems with those of their former colonisers rather than
adopting continental harmonisation strategies, complicating ef forts to create a unified
framework. Conversely , other African member states strongly oppose the colonial education
system, which they may believe has subjugated indigenous languages and cultures, further
polarising approaches to harmonisation.
> 203 AbebawYirgaAdamu,HarmonisationofHigherEducationinAfrica:20YearsaftertheBolognaProcess,
> TuningJournalforHigherEducation9,no.1(November26,2021):10326,
> https://doi.org/10.18543/tjhe-9(1)-2021pp103-126.
> 202 TeniolaT.Tayo,TheAfCFTACanHelpAddressAfricanInequalities,AfricanPolicyResearch
> Institute(APRI),September8,2023,https://afripoli.org/the-afcfta-can-help-address-african-inequalities.
> 201 SilindileNanzileMliloetal.,OpeningupAfricaforAfricans:AProposalinSupportoftheProtocolforthe
> FreeMovementofPersons,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,no.17(2023):18,https://doi.org/10.2870/81003.
62 Financial constraints also present a major obstacle. 204 Current harmonisation initiatives rely
heavily on external funding, particularly from European partners, raising concerns about
dependency and the sustainability of these ef forts. While the AU and member states recognise
the importance of harmonisation, many are reluctant to engage in these strategies if they entail
significant financial implications. Given that harmonisation and its associated activities are
costly , this poses a considerable burden for an already underfunded higher education sector .
Thus, balancing the need for harmonisation with the financial realities of African countries
remains a critical challenge that member states have to confront.
> 204 AbebawYirgaAdamu,HarmonisationofHigherEducationinAfrica:20YearsaftertheBolognaProcess,
> TuningJournalforHigherEducation9,no.1(November26,2021):10326,
> https://doi.org/10.18543/tjhe-9(1)-2021pp103-126.
63 Key Stakeholders
## Protectionist Bloc
The protectionist bloc prioritises safeguarding their domestic industries from external
competition. Countries in this bloc are particularly concerned about the adverse ef fects of trade
liberalisation on small-scale farmers, manufacturers, and local businesses that may struggle to
compete with cheaper imports or the industrialised economies of lar ger nations. 205 For them,
maintaining tarif fs, subsidies, import quotas and border closure policies is essential to shield
vulnerable sectors and protect critical government revenues derived from customs duties, which
fund national development projects. 206 As such, while these countries have af firmed their
commitment to remove tarif fs for 90% of products, most of them have not incorporated the
AfCFT A preferential tarif f rates into their national tarif f schedules. 207 Some of these countries
have even banned or raised tarif fs on imports, delaying the implementation of the AfCFT A and
impacting food security at other countries' expense. 208
In addition, this bloc emphasises the need to address national security risks associated with
informal cross-border trade, including food safety concerns, public health risks, and security
issues. Additionally , some of the informal trading activities may even go against the
government s industrial policy due to the evasion of taxes and tarif fs, reducing the government s
revenue that could be reinvested in industrial development. As such, member states would seek
to adopt a hard stance towards informal trade and clamp down on the informal economy by
imposing obligations and standards on informal traders. These countries also seek to encourage
the formalisation of informal trade because it improves tax collection and enforces safety and
> 208 GbekeAdebowaleAdenuga,LereAmusan,andSamuelOyewole,AfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea
> (AfCFTA)andtheChallengesofProtectionistPoliciesonRegionalIntegration:InsightsfromNigeriaandSouth
> Africa.
> 207 DesiderioConsultantsLtd.,AfricanStatesCautiousApproachtoAfCFTAImplementationCouldLeadto
> LongerTimetoRealizeItsObjectives,DesiderioConsultantsLtd.,June8,2024,
> https://www.ddcustomslaw.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=888%3Aafrican-states-cautious-
> approach-to-afcfta-implementation-could-lead-to-longer-time-to-realize-its-objectives&catid=1%3Aultime&Itemid=
> 50&lang=en.
> 206 MichaelTakudzwaPasara,AnOverviewoftheObstaclestotheAfricanEconomicIntegrationProcessinView
> oftheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea.
> 205 GbekeAdebowaleAdenuga,LereAmusan,andSamuelOyewole,AfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea
> (AfCFTA)andtheChallengesofProtectionistPoliciesonRegionalIntegration:InsightsfromNigeriaandSouth
> Africa.
64 quality standards. 209 They believe that without such measures, informal trade undermines
long-term economic development by fostering unfair competition between formal and informal
firms, enabling tax evasion and promoting unproductive work. 210 Furthermore, countries in this
bloc oppose unrestricted cross-border mobility , expressing concerns that a high influx of
immigrants could jeopardize their economic prosperity , leading to high poverty and
unemployment rates. In some of these countries, the migration of skilled labour is encouraged
while unskilled migrants are debarred, as the latter is seen as competitors with low income
citizens for available blue-collar jobs in the country .211
Overall, the protectionist bloc advocates for a gradual implementation of the AfCFT A
agreements to allow their economies time to adjust. They also support the establishment of
safeguards and compensation mechanisms to mitigate the economic shocks that may arise from
increased competition. This bloc remains cautious about fully embracing free trade without
adequate protections in place for their vulnerable sectors and populations.
## Liberal Bloc
Countries in this bloc are usually relatively poorer states or small island states. Characterised by
more diversified and export-driven economies, countries belonging to this bloc see trade
liberalisation under AfCFT A as an opportunity to expand markets, create economies of scale,
improve competitiveness, and strengthen regional cooperation by improving infrastructure,
streamlining procedures, and harmonising regulations. Recognising the benefits of the AfCFT A,
some of these countries participated in the AfCFT A Guided Trade Initiative, an initiative meant
> 21 1GbekeAdebowaleAdenuga,LereAmusan,andSamuelOyewole,AfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea
> (AfCFTA)andtheChallengesofProtectionistPoliciesonRegionalIntegration:InsightsfromNigeriaandSouth
> Africa.
> 210 OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),TacklingVulnerabilityintheInformal
> Economy,OECD(Paris:OECDPublishing,2019),
> https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@travail/documents/publicatio
> n/wcms_711804.pdf.
> 209 PoorvaKarkareetal.,EcdpmsMakingPoliciesWorkaSystem,NotanError:InformalCross-BorderTradein
> WestAfrica,EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement(ECDPM),June2021,
> https://ecdpm.org/application/files/1616/5546/8572/System-Not-Error-Informal-Cross-Border-Trade-West-Africa-E
> CDPM-Discussion-Paper-300-2021.pdf.
65 to test the AfCFT As operational, institutional, legal and trade policy environment, allowing
commercially meaningful trade to commence. 212
This bloc also emphasises the importance of including informal traders in the AfCFT A
framework to broaden trade networks and ensure that mar ginalised groups benefit from the
agreement. Liberal bloc countries have taken proactive steps to address the needs of small-scale
traders both domestically and at their borders. These measures include providing essential
market information, fostering direct engagement with representatives of informal cross-border
trade, and connecting small-scale traders directly to international markets. 213 They are
considerate of the needs of informal traders, viewing support for them as essential to unlocking
the productive potential of Africa s informal economy while promoting inclusivity and economic
participation.
