Lecture on John Perry's Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality

Introduction

• Discussion on the first half of the first day of John Perry's dialogue.
• Questions to guide the study:
  1. Who are the characters?
  2. What does Weirob want Miller to do?
  3. Two strategies for showing something is possible.
  4. Miller's first attempt to answer Weirob.
  5. The analogy with the tissue box.
  6. Difference between qualitative identity and numeric identity.
  7. Two inferences supported by qualitative identity.

Characters

• Gretchen Weirob: An atheist who is dying.
• Sam Miller: A Christian who believes in an afterlife for Weirob.
• Dave Cohen: A Jewish friend who also believes in some form of afterlife, but with a different perspective than Sam.

Discussion on the Afterlife

• Weirob's Request: She wants a philosophical discussion about the afterlife in her remaining hours.
• Miller's Belief: He believes in an afterlife and wants to show it's possible for Weirob to have experiences after death.

Philosophical Questions

• Weirob's Challenge: How is it possible for her to have experiences after death given her body will disintegrate?
• Showing Possibility:
  • Imaginability: Can it be vividly pictured?
  • Conceivability: Can it be explained without contradiction?

Miller's First Strategy

• Attempts to prove the possibility of the afterlife through imaginability.
• Weirob counters by emphasizing her physical disintegration after death.

Tissue Box Analogy

• Demonstrates the difference between two types of identity:
  • Qualitative Identity: Exact similarity (e.g., identical twins, identical golf balls).
  • Numeric Identity: Each thing is identical to itself (e.g., Mark Twain is numerically identical to Samuel Clemens).

Identity Inferences

• Inference Supported by Numeric Identity:
  • If A is numerically identical to B, then any feature of A must also be a feature of B.
  • Example: If Mark Twain (A) drinks whiskey and is the same person as Samuel Clemens (B), then Samuel Clemens drinks whiskey.
• Numeric Identity Inference: If A has a feature and B does not, A and B are not numerically identical.

Conclusion

• Miller's Mistake: Future person described by Miller cannot be Weirob as Weirob would have disintegrated, hence they cannot be numerically identical.
• Next Lecture: Discussion on Miller's mind-body dualist view and his concept of the soul.