all right good evening thank you for watching this virtual luxury event hosted by the institute of world politics for those of you are new iwp is a graduate school of national security and international affairs we have five master's degree programs 18 certificates of study and a new doctoral program we also offer the opportunity to take a single course without having to pay an entire semester's worth of tuition costs one can also audit such a course at a much less cost if you're interested in learning more about us please visit iwp.edu tonight's event is sponsored by the institute of world politics iafv student chapter i would like to thank dr richard schultz for joining us this evening to discuss his book transforming u.s intelligence for irregular war so without further ado i will hand it over to tonight's moderator professor aaron danis where is yours and uh welcome to dr schultz uh welcome to iwp just in case anybody's wondering uh my background is the inside of marlette mansion at lovely iwp and if you the students you see back there are not live students violating um the six foot rule um they are this is just a background screen so but it does give it give you an opportunity to see the inside of our lovely um institute um so tonight i'm introducing dr richard schultz who wrote the the book in uh that's our topic tonight he is the lee dirks professor of international politics and the director of international security studies at the fletcher school of law and diplomacy at tufts university he's the author of several books including the marine stake and bar the four-year fight against al qaeda and along with andrea dew insurgents terrorists and militias the warriors of contemporary combat one of my favorite books which i use for my violent non-state actors course so thanks for that one dick i couldn't couldn't do it without your book um the book for tonight is based on his original study for the joint special operations university called military innovation and war it takes a learning organization case study of task force 714 he took that um short monograph and has expanded it um to this much longer book he's well connected uh with the u.s special operations community and just as a point of advertisement as i've already mentioned i've used his books in my my courses previously and currently and uh welcome to iwp dick and i'll turn it over to you to give some background on your on your book and anything you want to say about it uh before we go into the discussion well first of all aaron thank you for that warm introduction i really appreciate it and um it uh it's good to be um to do this i've had a long uh long-standing connection with the institute including um with um with frank marlowe who i've known since um the uh the 1990s when he was a student at the fletcher school um the the book um really is um is an outgrowth of this long um long-standing interest and connection i've had with the special operations community really going back into the 90s and and the early 90s when when socom was first stood up and i became intrigued with the idea of 714 when i was traveling around morocco with my wife and son we were driving the whole country and and i went when i wasn't driving i was reading um because you know you can get you can only see so much of a certain landscape and and you can get bored with it i was reading stan mccrystal's memoir um and my share of the task and um and and so i i got interested in in this story of how uh 714 transformed itself because you know 714 comes out of the tier 1 forces it's the jsoc forces and um and they're best in the world uh and um i mean with it with all that goes with that but when they got to iraq they were given this mission uh of getting inside of and and destroying al-qaeda's secret networks and what they found was that no matter how hard they worked at it they they couldn't make a dent in the organization is what mcchrystal said when i interviewed you know we couldn't even make a dent in it so what that meant was that they had to transform themselves in the midst of war to be able to deal with an enemy that they had never envisioned fighting and um and over a two-year period they they did transform themselves and they did it by um changing the whole way they were organized into a joint interagency task force which was really a joint interagency intelligence task force um and to change um how they uh collected and used um intelligence that they were gathering so the way to understand the this transformation is pretty simple in in august of 2004 working as hard as they could the the best in the world could carry out maybe 30 missions in a month against al qaeda elements of their different networks two years later in august of 2006 they carried out 300 missions now they didn't add you know 15 the number of teams didn't become 15 times bigger so the the question you know i had was how they do it you know and um and why were they able to do it and so that that really um led me to um to uh approach this from the point of view of organizational innovation and transformation you know and i built this framework that i call the characteristics of learning organizations what happens you know what organizations when they face a crisis in practice and what i mean by that is that that they may be very good at what they do they may be even the best at what they do but for reasons that that that they have to figure out they're no longer able to to accomplish their mission or or whatever their their they do and so i spent a lot of time reading um business and management literature from the 90s and the early 2000s that they deal with the issue of just this what happens when an organization faces a complex problem and they can't solve it and so that led me to develop this framework called characteristics of learning organization and i used it to to study how 714 transformed this and how intelligence transformed you