Furthermore, some countries belonging to the liberal bloc support the ratification of the Free
Movement of Persons Protocol. They believe labour mobility will help create employment,
increase remittances within the continent, facilitate intra-African trade and improve the standard
of living in Africa. 214 While they acknowledge the challenges posed by integration, they are
optimistic that rapid liberalisation will eventually yield significant long-term economic benefits
for all participating countries.
## Informal Traders
Informal traders in Africa, who make up a lar ge portion of the continent's workforce, face several
concerns and challenges regarding the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade
Area (AfCFT A). One of the main issues is the lack of formal recognition of the informal
economy . Many informal traders operate outside the of ficial regulatory frameworks, which
> 214 AlanHirsch,AfricanCountriesAreStuckontheFreeMovementofPeople.HowtoBreaktheLogjam,The
> Conversation,January16,2022,
> https://theconversation.com/african-countries-are-stuck-on-the-free-movement-of-people-how-to-break-the-logjam-
> 174720.
> 213 GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,FormalizationofInformalTradeinAfrica-Trends,
> ExperiencesandSocio-EconomicImpacts.
> 212 Tralac,StatusofAfCFTARatification,Tralac,August13,2024,
> https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html.
66 means they may not have access to the same benefits as formal businesses under AfCFT A. 215
They often do not have the required documentation and trading licenses to fully participate in
cross-border trade under the agreement .216 This makes it harder for them to capitalise on the new
opportunities for reduced tarif fs and easier trade flows between African countries.
Additionally , infrastructure and logistical challenges are significant barriers for informal
traders. 217 Unlike lar ge formal businesses, informal traders often rely on small-scale and
inef ficient transport systems to move goods across borders. Underdeveloped roads and railway
networks, 218 customs delays, 219 and inadequate border facilities, 220 are among the factors that
complicate their ability to engage in AfCFT A's regional trade . These issues are compounded by
non-tarif f barriers, such as cumbersome customs procedures and inconsistent enforcement of
regulations, which disproportionately af fect informal traders who may not have the capacity to
navigate these complexities. 221 The lack of streamlined processes in many member states creates
obstacles for informal traders to benefit from AfCFT A's potential.
Another concern informal traders have is the competition from lar ger firms. AfCFT A aims to
create a more competitive and integrated market, which could mean increased competition for
small, informal traders. Lar ge businesses have better access to capital, technology , market
information and economies of scale are better positioned to take advantage of the broader
African market, crowding out informal traders. This can lead to fears that the benefits of the
> 221
Marek Dabrowski and Yana Myachenkova, Free Trade in Africa: An Important Goal but Not Easy to Achieve.
> 220
International Labour Organisation(ILO), Identifying Barriers to Formalization, International Labour
Organisation(ILO), April 2021,
https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@africa/@ro-abidjan/@ilo-pretoria/documents/publica
tion/wcms_836484.pdf.
> 219
Evarist Mugisa, Review National Policy Developments in the Targeted Countries Related to the Formalisation of
the Informal Economy, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 2021,
https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Final-Report-Review-of-Informal-Sector-in-Selected-Countrie
s.pdf.
> 218
Marek Dabrowski and Yana Myachenkova, Free Trade in Africa: An Important Goal but Not Easy to Achieve.
> 217
Marek Dabrowski and Yana Myachenkova, Free Trade in Africa: An Important Goal but Not Easy to Achieve,
Bruegel, April 13, 2018, https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/free-trade-africa-important-goal-not-easy-achieve.
> 216
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Formalization of Informal Trade in Africa - Trends,
Experiences and Socio-Economic Impacts.
> 215
Jennifer J Griffin, Kalyan Bhaskar, and Verena Radulovic, Challenges and Opportunities of Partnering with the
Informal Sector, Brookings, June 20, 2024,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/challenges-and-opportunities-of-partnering-with-the-informal-sector/.
67 agreement will be disproportionately reaped by formal and lar ger businesses, leaving informal
traders at a disadvantage .222
Furthermore, informal traders face challenges related to access to credit and finance. Without the
formal structures and credit history that lar ger businesses typically have, informal traders may
struggle to access the trade finance necessary for cross-border transactions under AfCFT A. 223
Moreover , they do not have collateral and are unable to pay high interest rates to secure loans. 224
This stifles the productivity of informal traders and makes it more dif ficult for them to expand
their businesses beyond local markets to seize opportunities from the free trade area. 225 As a
result, many of these informal traders are forced to shut their operations after a short while.
> 225
Corinne Delchat and Leandro Medina, What Is the Informal Economy?, International Monetary Fund(IMF),
December 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/12/what-is-the-informal-economy-basics.
> 224
Prince AsafuAdjaye, Perspectives on the AfCFTA from Informal Economy Workers in Ghana, Trade Unions
and Trade in Africa AfCFTA, September 15, 2023,
https://tradeunionsinafcfta.org/perspectives-on-the-afcfta-from-informal-economy-workers-in-ghana/.
> 223
Danny Buckley, Natalia Vershinina, and Peter Rodgers, How Much for Cash? Why the Informal Economy Is
Bad for Business, Consumers and Society, The Conversation, November 26, 2024,
https://theconversation.com/how-much-for-cash-why-the-informal-economy-is-bad-for-business-consumers-and-soc
iety-244454.
> 222
Teniola Tayo, Will Africas Free Trade Area Increase Inequalities?
68 Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)
1. How should member states integrate informal traders into African economies?
2. What are some ways in which member states can support small economies against
external economic shocks during the initial stages of implementation of the AfCFT A
agreement?
3. How can member states resolve the issue of overlapping memberships in multiple RECs?
69 Conclusion
To end of f, economic integration does not culminate with the formulation of the AfCFT A
agreement; its implementation is equally important. Economic integration has immense benefits
for Africa, but the path to achieving it requires careful navigation. Striking a balance between the
broader continental aspirations and the diverse national interests of member states is essential.
Only by considering the various viewpoints of dif ferent stakeholders can the promise of AfCFT A
translate into tangible benefits for all. All the best, and have a great time debating!
70 Bibliography
## Topic 1
Africa News. AfDB Chief Says African Countries Should Put End to Natural
Resource-Backed Loans. Africa News, August 13, 2024.
https://www .africanews.com/2024/03/12/afdb-chief-says-african-countries-should-put-en
d-to-natural-resource-backed-loans//.
Abou-Zeid , Amani. Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI for Africa s
Development and Prosperity . African Union, July 2024.
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44004-doc-EN-_Continental_AI_Strategy_Jul
y_2024.pdf.
Adams, Dawda, Kweku Adams, Rexford Attah-Boakye, Subhan Ullah, Waymond Rodgers, and
Danson Kimani. Social and Environmental Practices and Corporate Financial
Performance of Multinational Corporations in Emer ging Markets: Evidence from 20
Oil-Rich African Countries. Resources Policy 78 (September 2022): 102756.
https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.102756.
Adisu, Kinfu, Thomas Sharkey , and Sam C. Okoroafo. The Impact of Chinese Investment in
Africa. International Journal of Business and Management 5, no. 9 (August 19, 2010):
17. https://doi.or g/10.5539/ijbm.v5n9p3.
