On June 30th 2013 19 firefighters died on the Yarnell Hill fire in central Arizona southwest of Prescott the Granite Mountain interagency hotshot crew from the Prescott Fire Department was working west of Yarnell when they were overrun by fire within the fire area the terrain varies from steep ridges to nearly flat valley bottoms with numerous rock outcroppings and boulder piles the dominant vegetation type sharo brush ranged in height from 1 to 10 feet and in some places was nearly impenetrable On June 16 2013 a fire behavior advisory discussed critically low fuel moistures and increased fuel loading the drought severity index showed the fire area as being in extreme drought On June 29 2013 one day before the entrapment above-average loading of cured grass and drought-stressed fuels combined to allow for faster moving fires with or without winds and for increased fire intensities and flame lengths the Yarnell Hill Fire area had not experienced wildland fire since 1966 the fire started late the afternoon of June 28 2013 when thunderstorms moved through the area and ignited multiple fires the fire which was under the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Arizona State Forestry Division was approximately 1/2 acre in a boulder field in steep terrain the state did not put firefighters on the hill that night due to safety concerns on the morning of the 29th the type 4 incident commander orders retardant from single-engine air tankers attempting to box in the fire between a two-track road on the east side and the ridge to the north the fire had grown to roughly 2 acres a helicopter transports seven firefighters to the fire perimeter early in the day to begin constructing handline the fire holds well into midday when it's 1,600 increasing winds elevate fire activity by early evening the fire jumps the two-track Road on the east flank and becomes a six acre fire during the evening the fire continues to grow weather conditions impede the use of aviation to deliver retardant when the fire reaches approximately 100 acres in size the incident command requests a type 2 incident management team there is concern that people's Valli and Yarnell may be threatened if it burns to the Northeast in the next 24 to 48 hours on Sunday June 30th a 700 briefing occurred at the Yarnell fire station with the incident command members of the incoming team and the Granite Mountain IHC superintendent the briefing covers potential tactics the previous night's spot weather forecast and radio frequencies they use Google Maps on an iPad to review the area the Boulder Springs Ranch is pointed out to all as an excellent safety zone they discuss strategies for the north side of the fire estimated to be 300 to 500 acres and for keeping fire out of Yarnell by improving old roads they lay out a strategy to establish an anchor on the south end they also agree that the Granite Mountain superintendent will take division alpha and that his assistant superintendent will run the crew division alphas assignment is to establish an anchor point at the heel of the fire using direct or indirect tactics as appropriate division alpha scouts ahead of the crew as they hike about 45 minutes along the two-track road to the Anchor Point just below a saddle from their division alpha Scouts out the west side of the ridge a short squad of a few crew members follows him working along the fires edge toward a cold part of the fire to establish the Anchor Point on the east side by your activity picks up a bit and the rest of the crew slowly burns off the two-track road keeping pace with the fire as incoming resources arrive they are directed to the Model Creek School in people's valley where the incident command post is being established the incident commanders provide another briefing around 9:30 the formal transfer of command occurs by radio at 10:20 to several resources are immediately assigned after the briefing to keep homes from burning in Model Creek and an evacuation notice for that area is issued around 10:45 during the same period the Anchor Point is completed by a squad of Granite Mountain on the west side of the ridge division alpha meets face to face with the Blue Ridge superintendent and assistant superintendent near the Anchor Point they discuss tactics problems with radios and placing a lookout near an old grader at the bottom of the slope the Blue Ridge supervisors leave the Anchor Point and deliver the Granite Mountain lookout at the grader at 12:39 the fire is pushing north towards structures in people's Valley and backing at granite mountains location Granite Mountain reaches a rock face and takes lunch around 13:30 after eating the crew works back reinforcing their line as they go making sure their anchor is solid will look out by the grader has trigger points established for the crew and for himself in case the fire changes direction the Granite Mountain captain lookout and others talk over the radio about thunderstorms coming in the captain mentions he might have seen a few lightning strikes in the distance at 1402 the National Weather Service calls the fire to advise them that a thunderstorm east of the fire could produce wind gusts of 35 to 45 miles per hour this is relayed to the fire line but the winds from the storm did not develop over the fire area at 1526 the National Weather Service calls to advise the fire that