good morning good afternoon and good evening bonjour madames miss you and a special welcome to our friends in chile joining today for those of you who don't know me my name is stuart beck i am president and ceo of the asia pacific foundation of canada and it's my distinct pleasure to welcome you today to this panel discussion on asean and geopolitics its role as a middle path approach to asia presented with our partners at the chile pacific foundation first i recognize that many of you are joining us from across the world from multiple time zones in canada chile and across the asia pacific region i would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge that the places canadians call home are the traditional territories of many first nations metis and inuit apf canada is headquartered and i myself am speaking to you from the unseated territories of the squamish musculum and swellingtooth peoples we are grateful to canada's indigenous people for the stewardship of the lands in which we live work and play we at apf canada are collectively committed to the process of reconciliation the asia pacific foundation of canada and the chile pacific foundation signed an lu back in 2019 recognizing at that time the potential for mutual collaboration we are both the abac secretariats for our home countries uh pacific nations that literally face the immense and diverse economic opportunities in asia we are we share a commitment to promoting dialogue and understanding around strategic engagement with the region last week as part of this joint roundtable series on asean and the americas we convened experts to discuss and provide insight commentary on the growth of asean and the challenge and opportunities it presents for our respective economies who are also co-signators of the comprehensive and progressive trans-pacific partnership cpe tpp for the second part of the series today in partnership with our friends at the chile pacific foundation we have gathered an impressive group of experts to think through the importance of engagement and diplomacy with asean as an institution and with asean member states through bilateral or multilateral engagement for both canada and chile before i turn over the floor to alberto van glaverin from the chile pacific foundation to say a few words let me go over a few housekeeping notes this webinar is currently being recorded and will be available on our website shortly after this webinar will be hosted in english and spanish we encourage your questions and comments please use the q a box located at the bottom of your screen to submit your question if we don't have a chance to answer your question live please feel free to reach out to us offline and for technical support please reach out to mandy at events at asia pacific dot ca now let me introduce mr alberto van clavren to make a few remarks on behalf of our partners at the chile pacific foundation alberto is a political scientist lawyer and diplomat very close to the chile pacific foundation he served as deputy minister of foreign affairs of chile between 2006 and 2009 and as director of policy planning at the chilean ministry of foreign affairs between at the same time he was also he also represented chile in the international court of justice in the case of the chilean peruvian maritime dispute alberto the floor is over to you thank you very much stuart good morning to all of you on behalf of the chilean pacific foundation it's my pleasure to welcome our most distinguished speakers today and to welcome all of our participants the mission of the chilean pacific foundation is to promote the economic cultural and social participation of chile in the pacific basin as well as furthering knowledge about the political economic social and cultural systems and realities of the region we are particularly happy to organize this series of meetings about asean with the canadian pacific foundation and this is not only a coincidence chile and canada are like-minded countries we have common visions about international relations we have common visions about the americas and we also have common visions about the asia pacific area today we are going to deal with asean asean is a very timely subject very recently secretary of state of the united states tony blinken organized a meeting with all foreign ministers of the asean countries unfortunately there was a communication glitch and the meeting could not happen at least at that level some days afterwards the foreign minister of china wang yi received in chongqing all foreign ministers of the asean countries and at another level our own trade vice minister mr rodriguez visited some days ago jakarta and he visited the headquarters of asean and expressed the wish of chile and reiterated the wish of chile to establish a special partnership with asean asean is a regional issue is a model of regionalism regionalism has also been a subject of much importance in chile and in latin america and i think it's a very interesting also to bear in mind the sort of comparison between asean the integration experience in asean countries and the frustration of the integration process in the case of latin america i think that would be extremely interesting but today we are going to deal with another subject which has to do with the gio political dimensions of the asean and we have an excellent panel of speakers and a variable moderator and it's my pleasure to give the floor to our moderator today mrs loretto leyton a very good friend a former colleague at the foreign minister one of our best members of the foreign service at the time and right now a very able executive director of the chilean pacific foundation loreto you have the floor thank you very much thank you very much alberto and thank you very much stuart as well for giving these open remarks before we start and i give the floor to our first panelist i would just like to remind you that we have simultaneous interpretation and in the downside of your screen you're going to have a little world you can press there and choose for the language that is of your convenience also i would just like to uh draw the attention that today we have the honor to have within the audience the former president of chile eduardo frey so we give you uh our our most welcome for to this webinar mr president right now he's the chili's plenipotentiary ambassador and special mission to the asia pacific so this uh these issues are very relevant for for for him and we are very grateful that you're joining us today so having said that i would like to give the floor now to our first panelist uh stephanie you you will have the floor please go ahead good morning everyone i'm delighted to be here thank you to the asia pacific foundation and the chile pacific foundation for hosting this uh event and inviting me uh to speak to you today and share a few thoughts about asean so the focus of my remarks will be on asean's contributions to regional order and security with the starting point that asean's approach is often misunderstood but actually understanding this institution a bit better is very important if external partners of asean like canada like chile are to engage it successfully but also learn from it when it comes to navigating the current moment of geostrategic shifts in the region and the world so we can go to um the next slide yes so starting with some basics just so that we know what we're talking about