Here’s the weird thing about the Bolshevik Revolution which overthrew the Russian provisional government in November 1917: really only they could do what they did, but also, in theory anyone could do what they did. Is that a paradox? Welcome explorers. I’m William C. Fox. Today we’re going to be exploring Russia, starting in the year 1917. And we’re going to be talking about the Bolsheviks, a centralized revolutionary socialist party that took power against the odds. The Russian Revolution as we know it today had two parts, one in March of 1917 when the Tsar fell, ending Russia's monarchy, and another in November of 1917, during which the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, took power. The 7 months in between are defined by violence and indecisiveness, a formula for chaos. The following few years could also be defined by violence, really the next two decades, no more than two decades- really this whole period of Russian History is so interesting, but intense. And let’s get something out of the way, right away. Look at the subtitle of this video. "Underdogs of History", now back to me. This video is not an endorsement of Bolshevism, the Red Terror, Leninist purges- whatever. This is part of a new series I’m starting on this channel. For this new series, the “underdog” moniker is there because I’m covering historical groups and figures that had the deck stacked against them. “Underdog” in this case means, “not supposed to win”. Pop culture is full of underdogs with endearing qualities; content about them is a positive celebration. We’re not gonna hoist the Bolsheviks up on our shoulders here and send ‘em to DisneyWorld. Don’t mistake my attempt at a clickable series title for anything more than that. *Should we be even more open with them? Yeah, let’s do it. Part of my channel relaunch involves covering content that I’ve procrastinated on. In the case of the Russian Revolution, I found the subject so intimidating that my last upload, a so-called “part one” was uploaded four years ago. Four. One thousand five hundred days of collecting books, trying to convince guests to my apartment that I have all those books because I’m working on something, waiting for the perfect moment. Well friends, there is no perfect moment. Sometimes you just gotta put words on the page, and trust your audience to give constructive feedback. We learn together, you and I. On that note, if and only if you can, consider supporting this history channel by chipping in at patreon.com slash williamcfox. Times are tough, take care of yourself. But if you’re able to help, you can move this little passion project one step closer to sustainability. Let’s go. Russia prior to 1917 was ruled by a Tsar. Well, in 1917, the Russian Tsar Nicholas II abdicated, left the throne, this powerful institution ended with the stroke of a pen. How did it happen? Russia was taking heavy losses in World War 1, and Russian troops were ill-equipped, desertion was common. There were three major problems: 1. The military was not ready for a long-term war of attrition- a war of prolonged trench warfare. Supply shortages affected the front lines as well as the fatherland. 2. The army was mostly peasants and the officers mostly members of nobility. As the death toll rose on the Eastern front and hunger set in back home, morale plummeted. The government to which soldiers dedicated their lives was submitting them to death without equipment or rations. 3. Tsar Nicholas may have liked the military, but he was no tactician. Even worse, he was a fatalist. When he took personal control of military command on September 5th 1915, he believed that god would guide him. However, the reality was that the incompetent Tsar had now directly associated his dynasty with the disasters of the great war; every failing on the front, every empty stomach back home would be personally linked with him. And there were plenty of empty stomachs back home. The situation in Russian cities would prove catastrophic. People were hungry, first and foremost. As defeats mounted on the Western Front, civil unrest and strikes became regular occurrences. It started on March 8th, International Women’s Day with demands that bread rationing be ended. By evening, the women were joined by men as roughly 100,000 demonstrators took to the streets. The next day the group swelled to 150,000. 200,000 the next. Violence broke out as calls for bread became shouts for the end of the Tsar and the War. Tsar Nicholas simply telegrammed from afar that the protests be put down. But things were much further along than he perceived. Every protester shot by police incited the crowds more. Revolution was at hand. The critical piece of the puzzle here is that police and soldiers began to disobey orders to kill civilians. Some even joined in with the revolutionary streets. Politicians in Petrograd began making arrangements for a democratic election and a provisional government. The only thing remaining was the Tsar himself. On the 15th of March 1917, on a train 250 miles from the source of the unrest, the Tsar received unanimous advice from those around him to abdicate the throne. He did. The first half of Russia’s Revolution was over. Here's the first obstacle for the Bolsheviks. Sure, party members were around during this February Revolution, but the Bolsheviks were just one of a staggering number of parties and groups vying for influence. And the first groups to occupy power after the Tsar weren't much like the Bolsheviks. As we'll see, a combination of aristocrats and moderate socialists ran Russia's government. This February