African Development Bank Group . Africa s $824 Billion Debt Burden and Opaque
Resource-Backed Loans Hinder Its Potential, African Development Bank President
Warns. African Development Bank Group, April 19, 2024.
https://www .afdb.or g/en/news-and-events/press-releases/africas-824-billion-debt-burden-
and-opaque-resource-backed-loans-hinder -its-potential-african-development-bank-presid
ent-warns-70183.
African Ener gy Chamber . T otalEner gies: Driving Economic Development beyond Oil & Gas -
African Ener gy Chamber . African Ener gy Chamber , July 4, 2024.
https://ener gychamber .or g/totalener gies-driving-economic-development-beyond-oil-gas/.
African Union. 3rd Sub-Committee on Tax and Illicit Financial Flows of the Specialized
Technical Committee on Finance, Monetary Af fairs, Economic Planning, and
71 Integration. African Union, May 8, 2024.
https://au.int/en/newsevents/20240508/3rd-sub-committee-tax-and-illicit-financial-flows.
African Union. About the African Union. African Union, February 12, 2010.
https://au.int/en/overview .
African Union. African Mining Vision. African Union. African Union, February 2009.
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30995-doc-africa_mining_vision_english_1.pd
f.
African Union. African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). African Union. Accessed February
23, 2025. https://au.int/en/or gans/aprm.
African Union. The African Continental Free Trade Area African Union, 2024.
https://au.int/en/african-continental-free-trade-area.
Aix-Marseille School of Economics . V iolence in Africa: Multinationals Take Some of the
Blame. Aix-Marseille School of Economics , April 26, 2019.
https://www .amse-aixmarseille.fr/en/ecodialog/violence-africa-multinationals-take-some-
blame.
Albertin, Gior gia, Dan Devlin, and Boriana Yontcheva. Countering Tax Avoidance in
Sub-Saharan Africa s Mining Sector . International Monetary Fund , November 5, 2021.
https://www .imf.or g/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/1 1/05/blog-countering-tax-avoidance-sub-sa
haran-africa-mining-sector .
Amani Africa. Discussion on Enhancing Mechanisms for Curbing Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources by Armed and Terrorist Groups in Africa. Amani Africa, November
25, 2024.
https://amaniafrica-et.or g/discussion-on-enhancing-mechanisms-for -curbing-illegal-explo
itation-of-natural-resources-by-armed-and-terrorist-groups-in-africa/.
Amnesty International. Forced Evictions at Industrial Cobalt and Copper Mines in the DRC.
Amnesty International, September 12, 2023.
https://www .amnesty .or g/en/latest/news/2023/09/drc-cobalt-and-copper -mining-for -batter
ies-leading-to-human-rights-abuses/.
Anderson, Kara. Does Transparency Benefit or Harm Your Company? Greenly , October 23,
2023.
72 https://greenly .earth/en-us/blog/company-guide/does-transparency-benefit-or -harm-your -
company .
Arthur , Peter . Reimagining Natural Resources Governance in Africa: Is Digitalization the Game
Changer? Edited by Korbla P. Puplampu and Kobena T. Hanson. International Political
Economy Series, August 22, 2023, 71100.
https://doi.or g/10.1007/978-3-031-32164-1_4.
Azaroual, Fahd, and Otaviano Canuto. Fiscal Space in African Economies and Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Center for Macroeconomics and Development. Centre For
Macroeconomics & Development , August 29, 2023.
https://www .cmacrodev .com/fiscal-space-in-african-economies-and-base-erosion-and-pro
fit-shifting-beps/.
Baharumshah, Ahmad Zubaidi, Ly Slesman, and Evelyn Shyamala Devadason. T ypes of
Foreign Capital Inflows and Economic Growth: New Evidence on Role of Financial
Markets. Journal of International Development 29, no. 6 (April 8, 2015): 76889.
https://doi.or g/10.1002/jid.3093.
Bauer , Andrew , Uyanga Gankhuyag, Sofi Halling, David Manley , and Varsha Venugopal.
Natural Resource Revenue Sharing. Natural Resource Governance Institute, September
2016.
https://resourcegovernance.or g/sites/default/files/documents/nr gi_undp_resource-sharing
_web_0.pdf.
Benza, Brian. Botswana Proposes Law for Locals to Acquire 24% Stakes in Mines. Edited by
Nelson Banya and Emelia Sithole-Matarise. Reuters, July 23, 2024.
https://www .reuters.com/world/africa/botswana-proposes-law-locals-acquire-24-stakes-m
ines-2024-07-23/.
Besada, Hany . Foreign Investment in Africa: Challenges and Benefits. South African Journal
of International Af fairs 13, no. 1 (January 26, 2010): 15968.
https://doi.or g/10.1080/10220460609556793.
Besada, Hany , Franklyn Lisk, and Philip Martin. Regulating Extraction in Africa: Towards a
Framework for Accountability in the Global South. Governance in Africa 2, no. 1
(2015): 112. https://doi.or g/10.5334/gia.ah.
73 Brodowicz, Mateusz. Colonialism and the Exploitation of African Resources. Aithor , July 2,
2024.
https://aithor .com/essay-examples/colonialism-and-the-exploitation-of-african-resources#
21-scramble-for -africa.
Brown, Jason P., Timothy Fitzgerald, and Jeremy G. Weber . Asset Ownership, Windfalls, and
Income: Evidence from Oil and Gas Royalties. SSRN. Social Science Research Network
(SSRN), May 4, 2017. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2963775.
CFI. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Corporate Finance Institute, November 27, 2022.
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/foreign-direct-investment-fdi/.
Chambers and Partners. ESG in Mining: Shaping the Future of Africa s Metals and Minerals |
Article | Chambers and Partners. Chambers and Partners, October 1, 2024.
https://chambers.com/articles/esg-in-mining-shaping-the-future-of-africa-s-metals-and-mi
nerals.
Cole, Matthew A., Robert J.R. Elliott, and Eric Strobl. The Environmental Performance of
Firms: The Role of Foreign Ownership, Training, and Experience. Ecological
Economics 65, no. 3 (April 15, 2008): 53846.
https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.025.
Coria, Jessica, and Thomas Sterner . Natural Resource Management: Challenges and Policy
Options. Annual Review of Resource Economics 3, no. 1 (October 201 1): 20330.
https://doi.or g/10.1 146/annurev-resource-0831 10-120131.
Coulibaly , Yacouba. Resource-Backed Loans and Ecological Ef ficiency of Human
Development: Evidence from African Countries. Ecological Economics 224 (October 1,
2024): 125. https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108295.
Dechezleprtre, Antoine, and Misato Sato. The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on
Competitiveness. London School of Economics and Political Science(LSE), November
2014.
https://www .lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/1 1/Impacts_of_Enviro
nmental_Regulations1.pdf.
Dominican University . Pan-Africanism. Dominican University . Accessed February 12, 2025.
https://research.dom.edu/AfricanAmericanStudies/panafricanism.
74 Ekhator , Eghosa Osa. Regulating the Activities of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria: A
Case for the African Union? International Community Law Review 20, no. 1 (March 5,
2018): 3068. https://doi.or g/10.1 163/18719732-12341365.