know to deal with a new context war um and and more not against the state but against non-state actor and war against a non-state actor that um wasn't constructed and built like 20th century armed groups it was a 21st century uh new iteration that was networked and so that's the story of the book of how 714 was able to do that and really eviscerate uh al-qaeda's um secret networks over a period of about three years so i'll you know i'll stop there well it's great that um you know you looked at it from the perspective you that you did and another key piece to this and for for those who are out there i did a review of um dick's book for intelligence and national security journal i mentioned this in the in the review it was posted recently on their website um that you know task force 714 had an exceptional batch of leaders as well um in addition to general mcchrystal um it's kind of a who's who of counter terrorism in the years following um bill mcraven from from the bin laden raid um colonel mike flynn would later become director of dia um ben cicolic who would eventually become the head of dsop at nctc and scott miller who would go on um to run this very same unit so um how much role did leadership play in this as well you know not just mcchrystal but having good subordinates for him no it was huge you know and and it included joe votel yes you know as well yeah no and and you know i mean i talked to all of them except scotty miller because i it was hard to get to him because he was otherwise engaged the role of leadership here is is really important but it's a new kind of leadership you know it it's not leadership that that you know that it's the boss that makes all the decisions and drives the organization um no mcchrystal's approach which really became um admiral mcraven's approach and joe votel's approach and tony thomas's approach yes yeah yeah i mean it was really um changing the way that um that they had been schooled to lead which was you know to to be the force that made decisions that drove the organization they decentralized that and they empowered those at the bottom not only did they decentralize it but they flipped it on its head from operations heavy first to intel first to drive the operations as you point out in the book they end up with 80 intelligence 20 operations and those opera continued operations are focused on collecting more intelligence and uh that that begets the whole f3 ead construct which is is well known now but didn't exist prior to this really except on a very small level um and and that's what allowed them to take what was essentially a counter terrorism uh technique and apply it to a larger fight could you talk about that a little bit because that's kind of an interesting juxtaposition that they're doing as you call the industrial-sized counter terrorism yeah feed an insurgency yeah well and you know that was a big part of their transfer transformation because they were built um you know through the 90s to be an organization that would be used occasionally as we know it was never used at all but but it was for you know a handful maybe a handful of operations a year or maybe only a couple a year you know now they they have to be operating every day uh and and at a rate that was unprecedented so they had to leverage other special operations units other than their own manpower for this the ranger regiment some of the white special forces isn't that what they had to do absolutely you know so for instance um the rangers which i i don't talk about in in in the book because i'm focused on al qaeda but the rangers were focused on you know some of the shia groups you know they were doing the same thing to the shia groups um that seven the other parts of 714 were doing to al qaeda i just didn't cover that that part in in the book i i want to say also that um you know you talked about this flip from 80 operations 20 intelligence to the the opposite and and the person who really um deserves a lot of credit for that is is general flynn then then then colonel flynn you know who who who really uh impressed on this on general mcchrystal then they had to figure out okay how do we do that yeah and um it's it's funny because they do that and you know it becomes a self-sustaining chain reaction and you know my focus in my my review was on the intelligence portion of this obviously for the journal that it was written for and um you did a great job at going into and talking about how they took this really um tactical intelligence pocket litter um you know busting cell phones things like that and turned it into a way in very short order to stay in front of the decision cycle of the insurgency itself you know the key is is to take out a cell and then get that information be able to take out the next cell before they can tell the first cell was actually was actually captured and that's a hard thing to do yeah well and and to you know to be able literally to construct what a cell looks like so you know you may get one person in it but then all that stuff that you're collecting if you if you curate it and you condition it uh properly you can put it into a database that then you can start to use tools to search for things you don't even know about connections you don't even know about but because of the feeding the the the information you collected on on this from this guy into it you start to see that architecture yeah and and that and that certainly allows you to operate much more quickly um even though working at that pace the insurgency was so large um it took them you know essentially years to do it and that that was through the surge the surge period where additional conventional forces were brought in and uh it you know it took a long time it just took a long time because the insurgency was so large plus the huge influx of foreign fighters from outside upwards of 30 000 foreign fighters um you know well and to go to your point aaron