revolution wasn't about the Bolsheviks, and it's outcomes weren't immediately favorable to them. They would have to make it about them, make it favorable. Summon the Zeitgeist and make it dance. The Bolsheviks were the underdogs because there was a laundry list of people and organizations that stood against them in 1917. Look at 10 Days That Shook the World, a partisan yet interesting primary source on some of the events from 1917. The author starts with a long list of many of the Russian factions: cadets, monarchists, populist socialists,the Russian social democratic labour party, Mensheviks, menshevik internationalists, united social Democrats internationalists, yedinstvo, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Left Socialist Revolutionaries (11). That’s not even to mention the Russian provisional government, right-wing elements of the military, the nations of Western Europe happy to meddle in Russia, but concerned with a potential Bolshevik government. How about the great mass of Russians living outside big cities, unaware of revolutionary theories, and disinterested in Petrograd or Moscow machinations? To see how the Bolsheviks navigated all this, we have to start with the governing arrangement in the wake of the Tsar’s abdication. After the abdication of Nicholas II, there were two main factions in petrograd. First, there was a mixture of working people and soldiers formed into councils called Soviets, out of which came a main Soviet- the Russian word Soviet translates to council, you'll often see it translated contextually to "workers council". These councils and the main Soviet claimed to be the continuing voice of the Revolutionary people. Their demands and decrees, especially at the start, were aspirational demands, decrees, virtue signalling, if I can be spared condemnation for using that modern term here. So there's a Soviet. Well, you might be asking, to whom did the Soviet make demands? That would be the second group wielding power in the period after the February revolution. The second group was a provisional government led by liberal aristocrats. The members were formerly part of the Tsar's Duma established in 1905, so elitism mixed with some governing experience. These two organs, the soviet and the provisional government developed into a dual power system in the wake of the revolution (2,46). Not to be stereotypical here, but the two sides of the power structure looked a lot like one would expect. The provisional government was a council of well-to-do ministers in suits; and many of the meetings of the two to three thousands Soviet members involved scattered debate of laymen and broken agendas. Though the Soviet had a guiding committee, they were often overruled in meetings by the general membership. The committee of the provisional government tried to handle basic government administration while leaving concerns of the peasantry aside, while the Soviet issued proclamations on behalf of the people while refusing to engage in general government administration. The relationship between the provisional government and the soviet was fraught. Who really had the right to run things? The Soviet made demands of the provisional government, which didn't have much choice but to accept. But the members of the Soviet also made compromises. In time, some of them joined the provisional government, ostensibly to invigorate it with the revolutionary spirit, but ultimately opening themselves up to arguments of selling out. As we'll see, this detail will prove decisive. The various types of people and interests in this dual power structure loosely, many argue poorly, reflected the diversity of the revolution itself. And split authority and fragmented interests inevitably led to paralysis and confusion. Now what were the Bolsheviks doing at this time? Well, some were participating in the Soviet. Many were coming out of exile, including, critically, Vladimir Lenin. On April 28th 1917, Vladimir Lenin arrived in St. Petersburg from Zurich, and gave a speech that set the tone for his ultimate takeover, and exemplified one of his preferred tactics, a modus operandi: take the most extreme position in a situation. Just take the opinion farthest in the corner you can. Just to give you an example of this from a few years earlier: when World War I broke out, many socialist revolutionaries became war-supporting patriots- most often, they at least supported the idea of Russia defending its borders from a German invasion. But Lenin, no. He opposed the Great War completely: Russia losing would be a good thing (2). This is actually what got him kicked out of Russia and into exile in Zurich in the first place. But everybody knew his name, didn't they? By occupying the wings of the conversation, one can often cut through the noise and draw attention. In a crowded rhetorical space like revolutionary Russia, this would prove necessary. So in his speech the day of his return in 1917, Lenin took the hardest position he could, one that distinguished him from other socialist revolutionaries participating in the new dual power structure; some of whom had even crossed from the Soviet into the provisional government. Lenin argued the provisional government in its compromises with the Soviets wasn’t simply insufficient; it was to be overthrown as soon as possible. Instead of working with the liberals of the provisional government, Bolsheviks should struggle against it. In a phrase, “all power to the Soviets”. Why delay in this ineffective purgatory? The dictatorship of the proletariat should start right away (3). In saying this, Lenin wasn’t