Erum, Naila, Kazi Sohag, Jamaliah Said, Kazi Musa, and Muhammad Mansoor Asghar .
Governance, Fiscal Expenditure, and Economic Growth in OIC Countries: Role of
Natural Resources and Information Communication Technology . Resources Policy 90
(March 2024). https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.resourpol.2024.104717.
Ganda, Fortune. Analysing the Impacts of FDI, Material Footprint and ICT on the Load
Capacity Factor in Sub-Saharan African Countries. Edited by Muhammad Ramzan.
Frontiers in Environmental Science 12 (July 18, 2024): 117.
https://doi.or g/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1419307.
German, Laura, Carol Colfer , Edmund Barrow , Christian Kchli, Jr gen Blaser , and Wahjudi
Wardojo. Forest Governance and Decentralization in Africa: Linking Local, Regional
and Global Dialogues. The Center for International Forestry Research and World
Agroforestry (CIFOR-ICRAF). Accessed January 1, 2025.
https://www .cifor -icraf.or g/publications/pdf_files/events/documentations/durban/papers/P
aper01Laura.pdf.
Global Financial Integrity . T rade Misinvoicing. Global Financial Integrity . Accessed January
2, 2025. https://gfintegrity .or g/issue/trade-misinvoicing/.
Greef f, Johan C. The Environmental Management Programme Route to Integrated
Environmental Management: A South African Mining Industry Perspective. Journal
American Society of Mining and Reclamation 1994, no. 4 (1994): 26974.
https://doi.or g/10.21000/jasmr94040269.
Green, Mark A. Africa s Natural Resources for Africans? Wilson Centre, May 29, 2024.
https://www .wilsoncenter .or g/blog-post/africas-natural-resources-africans.
Guensbur g, Carol. Africa Bled by Illicit Cash Outflows - Report. Edited by Eric Manirakiza.
VOA Africa, September 18, 2022.
https://www .voaafrica.com/a/africa-bled-by-illicit-cash-outflows---report/6750772.html.
Ho, Terence. A voiding the Resource Curse Is the Key to Singapore s Sustained Growth. Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy , November 12, 2023.
75 https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/avoiding-the-resource-curse-is-the-key-to-singapore-
s-sustained-growth.
Hodu Ngangnchi, Forbe, Nkwetta Ajong Aquilas, and Mukete Emmanuel Mbella. Natural
Resource Use, Industrialization and Climate Change in Africa: Blueprints for Sustainable
Regional Development. Research in Globalization 9 (December 2024): 100245.
https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.resglo.2024.100245.
Hormeku-Ajei, Tetteh , and Camden Goetz. A History of Resource Plunder . Africa Is a
Country , 2021. https://africasacountry .com/2021/04/a-history-of-resource-plunder .
Houser , Trevor , Solomon Hsiang, Robert Kopp, Kate Larsen, Michael Delgado, Amir Jina,
Michael D Mastrandrea, et al. Economic Risks of Climate Change. Columbia University
Press EBooks. De Gruyter , 2015. https://doi.or g/10.7312/hous17456.
Hove, Seedwell. Why Africa Must Shift from Dependence to Diversification, Now . African
Development Bank Group (blog), March 21, 2018.
https://blogs.afdb.or g/fr/industrialisation-and-trade-corner/post/why-africa-must-shift-fro
m-dependence-to-diversification-now-17962.
Igbayiloye, O. B., Hameenat Bukola Ojibara, and Anthonia Omosefe Ugowe. Legal Response
to Human Rights Challenges of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria. Nnamdi Azikiwe
University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 6 (2015): 10619.
https://www .semanticscholar .or g/paper/Legal-response-to-human-rights-challenges-of-in-
Igbayiloye-Ojibara/e2ee8a6d1fd6a0f51ccb76f19b292d9862c266bc.
Inter governmental Forum. T ransfer Pricing - Inter governmental Forum. Inter governmental
Forum, April 2, 2024.
https://www .igfmining.or g/financial-benefits/global-mining-tax-initiative/transfer -pricing
/.
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Pula Fund. International Forum of
Sovereign Wealth Funds. Accessed January 15, 2025.
https://www .ifswf.or g/members/botswana.
International Monetary Fund. The IMF and the Fight against Illicit Financial Flows. IMF ,
2023.
76 https://www .imf.or g/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Fight-against-illicit-financial-flow
s.
International Trade Administration. Botswana - Mining & Minerals . International Trade
Administration, February 28, 2024.
https://www .trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/botswana-mining-minerals.
International Trade Administration. Botswana -Market Challenges | International Trade
Administration. International Trade Administration, February 28, 2024.
https://www .trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/botswana-market-challenges.
International Trade Administration. Namibia - Mining and Minerals. International Trade
Administration, February 29, 2024.
https://www .trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/namibia-mining-and-minerals.
Jef feris, Keith. The Role of TNCs in the Extractive Industry of Botswana. United Nations
Digital Library . Transnational Corporations, 2009.
https://digitallibrary .un.or g/record/668770?ln=en&v=pdf.
Jones Day . T anzania Overhauls Mining Laws, Fines Investor US$190 Billion: Is Your
Investment Protected? Jones Day , August 4, 2017.
https://www .jonesday .com/en/insights/2017/08/tanzania-overhauls-mining-laws-fines-inv
estor -us190-billion-is-your -investment-protected.
Kimanuka, Oscar . What Pan Africanism Means in the Context of Regional Integration - Tralac
Trade Law Centre. tralac, August 14, 2015.
https://www .tralac.or g/news/article/7900-what-pan-africanism-means-in-the-context-of-r
egional-integration.html.
Kohl, Benjamin, and Linda Farthing. Material Constraints to Popular Imaginaries: The
Extractive Economy and Resource Nationalism in Bolivia. Political Geography 31, no. 4
(May 2012): 22535. https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.03.002.
Kuryla, Peter . Pan-Africanism. In Encyclopdia Britannica, April 29, 2016.
https://www .britannica.com/topic/Pan-Africanism.
Kwakwa, Paul Adjei, Hamdiyah Alhassan, and Geor ge Adu. Ef fect of Natural Resources
Extraction on Ener gy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emission in Ghana.
77 International Journal of Ener gy Sector Management 14, no. 1 (January 9, 2020): 2039.
https://doi.or g/10.1 108/ijesm-09-2018-0003.
Laville, Sandra. T op Oil Firms Spending Millions Lobbying to Block Climate Change Policies,
Says Report. The Guardian, March 22, 2019.
https://www .theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/22/top-oil-firms-spending-millions-lobb
ying-to-block-climate-change-policies-says-report.
Le Billon, Philippe. Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial Flows: What Role for Revenue
Governance Initiatives? U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2025.
https://www .u4.no/publications/extractive-sectors-and-illicit-financial-flows-what-role-fo
r-revenue-governance-initiatives.pdf.
Liu, Jia. How Multinationals Avoid Taxes in Africa and What Should Change. University of
Portsmouth (blog), April 5, 2022.
https://www .port.ac.uk/news-events-and-blogs/blogs/building-an-inclusive-and-growth-le
d-economy-and-society/how-multinationals-avoid-taxes-in-africa-and-what-should-chang
e.
