Flashcards for:
Consciousness and Computation

It illustrates whether accurate physical measurements can capture consciousness, raising questions about the sufficiency of physical observations in explaining conscious experiences.

Considering consciousness as fundamental could lead to ontological frameworks where consciousness is an essential component of understanding reality, rather than a byproduct.

It suggests that defining consciousness is complex and analogous to the difficulty of scientifically explaining how life arises from non-life.

Observing consciousness from other perspectives remains speculative, as one can only truly observe their own conscious experiences.

Leibniz's perspective highlights a philosophical stance that conscious experiences (qualia) cannot be fully explained by non-conscious processes.

Ruliad suggests that different parts interact, but observation is limited, indicating conscious experiences might lie beyond current physical observation capabilities and laws of physics.

The 'Single Instance Problem' refers to the challenge of explaining consciousness only from one's own perspective, making it difficult to understand consciousness from others' perspectives.

The argument is that conscious experiences might exceed the scope of physical observation and the laws of physics, similar to the ruliad analogy.

Computation and mathematics describe the activity of consciousness, emphasizing the fundamental nature of observers with conscious experiences in the ontology.

Leibniz found it difficult because conscious experiences (qualia) remain unexplained scientifically, akin to the challenge of defining life from non-life.

It suggests that observation limitations may prevent us from accessing certain aspects of consciousness, potentially requiring new paradigms to understand fully.

Because consciousness is fundamental in ontology, and any notion of observers inherently implies the presence of conscious experiences.

Conscious experiences are directly known to the individual, while the physical world is an extrapolation from those experiences, making it questionable if physical observations alone can explain consciousness.

Physical observations may fall short because they are extrapolations rather than direct experiences, lacking the subjective quality inherent in conscious experiences.

It implies that knowledge derived from conscious experiences is more directly known, whereas knowledge of the physical world is inferential and possibly limited in explaining consciousness.