the thunderstorms have moved north-northeast of the fire and that an outflow boundary has formed this outflow boundary is moving toward the fire and could potentially produce north-northeast winds at 40 to 50 miles per hour this message is also related to the fire line Operations double-checks that division alpha also heard the second weather update the vision alpha acknowledges the weather update and mentions the winds are getting squirrely on the ridge but that everyone in the black and in a good spot between 1530 and 1545 the fire experiences a gradual wind shift from the Southwest to the west-northwest the fire becomes very active with some spotting by this time the two-mile flanking fire looks more like a head fire and is starting to move in a more southeasterly direction these wind shifts occurred ahead of the arrival of the outflow boundary this radar data was recorded as the storm outflow boundary arrives at the north end of the fire at 1618 around 1550 the Granite Mountain assistant superintendent calls the lookout to relay the weather update the lookout acknowledges looks around and notices the fire has started building and the wind is starting to shift he calls the assistant superintendent and says the fire has hit his trigger point and he's moving back to the old grader area the assistant superintendent replies calmly okay cool the Blue Ridge superintendent picks up the Granite Mountain lookout near the old grader and delivers him to the vehicles the Blue Ridge superintendent then goes for more drivers to get the rest of the vehicles moved on the way out for moving all of the vehicles the structure protection group supervisor contacts the Blue Ridge superintendent to ask if the dozer line is still an option to burn out from the answer is no division alpha hearing the transmission agrees and says the fire has reached the area where Granite Mountain screw carriers were a moment later division alpha says I want to pass on that we're going to make our way to our escape route Blue Ridge tries to clarify by asking you guys are in the black correct division alpha response yeah we're picking our way through the black and then mentions a road in the bottom and going out toward the ranch Blue Ridge thinks division alpha is talking about heading northeast through cold back to a ranch there he asks division alpha to confirm you're talking about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier in the bottom division alpha replies yes the road I saw you on with the UTV from this point on granite mountains motivation and path were unknown to all resources on the fire and we will never know their exact route the available information interviews times evidence of probable route and best probable routes suggest the following after 1604 the crew began moving from the flank of the fire where they had been working near the anchor point they traversed the two-track Road near the top of the ridge and proceeded south along the ridge until they reached a saddle as they traveled along the ridge they had full view of the fire when they reached the saddle they had a direct and clear view of the boulder Springs Ranch which appears to be very close as they start to drop down from the saddle their view of the fire was rapidly cut off until it disappeared completely the outflow boundary reached the southern perimeter of the fire at 16:30 it caused a drastic increase in wind speed and a shift in wind direction driving the fire south the primary fire spread Direction changed to the south fire intensities and resulting flame lengths doubled while rates of spread tripled the fire made a major run into the town of Yarnell the fire in the flat terrain east of the origin was affected by these changes in a dramatic way it moved from along the base of the main ridge and reached the bottom of a bowl one half mile south southeast of the origin from there the head split into two heads the southern had entered the unnamed drainage referred to as the middle bull the northern head continued burning along the base of the ridge Granite Mountain worked their way down the slope through the boulders and brush until the flaming front cut them off from their escape route to the ranch the second head of fire burning along the base of the slope rounded a knoll composed of granite boulders once past the knoll the fire accelerated as it entered the Bowl Granite Mountain was hiking down rate of spread is estimated at 10 to 12 MA per hour it is estimated that the time between the siting of the fire front from the deployment site to the time the fire reached the deployment site was less than two minutes Granite Mountain made several radio transmissions before deploying fire shelters you a sm2 instructs the very large airtanker veal at that is over the fire to orbit to the southeast until the ASM to locates Granite Mountain over the next four minutes ASM to makes seven attempts to reach Granite Mountain to determine their location but is unable to establish contact upon hearing of the deployment dispatch and resources on the fire immediately initiate a Medical Response Blue Ridge IHC and other fire fighters begin a ground search for granite mountain at 1716 Ranger 58 in Arizona Department of Public Safety helicopter assigned to the fire launches to assist in the search Ranger 58 spots the Granite Mountain shelters at 1810 and lands nearby