Liu, Lingcai, Tomiwa Sunday Adebayo, Jin Hu, Muhammad Irfan, and Shujaat Abbas.
Exploring Resource Blessing Hypothesis within the Cof fin of Technological Innovation
and Economic Risk: Evidence from Wavelet Quantile Regression. Ener gy Economics
137 (July 30, 2024): 107802. https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107802.
Luong, Pauline Jones, and Erika Weinthal. Oil Is Not a Curse. Google Books. Cambridge
University press, 2010.
https://books.google.com.sg/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Y idGtiV uvjEC&oi=fnd&pg=P A1&ot
s=Q1_oJd0bYr&sig=Rxc3bWTR9ewe67b1whZpTRpYsvk&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q
&f=false.
Martin, A. Timothy , and J. Jay Park. Global Petroleum Industry Model Contracts Revisited:
Higher , Faster , Stronger . The Journal of World Ener gy Law & Business 3, no. 1
(February 9, 2010): 443. https://doi.or g/10.1093/jwelb/jwp022.
Mihalyi, David, Aisha Adam, and Jyhjong Hwang. Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and
Potential. Natural Resource Governance Institute. Natural Resource Governance
Institute, February 2020.
78 https://resourcegovernance.or g/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-execu
tive-summary .pdf.
Mintz, Jack M. T axes, Royalties and Cross-Border Resource Investments. Edited by Michael
Keen and Victor T Thuronyi. IMF ELibrary , September 22, 2016, 1380.
https://doi.or g/10.5089/9781475539660.071.ch012.
Mohommad, Adil. Employment Ef fects of Environmental Policies Evidence from Firm-Level
Data. International Monetary Fund 21, no. 140 (May 14, 2021): 129.
https://doi.or g/10.5089/9781513573618.001.A001.
Moll de Alba, Jaime, and Valentin Todorov . Measuring Green Industrial Performance: A
Regional Outlook of Eastern Asia and Europe. Economic Change and Restructuring 56,
no. 4 (August 10, 2022): 32813307. https://doi.or g/10.1007/s10644-022-09436-x.
Monkam, Nara. African Strategies to Combat Illicit Financial Flows. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, November 12, 2024.
https://carnegieendowment.or g/research/2024/1 1/illicit-financial-flows-africa-tax?lang=e
n.
Monks, Kieron. W orkers Extracting Cobalt from a Lake in Katanga Province, DR Congo.
CNN, January 2, 2018.
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/18/africa/looting-machine-tom-bur gis-africa/index.html.
Nakhle, Carole. The Ener gy Transition and the Risk of Resource Nationalism. GIS Reports,
May 12, 2023. https://www .gisreportsonline.com/r/resource-nationalism/.
Nanziri, Lwanga Elizabeth, and Gifty Abban. Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational
Corporations in the Oil and Gas Sector . In Sustainability Management in the Oil and
Gas Industry , edited by Joshua Yindenaba Abor and Amin Karimu. Routledge, 2023.
https://doi.or g/10.4324/9781003309864-18.
Narula, Rajneesh. Multinational Firms and the Extractive Sectors in the 21st Century: Can They
Drive Development? Journal of World Business 53, no. 1 (January 2018): 8591.
https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.jwb.2017.09.004.
National Environmental Management Authority(NEMA). Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment (ESIA) Guidelines for the Mining Sector . National Environmental
Management Authority(NEMA). Accessed February 12, 2025.
79 https://www .nema.go.ke/images/Docs/Guidelines/Signed%20ESIA%20Guildelines%20f
or%20the%20Mining%20sector%20-%20Final-min.pdf.
Natural Resource Governance Institute. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI): Using EITI to Promote Policy Reform. Natural Resource Governance Institute,
March 2015. https://resourcegovernance.or g/sites/default/files/nr gi_EITI.pdf.
Natural Resource Governance Institute. The Resource Curse the Political and Economic
Challenges of Natural Resource Wealth. Natural Resource Governance Institute. Natural
Resource Governance Institute, March 2015.
https://resourcegovernance.or g/sites/default/files/nr gi_Resource-Curse.pdf.
Ngocho, Burure, and Sadock Magai. Mining in Tanzania: Ef fects of the Mining Legal
Framework Overhaul. DLA Piper , August 10, 2020.
https://www .dlapiper .com/en/insights/publications/2020/08/africa-connected-issue-4/6tan
zania-mining-legal-framework-overhaul.
OECD. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). OECD, 2024.
https://www .oecd.or g/en/topics/policy-issues/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps.html.
Opalo, Ken. How to Help Africa s Resource Sector . World Economic Forum, October 30,
2014. https://www .weforum.or g/stories/2014/10/help-africas-resource-sector/.
Oxfam. From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the Africa Mining Vision. Oxfam, March
2017.
https://oxfamilibrary .openrepository .com/bitstream/handle/10546/620208/bp-africa-minin
g-vision-090317-en.pdf?sequence=1.
Oxfam International. Lifting the Resource Curse. Oxfam International, December 2009.
https://www-cdn.oxfam.or g/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp134-lifting-the-resource-curse
-01 1209_4.pdf.
Oxfam International. Multinational Companies Cheat Africa out of Billions of Dollars. Oxfam
International, June 1, 2015.
https://www .oxfam.or g/en/press-releases/multinational-companies-cheat-africa-out-billio
ns-dollars.
Oyier , Christopher . Multinational Corporations and Natural Resources Exploitation in Africa:
Challenges and Prospects. The Journal of Conflict Management and Sustainable
Development 1, no. 2 (2017): 6971.
80 https://journalofcmsd.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OYIER-MNCs-P APER-20-Decem
ber -2017.pdf.
Paget, Dan. T anzania: Magufuli s Mining Reforms Are a Masterclass in Political
Manoeuvring. African Ar guments, July 17, 2017.
https://africanar guments.or g/2017/07/tanzania-magufulis-mining-reforms-are-a-mastercla
ss-in-political-manoeuvring/.
Patnaik, Pratyusna. Asian Review of Social Sciences Decentralized Natural Resource
Management: A Review of Devolution of Property Rights and People s Participation
Pratyusna Patnaik. Asian Review of Social Sciences . The Research Publication, 2019.
https://trp.or g.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ARSS-V ol.8-No.1-January-March-2019-pp
.-92-96.pdf.
Poncian, Japhace. Adopting and Practicing Resource Nationalism in Africa: A Case of
Tanzania s State Mining Corporation. Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8, no. 1
(2023). https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.ssaho.2023.100678.
Poncian, Japhace. Extractive Resource Ownership and the Subnational Resource Curse: Insights
from Tanzania. The Extractive Industries and Society 6, no. 2 (April 2019): 33242.
https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.exis.2018.08.013.
Poncian, Japhace, and Jim Jose. National Resource Ownership and Community Engagement in
Tanzania s Natural Gas Governance. Ener gy Policy 133 (October 2019): 110903.
https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.1 10903.
Ramchurn, Sundesh. Reskilling and Upskilling in Africa s Workforce Transformation -
Talenteum. Talenteum. Accessed March 25, 2025.
https://talenteum.com/reskilling-and-upskilling-in-africas-workforce-transformation/.
