Transcript for:
Understanding Social Cognition and Its Influences

Title: someTitle URL Source: blob://pdf/c6a64bce-17d4-46f1-98ea-594dfc74c8f2 Markdown Content: What we shall notice in the external stimulus field, and what aspects of it will stand out, are largely a function of what we are prepared to see. The socially established norms of a given period create in us lasting expectations and a preparedness to see in the nature that surrounds us much to which another period would be totally blind . . . to a person brought up on oriental music, which is built chiefly upon rhythm and melody, the harmony of a musical work coming from a great European orchestra is almost sheer noise. (Sherif, 1936, pp. 6264) Humans are social animals in that they are dependent on one another for connectedness, self-esteem, and knowledge/understanding of the world (which exists only in the context of ones culture that establishes norms, expectations, attitudes, and values/morality). From Heider (1944) through Fiske (2014), these three social needs are elevated to be thought of as drives, equivalent in importance to the drives for self-conservation and conservation of the species. Self-esteem and connectedness (belongingness) are the focus of other chapters in this book, and we focus here on an examination of the drive for causal explanation and the pursuit of meaning social cognition . Heider (1944, p. 359) used the term social cognition to refer to deriving meaning from the organization of experiences in relation to standards of judgment (set by social norms and culture) and social values. A more familiar term, epistemology, is the study of the origin and nature of knowledge, whereas social cognition is concerned with the origin and nature of a specific type of knowledgethat formed about, or influenced by, people. Social cognition encompasses the way humans perceive stimuli, attend to information, categorize, form inferences, reason, and react affec-tively to and make judgments about the social world. An early definition can be traced to Heider (1958, p. 1): How one person thinks and feels about another person, how he perceives him and what he does to him, what he expects him to do or think, how he reacts to the actions of the other. The modern-day discipline of social cognition arose by fusing Heiders (1944, 1958) focus on explicit cognition used for sense making (and the work of his theoretical heirs Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967) with both Aschs (1946) study of how consistent and inconsistent information are perceived to form a coherent impression around an organizing principle (a central trait, a first impres-sion, etc.) and Bruners (1957) focus on implicit cognition (perception, attention, and judgment) as it is affected by socially derived needs of the perceiver. Other pioneering influences were (1) Gordon Allports (1954) chapter called The Cognitive Process that not only initiated a major theme of social # 3 # SOCIAL COGNITION # Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 38 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten cognitive researchstereotypingbut laid the foundation for the fields interest in mental represen-tations such as stereotypes, heuristics, traits, and prototypes as the filters through which the world is experienced and organized; (2) Leon Festingers (1957) model of cognitive dissonance (and the work of his mentor, Kurt Lewin) for emphasizing the motivated nature of cognition; (3) Henri Tajfels (1981) work on how the mere cognitive process of categorizing people (and objects) into groups based on trivial criteria create group preferences, which generated over 50 years of research that examines not merely intergroup conflict and within group favoritism/privilege, but social identity; (4) the incorporation of cognitive psychology procedures used to study memory to allow for the study of implicit impression formation in Hastie et al.s (1980) book Person Memory ; (5) work on automatic processing in cognitive psychology (e.g., Neely, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) as applied to per-son perception by Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977), Srull and Wyer (1979), and Bargh (1982); and (6) the cognitive response (Greenwald, 1968) and dual process models (e.g., Chaiken, 1980) of attitudes. All Cognition Is Social Ostrom (1984) famously declared the sovereignty of social cognition, heralding the arrival of a distinct field of inquiry that in many ways laid waste to the need to distinguish between social and nonsocial cognition. Ostrom (p. 3) proclaimed all knowledge is social knowledge, and all social knowledge derives from action on the environment. Ostroms reasoning is extended here in a way that hopefully does not alter his meaning or purpose: action on the environment is always in the service of the goals of the organism within that environment. That is, what makes cognition social is not merely the fact that people may be the content that is being processed. Additionally, the stimuluswhether person or objectmust be acted and reacted toward, and that this reaction occurs in the service of two distinct social forces: (1) the goals of the person in relation to that target stimulus, and (2) the social environment in which the target stimulus is nested (where, even if not physically present, the impact of other people is exerted through internalized norms, values, expectations, schemas, learning, etc.). What makes social cognition sovereign is the socially motivated nature of all cognitionany commerce with the environment introduces needs, motives, values, and goals that are part and parcel of social life, that are the guiding force of any action or reaction. As such, all cognition and behavior is governed by the volitional system in that it occurs within the context of the social goals of the perceiving organism in relation to the sociocultural forces existing in that setting at that time. As such, cognition is a tool that services the needs, intentions, and goals of the organism that are accessible at that moment in relation to a socially embedded stimulus. This sovereignty of social cognition is often not considered because experimental psychology mostly treats the social goals of the perceiver as an independent variable that is manipulated by explicitly asking people to adopt one goal versus another, so that the effects on cognition can be observed. This approach to equating goals with consciousness began when research on