today so asean is a regional institution it's composed of 10 southeast asian states next and it is often compared to other regional institutions particularly the european union but also commonly nato and very often to its disadvantage and that's because asean operates differently than these institutions to some extent but also very importantly with far less resources so you have a general idea of the discrepancy for instance between asean's resources and in terms of staff and budget uh compared to the to the contrasted to the the european union um so and and that's significant because asean is also faced with pretty similar expectations when it comes to its role um as the regional institution and when it comes to its security role in particular so the comparison here can only bring us so far in understanding asean's value so as singaporean diplomat bill harry kausiken famously stated asean is a cow not a horse and while it's unrealistic to expect a cow to run as fast as a horse it doesn't mean it has no value next slide so asean was created during the cold war which was actually not cold at all in asia to bring together against all odds states that didn't have much in common except a shared sense of vulnerability against external interference from major powers but also domestic sources of instability and this is important in understanding how asean approaches its role when it comes to regional order and regional security next slide so in this context asean's essential purpose has always been to manage distrust and to foster cooperation on issues of shared concern among its member states and this informs its approach to regional security and order up until today which is characterized by two principles that we see commonly being thrown around in analysis about asean non-interference in internal affairs and also consensus-based decision-making and none of these are actually specific to asean non-interference is a foundational norm in our international system and it's actually pretty essential to the workings of other international institutions um but also other international institutions for example nato operate on the basis of consensus so consensus building more broadly is also part and parcel of multilateralism whatever the type of decision making process that you have in place in particular institutions so in this sense asean might not be a horse but as i like to say it is no unicorn either so it is really important to understand that it's the ways in which these particular norms are practiced in asean as in other institutions that really matters here and the way that they are practiced is actually much more flexible than what most commentators of asean affairs typically suggest many of asean's limitations as an institution are also common limitations of multilateralism in general and yet it doesn't mean it has no value it remains very important so since the end of the cold war asean has also sought to extend this approach to the broader asia pacific which you you can see a representation of uh in the slides here um so asean now stands at the core of a set of regional institutions where it exercises centrality through various asean plus arrangements including the asean plus three the east asia summit and the the asean defense ministers mutant plus but also the asean regional forum and centrality for asean is basically dependent on three things inclusivity the idea that everyone is welcome to participate in asean-led multilateralism neutrality the the notion that asean doesn't take science and finally unity the idea that asean should speak with one voice on important issues but of course exercising centrality has not been easy for asean partly because of the kind of external interference it has always thought to protect itself against but that also means asean has actually a lot of experience when it comes to dealing with destabilizing behavior from major powers and this is an experience that we can learn from next slide asean has now a very far-reaching agenda that covers security economic and socio-cultural cooperation but again very limited resources to realize it so that means that asean tends to be more process oriented than results oriented and as such a lot of asean's commitments remain aspirational so a key challenge for asean in the years leading to its 2025 vision which is the next threshold in realizing its ambitions as stating stated in its various declarations is really to consolidate the community from within but at the same time asean is also facing new challenges and expectations that it goes beyond that internal consultants consolidation if it if it is to uh remain relevant and this is the very difficult balancing act that asean struggles with next slide so asean remains most useful when it comes to our conversation today in its role as an honest broker so to speak between a diverse group of regional states with interests preferences and ideas about regional peace stability and order that are often opposed and need to be reconciled and so asean as a as a venue but also as exercising normative power offers these states the opportunity to sit at the same table to discuss issues of common concern to agree on shared principles of conduct and no other actor including powers with far superior material capabilities like the united states or china for instance has been able to fulfill this role and this is the reason why every time an external partner of asean proposes a new institution for the region that could do things differently and obviously it is assumed better the debate always ends in the same way all involved inevitably come to recognize once again but of course you know sometimes reluctantly that if asean did not exist it would have to be invented and current discussions about a new indo-pacific order or the relaunch of the quad are following a very familiar pattern in this sense and unsurprisingly asean's own indo-pacific outlook demonstrates a cautious but skeptical recognition of new suggestions as well as an ongoing commitment to what has made its approach so useful to the region throughout the years next slide asean has also often been criticized for being ineffective and providing timely and effective responses to key challenges and in recent years are two issues that have been particularly vexing for asean the south china sea disputes and myanmar partly because these issues unfold against the backdrop of a new phase of major power overly rivalry but also not specifically only because of this so i don't have time to elaborate now although i'm very happy to do so during a discussion but i would suggest that instead of asking why asean has not done more or better on these very challenging issues we actually need to be asking what it is that asean has done and what it can reasonably do given the nature of the challenges but also the limitations that it works with and the specificity of its approach so asean cannot solve these issues on its own there are many things outside of its control but that doesn't mean it's useless or that the fact that asean emphasizes non-interference and consensus is actually the root the problem if that's what people think then they probably don't think very highly of multilateralism in general so that's also a broader question so could asean act harder better faster and stronger yes but it's important to temper also our expectations while also offering fair criticism