that you asked me um this the 714 effort would have not been successful without it being integrated into the counter insurgency effort and so those two things went hand in hand um in the because um all all in the past insurgencies have always had a secret infrastructure so in in the vietnam war i'll go back to the vietnam war the viet cong had a secret infrastructure the the and and there was an organization that was created to get at that infrastructure you know which was very controversial that was phoenix but but but but phoenix you know was even though it was controversial it was it was correct from the point of view of how do you attack an insurgency counter insurgency can do a lot it can clear it can hold areas but counterinsurgent forces cannot do counter infrastructure or counter yeah what i call counter infrastructure there you you have to have a special capability 714 was that special capability yeah and people don't realize i think at least folks who are looking at it from the outside that you know the special operations community they say it themselves and the commander socom says it every year in his annual report to congress you know that they rely on the big military for a lot of a lot of things that they can't do themselves for a lot of the um the logistics the the the lift a lot of the things that um you know big big military big army big big air force takes for granted you know the special operations forces need that assistance so um and you bring that out in your in your book i think is really good yeah no it was you know it it had they had to be combined and but big army had to stop fighting uh in in the way that they would fight with the way they fought in the march up and changed to fighting against an insurgency that that caused that was a big change too and you know look it took uh the regular army to 2007 to make that change i mean that was petraeus that was the petraeus uh phenomenon the marines did it a year earlier in anwar um how about um working with allied countries you mentioned um you know in addition to socom's own experience working in places like colombia and bosnia other places at a smaller level you know they they learn some lessons but you mentioned in particular they go to the israelis talk a little bit about about how the israelis helped uh the us in this regard well the israelis came to understand that that they had to essentially become uh their their their counterterrorism forces had to be intelligence driven and and the way that i found this out is is really the the story of how in research you you stumble on things and and and you didn't know you were going to stumble on so i was um in israel and i was giving a talk on on one seven one four before the book i i had developed a whole presentation on it for for socom which i gave when i deployed with teams the military training and education teams so i i was in israel i was teaching at one of the universities and i go over to tel aviv they have a security studies institute headed by a very famous uh israeli two star um who who had an intelligence background amos yadlin and i'm giving the presentation and i'm talking about mcchrystal in 714 and he says this very strange thing to me he goes oh yeah stan mccrystal starting in 2004 he came to israel because it's the only place in the region you can find a comfortable bed to sleep in so i thought that's rather strange but i didn't really get it about a a year later i'm reading this very interesting book um by uh called rise and kill first it's a story of israeli targeted killing and it's going through the you know the the goat back before israel was a state and i'm going through the 50s you know and then i get to the late 90s and as i'm reading it i'm reading and i'm thinking this sounds an awful lot like some of the techniques that seven one and four did so no this never came up in any interviews so i i go back to israel and i go to see amos yadlin then i see the the former chief of the idf and then i see some some other people in in shin bet and and in in mossad and i i get this whole story that that not only did 714 learn from them but they learned a great deal from them and they they they mined the israeli experience so that was really pretty interesting and i stumbled on it you know a weird remark yeah reading a book putting two to two together and then being able to go back to israel and and talk to yadlin especially who was the action officer for all 714 uh learning well it's uh it's an interesting story and to mine an organism you know a country that has a lot of ct experience that goes back you know even farther than a lot of what the us has for experience um seemed like seems like a logical thing to do in hindsight but you know a lot of people might not think of it in the in the moment you know to miss that opportunity so i think that's that's fantastic um one last topic and i want to go to questions i'm going to turn over to dan uh for the for the questions i'm looking at the q a here and we're already getting um a few things in here um the last thing is about a year ago we had um just newly retired lieutenant general mike nagata come in and speak at iwp um he came in under mcchrystal he's uh um you know one of the crystal crew and uh when he worked at nctc and his last assignment um he mentioned a lot that the f3 ead construct was is outstanding we are the united states is now probably the country in the world that's that's best at that kind of targeting cycle and taking out terrorist networks um whether it's industrial scale or less than that um his concern is is keeping terrorists off the battlefield that you know as fast as we take them off kinetically or you know via arrest or detention they seem to be replaced so his concern in his last three years of his career and what he talked about when he came to iwp was non-kinetic terrorism looking at things like winning the internet uh winning