only distinguishing himself from other socialists, but also some of his fellow Bolsheviks who were in qualified support of the Soviet’s work. He tells his fellow Bolsheviks, "when I was coming here with my comrades, I believed that they would take us from the station straight to jail. We do not lose hope that that will come to pass." In other words, 'fellow Bolsheviks, while you were selling out with the provisional government, I was such a rebel that I'm still hoping they arrest me any minute now’ (1,330). Again, Lenin just went as far as he could. Another famous future-Bolshevik, Leon Trotsky, at the time exiled in New York City, also spoke ill of the non-Bolsheviks in the Soviet, like the Mensheviks and the Soviet Revolutionaries. Because they watered down the spirit on the streets, they enabled the elites of the provisional council (1,317). As a party the Bolsheviks were defining the Soviet and the provisional government as a single entity to which they would be the alternative. The initial result of all this posturing was universal condemnation of the Bolsheviks from other socialists, and a near-split among the Bolsheviks themselves. But Lenin held on to his spot as Bolshevik leader, and the message actually started to cut through. Membership in the Bolshevik party grew in the following months; they enjoyed particular support among militant workers councils in factories, and soldiers who opposed the Great War's continuation (2,55). Because remember, world war I is still happening through all this, and Russian troops are still fighting and dying. So here's a question: Though Lenin’s position here, overthrow the provisional government, is a useful rhetorical tactic, did he really mean it? If offered the chance to take power, or at the very least, secure all power for the Soviet as he demanded, would he follow through? In July 1917, a chance to peek behind the curtain arrived. On the 16th, a combination of soldiers and factory workers took to the streets in Petrograd demanding, as the Bolsheviks had been for months, that all power leave the provisional government, and go to the soviets. Though the initial presence seemed peaceful, reports of armed demonstrators and gunshots came soon after. Some of them marched around Bolshevik HQ, many carried posters with Bolshevik slogans. But Bolsheviks weren't certain how to respond. A pamphlet from Bolshevik member Joseph Stalin, we all know that guy, well, he virtue signalled in his pamphlet that the movement should become... the expression of the workers and soldiers. Wow, how specific. The front page of the Bolshevik paper Pravda literally had a blank space where an opinion on the protests should have gone. A notable bolshevik summed up the attitude towards the demonstrators fairly succinctly, "We will see" (9, 355-60). This highlights another obstacle for the Bolsheviks: their own general disorder and disagreements. We'll see more of this soon. Important distinction here: these protesters during the July Days weren't necessarily calling on the Bolsheviks to take power, they were agreeing with the Bolshevik sentiment that all power should go to the soviets. Had someone snapped their finger and removed the power sharing between the provisional government and put the Soviet exclusively in charge, the Bolsheviks would not have been in control. After all, they were a minority party in the Soviet behind other factions, like the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. Further, the mix on the streets wasn't uniformly left wing; among the crowds could be found right-wing people, as well as general provocateurs. But we also know the Bolsheviks had bigger plans, and there is an account that Lenin considered whether now was the moment to strike and take over; it was undoubtedly a topic amongst the Bolsheviks (4,12). For a full description of what we know, see these secondary sources and pages, this secondary source which I don't have access to in the pandemic, and this primary source around which the debate falls (4,12;5,426;6;7) What ultimately happens here in July 1917 is that a group of militants show up where the Bolsheviks are and await instructions from Lenin himself on how to proceed. And Lenin basically sends them packing, he removed their raison de etre. That's french for 'reason for being' if you're pretentious enough to care. Lenin goes out, says a few platitudes about Soviet power, and walks off without giving the workers and soldiers any direction. He might have said, "hey now's the time. Let's do it. Palace this way, comrades." Nope. A few lines of platitudes and finished. One person I read called Lenin's speech here "subdued", another "ambiguous", another "brimstone free" (2;5;9). Whatever adjective we want to put there, it's not what we would expect from someone who's talked a big game for months about the need to overthrow the provisional government. By morning, the crowds had dispersed, the moment was gone. But things were different. Things had changed. Not for the provisional government and Soviet, but for the Bolsheviks, who were now on the defensive. Despite the fact that Lenin and the Bolsheviks hadn't acted to bring down the provisional government, they nonetheless received blame for the violence on the streets in the July Days. After all, the armed demonstrators were using *their slogans about bringing all power to the Soviet. This incident, plus a charge that Lenin was an agent of the German government, led to him being charged with high treason, and ran out of the country into exile once again. His popularity, and that of the Bolsheviks reduced - they'd missed their shot when they had it. Things were so low for the Bolsheviks in this moment, Lenin began to anticipate his own death, writing an associate that should "they" kill him to please publish his unfinished book on Marxism (1,348). Lenin remained in Finland through the rest of the summer, and deep into the fall. In Lenin's absence, events still developed back home. There was a new Prime Minister, Alexander Kerensky, a moderate socialist who had served the provisional government in several ministerial positions. He had also served as Vice Chairman of the Soviet (8); so his toes were dipped in both institutions. Prior to taking the role of prime minister, Kerensky had been responsible for military failings in July. A participant in the provisional government and a representative of the Russian failings in the great war? In short, he was the perfect foil for Lenin. The political situation was still a giant mess. Kerensky's biggest initial concern wasn't even the Bolsheviks. In September, he faced a crisis over a potential military coup d'etat from the right, now called the Kornilov Affair. The middle of Russian politics, which Kerensky basically represented, seemed vulnerable to threats from the right, which in turn drove those on the left to feel threatened, pushing them further left. While many were headed left, the clear occupants of the hard left were still the Bolsheviks. Specifically, the bolsheviks had virtue signalled openly and unwaveringly for full power to go to the soviets, something other parties like the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries came around to only later. Political sentiment began to concur with Lenin, even in his physical absence, that socialists like Kerensky participated in the power sharing arrangement to the peril of the broader revolution. Even with Lenin out of the country, the Bolsheviks won a majority in Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, sidelining moderate socialists (1,359). And then for the first time, an open discussion began of whether or not to overthrow the provisional government, and how. Opinion wasn't uniform. The Bolsheviks might have had more influence than ever in the Soviet, but their position was hardly invulnerable. What if they failed an overthrow and found themselves in a situation similar to July? Why tempt fate while things were headed their way? What if a bolshevik uprising resulted in a civil war? Lenin, tempestuous in exile, wrote agitations from afar. The members of his own party, Bolsheviks of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, weren't acting decidedly enough or fast enough. 'Don't wait for majority support in elections, don't worry about a potential civil war- it would actually be good, stop dawdling in the Soviet like a British parliamentarian, overthrow the provisional government now!' While Lenin agitated in writing, Trotsky was on the ground organizing. He was giving public speeches often in front of large crowds. In the Bolshevik-controlled soviet, he formed the Military Revolutionary Committee. Though its claimed purpose was to defend Petrograd against another potential right-wing coup, it quickly pivoted to planning its own armed uprising against the provisional government. When asked point blank by more moderate socialists in the Soviet if the bolsheviks were planning their own coup d'etat, Trotsky deflected: they weren't planning one, but if an uprising of the people happened to occur, led by the workers and soldiers of the streets, well the Bolsheviks would be ready (1,363). It seems like an important point to dwell on for just a moment. The provisional government was so weak here that the Bolsheviks could openly discuss overthrowing them, with a bit of a wink and a nod, and nothing happened. But, as the Bolsheviks themselves weren't unanimous on the need for an uprising, and their most stalwart advocate for one, Lenin, was in exile in Finland, it might have seemed the situation could continue with the current tension. But like any good drama, the clock was ticking. Something called the Congress of Soviets would open soon, November 7th. Don’t mix this up with *the Soviet. The Congress was not one Soviet, but many Soviets all together. It was to be a gathering of Soviets from throughout Russia in Petrograd, like Soviet-comic-con, soviet-con. Those assembled were slated to make big decisions on the future of Russia. And had the Congress gone off as planned, it looked like a majority would have voted to transfer power out of the hands of the provisional government and into the hands of the Soviets. Ostensibly, exactly what the bolsheviks had been asking for. However, this wouldn't have given the Bolsheviks full control. Once power was with the soviets, the bolsheviks would have to form a coalition with Mensheviks, SRs, and compromise in governance. This was a situation most Bolsheviks seemed ok with, but which Lenin aggressively wanted to avoid. He saw the dictatorship of the proletariat going through the Bolsheviks, and specifically, through him. He berated moderate bolsheviks that advocated the compromise course. The takeover needed to happen BEFORE the Congress met. Once assembled, the Congress would be informed of the bolshevik seizure of power, and give their endorsement of it. A fait accompli. That's Latin for "done deal" in case raison d'etre wasn't enough pretension for you. The Petrograd Bolsheviks, despite Lenin's constant barraging of them, organized his return to the city in mid October- in time to make fateful interventions. A week later, donning a wig as disguise, Lenin made