that takes asean for the cow that it is and not the horse we would wish it to be thank you thank you so much um stephanie for that introduction and introducing us on what asian represents its origins the current position and the role that it's playing right now among other multilateral multilateral organizations and in the national context so that was a really good introduction i didn't mention it before but stephanie martell she's an assistant professor political studies in queens university so thank you very much stephanie and we we certainly are gonna going to come back to you with some questions uh now i would like to give the floor to jeff reeves he's the vice president of vice president of research at the asia pacific foundation jeff you have the the floor thank you loretto and uh it's a pleasure to be here uh this morning in vancouver uh to talk about what i think are some very important issues both for canada and chile i'm going to do a little bit of focus on on southeast asia in particular and maybe add a couple of points on asean that i think are worth reiterating but that stephanie has already raised i'm going to do this in 10 minutes so i'll have to speed through a lot of points but if i do over generalize please do ask for clarity in the question and answer period i'd like to start off with a discussion of southeast asia with particular focus on southeast asia's strategic importance as i believe it's actually difficult to overstate how significant the sub-region has become within asia's broader strategic environment now whether with respect to its geographic centrality as you can see on the map between the indian and pacific oceans or at its immediate proximity to the contentious south china sea and the sea lines of communication that connect the middle east to northeast asia's advanced economies now southeast asia is unarguably the regional prize in asia around which all the major states are building their strategies take the united states free and open indo-pacific concept for instance we now know from declassified documents as well as a number of formal strategies from the us departments of state and defense that washington sees southeast asia as asia's regional strategic center of gravity now the region is after all home to two of the united states formal asian allies the philippines and thailand to singapore a key us economic and strategic partner and to the into indonesia the world's largest muslim majority state among other important regional actors like malaysia and continental southeast asian states like cambodia lau and myanmar the region is also directly centered on the south china sea which the us navy and u.s indo-pacific command has prioritized as an area of strategic importance for u.s china competition and for the u.s forward presence in the asia pacific we see similar logic in australia's understanding of southeast asia although on a different scale of course around security partnerships sea line of communication security and humanitarian and disaster relief now japan too shares some of these security concerns although its priority approach to the southeast asian region remains largely economic in nature for reasons related to its own internal security constraints and its overall approach to the region japan's own free and open indo-pacific concept also identifies southeast asia as the most important area for its foreign and economic engagement and indeed tokyo remains the largest investor in southeast asia and the region's second largest trade partner just behind china japan's southeast asia relations in my opinion remain one of the truly under-appreciated aspects of southeast asia's broader strategic environment now not to be outdone south korea has also prioritized southeast asia in its new southern policy albeit with less of a focus on security and more on economic and technological integration taiwan ii has a southbound policy that privileges the development of ties within southeast asian states as a condition of its foreign and security policies as does india with its act east policy even europe has identified southeast asia in its indo-pacific strategy as the primary sub-region in asia with which it seeks to develop deeper ties the uk too sees southeast asia front and center in its global britain strategy including its attempt to eventually accede to the comprehensive and progressive trans pacific partnership or cptpp now and china of course sees southeast asia as arguably the most strategically significant sub-region in the world whether with respect to its core interests around territorial integrity its trade and maritime security posture its access to regional and internal markets to its peripheral relationships which are a priority in its own foreign policy approaches and with respect to the maritime aspect of its belt and road initiative now while there's lots of interesting data backing up this point about china prioritizing southeast asia one of the most salient i think for this moment in time is the amount of vaccine china has provided to southeast asia of the 262 million doses of covet vaccine china has delivered internationally to date 139 million went just to southeast asia with 88 million going to indonesia alone china has also sold an additional 160 million doses to southeast asia which it has not yet delivered making it by far the largest provider of vaccine in the sub-region with over 300 million doses for those that were encouraged by the biden administration's recent pledge to provide 80 million doses to about 10 different countries by the end of june the scale of china's vaccine rollout in southeast asia alone should give perspective to the competitive scale and this is particularly the point as 60 of those 80 million doses from the united states are the astrazeneca vaccine which the united states fda hasn't approved yet so that's not lost on southeast asian states if we could go to the next slide so what is it about southeast asia that makes it so important to all of these actors now part of it is geography of course as southeast asia sits at the literal crossroads of asia whether one uses the asia-pacific or the indo-pacific as his or her geographic frame of reference part of it is related to the us-china competition which i won't go into here so as to not overlap with the next speaker but we can certainly see this in everything from maritime security and competition in the south china sea to alliance relationships part of it is the realization that the region is growing in terms of its markets populations and strategic significance and part of it of course as stephanie rightfully pointed out is the importance of asean as a regional actor and with its ability to act with a degree of qualified strategic agency and its potential to act as a regional spoiler for external power's ambitions across the indo indian and pacific ocean areas indeed despite asean's function as a soft institution based on consultation not as a formalized eu type institution asean has the ability to effectively direct regional developments in ways that shape the operational environment for even the great powers now specifically relevant here are the ongoing discussions within asean and with china a round of code of conduct for the south china sea now while there are clear debates around this process with respect to shared strategic visions power dynamics and international law for instance