the battle for narratives defeating terror finance defeating terrorist travel their ability to move foreign fighters you know you know from from birmingham england into a crop into turkey across into iraq all of these kind of non-kinetic issues um and there's more um in your experience and this is just you can just keep it broad you know in your time you know researching your book did that ever come up at all that okay we need to do something about drying up the supply of bad guys instead of just taking them out um did any of that ever come up in any of your research no it it it did um although um not a lot i mean so it's an interesting uh uh thing that uh the the it was not a focus of 714. um now what's interesting is that if we think about where we are today we we we've put a pretty big dent in in in in isis and in in in al qaeda they're still around they're dispersed you know they're in a lot of different places yeah and and and so the these issues um are getting some traction in addition to how do you keep them from getting back up off getting off their back yeah you know as as bill mcraven said when you have your foot squarely on their chest you don't want to take it off and and and aaron the interesting thing uh is the connection between the way that 714 designed itself this new broader battle space and the intersection between the soft forces and ai and this is where project maven comes in now i won't go into it in too much detail but please mention it because that that's your new work yeah um i just uh published this um article with um with general uh rich clark who's the cg of the special operations command he he worked in 714 against shia elements back in you know 2007 a time frame and we we have a new article out um titled big data at war and it looks at soft uh um project maven and and and the future of of warfare and that's at the modern war institute up at west point yeah easy to get to if you just google big data at war you'll find the link and there's there's a podcast that'll be posted tomorrow that general clark and i did for the modern war institute great thanks well this is perfect timing because we're just about at 17 30 5 30. and i'm going to turn it over to daniel hague who is the president of our iac chapter you can see he has his logo up his camera's not functioning but iafy is the international association for intelligence education and iwp has a student chapter in fact we have the first student chapter of iafy and daniel's our president he's going to pick up here with the q a piece and he's going to alternate between some of our student member questions and the questions that i see our pilot beginning to come up in the window here we've got three different people with four questions so daniel i'll turn it over to you you can alternate them as you see fit if you want to start out with a student question fine or you can go with one of the ones in the window it's all yours great thank you very much professor danis and thank you for coming and speaking with us dr schultz i uh our chapter of iap we read your book over the summer it was one of our uh first projects that we wanted to do as a chapter and i i really enjoyed it learning uh about especially the as you were talking about the leadership dynamics and how to kind of instill that going all the way down to be effective one of our first questions uh is from a guest uh chris chris orr uh former u.s air force security forces officer he asked how big a role did air force special operations members particularly pair rescue jumpers or combat controllers play in task force 714 um well they were they were involved in it i didn't really go into that um that particular element of uh 714 because that was really more tactical than than than i was trying to get at but um you know saw forces are are are not just uh not just army and uh but i don't know much um much beyond that um daniel i want to thank you for the kind remarks too by the way oh of course thank you um so one of our chapter members sent a question uh justin he asked how applicable do you think the task force 714 strategy facing conflicts is with state actors today well i think that that some of the things that um that 714 was involved with uh are harbingers of of the way we will deal with pure competitors and it really has to do with um with how you manage big data and and how you use um artificial intelligence machine learning computer vision uh all these tools which you know 714 started to use them in terms of taking enormous amounts of data uh which were collected on on these night raids plus um quite a bit of um of fmv and uh and and and and curating and conditioning that data and putting it into a a data management platform that they had a very you know smart contractor who who developed that vendor who developed that platform for them and um and and then um intelligence officers were able to mine that data and this was integral in the f3 ead process now the lessons from that then you can almost draw a straight line from that through the first years of the second decade of the of the 21st century right into maven because because the consumer for maven is uh saw forces so now all of that uh learning and the development of a of a new very sophisticated platform that that combines intelligence picture operation picture hasn't has the maven algorithm platform into it um gets a direct feed from fmv all that is is going to be the framework for for now how conventional forces have to manage peer competitors and and if you're going to be successful against the pure competitors you have to dominate the intelligence part of it and and this whole architecture that's still being refined and developed for the the ct mission will will roll into the and is already get starting it's already started i mean i i won't go into the details because i don't want to i want to make sure i'm careful i don't say something i i i shouldn't