an officer paramedic hikes to the deployment site and confirms that none of the firefighters survived this tragedy occurred when Granite Mountain IHC was travelling through an unburned area on a route towards a safety zone when a rapidly advancing fire of great intensity overtook them the fires extreme speed of 10 to 12 miles per hour eliminated the crews options of reaching the safety zone or returning up to the canyon rim this left the crew less than two minutes to improve a shelter deployment site by using chainsaws and burning out the crew was deploying their fire shelters close together in a small area when the fire overtook them the deployment site in the box canyon was not survivable because heavy brush caused direct flame contact and temperatures exceeded 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit as the fire swept through the site the team developed a few conclusions based on available information from personnel on the fire physical evidence cultural knowledge observations and subject matter expert sessions the Granite Mountain IHC was a fully qualified staffed and trained hotshot crew they were current with the required training and met work rest guidelines the Yarnell Hill area having not seen wildfire in over forty five years was primed to burn because of extreme drought decadent chaparral and above-average cured grass loadings although Yavapai County had a community wildfire protection plan many of the structures were not defendable by firefighters responding to the Yarnell Hill Fire the fire destroyed over 100 structures radio communications were challenging throughout the incident some radios were not programmed with appropriate tone guards crews identified the problem engaged in troubleshooting and developed workarounds so they could communicate using their radios radio traffic was heavy during critical times on the fire Fyers complexity increased in a very short time challenging all firefighting resources to keep pace with the rapidly expanding incident as complexity dramatically increased starting Saturday evening fire management went through multiple transitions from a type four through a type 1 incident in fewer than 20 hours the Granite Mountain crew had been watching the active fire burn away from their position all day but their observations did not lead them to anticipate the approaching outflow boundary or the accompanying significant fire behavioral changes these changes including a doubling of fire intensity and flame lengths a 90-degree directional change and dramatically accelerated rate of spread the Granite Mountain IHC left the lunch spot and traveled southeast on the two-track Road near the ridge top then they descended from the two-track road and took the most direct route towards Boulder Springs Ranch the team believes the crew was attempting to reposition so they could re-engage Granite Mountain IHC did not perceive excessive risk in repositioning to Boulder Springs Ranch there is no indication that they doubted the black was a valid safety zone or that they moved to the boulder Springs Ranch because they feared for their safety if they stayed in the black in retrospect the importance of the 1526 weather update is clear however the update appears to have carried the less relevance in the crews decision-making process perhaps due to the wind shift starting at about 1550 that preceded the outflow boundary or because of the time it took the outflow boundary to reach the south end of the fire at 16:30 it is possible they may have interpreted the early wind shift as the anticipated wind event an air attack and/or an aerial supervision module provided aerial supervision coverage throughout the day including at the time of the accident during some limited times aircraft were not available due do it first weather conditions and refueling needs at the time of the deployment the dc-10 air tanker was on station over the fire waiting to drop on the location of the deployment site once it was found although much communication occurred among crews throughout the day few people understood granite mountains intentions movements and location once they left the black the deep sense of loss here is unimaginable the investigation team and the wildland fire community stands together with the families of the Granite Mountain interagency hotshots grieving heartbroken devastated our brothers sons dads they're gone the current generation of firefighters has never experienced the tragedy such as Yarnell Hill and the loss of the Granite Mountain crew on that last day in June the families and firefighters alike want answers to understand to make sense of this terrible outcome there is a gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for Granite Mountain IHC no crew members from the deployment site survived we will never know specifically why the crew took the actions they did nor the thought processes they employed many discussion points go unanswered in the report their situational awareness decision-making route of travel and motivation family members firefighters and many others will continue to pour over the circumstances of this tragedy for years to come much thought and analysis will go into reviewing this accident to understand to learn and to make sense of how and why this account the loss of 19 firefighters our brothers is not complete and it never will be