the fact discussions are taking place between southeast asian states with divergent views and china which has its own strategic priorities should demonstrate to all observers the potential for asean to shape regional security and political institutions in ways that are hugely significant for outside powers we can see similar function for asean in the asean plus mechanisms the east asian summit the asean regional forum and the asean ministers meeting plus dialogues indeed for all the talk that asean is weak and irrelevant which has been going on for decades i'd challenge anyone to identify a more relevant institution in asia than asean particularly one that has managed to communicate its relevance to every major power whether regional or extra-regional and one that has the ability at this point in time to have a more lasting impact on global strategic issues and that's not even considering its role within asia as a driver of what i'd call asian consolidation now whether with respect to the asean economic community 2025 the rcep the digital trade agreement the china asean fta asean's prioritization of people-to-people connectivity the emergence of singapore as a destination for regional post-secondary school education and as a regionally based provider of capital within southeast asia no weather with respect to the re-shoring of global supply chains in southeast asia transnational rail networks connecting china to singapore and all the states in between them whether with respect to cross-border special economic zones joint military law and customs exercises as well as millions of other examples of state and sub-state engagement southeast asia is becoming increasingly consolidated in a way that challenges the western narrative around the need to expand the asia-pacific to the indo-pacific this is specifically the case as neither the indo nor pacific's primary strategic actors and here i mean india and the united states have shown a degree of strategic commitment to the southeast asian region in the modern day to any degree that would support this idea of the indo-pacific redesign indeed it's important to consider southeast asia an asian consolidation in line with discussions primarily taking place in western capitals around the need to maintain asia's order through western strategies such as the free and open indo-pacific and through western dominated security coalitions such as the quad specifically there is a natural progression taking place in asia around order reformation that shouldn't give fears in the west that the region's order is as is often said in strategic documents under attack rather asian order is in a state of flux because asian states are becoming wealthier they're becoming more integrated they're becoming more aligned with china the regional center of gravity the economic center of gravity and they're interested in having more of a role in how the region is managed how its norms and values are represented and how outside powers engage in the region in the next slide this brings me to canada which will be my last focus before concluding my remarks which has identified southeast asia as an area of strategic importance but arguably which hasn't developed a strategic approach to asia that takes its strategic centrality and importance into consideration now while there's a natural tendency in ottawa to look to other western states for ideas about how to engage in asia i'd argue a more thoughtful approach to southeast asia is needed now this is particularly important for two reasons first all the indo-pacific approaches to southeast asia and asean are predicated on a parallel understanding that the region is critical to balancing china now i believe viewing southeast asia through a china lens is inappropriate as the region has far more to offer than just counterweight to beijing and indeed there is little regional buy-in to the idea of balancing against china within southeast asia indeed indonesia arguably southeast asia's natural leader has expressly developed a policy that it calls equidistance towards the us and china to ensure its value isn't limited to being a pawn in the asian regional chess board indeed if one looks at indonesia as tipping one direction over the other i'd argue it's moving closer to china than the united states and i'd point to recent joint naval exercises between jakarta and beijing in the java c and beijing's provision of vaccine to indonesia as two relevant examples of how and why now second canada shouldn't over securitize the region which means from my perspective avoiding regional approaches like the u.s indo-pacific indo-pacific concept that places too great an emphasis on military power and security relations canada needs to engage with southeast asia's regional ecosystem in ways that make sense for the region such as on issues related to transnational interconnectivity climate change and sustainable development otherwise it risks becoming an entirely outside power canada needs to understand that southeast asian future doesn't rest in western management or western preservation it won't be a product of u.s european uk institutional leadership rather southeast asia is going to become increasingly asian in ways that will challenge western involvement in the region particularly if such involvement is seen as destabilizing canada should plan accordingly and with that i'll conclude thank you thank you very much jeff um for explaining further uh the relevance of sharing as an important just geostatic player in the region and its current relation with china as the regional economic center of gravity also it was very interesting to hear your views on what should be the position of canada in this new order not only looking at china but also to the the region asian as a whole and also country by country so thank you very much for for that chief jeff and now i'm going to give the floor to um ambassador jorge heine um he's the research professor of international relations at the university of boston and former ambassador of chile in india and china ambassador you have the floor thank you loreto and let me thank the pacific foundation of chile and the asia-pacific foundation of canada for this kind invitation as you may know i have a very strong connection with canada where i taught for 10 years at wilfield laurel university so it is a particular pleasure to be able to participate in this panel my brief uh today is to speak about the relevance of asean for latin america so um you will be happy to hear that i will not overlap with a very extensive analysis undertaken by the two previous uh panelists what i would like to stress is a number of key points that are often lost in in chile and in latin america when we talk about asean and the member countries the first of all is that because southeast asia is located between the two so-called asian giants china and india the attention to it is often not what it should and a recent example of that is the signing of the rcep in in november of last year much much of the coverage was on china's role in it although of course the rcep this very significant trade agreement biggest trade agreement in the world according to some indicators was an asean initiative which only goes to underscore what my previous what previous panelists have said if you look at asean also you look at the population we're talking 600 650 million which is comparable to life in