say but i can tell you that there is a component of the conventional force that in two years wants to be ai enabled and and so it's coming interesting yeah that is something that uh as a strategic intelligence major uh or focused here at iwp that's something i'm learning a lot through my studies is it's not with intelligence it's not it's no longer lack of data so much as just way too much of it and how do you find the signal through the noise and how do you do it not just you know how does how does the how does that collection of of massive amounts of data and the use of of these new tools enable commander decision making at a speed that that that will be unprecedented yeah it's very it's a a very interesting thing to do especially with evolving situations like that that's been as what's the case in iraq right uh kurt cloon asks were these lessons learned taken from law enforcement decentralized intelligence driven investigations uh or and law enforcement task force structure and information sharing and collaboration yeah well law enforcement starting really around the same time maybe a little later that um that 714 had this um this vendor that that created this data integration and data management tool law enforcement uh in in the united states started to use some of those tools as well the common denominator here are our vendors and um and so it it it's not that that one learned from you know law enforcement learned from from from from the military or vice versa um but both um both had lots of data and um and and and both had to figure out how to how to you know manage and and benefit from this data and and law enforcement especially some of the big law enforcement [Music] agencies did this and of course there's one that has a pretty big ct mission the one in new york city and uh and and and and you know they they were they had big data problem in the form of sigit and other things so they needed this tool box as well let me just hop in just want to point out you know i'm not sure how much the fbi did with task force 714 but you know fbi's role in iraq is really another story that needs to be told someday we've seen a little bit of a payoff from that because there's been a couple of cases in the u.s where evidence that they collected off the battlefield there from ieds fingerprints and other biometrics led to cases here in the u.s i think one in particular a few years back and it was kentucky where a couple of former um aqi bomb and placers were captured based on fingerprints that they had that were pulled off of uh i exploded ieds in iraq and uh led to their arrest and imprisonment here in the us when they snuck in through a refugee program a couple of the rare ones that made it through so the role of law enforcement on the battlefield the intel role i think is something that has not been a story that hasn't been told yet hopefully we'll be told one day well and aaron i can tell you that they were there in 714 they were one of the three letter agencies that were there so and and of course they brought a lot to the table too especially in terms of forensics so um they're they're part of the story i i never you know i mean i never went to to try to find you know fbi uh individuals who were involved in it because it was you know too too tactical but there's no question that when when um when when bill mcraven said we need all the three-letter agencies um he included fbi and fbi did take part in this right uh so we have a question from one of our chapter members isabelle she asked at the end of the book you mentioned that the future of terrorist tactics and techniques are expected to reflect the development of commercially available technology of the eight identified areas of concern which do you believe is the most important for the us government and its allies to be focusing ct efforts on i'm trying to remember what the eight were um but i would say that one of the things that um one area that we definitely should be focusing on uh is um is how uh is the extent to which isis is able to recreate their information operation capability now this was really an interesting development because isis had had a use of of social media and encryption and even the use of deep web um as part of an architecture not just for telling their story you know getting the word out which the internet has allowed terrorist groups to do in ways that their their 1980s and 1970s and 90s forerunners would have died to have the ability to communicate but more importantly that architecture was used to recruit 30 to 50 000 foreign fighters now just think about the significance of that they were able to do this and and i've looked into this quite quite a bit in terms of what their messaging was um how they they used video and then how once they they they got someone interested then how they took that into a recruitment effort so you don't want that to get reconstructed um and and yeah okay they're they're on the run and they've been beaten down but they have that knowledge and um and so that is one area that um we really have to focus on that kind of goes back to your question aaron about you know are we are we dealing with you know the the information component of this now that's not counter messaging but what it's doing is it's stopping their messaging and and if you look at um if you look at the campaign inherent resolve against isis there was a concerted component of that to take out the physical infrastructure of this because see when they were a state or so-called state they were able to to to build their their information architecture physically not just virtually there were physical locations and there were individuals that were identified as key figures in this and they were all targeted yeah so i mean it's very interesting yeah um all the lessons um we learned from aqi were applied to isis and it probably contributed how quickly we were able to defeat isis considering