his way through Petrograd to what was to be a historic meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee. In this meeting on October 23, the decision would be taken to stage an uprising against the provisional government. Only 12 of 21 Bolshevik central committee members were present at the rushed and hushed gathering; a vote of 10 to 2 ensured Lenin's strategy would be the one pursued in the near future (5,472). The Bolsheviks would use force to take power. On November 6th, the evening before the Congress of Soviets would meet, Bolshevik and Revolutionary committee forces began occupying infrastructure: train stations, government buildings, telegram offices, post, electricity station, bridges (1;2;4;5). And they were countered with … nothing. Prime Minister Kerensky left government ministers alone in the Winter Palace while he ran from Petrograd to find help in putting down the uprising. Also in the Winter Palace were a group of holed up and armed government loyalists. But on the streets? Basically quiet. Some people scurried home anticipating violence. Others went on with business as usual. Another revolution? Yeah ok. I'm off to a bar. Let me know who wins. The lack of resistance gave the Bolsheviks confidence, and bolstered Lenin's appeal that the time had been right. Instead of merely holding the infrastructure they had, their forces should make the final push to the palace. Their plan was to take it all by noon before the Congress of Soviets was in session, though there were many delays due to lack of organization. For example, some of the guns intended for the storming of the winter palace were completely non-functional, so new guns were acquired at the cost of several hours of identification and transportation. The eventual run on the Winter Palace that night was aided by harsh lack of morale inside. A great number of the original defenders had gotten drunk, gotten hungry, and simply left. When the "storming" began, only 300 defenders remained (5,487). The government ministers inside fumbled the organization of the defense, instead bickering amongst themselves, and sending out unanswered appeals for help. Around 2am, the assault was over. Defenders had gradually abandoned their posts, and the remaining government ministers were arrested. The Bolshevik takeover had been a success, a clumsy one, but that's all that was needed. They had Petrograd infrastructure. They had the winter palace. Meanwhile, the Congress of Soviets was coming into session late, close to 11pm. They started while the siege of the Winter Palace was still in motion. The Bolsheviks announced that the transfer of power from the provisional government to the Soviets had finally arrived, with a twist. Rather than transfer the governing power to the executive committee of the Soviet, it should go to a brand new council of "People's Commissars" of whom all would be Bolsheviks. It must have been shocking for the members of this super soviet to find out that they had traveled all the way to give all power to the soviets, only to find out it was already in the hands of the soviets - but also, that process would be really controlled by the bolsheviks. 'So, did we win? I'm very confused.' The Bolsheviks had finally put their cards on the table. All power to the Soviets had always meant all power to them, and now they meant to seize it. A famous protestation came from Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in the chamber, a notable Menshevik named Martov insisted the new council be a coalition between the Bolsheviks and other parties. To this, Trotsky gave his most quoted counterargument. Compromise was something done between two equal parties. Quote "To those who have left and to those who tell us to do this we say: 'you are miserable bankrupts, your role is played out. Go where you ought to go: into the dustbin of history!" One of the more fascinating debates surrounding this night in 1917 is the ease with which the Bolsheviks chopped off the head of the provisional government. Lenin was correct in his assessment that the provisional government was weak; in theory anyone with enough determined members could have conducted a similar takeover. Because of the low numbers of participants this night, some observers call this the Bolshevik coup, not the Bolshevik revolution. Adam Ulam, writing in the heart of the Cold War, said: “The Bolsheviks did not seize power in this year of revolution. They picked it up.” (Ulam, 314) But the plain response is that no other group did what the Bolsheviks did. No other group was spurred on by a leader like Lenin. As we learned, he was constantly kicking his fellow bolsheviks into action, not merely criticising opponents. And more important, even if we concede that this one evening shouldn't be described as a revolution, the events it set off, the violence, the upheaval most certainly should be. Lenin and the Bolsheviks kicked a struggling nation off the cliffedge into masochism, and it landed a totalitarian state under their control. We flirt with 'great man' history or assign too much agency when we say things like this, but everywhere you turn inside the Bolshevik organization is Lenin agitating and conspiring for his way, even to the detriment of the party. Several famous bolsheviks like Trotsky will later claim they were on board for taking power before the Congress of Soviets, but the evidence shows they at least wanted to wait until it was in session. It's a common thread woven through several times in our story. Lenin didn't really have the best hand, but when he pushed the party in his direction, when