america's population a number of countries some of them small some of them mid-sized some big like indonesia again one can easily compare it to latin america in a way that one cannot really compare either china or india so there are a number of things that are particularly relevant for latin america and for chile in in asean now the other the second point i would like to make is whatever attention is paid to asean in the americas is on its economic achievements and less so on its political and diplomatic ones yet what i would like to argue is that the latter are no less significant for a very diverse region one described as the balkans of asia that has made enormous progress again i would like to underscore here we're talking about a region in which there are four different religions many more languages huge conflicts in the past i only have to mention of course the the vietnam war a long protracted guerrilla uh warfare in countries like malaysia and elsewhere yet in asean in southeast asia enormous progress has been made much forward movement towards peace and prosperity on the diplomatic front also enormous progress asean and entities like the east asia forum a big power gathering places we just heard about this recent meeting of the asean foreign ministers with the chinese foreign minister wang yi and an ultimately frustrated meeting with a u.s secretary of state lincoln this only gives an indication of the permanent dialogue that goes on between asean and the big powers again in a way that we do not see at all in latin america asean has moved towards a culture of peace from the assimilation of the principles of consultation and consensus that are so close to the way asean operates uh and most significant in the merchants there's even a word for it the asean way a special approach to doing things via consensus rather than confrontation now it is important to put these things in perspective as we know asean was founded in 1967 at the height of the cold war essentially as an anti-communist entity and we look how far it has come today it has among its members countries like vietnam countries like laos like cambodia and they get along very well with philippines singapore thailand and others countries with very different political systems in some ways quite different economic systems but they get along they managed to develop an identity in a way of doing things together that so far has largely eluded us in in latin america so if we ask ourselves why has asean succeeded in becoming such a relevant diplomatic actor why is it that when asean meets the world listens u.s presidents attend their meeting russian presidents chinese presidents attend the meeting they wouldn't miss them they established a permanent dialogue with the uh with asean and asean members again in a way that other developing countries have not managed to establish so let us set aside for the moment for the purpose of this panel the considerable achievements that asean can show on the economic front and that according to some say that asean gdp may reach 10 trillion by 2030. let us focus for the moment just on the diplomatic the geopolitical aspect that is the subject of today's webinar and that it seems to me shows remarkable achievements again a very important point has to do with the fact that there isn't one big member that dominates asean and here the case of indonesia by far the biggest member with over population of over 200 million he could have very easily er played an inaudible role in obviously a disruptive role had it decided to do so the interesting thing here is that there was a time when indonesia in flag in fact played that role in the 60s indonesia had the policy of confrontation trying to sort of stir up the pot in the region as it were a confrontational approach yet over time it left it behind and today indonesia is very much part of the club works together with other countries that are much smaller but that all buy in to this asean way into the steam spirit that is so significant for asean and for its success again for the big powers to engage with asean it is very reassuring to know that when they actually meet with asean as a body as an entity this is a collective that will actually respond as a collective in the case of other entities when the big powers meet with them they do not know whether in fact there is some big power behind it actually pulling the strings making those conversation with a former representative of that particular regional entity a bit of a show rather than a substantive meeting if we look at the americas we see that in the case of the ois dominated by the united states there is a problem in the case of mercosur dominated by brazil we also have a similar situation so that it seems to me is a very notable and important aspect that we have to keep in mind but beyond the sort of evolving structural diplomatic features that asean shows in its remarkable success on the more current affairs side of things and some comments about it have been made before i would like to emphasize something that is uh very current in chile today and also in the rest of the region and that has to do with how to deal with what some have referred to as an emerging second cold war er basically how to deal with their tensions the growing tensions between the united states and china and also i also will make a reference to the indo pacific which it seems to me it's also very pertinent for this and as you may know there's a very interesting parallel again between asean and and latin america in this regard why do i say this asean's situation in this growing you might call it conflict tension between the united states in and and china is in some ways the mirror image of latin america why do i say that these countries are located very closely to china and have traditionally been in the sphere of influence of china much as countries in latin america are very close to the united states and have traditionally been under the speed of influence of the united states now that being the case what does asean do what it does is instead of siding automatically with china as you know some people might expect given how close they are to china how much their economies are intertwined with the chinese economy asean seeks an equidistance between the big powers this has been formalized by indonesia malaysian academics have also written about this how it is important to keep an equal distance between the big powers in chile with my colleagues carlos fortin and carlos ominami we have written about this we are saying that for latin america uh something uh comparable to this equidistance what we have called active non-alignment should be the way forward for latin america that to be forced to choose between washington and beijing is a false choice that we have to put our own interests front and center rather than giving in to one of the true powers and in that sense it seems to me that asean what asean is doing is extremely pertinent there are lessons there to be drawn in seeking this middle road and of course the prime minister of singapore singapore has played such a leading role in asean he has written in foreign affairs and elsewhere about how singapore and southeast asia more generally is interested in walking a middle road between china in the united states and that these countries should not be forced to choose because that can only have a negative and very unproductive