we the lack how much less infrastructure the us military had in iraq you know from 20 2014 and afterwards yes we had people there but it was nothing it was not the surge but i would have to say the less you know i would attribute some of the our success to the lessons we learned earlier um plus you know having good partners somebody somebody had to do some of the heavy lifting to help us yeah all right dan uh another question by another another one of our individuals here great uh outside individual sorry yes so kurt cloon asked does strategic planning have value in counter networks if so how well i mean strategic planning has value in everything so um i think now and i'm not privy to this but i think that um that the way that we think about um keeping uh keeping this uh al-qaeda isis remaining elements keeping them from from reconstituting themselves really is more than just a tactical mission um it it needs um what i would call a you know a strategic effort that looks at how you you're going to use not just the tier one units but how can you use other soft and then other parts really of of of the us government especially uh from the intelligence community um to to uh not just keep it down but but to start to delegitimize it i mean that that's i think kind of what you were getting at air and how do we how do we deal with this uh the the the way that look they were able to recruit 50 000 and they had large numbers of people that followed them on the internet so you know how do we deal with that we can we can know about it because we got all the the tools to do that and ai is going to help you do it even better than it already is um but there are other aspects to it yeah and there's been a lot of academic research into you know various network you know looking at network theory and you know um the connectedness of nodes which nodes are more valuable than others sometimes the obvious leader node is not the most important node but it's this this node over here of three or four people there the communication is not another one's really keeping the network together and probably from a strategic aspect that kind of analysis um you know looking at the bigger network picture and trying to find out where those nodes are that would you know cause the network to to the fracture so yeah yeah how they how are they trying to re recreate this architecture they had and and they certainly have um a number of um of affiliates in different places all right dan already another student question and then i want to take we have to have time for like two more questions one more student question and we do have a kind of a vip question here we have charles duffer of the iraq survey group asked a question uh so i want to make sure we get to that one uh maybe to close up it's not often we have uh folks from a rock survey group hop on our hop on our q a so dan get us a student question and then we'll take charles charles guilford's questions yeah that's great i'm excited to hear uh his answer to mr dolter's question uh i actually have a question for you dr schultz did task force 714 uh try to leverage this special relationship with the british to analyze their react their actions with northern ireland and the troubles and that kind of counter-terrorism counter-insurgency case uh before they went to the israelis or did they try to learn from that as all uh at all well no the british were part of the task force the the british played a role in it there's there's actually a book written um by a british journalist on on this it was an early book but but oh no the british were were involved uh with this um really early on and um they have a famous commander now i'm forgetting his name um who was um who was from a crystal's counterpart but but um absolutely i mean the answer is yes fantastic all right our question from mr dolphur is in 2003 there were many raids various units but one we called task force tomorrow based on bad intelligence that resulted in rounding up potentially sympathetic iraqis in jail and creating lots more enemies forward deployed intelligence units were awful is part of your point that the cycle of collection analyze and task for their collection is they forward deployed analysis well yeah i mean the the point the the point i would make is and i know about some of that and um and it's the fact that you know not every um every uh raid the 714 uh carried out um actually was successful i mean it is war it is war but the the the key to to minimizing that and and by the way you know and 714 was was you know i called it a an industrial strength um killing machine but it really was an industrial strength capturing machine and um and let me just so but but the the the the the collection um and and development of databases that you could really search and mine were were aimed at giving much more um [Music] supportable evidence to targeting you know so that you you you avoid obviously some of those 2003 mistakes now i want to just talk about for a second um interrogation because um 714 at its um at its height had about 300 interrogators which you know is and and support you know operators specialists in interrogation and the interesting thing was that mike flynn said the following and this really gets it so flynn said in interrogating someone i wanted this individual to think that i knew him better than he knew himself and the way that that we were going to do that is that we we before we interrogated him we had his phone we had we had maybe his computer um where we were able to to to put that right into our our big database we were able to start to look for connections and correlations and pretty soon we we did know a hell of a lot about that person so we might say to to someone you know um uh tell me about your your your association with um uh with aaron and and you know the guy says aaron who uh i don't know any airing and then then you start to show him all