Sarassoro, Hyacinthe. Corruption of Public Of ficials in Africa - a Comparative Study in
Criminal Law . U.S. Department of Justice . Economica , 1980.
https://www .ojp.gov/pdf files1/Digitization/81952NCJRS.pdf.
Schilir, Daniele. Botswana s Economy and the Question of Diversification. Munich Personal
RePEc Archive, December 2022.
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1 15608/1/MPRA_paper_1 15608.pdf.
Soilihi, Allison. ESG Investments: The Middle Eastern and African Regulatory Perspective Part
2. Mor gan Lewis, August 14, 2024.
81 https://www .mor ganlewis.com/pubs/2024/08/esg-investments-the-middle-eastern-and-afr
ican-regulatory-perspective-part-2.
Starke, Linda. Breaking New Ground. Routledge EBooks. 1st ed. 2002. Reprint, Taylor &
Francis, 2016. https://doi.or g/10.4324/9781315541501.
Tanzania Digest. Digging Deeper: Local Content Challenges in Tanzania s Mining Sector .
Tanzania Digest, August 22, 2023.
https://www .digest.tz/digging-deeper -local-content-challenges-in-tanzanias-mining-sector
/.
Tax Justice Network. What Is Transfer Pricing? Tax Justice Network. Accessed January 2,
2025. https://taxjustice.net/faq/what-is-transfer -pricing/.
The Sudan Times. Africa s Resource Nationalisation to Reclaim Control Post-Independence -
the Sudan Times. The Sudan Times, December 15, 2023.
https://thesudantimes.com/africa/resource-nationalization-to-reclaim-control-post-indepe
ndence/.
Toroskainen, Kaisa. Resource Governance Index: From Legal Reform to Implementation in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Natural Resource Governance Institute, April 14, 2019.
https://resourcegovernance.or g/sites/default/files/documents/r gi-from-legal-reform-to-im
plementation-sub-saharan-africa.pdf.
Udeagha, Maxwell Chukwudi, and Marthinus Christof fel Breitenbach. Can Fiscal
Decentralization Be the Route to the Race to Zero Emissions in South Africa? Fresh
Policy Insights from Novel Dynamic Autoregressive Distributed Lag Simulations
Approach. Environmental Science and Pollution Research 30, no. 16 (January 31,
2023): 4644674. https://doi.or g/10.1007/s1 1356-023-25306-z.
UN Environment Programme. Our Work in Africa. UNEP - UN Environment Programme.
UNEP , October 25, 2017. https://www .unep.or g/regions/africa/our -work-africa.
United Nations. Speakers Stress Need to Address Exploitation of Africa s Resources, Ur ging
Paradigm Shift, as Economic and Social Council Concludes Segment . United Nations,
May 10, 2017. https://press.un.or g/en/2017/ecosoc6831.doc.htm.
Van Der Ploeg, Frederick. Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? Econstor . Econstor , July
2010. https://www .econstor .eu/bitstream/10419/38934/1/631864989.pdf.
82 Vandome, Christopher , and Lawrence Dechambenoit. African Agency in Mineral Resource
Governance. Chatham House, February 24, 2023.
https://www .chathamhouse.or g/2020/10/african-agency-mineral-resource-governance.
Warah, Rasna. Multinational Companies Reaping from Africa s Natural Resources, Including
from Illicit Financial Flows, While Locals Benefit Only Mar ginally, Says Columnist.
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, July 10, 2017.
https://www .business-humanrights.or g/en/latest-news/multinational-companies-reaping-fr
om-africas-natural-resources-including-from-illicit-financial-flows-while-locals-benefit-o
nly-mar ginally-says-columnist/.
Wegenast, Tim, and Gerald Schneider . Ownership Matters: Natural Resources Property Rights
and Social Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political Geography 61 (November 2017):
11022. https://doi.or g/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.07.007.
Weider , Drew . Structural Adjustment s Complex Legacy in Sub-Saharan Africa Michigan
Journal of Economics. Michigan Journal of Economics, April 29, 2024.
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2024/04/29/structural-adjustments-complex-legacy-in-sub
-saharan-africa/.
Wentworth. T anzania Local Content Policy , April 2019.
https://wp-wentworth-2020.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/media/2021/04/19151741/WE
N_LCP_FW .pdf.
Wilkes, Tommy Reggiori. T op Companies Lobbying Undermines Their Climate Pledges,
Study Finds. Edited by Barbara Lewis and Sharon Singleton. Reuters, November 17,
2023, sec. Environment.
https://www .reuters.com/business/environment/top-companies-lobbying-undermines-thei
r-climate-pledges-study-finds-2023-1 1-16/.
Zhang, Ting, and Manuella Appiah. Manuella Appiah LL.M. Researcher and Escaping the
Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa Policy Brief | 4. The Hague Institute for Global
Justice, August 2013.
https://thehagueinstitutefor globaljustice.or g/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/PB4-Escaping-
Resource-Curse-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf.
83 Topic 2
Adamu, Abebaw Yir ga. Harmonisation of Higher Education in Africa: 20 Years after the
Bologna Process. Tuning Journal for Higher Education 9, no. 1 (November 26, 2021):
10326. https://doi.or g/10.18543/tjhe-9(1)-2021pp103-126.
Adenuga, Gbeke Adebowale, Lere Amusan, and Samuel Oyewole. African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFT A) and the Challenges of Protectionist Policies on Regional
Integration: Insights from Nigeria and South Africa. African Renaissance, August 1,
2024, 35773. https://doi.or g/:%20https://doi.or g/10.31920/2516-5305/2024/sin2a15.
Aderonmu, Funke. Formalizing Africa s Informal Sector through the AfCFT A: An Opportunity
for Economic Transformation. Journal of Public and International Af fairs, September
11, 2023.
https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/formalizing-africas-informal-sector -through-afcfta-opport
unity-economic-transformation.
African Development Bank. Importance of Regional and Continental Integration for Africa s
Development. African Development Bank - Building today , a better Africa tomorrow ,
December 3, 2018.
https://www .afdb.or g/en/news-and-events/importance-of-regional-and-continental-integra
tion-for -africas-development-18773.
African Export-Import Bank. African Trade Report 2020 Informal Cross-Border Trade in Africa
in the Context of the AfCFT A. African Export-Import Bank, January 19, 2020.
https://media.afreximbank.com/afrexim/African-T rade-Report-2020.pdf.
African Union. Theme of the Year 2023: Acceleration of Afcfta Implementation. African
Union, 2023. https://au.int/en/theme/2023/acceleration-of-afcfta-implementation.
Ajibo, Collins C. Regional Economic Communities as the Building Blocs of African
Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: Challenges and Way Forward. Afronomics
Law , February 4, 2019.
https://www .afronomicslaw .or g/2019/02/04/regional-economic-communities-as-the-build
ing-blocs-of-african-continental-free-trade-area-agreement-challenges-and-way-forward.
Akeyewale, Rilwan. Who Are the Winners and Losers in Africa s Continental Free Trade
Area? World Economic Forum, October 17, 2018.