consequences let me then close by referring to the notion of the indo-pacific that has become so popular in some way it is sort of the word du jour in many geopolitical circles it is important to understand that words have significance they have connotations it and therefore to use them is not inconsequential and i was particularly interested to hear what jeff said on canada's position on the notion of the indo-pacific it is an evolving situation uh it is important to consider all aspects that are associated with it but sort of jumping into the fray embracing the use of this word just because it is new and saying that this is what we should all now use in our international relations vocabulary it seems to me it's not a prudent thing we don't know whether in fact we will see the emergence of an indo-pacific right now it is more aspirational than anything else and it has connotations so it seems to me that what asean is doing that is to refer to it in a very very prudent fashion rather than embracing it wholeheartedly is a very much also the way to go for latin america none of this is to say that asean doesn't have problems of course it does and myanmar for example in myanmar in the inability of hassan to do anything about it it seems to me is the best example of that but having said that it is important to underscore once again that in so many ways asean not just within asia i would argue more generally within the global south is an excellent example of how small and medium-sized countries can get together an excerpt is not necessarily power but certainly influence in a way that in latin america we should certainly consider and pay heed to because there's much to learn from it thank you thank you very much jorge and you leave us with a lot of things to think and there's a big challenge for latin america to try to approach or or approach to what asean has done till now we only have one successful exercise in integrating positions and that's the pacific alliance and but that's mainly in terms of commercial issues more than political or geostrategic issues so we will have to work hard and definitely it's a very interesting uh model to follow and um this this notion of arctic non-alignment that you say that should be the way forward for latin america um that's a very interesting um concept to to explore and we hope that our authorities um i'm sure that they're considering this but it's difficult to put together all the countries of latin america in one in one with one view towards the world and towards the united states well we'll go down with and thank you so much jorge for that very interesting uh presentation on on the role of latin america and and asean we have many interesting questions now um i will go with one that that's here related with the united states it says how can the biden administration counter the influence that china has achieved through the belt and road initiative and the asian infrastructure investment bank since basically all s asean countries have subscribed to i don't know whether jeff or or stephanie or jorge whoever wants to take the floor you are free to do so i'll be happy to speak to it okay the the point it seems to me the notion that um you know somehow um the belt and road initiative has to be countered it seems to me is um you know a bit wrong-headed what these countries in southeast asia need not just the countries of latin america need they need more and better infrastructure there was one study on asian infrastructure that said asia needed had a deficit of eight trillion dollars in infrastructure that was updated now i think it's about 30 trillion dollars and what china is saying we want to provide some of that it seems to me what what the united states and western countries more generally should do if they want to compete they should say we are able to provide you with better uh projects with better financing than china does let us compete with that let us not forget that both the world bank and the imf in general western international financial institutions in the of the course of past two decades have basically gone out of the business of financing hard infrastructure they moved to soft infrastructure poverty elevation uh health education so that only fed this deficit that exists in heart infrastructure in the global south so what i would say is the best way for the united states to counter quote unquote the belt and road initiative is to provide more and better projects more and better financing for those projects thank you very much jorgen do you want to compliment or add something to that if not we move to the next question okay um we have here a question that draws our attention a bit out of what we have tackled now but it's uh something that normally is asked uh what is the asean view on china's claim over taiwan do they have an official position on this uh how are they they managing this relation yes jeff uh sure um what i would say is that if if any of the asean member states have a very strong opinion about china taiwan relations they tend to probably keep it to themselves much of the uh kind of agreement that china has whether with through strategic partnerships or within its ftas a lot of the political language that goes into these agreements is predicated on the acceptance of its partners state around the idea of a one china principle or one china policy depending on how you kind of parse it and asean member states have largely bought into that uh framework which i would which is just to say a an understanding of the status quo an understanding of the status quo is the preferred status quo being the current situation between taiwan and the mainland uh where unification and discussions of unification will happen over time in a peaceful manner and both sides commit to not using force although beijing has moved a little bit on its position with respect to that but mostly i think within the southeast asian community there's a desire to not become embroiled in that in that particular strategic calculation being much more focused on issues around for example the south china sea uh issues on the on on mainland southeast asia around the landsang mekong river and security cooperation around them more focal more focused on regional security issues rather than trying to get involved in that taiwan prc security dilemma that has become so central to the u.s china rivalry and it's become much more of a northeast asia issue with japan now coming out in under the suga administration and identifying certain approaches to taiwan in the events that it's the recipient of chinese aggression those discussions don't tend to feed into southeast asia as much that's just my reading of it i don't know if jorge and stephanie have some some other points at the top i mean i agree the only thing that i would have that i would add to that is that asean kind of at it at its essence if there is such a thing as an institution will um be very careful and avoid to taking on any kind of position that has to do with domestic affairs of of states you know even its own membership let alone states that are outside of its membership the only uh kind of position that or a kind of situation where asean would depart from that is if there were to be some kind of destabilizing incident or developments that would have an impact on regional stability overall then this is typically a situation where asean would come up