the emails between himself and aaron and and and all of a sudden this this guy starts to think holy cow you know they they know everything about me and you you start to to do more of this um so uh the the the use of of all of this information you know had the the application the mining of it had many different dimensions to it okay great i think um we did have one other question in the queue we might as well get it knocked out real quick this is an easy one this is kind of it's kind of a yes no um did task force 714 um work uh complement that of task force 2021 they may mean 20 and 121 i'm not sure and 6-26 or did they replace them that's an e that's a that's a soft call for you yeah yeah no these were replacements um yeah the names change the names change all the time and i had to help you by the way i had a hell of a time getting um you know uh to be allowed when i wrote the monograph to use 714 and by the way you'll notice that in in the monograph now that's not true in the book but in the monograph the the j word is not mentioned you know if you go through the monograph you couldn't mention it and and that's true by the way in in terms of the you know the the big data at war you can't you can't mention it even though i remember one one night i'm i'm walking through my living room and my wife is watching some police show and they're talking about the j word which is of course json um yeah you set it up i know i know it's your book not mine all right and what's in the book it's in the book um daniel thank you for running the q a for us i appreciate it um before we uh go i'm going to turn it over back over to hannah so she can make some closing remarks um we do we did have one other thing i'll pass you afterwards you got an invite to speak at a rotary club dick so um that i will uh i will pass that invite on to you separately that act this actually looks like it could be really good if you don't if you if you don't go uh maybe maybe i'll go in your stead um but uh this uh this looks like a good invite um just to kind of uh you know wrap up here i thought the book was really good you know in my review i said i think this is a great book for either you know on the war college side because a lot of times we have international partners you can't go into the classified realm um so this book i think really the lessons learned piece out of this is really important and also for other grad school courses i'm hoping to use this one in the future here maybe my counterterrorism course in the spring so i think it really um it really fills a niche and not only a niche but you know somewhere down the road as i mentioned my review hopefully isis doesn't come back as 3.0 or 4.0 or anything else um and we have to remember what we did um that we have to grab your book off the shelf to remind us what we did i have a funny feeling our our special operators will will probably be doing this for a while um it's the folks at the national level have to remember what we did in the past so um where do you see things going in the future here with this with f3 ead obviously ai is going to be a big piece of it anything else you wanted to add no i i think that um for for soft and and especially for the command you know it's about it's going to be a balancing act you know how much effort do they they have put and they will put effort into um what we now call the the peer competitor or you know the return to state competition and and conflict um and that conflict is taking place in a number of new ways already and then how much effort to this what i call in and i think i call it in the book an enduring ct mission so that that'll be the the big challenge i think for for soft and and you know and of course as i said there's going to be a lot of learning by the conventional force especially about the ai applications um and how that will help it with a variety of intelligence sources great thanks um my my final parting word here is about our dean who studied under under you back in the 1990s as you mentioned dean frank marlowe uh i have to know how did he get out of the fletcher school without getting the love for new england sports that you and i have i noticed your red sox shirt on the door i i have to ask this question frank is on the line i see him online here and he has not gotten the love for new england sports that you and i have how did that happen how did you let him get away without that well you know it he he he he he wasn't there uh the the way that we we have been there you know he didn't develop that love um which it was really hard to to to express in the 90s so you remember in the 80s i mean you you remember what that was like yeah but but you know frank needed a little little vision because if he had had vision then he could have celebrated the first two decades of the 21st century by being associated with with the the area of the world in which there are more champions more victories and uh and and more great sports teams including i would add six super bowl titles all right with that i'm gonna turn it back over to hannah before we lose all of our all of our listeners who are not new human sports fans so hannah i'll turn it over to you to make an announcement about upcoming uh presentations uh dick thank you again for coming you were uh great on the q a today i really appreciate it here all right hannah all yours perfect i don't think anyone can see my video but i'm not trying to pull it up but um i would like to thank dr schultz for joining us today and all of you who tuned in here on zoom and facebook just an additional thank you to professor danis daniel hagan naife student chapter for hosting this event it was a very interesting discussion so we appreciate it if you're interested in attending other upcoming webinar events supporting iwp or applying to one of our graduate programs please go to iwp.edu again that's iwp.edu thanks everyone have a great evening