84 https://www .weforum.or g/stories/2018/10/africa-continental-free-trade-afcfta-sme-busine
ss/.
Asafu Adjaye, Prince. Perspectives on the AfCFT A from Informal Economy Workers in
Ghana. Trade Unions and Trade in Africa AfCFT A, September 15, 2023.
https://tradeunionsinafcfta.or g/perspectives-on-the-afcfta-from-informal-economy-worker
s-in-ghana/.
Basri, Chatib. Can Economic Cooperation and Integration Promote Regional Peace and
Security? East Asia Forum, May 2, 2022.
https://eastasiaforum.or g/2022/05/02/can-economic-cooperation-and-integration-promote
-regional-peace-and-security/.
Bello, Abdoul Salam , and Jonathan Gass. Who Are the Winners and Losers of Africa s New
Free Trade Agreement? Atlantic Council, April 3, 2018.
https://www .atlanticcouncil.or g/blogs/africasource/who-are-the-winners-and-losers-of-afr
ica-s-new-free-trade-agreement/.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. Termites in the Trading System. 1st ed. Vol. 52. 2008. Reprint, New York :
Oxford University Press, 2008. https://scholarship.law .columbia.edu/books/261/.
Buckley , Danny , Natalia Vershinina, and Peter Rodgers. How Much for Cash? Why the
Informal Economy Is Bad for Business, Consumers and Society . The Conversation,
November 26, 2024.
https://theconversation.com/how-much-for -cash-why-the-informal-economy-is-bad-for -b
usiness-consumers-and-society-244454.
Byiers, Bruce. T owards a Continental Industrial Policy? European Centre for Development
Policy Management(ECDPM), August 21, 2024.
https://ecdpm.or g/work/towards-continental-industrial-policy .
Byiers, Bruce, Sean Woolfrey , Alfonso Medinilla, and Jan Vanheukelom. The Political
Economy of Africa s Regional Spaghetti Bowl. European Centre for Development
Policy Management(ECDPM), May 2019.
https://ecdpm.or g/application/files/2716/5546/8685/ECDPM-synthesis-report-political-ec
onomy-Africas-regional-spaghetti-bowl.pdf.
85 Chipanda, Blessing, and Jakkie Cilliers. The AfCFT A. ISS Africa, January 14, 2025.
https://futures.issafrica.or g/thematic/08-afcfta/.
Chiukira, Levious. The Ef fectiveness of AfCFT A Rules of Origin as a Build-up from Dif ferent
Existing RECs in Africa. ON POLICY Africa, December 19, 2022.
https://onpolicy .or g/the-ef fectiveness-of-afcfta-rules-of-origin-as-a-build-up-from-dif fere
nt-existing-recs-in-africa/.
Corporate Finance Institute. Non-T arif f Barriers. Corporate Finance Institute. Accessed
January 7, 2025.
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/non-tarif f-barriers/.
Dabrowski, Marek, and Yana Myachenkova. Free Trade in Africa: An Important Goal but Not
Easy to Achieve. Bruegel, April 13, 2018.
https://www .bruegel.or g/blog-post/free-trade-africa-important-goal-not-easy-achieve.
Delchat, Corinne, and Leandro Medina. What Is the Informal Economy? International
Monetary Fund(IMF), December 2020.
https://www .imf.or g/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/12/what-is-the-informal-economy
-basics.
Desiderio Consultants Ltd. African States Cautious Approach to AfCFT A Implementation
Could Lead to Longer Time to Realize Its Objectives. Desiderio Consultants Ltd., June
8, 2024.
https://www .ddcustomslaw .com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=888%
3Aafrican-states-cautious-approach-to-afcfta-implementation-could-lead-to-longer -time-t
o-realize-its-objectives&catid=1%3Aultime&Itemid=50&lang=en.
Erasmus, Gerhard. Comparing the Abuja Treaty and the AfCFT A Agreement. Tralac (blog),
February 29, 2024.
https://www .tralac.or g/blog/article/16331-comparing-the-abuja-treaty-and-the-afcfta-agre
ement.html.
Erasmus, Gerhard. Regional Economic Communities and the AfCFT A Investment Protocol.
Tralac (blog), April 16, 2021.
https://www .tralac.or g/blog/article/15173-regional-economic-communities-and-the-afcfta
-investment-protocol.html.
86 Ezekiel, Yvonne, and Fehintoluwa Ajayi. From Vision to Reality: Highlighting the Challenges
of AfCFT A. Mondaq, October 11, 2023.
https://www .mondaq.com/nigeria/international-trade-investment/1375774/from-vision-to-
reality-highlighting-the-challenges-of-afcfta.
Fofack, Hippolyte. A Competitive Africa. International Monetary Fund(IMF), December 2021.
https://www .imf.or g/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2018/12/afcfta-economic-integration-in
-africa-fofack.
Global Initiative Against Transnational Or ganized Crime. Formalization of Informal Trade in
Africa - Trends, Experiences and Socio-Economic Impacts. Global Initiative Against
Transnational Or ganized Crime, April 1, 2017.
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/formalization-of-informal-trade-in-africa-trends-exper
iences-and-socio-economic-impacts/.
Grif fin, Jennifer J, Kalyan Bhaskar , and Verena Radulovic. Challenges and Opportunities of
Partnering with the Informal Sector . Brookings, June 20, 2024.
https://www .brookings.edu/articles/challenges-and-opportunities-of-partnering-with-the-i
nformal-sector/.
Hirsch, Alan. African Countries Are Stuck on the Free Movement of People. How to Break the
Logjam. The Conversation, January 16, 2022.
https://theconversation.com/african-countries-are-stuck-on-the-free-movement-of-people-
how-to-break-the-logjam-174720.
Igbayiloye, Oluwatosin Busayo, Hameenat Bukola Ojibara, and Anthonia Omosefe Ugowe.
Legal Response to Human Rights Challenges of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria.
Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 6 (May 30,
2016): 10619. https://www .ajol.info/index.php/naujilj/article/view/136270.
Ikome, Francis, and Christopher Otieno Omolo. Free Movement of Persons, Informal Trade and
the African Continental Free Trade Area. United Nations ILibrary , March 26, 2024.
https://doi.or g/10.18356/9789292687908c007.
International Labour Or ganisation(ILO). Identifying Barriers to Formalization. International
Labour Or ganisation(ILO), April 2021.
https://www .ilo.or g/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@africa/@ro-abidjan/@ilo-
pretoria/documents/publication/wcms_836484.pdf.
87 International Or ganization for Migration. IOM Institutional Strategy on Legal Identity . IOM
UN Migration. International Or ganization for Migration, 2021.
https://publications.iom.int/books/iom-institutional-strategy-legal-identity .
Karkare, Poorva, Bruce Byiers, Philomena Apiko, and Mounirou Kane. Ecdpm s Making
Policies Work a System, Not an Error: Informal Cross-Border Trade in West Africa.
European Centre for Development Policy Management(ECDPM), June 2021.
https://ecdpm.or g/application/files/1616/5546/8572/System-Not-Error -Informal-Cross-Bo
rder -T rade-W est-Africa-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper -300-2021.pdf.