with a very non-committal not taking sides you know position just to reassert the importance of maintaining you know regional peace and stability so if we if we were to see in the future and i don't want to speculate you know about that um too much but if we were to see some kind of destabilizing uh incident or event that had to do with cross-strait relations we could potentially perhaps expect asean to come out with you know some very vague statements about the need to preserve you know regional stability but again knowing that this is such a core interest and sensitive issue for china that approach would necessarily if if there is something to be said about it from from asean as an institution would be very very careful can i respond to carlos ambassador carlos question yes can you read it please do you have it there are you okay yes um so ambassador carlos portales long-standing director general of our chilean foreign ministry asks whether the recent references to the indo-pacific in a white paper on defense that the chilean foreign ministry sorry chilean defense ministry has just published and refers to the indo-pacific how that jives with asean's stance on the indo-pacific so let me speak to that very briefly it seems to me you know that that is exactly the wrong thing to do the very notion of indo-pacific is right now a very fluid one it is by no means established it is fashionable but it is by no means established it's a contentious issue china of course doesn't buy into it there are various versions of it there is a strong militaristic version of it which is the free and open in the pacific which is espoused by the united states uh india has a somewhat different view of that asean in turn has a different view so for the chilean ministry of defense to come out in an official document speaking about the indo-pacific gives exactly the wrong message this is something that should first be discussed at the level of the foreign ministry and then move forward to others but to have the ministry of defense using for the first time in an official document the notion of indo-pacific seems to me it gives exactly the wrong message this is not the way forward okay thank you very much jorge for that very content very solid um answer um we have another question that is related to your presentations and i think it's very interesting to to clarify it says powerful analysis and considerable overlap in the policy of prescriptions overlapped by jeff and jorge but how far do they reflect devoting approaches approaches in otawa and santiago is the move for towards a full-throated strategic competition with china irresistible case in point what about the pull towards cooperation with the quad as part of an indo-pacific architecture i i can take a first crack at that thank you from the canadian perspective and i do think that there's probably an irresistible pull to be part of a western conceptual approach to the asia-pacific i think unfortunately driven largely from the strategic thinking in washington dc which i would agree with jorge is over militaristic in its prescription about how to approach the region i think a lot of that is because of the shared values and the shared concern around how to manage china and how to engage with other democratic partnerships or other democratic states and within democratically led multilateral institutions there's a natural tendency i think to to look for those and to those as mechanisms for engagement i think at this particular moment in time however limiting oneself to that description that understanding of how to engage is self-defeating i think ultimately what you're you're going to find if ottawa does kind of embrace a western-led free and open indo-pacific and that that includes the indo-pacific concept coming out of japan uh that includes in my opinion the pacific uh concept coming out of the european union which it oddly is also quite militaristic with this idea of a significant eu led navy maintaining a presence in the indo-pacific region and france talking about deploying battleships in the uk sending its aircraft carriers to the south china sea this is very much becoming a western coalition of in many ways external partner external actors within the asia pacific region intent on preserving a degree of order there that has long been western-led and privileges western states over the asian states and the region and so i think that any approach that comes from ottawa should have a blended uh methodology to it one foot in the western field of understanding partnerships and democracy is very important but another foot firmly in the asia pacific region understanding that many states are moving away from democracy towards autocracy or towards other forms or mixed systems of government and you still have to engage with those states you can't put everything down on values that canada has interests that are much broader than a western leg coalition in the asia pacific region and as i mentioned this consolidation of institutions and economics and politics in southeast asia you can say the same thing about northeast asia the idea of south korea and japan and china becoming more integrated through trilateralism is now a possibility uh considering arseph is the first multilateral trade agreement that all have been a part of and you you really are seeing areas where asia's becoming more inward-looking and so i think that any state that wants to have a sustainable strategic approach to the region has to has to manage those regional dynamics that are often at odds with the western light approach okay let me jump in just very briefly well some refer to as the quad as an asian nato now that may be more wishful thinking than anything else but the fact that people refer to it in those terms tells you something in those terms you know getting closer to the choir aligning yourself with the quad is just the opposite of what i've been saying in terms of equidistance in terms of active non-alignment that is taking sides very clearly with one side now does chile want to do that do like an american country south america's number one trading partner is china does it want to join a military alliance against china i mean these things again words not just acts words have consequences so these are things that in the chilean foreign history should be considered and perhaps they need to talk with their colleagues in the defense ministry and make sure they really know what they are doing thank you very much jorge and jeff as well uh there is a question related to something that i mentioned actually in one of my comments that says related with the pacific alliance uh there is a current dialogue or or intention of a dialogue between asean and pacific alliance and there's a question from a former ambassador fernando reyes mata a chilean ambassador it says what is the interaction between asean and the pacific alliance as a possibility of new developments under today's expanding digital interactions i don't know if you have any views on that maybe hotkey that you that you're close to sure because right yes let me say the following it seems to me that much as i said earlier for latin america as a whole for the pacific alliance asean is extremely relevant it shows how a group of relatively small medium-sized countries can get together and have an impact on world affair on world affairs the pacific alliance is very far from that