he pushed and got his way, others, with arguably just as much reason to think they held the majority or plurality opinion simply left the party, leaving Lenin as the default winner, the last man standing. When Bolsheviks made demands in the Congress, the Mensheviks and SRs could have stayed and insisted on a coalition. Decidedly though, when Trotsky told them to leave and resign themselves to the dustbin of history, they complied. They left. The bolsheviks then got their way by default. This nucleus around Lenin had basically everyone against it, even at times from within the bolshevik party. They got their way nonetheless. So now that I've leaned hard in that direction, let's correct course with some caveats. First, a caveat on Bolshevik popularity. The iconography, and of course the Soviet telling of the Bolshevik revolution would lead one to believe that the masses stormed the palace, a class awakening in one country, to inspire the workers in industrial economies, all on the road to an international revolution. The Bolsheviks had support, no doubt. But in their first test of support- December elections to the Constituent Assembly, a national election, they won only 168 seats out of 703, a decided minority to the Socialist Revolutionary Party (10,300). They won big within cities and the army on the western front, but they didn't have the national support one might expect considering they had ostensibly taken over the country on a wave of majority enthusiasm. The Bolsheviks disbanded the constituent assembly when they lost the elections, by the way. So second, a caveat on the extent of bolshevik power at this moment. While they struggled to even get control of the civil service in Petrograd, a city they had just taken over, they were surrounded by the entirety of the rest of Russia, which went about pursuing "all power to the Soviets" in their own way. In Moscow, where Bolsheviks had more influence, it simply required time and wrangling for the Bolsheviks to take control. But outside major cities, in small villages, "all power to the Soviets" often manifested in local Soviets taking control. In the edges of the Russian empire, like Ukraine, it was license for independent action, movement towards autonomy (5,505). Russia, I need not tell you, is a big place, and it's population at the turn of the century was 127 million, doubling major western European nations. And, for that large population, there was less cohesion. One does not simply take the palace in Petrograd and take control of the country. But this leads to another caveat: the 'nature' of Bolshevik power. As I mentioned earlier, it looks pretty clear, particularly with Lenin, that "all power to the Soviets" was a clever way of disguising, "all power to us bolsheviks. All power to Lenin". But after the immediate takeover in Petrograd, the effect looked to be the opposite. In the countryside, in other cities, in the corners of Russia's sphere, there was decentralization. Unions, factories, peasants, they're not taking cues from Lenin, they were bringing about something closer to local chaos than central control. In fact, it is the opinion of some, that the radical one-party one-strong-man Soviet state actually finds it footing in the Russian Civil War, where the rigid authority needed to run a military campaign, and the power structures that entails, came to color how the Bolsheviks governed once it was over- why people like Stalin wore trench coats and high boots for years after to demonstrate their authority. As Sheila Fitzpatrick points out, in 1927, only 1% of the current list of Bolshevik membership had joined before 1917. That means the other 99% came to Bolshevism not through the streets of the October Revolution, but through the battlefield of the Russian Civil War. Speaking of the Civil War, we should touch on that briefly now. The fact the Bolsheviks had no army was yet another reason why they were unlikely to hold power, yet they did. While the Bolsheviks negotiated peace with Germany, ending Russia's involvement in the Great War, officers of the Russian Army were refashioning forces in the south to oppose the new bolshevik rulers. A Mishmashed group of anticommunist forces, known today as the Whites, opposed the Bolshevik Red Army, built from the ground up and led by Trotsky. From 1918 to 1922, the Red Army went from zero to 5 million members (2,75). The Bolsheviks had defeated their primary opponents by 1920, and the war itself was completely wrapped up by 1921. The Bolsheviks were in complete control. Even among their own ranks, many Bolsheviks didn't believe they could take and hold power. Kamenev said they could take power, but couldn't hold it two weeks, to which Lenin later quipped, "after two weeks when we are still in power, you will say that we can't survive longer than two years" (5,484). The Soviet Union lasted until 1991. During its decades, it would export its brand of Marxist-Leninism around the world, defy invasion from Axis Powers in World War II, become only the second nation on earth to master the dark art of nuclear weaponry, launch the first artificial satellite into space, the first man into space, the first woman into space, develop, centralize, degrade, collapse. It all started with a clumsy takeover of the Winter Palace in 1917. Thanks for watching the first episode in this new series: Underdogs of History. Stories of historical people and groups with the deck stacked against them. Watch this video of mine if you want more of my content. Tweet at me, @WilliamCFox and tell me who I should cover in a future episode. Later y’all.