Kenton, Will. Balance of Trade (BOT). Investopedia, June 27, 2024.
https://www .investopedia.com/terms/b/bot.asp.
Koroma, Suf fyan, Joan Nimarkoh, Ny You, Victor Ogalo, and Boniface Owino. Formalization
of Informal Trade in Africa Trends, Experiences and Socio-Economic Impacts. Global
Initiative against Transnational Or ganized Crime (GI-T OC), January 2018.
https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/F AO-Formalization-of-informal-t
rade-in-Africa.pdf.
Lawal, Shola. Can Africa s New Free Trade Treaty Boost Business on the Continent? Al
Jazeera, February 16, 2024.
https://www .aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/afcfta-can-africas-new-trade-treaty-boost-bus
iness-on-the-continent.
Lewis, Nell. Intra-Africa Trade Could Double in next Five Years, Says Secretary General of
African Continental Free Trade Area. Cable News Network (CNN), October 7, 2024.
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/07/africa/afcfta-secretary-general-mene-interview-spc/in
dex.html.
Mkandawire, Thandika. On Tax Ef forts and Colonial Heritage in Africa. Journal of
Development Studies 46, no. 10 (January 10, 201 1): 164769.
https://doi.or g/10.1080/00220388.2010.500660.
Mlilo, Silindile Nanzile, Keamou Marcel Soropogui, Teniola Toluwani Tayo, Mohamed Ibrahim
Hafez, Mohammed Foboi, Thomas Kankam Adjei, and Jane Dorothy Anika. Opening
up Africa for Africans : A Proposal in Support of the Protocol for the Free Movement of
Persons. European University Institute, no. 17 (2023): 18.
https://doi.or g/10.2870/81003.
88 Moyo, Inocent. The African Continental Free Trade Area and Informal Cross Border Trade.
London School of Economics and Political Science(LSE) (blog), September 21, 2023.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/09/21/the-african-continental-free-trade-area-and-i
nformal-cross-border -trade/.
Mugisa, Evarist. Review National Policy Developments in the Tar geted Countries Related to
the Formalisation of the Informal Economy . Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), 2021.
https://www .comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Final-Report-Review-of-Informal-S
ector -in-Selected-Countries.pdf.
Ndlovu, Thapelo, Melusi Matsenjwa, Jimmy Kainja, Dianne Hubbard, Levy Syanseke, and
Helen Sithole. Digital Rights Southern Africa . Edited by Reyhana Masters and Lis
Jordan. African Internet Rights Alliance (AIRA). Johannesbur g, South Africa:
Association for Progressive Communications(APC), April 2024.
https://africaninternetrights.or g/sites/default/files/Digital%20Rights%20Southern%20Afr
ica_ED3-2.pdf.
Or ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD). T ackling Vulnerability in
the Informal Economy . OECD. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019.
https://www .ilo.or g/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@tr
avail/documents/publication/wcms_71 1804.pdf.
Otoo, Kwabena Nyarko. Africa s Economic Trade-Of f. IPS Journal, October 18, 2021.
https://www .ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/african-continental-free-trade-ar
ea-5496/.
Pant, Manoj. The Costs and Benefits to South Africa of Joining the SADC EP A. Uk
Department for International Development(DFID), December 2009.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov .uk/media/57a08b8440f0b652dd000d12/Pant_EN_01
1209_DFID.pdf.
Pasara, Michael Takudzwa. An Overview of the Obstacles to the African Economic Integration
Process in View of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Africa Review 12, no. 1
(November 5, 2019): 117. https://doi.or g/10.1080/09744053.2019.1685336.
PSC Report. AfCFT A: Potentially Costly at First, but Promising Great Rewards. ISS Africa,
May 22, 2024.
89 https://issafrica.or g/pscreport/psc-insights/afcfta-potentially-costly-at-first-but-promising-
great-rewards.
Radclif fe, Brent. The Basics of Tarif fs and Trade Barriers. Edited by Robert C. Kelly and
Yarilet Perez. Investopedia, June 26, 2024.
https://www .investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/tarif f-trade-barrier -basics.asp.
Salazar -Xirinachs, Jos Manuel, and Assane Diop. The Informal Economy in Africa: Promoting
Transition to Formality: Challenges and Strategies . Geneva: International Labour
Of fice, 2009.
https://www .ilo.or g/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_policy/do
cuments/publication/wcms_127814.pdf.
Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA). Understanding Human Mobility in
Africa / the Future of RECs and Human Mobility in the African Union. Scalabrini
Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA), 2022.
https://www .sihma.or g.za/online-resources/understanding-human-mobility-in-africa-the-f
uture-of-recs-and-human-mobility-in-the-african-union.
Shikwati, James. AfCFT A: A Beacon of Hope or a Failed Project? Friedrich Naumann
Foundation, May 2, 2024.
https://www .freiheit.or g/sub-saharan-africa/beacon-hope-or -failed-project.
Tayo, Teniola. W ill Africa s Free Trade Area Increase Inequalities? London School of
Economics and Political Science(LSE) (blog), June 18, 2021.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/06/18/will-african-continental-free-trade-area-afcf
ta-increase-inequalities-issues/.
Tayo, Teniola T. The AfCFT A Can Help Address African Inequalities. African Policy
Research Institute(APRI), September 8, 2023.
https://afripoli.or g/the-afcfta-can-help-address-african-inequalities.
The Economist. The Noodle Bowl. The Economist, September 3, 2009.
https://www .economist.com/asia/2009/09/03/the-noodle-bowl.
Tieku, Thomas Kwasi, and Afua Boatemaa Yakohene. Analyzing the African Continental Free
Trade Area (the AfCFT A) from an Informality Perspective: A Beautiful House in the
Wrong Neighborhood. Global Studies Quarterly 3, no. 3 (July 1, 2023).
https://doi.or g/10.1093/isagsq/ksad043.
90 Torkington, Simon. What Is the Informal Economy and How Many People Work in It? World
Economic Forum, June 4, 2024.
https://www .weforum.or g/stories/2024/06/what-is-the-informal-economy/.
Tralac. Status of AfCFT A Ratification. Tralac, August 13, 2024.
https://www .tralac.or g/resources/infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html.
United Nations Trade and Development(UNCT AD). Non-T arif f Barriers: Monitoring,
Reporting and Eliminating Mechanisms. United Nations Trade and
Development(UNCT AD). Accessed January 5, 2025.
https://unctad.or g/topic/trade-analysis/non-tarif f-measures/NTMs-policy-support/monitor
ing-and-reporting.
Viljoen, William. The Intra-Africa Non-T arif f Barrier Dilemma - the Challenges Facing the
AfCFT A Approach. Tralac, March 2019.
https://www .tralac.or g/documents/events/tralac/2739-tralac-brief-the-intra-africa-ntb-dile
mma-the-challenges-facing-the-afcfta-approach-march-2019/file.html.
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Or ganising(WIEGO). Rethinking
Formalization. WIEGO, July 30, 2024.
https://www .wiego.or g/informal-economy/articles/rethinking-formalization/.
Zongwe, Dunia P. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFT A): The Law , the
Economics, and the Research - GlobaLex. New York University , February 2024.
https://www .nyulawglobal.or g/globalex/AfCFT A.html.
91