but it seems to me asean is a sort of role model that the pacific alliance can look towards and digital uh interaction is of course very critical in today's world we live in the digital era and anything that can be done to foster that is of course important now we do have one case um that is of a recent vintage and it shows you know how much more thought we need to give to that as you know there was this project of a trans-pacific fiber optic cable from china to china from chile china that was formally submitted by the chilean government fujian in 2016 which would have made chile into the digital gateway for china into south america which would have been of course extremely significant unfortunately because of the pressure of third parties that project was abandoned and right now what is on the table is a fiber optic cable from chile to australia which is you know not exactly the same thank you very much jorge for that um there are a couple of questions that more or less try to focus on the same issue um i'm gonna read the paul evans uh question that tackles other ones it says valuable discussion thank you very much for that is there the foundation for a chilean canadian joint venture on middle power cooperation on strategic outlook that's a very interesting question given that we're working together actually and and these two foundations at least to use the word for nation and uh but as you mentioned jorge and we are very like um no alberto van claren mentioned that we are like-minded countries and we always have similar positions in international foreign in the united nations etc do you think that there are the grounds to start a new era of cooperation in this field well i would ask jeff to take that on first i'll pass to stephanie well i'm happy to make some comments but i would i would really like to hear stephanie if you have comments i um my thoughts i mean i think that you know just in general from a canadian perspective it is you know absolutely crucial and important that we try to again move away from um the idea that we need to be primarily focused on on major power dynamics directly and to figure out a way to develop some uh you know useful collaborations and and and forms of cooperation with like-minded countries and in that sense clearly uh you know considering uh like-minded countries in latin america and in the case of chile in particular i think opens up some some possibilities when it when it comes to you know fleshing out uh whether that would look like a common kind of strategic outlook i wouldn't necessarily go as far uh partly because i think canada needs also to clarify with its strategic outlook or or or just you know general framework when it comes to engaging asia uh or or or you know taking kind of a a broad stance on current geostrategy shifts whether in the at the regional level or globally uh needs to be clarified right first before we we we can engage in that kind of in these kind of discussions but i do think that there are yes significant opportunities for for uh conversations and exchanges uh being similarly caught in the middle of that analogy and so far as this analogy actually holds maybe i just had two two quick things i think canadian chilean participation in the cptp provides a institutional foundation for engagement in the asia-pacific region i think that the cptpp is you know the the economic side the trade side allowing smaller i think powers to come together understanding of course japan is involved in the cptpp and one of the world's largest economies but many of the other economies that are part of the cptp are small to middle powers that engagement through trade forums such as that provide i think a a foundation for further strategic dialogue and i don't think we should dismiss offhand the the potential for that to become an area where we do see strategic discussion taking place if if we can talk about the five eyes uh u.s intelligence system uh sharing system as being a potential area for further strategic discussion going forward surely we can look to institutions like cptpp and rsep of course which canada is not a part of as as opportunities for discussion on economic issues that have strategic implications that would be the one area where i think we might find the most immediate opportunity for engagement the second point that i would just raise is i think it's critical for canada to think more about how to engage with not only chile but the other latin american pacific states in approaching the asia pacific region and i think when you look at the strategic dialogue that takes place within canada this is one area that is very very underdeveloped and it's something that i think we need to put more resources towards to think about what would a common approach to the region look like in particular because we're bringing a very certain geographic perspective to the asia region that that flies in in many ways in the face of the indo-pacific concept once again that focuses on the pacific that focuses on the asia pacific rather than the indo-pacific and it might make sense to reconsider this concept in line with that that nature of that partnership with canada with latin america and with chile is there a need to go further than the pacific into the indo-pacific and if so where is the rationale so i think that that discussion around how canada chile and latin american pacific states can engage could be a very important crucial consideration in that broader discussion of the relevance of the indo-pacific for for ottawa okay just very briefly let me say the following first chilean canada of course signed the first free trade agreement between the southern country and the northern country as far back as 1996 and there was a real you know watershed and it seems to me it would be interesting to explore new ways in which chile and canada can move forward as we did in 1996 which was such a significant moment the second point that i would like to make in this touch is what jeff just said in terms of the asia pacific and indo-pacific chile played a pioneering role in identifying the asia-pacific region as the most dynamic and happening region in the world in the 1990s joining apic in 94 and moving forward opening embassy is establishing all sorts of commercial offices across asia and we have been reaping the benefits from that now part of the reason chile has made all the progress it has made is because it you know it multiplies its exports 9-4 from 1990 to 2007 among other things because it managed to get into the asian markets now the irony here is that where chile now to play a pioneering role in embracing the notion of the indo-pacific and particularly in its strategic dimensions it might undo a significant part of that effort so uh beware of what you wish for thank you very much um jeff stephanie and jorge um we're over time i'm very sorry for that but i just want to give the chance to former president evan frey who we have put already as a speaker if he wants to take the floor make any comments uh president would you like to make any remarks or you feel like you're we're ready to adjourn this meeting if there's nothing to say we will give you one second to to consider i i haven't asked him before so this is just out of the just to give him the chance but well there you are president [Music] okay [Music] um chile a [Music] a [Music] reflect [Music] thank you very much to everyone you