motiva-tion shifted from animal models to human models, creating fervor to study consciousness, and to see humans as a determining organism with free will and wants, with skills relevant to achieving those wants. But this approach ignores important questions of whether consciousness is (1) required for control (e.g., Bargh, 1990) or (2) the dominant mode through which control is manifested (e.g., Moskowitz, 2014). A sovereign social cognition requires altering our conception of control as a slave to consciousness, so that social forces are seen as implicitly guiding the nature of all cognition. From very early illustrations of the Zeigarnik effect, to how needs impact perception (Bruner & Goodman, 1947), to the Ames room, to the cocktail party effect, to the Stroop effect, we know that perception, attention, categorization, and most low-level cognitive functioning is guided by the social forces at play in the context in which that cognition occurs. > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 39 Perceiving People Versus Perceiving Objects Although all cognition was posited to be social, there are distinctions to be made between percep-tual targets that are social only in that they are objects nested within the perceivers social world, and those that are social because they not only exist within the perceivers social world but also have social lives themselves (people and animals). This distinction is traditionally identified as object versus person perception. Perceiving people involves psychological processes that in many ways are similar to those used in perceiving objects. With each, a target first becomes present to our percep-tual apparatus, occupies our focus of attention, and is categorized (often unconsciously). The raw material on which categorization is based consists primarily of physical properties of the object. With categorization come expectancies that inform perceivers about how to act. Targets that enter into our life-space must be understood, so that we know how to respond to them, and in both object and person perception the raw features of the target become percepts when they are met by the perceptual apparatus and transcribed into sensations to which the mind assigns meaning. But the nature of object and person perception significantly differs too. Intentionality and Theory of Mind A first difference between person and object perception is that person perceptions raw materials include behavior. Behavior can be random, but it usually reflects the willed activity of a sentient crea-ture. A developmental milestone is the realization that whereas objects can move, the movement of objects is due to random forces and external agents (wind, gravity, pressure, collision), whereas move-ment from people often reflects intentionality; a desire generated in the mind of the perceived person to engage in the observed behavior. Humans develop theory of mind (Wellman, 1990): A belief that the psychological state of others is separate from ones own and the belief in a relationship between that psychological state and behavior. Even a motionless human is perceived to have intentions we would never infer exist in objects. Forming inferences about the cause for a given action requires a perceiver to discern whether the act was initiated for reasons related or unrelated to the persons inten-tions (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965). Such deduction is unnecessary in object perception. Anticipation of Behavior People, as opposed to objects, are likely to be in flux and expected to change from moment to moment, especially as they shift from interacting with one person to another (Kenny, 1994). This highlights that people act in ways meant to affect their partners, because each interaction partner is relevant to the persons goals in unique ways. As a person will be adjusting behavior appropriately as partners change, a perceiver of that person is tasked with anticipating these changes by being able to predict what the person is likely to do in a given interaction by an inference regarding why they act. Objects stay the same across time and circumstance, people do not. And while objects can harm or help us, they do not try to. People may, and perceivers of people need to understand how the social environment in which an interaction occurs is likely to impact what goals that person will pursue (the why ) and how that person will act (the prediction). Person Perception Is Dynamic The people we perceive are themselves perceiving us, attempting to plan behavior and responses in anticipation of our acts, according to the inferences they make about us. When we infer intentionality from behavior we observe, we must realize not only that the person is aware he/she is being evalu-ated, but that they are evaluating us and have assumptions about what we expect or want. Thus, our > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 40 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten inferences about why others act as they do must incorporate the understanding that a part of what they do is simply a reaction to what they think we want or expect them to do, as opposed to a reflec-tion of their underlying goals. The dynamic of evaluation and being evaluated creates impression management and ulterior motive concerns that do not exist when perceiving objects. Regardless of the targets being an object or person, cognition will still be social as information is filtered through the mental representations of the perceiver. These mental representations are socially transmitted and learned through a lifetime of experience within a culture and its norms. Next, we examine the types of mental representations that serve as the lens through which all social cognition occurs. Interpreting and Organizing Information via Mental Representations The cognitive psychologist Bartlett (1932) was conducting research on how stories that were initially odd to perceivers were transmitted from person to person. Bartlett observed that the stories evolved as they were transmitted, eventually becoming more coherent to the perceivers, but losing some important detail from the original. He reasoned that people had prior knowledge about the form and structure of such stories, and that new information embedded in the story was interpreted and recalled in the context of their prior structures. He coined the term schemata (or schemas) to refer to a mental representation of a category of event in the external world (in this case, a type of story) that served to guide the way new information relevant to that category is understood. Schemas alter the way the information is encoded into and retrieved from memory by using old knowledge to fill in gaps and add inferences to new information, thus leading to the production of new knowledge that is an admixture of the new data and the prior knowledge specified by the mental representation. Perhaps the earliest application of the schema notion to social psychology was Aschs (1946) explora-tion of the role traits play in organizing information about a person. First impressions, as well as traits that were identified as more central than others, were shown to have the power to reorganize the narrative surrounding a set of information about a person. A coherent impression is formed around such traits, assimilating new information to fit with the meaning suggested by the organizing trait. Allport (1954) incorporated this cognitive view of a stimulus being integrated with mental representations to provide an early account of how social cognition operates, with stereotypes serving as a schema that directs how the behavior of a person can be distorted without prejudice or ill will (e.g., Lippmann, 1922). From its inception, social cognition has been concerned with examining the various forms that mental representations may take when filtering the stimulus bombardment from the social world. A basic assumption is that the experience of the social and physical world is constructed by the perceiver, and that the mental representations one uses for assimilating and making sense of information develop over a lifetime of experience in order to provide a framework for organizing incoming information, creating expectations and predictions regarding future events, and (re)pro-cessing information stored in memory. Schemas (Schemata) A schema is an organizational structure containing the abstract features that make up a category, rather than a simple collection of specific examples drawn from past encounters and specific behav-iors and attributes observed when interacting with specific people (or objects or events). Instead of a stockpile of relevant examples, the information one has about a category is conceived of as a list of possible attributes and behaviors that might be evidenced by a member of the category. In addi-tion to possessing an abstracted list of traits and behaviors, the schema is also assumed to contain the relationships that are known to exist among the features (Fiske & Linville, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 41 Taylor & Crocker, 1981). In this way, schemas provide more than a taxonomy of features, but also a sense of understanding the connections between the features and the rules that govern the features in question . Finally, they guide the manner in which new information is processed and selectively dictate what information is retrieved from memory (e.g., Fiske & Linville, 1980). This definition is not meant to exclude concrete examples from being contained within schemas. Rather, the schema is meant to hold all of ones knowledge about a person, object, or event. Taylor and Crocker (1981) state schemas can be conceived of as having a pyramid-like structure, with the more abstract knowledge at the top, and leading one to more and more specific features. Such a hierarchical structure requires that a single ancestry relationship exists (Lingle, Altom, & Medin, 1984, p. 98). This means that if one category (e.g., Catholics) is nested within another category (e.g., religious groups) which is in turn nested within another category (e.g., people), the members of the lowest level in this link (Catholics) must also be members of the highest level (people). Additionally, all of the features associated with the higher level categories in the hierarchy must also be true of the more specific instances. Our knowledge of Catholics does not need to contain the fact that they typically have limbs, because it is embedded within the category person, which has this feature. Collins and Quillian (1969) show that participants respond to statements such as a robin is a robin faster than statements such as a robin is a bird, which in turn is responded to faster than statements such as a robin is an animal. These differences in speed are consistent with a structure that is hierarchical. However, not all categories are nested within other categories in a hierarchical relationship. Some categories are linked to many categories in an overlapping fashion. Concepts that have many connec-tions and that get used frequently perhaps can develop strong associations to other concepts, and these strong associations may account for why people respond so quickly. The speed with which people reply that a robin is a bird may simply reflect a strong association between these two concepts that allows for the signal to travel faster, rather than to the fact that robin and bird are stored closer together in a structure than robin and animal. The exact structure of mental representations (if there is just one structure) is still a topic of interest in social cognition. This remains an important issue, because the way in which we conceive of the structure of the schema can impact on what we believe may get triggered when we encounter information linked to it. It has already been mentioned that schemas often lead people to see and remember information in a manner that is consistent with the schema. This is known as schema-consistent judgment and schema-consistent recall . For a fairly comprehen-sive early review of how schemas influence memory, we direct you to Alba and Hasher (1983). For a more complex view that details when and why schema-inconsistent information is sometimes given preference in recall and judgment, we direct you to Sherman (2001). Given this broad definition of a schema, research has evolved to detail a variety of distinct types of schemas. One example is the self- schema . Markus (1977) put forward the idea that our self-concept is in effect a mental representation to which all self-relevant information is linked. This includes abstract conceptions of the self that represent ones most cherished values, aspirations, and beliefs, as well as specific examples of behavior from ones past that linked to these central attributes. Markus (1977) showed that a self-schema will allow people to make judgments about a schema-relevant behavior or attribute fairly easily and quickly, to make predictions about future behavior relevant to that attribute or behavior fairly readily and accurately, and to resist discovering infor-mation about the self that is contrary to that which the schema would suggest to be true. Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) provided further evidence that ones vast reservoir of self-knowledge can help one to embellish material that is self-relevant by filling in the blanks and makes the encoding of that information richer and more complex. Another type of schema is the role or relational schema , which is a mental structure that captures the features (and relationships among those features) for the various roles that people play and the various types of social relationships that people enter into. Role schemas provide for us our > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 42 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten knowledge of the rules, norms, and expected behaviors that are associated with broad social catego-ries such as gender, age, and race, as well as the norms and behaviors associated with more specific types of categories relating to social positions, such as occupations and relationship status (brother, cousin, friend, etc.). To illustrate the influence of role schemas, Cohen (1981) asked research par-ticipants to watch a videotape that depicted a woman engaged in a variety of behaviors. Some watched the video with the understanding the woman was employed as a waitress, others believed she was a librarian. The details recalled differed between the two groups in a schema-congruent fashion. The librarian was more likely to be remembered as having glasses and liking classical music, the waitress was more likely to be recalled as being a beer drinker. Baldwin (1992) postulated that the relational schema does not only include summaries of typical action patterns, but thoughts, feel-ings, and motivations that permeate the relationship. Triggering the schema triggers these related emotions, goals, cognitions, and behaviors, making them more likely to impact on ones current information processing. Thus, feelings toward ones mother might impact on how one thinks about some new person if something about the current environment triggers the relational schema with mother (e.g., Andersen & Saribay, 2005; Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990). A final example is the event schema , which incorporates what have been called scripts and frames . Event schemas capture specific sets of action patterns associated with environments, dictating ways of behaving for specific situations. One example, a script , was defined by Schank and Abelson (1977) as a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation (p. 41). By its nature, the script specifies both procedures (how to act) as well as semantic knowledge that defines the situation and the elements within it. Thus, it contains information that specifies expectations but also the order of events. Procedurally, the script can be conceived of as a series of if-then clauses that dictate responses in the presence of certain conditions. Abelson defined three preconditions for scripted behavior: the attachment of an action rule to a script, a context that will serve to trigger the script, and a mental representation that can be triggered in memory given the appropriate context. One chooses to enter the script if a particular action rule is met (see Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). Scripts are similar to the work on frames in cognitive psychology, a term introduced by Minsky (1975). A frame was defined as a mental representation that contains information about stereotyped setting or situations, such as attending the opera, taking an exam, or going to work. Frames were proposed to be hierarchically structured, with the top levels specify-ing unwavering truths about the situation, such as the fact that ones office will be there when one arrives. The lower levels of the frame have slots . The slots specify the specifics of this particular instantiation of the frame. There is a default value for the slot if nothing unusual is happening within the situation. But if there is, the frame has built- in flexibility to tell you how to act. Prototypes Versus Exemplars Whereas schemas are defined by lists of associated features that are singly necessary and jointly suf-fi cient, prototypes describe a mental representation that is best represented by a central tendency, or a list of features that represent a typical category member (e.g., Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Rosch, 1975). When we think of birds we perhaps have a mental image of the prototype of a small, flying, singing creature (even though we can think of birds that are large, flightless, or songless). However, because prototypes are abstractions of sets of likely characteristics derived from personal experience, two individuals can have different prototypes for the same category. Cantor and Mischel (1979, p. 11) remarked: Clearly it would be difficult to find a set of necessary and sufficient features shared by all members of any particular person category that one would want to use as the definitive test > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 43 of category membership. For example . . . some extraverts seem primarily dominating and active rather than warm and sociable. Perhaps the classic illustration of the role of prototypes in person perception was provided by Cantor and Mischel (1977), who demonstrated that traits operate as prototypes. If we label someone as hav-ing a certain personality trait, then we think they have the other central features that make up the prototype for that personality trait. People then learn and remember information by categorizing it according to the prototypes, generating missing information (filling in the gaps in their knowledge) using the prototype to distort the new information being learned. Medin (1989) suggested that categories do not consist of summaries of highly probable features of the typical member, but of specific examples of actual members known as exemplars . Thus, rather than there being an abstracted sense of the sorts of features a typical extravert might possess, the category extravert would instead be conceived of as a set of actual extraverts one has encountered in ones experience. Smith and Zarate (1992) defi ne an exemplar as a cognitive representation of an individual that can range from being a fairly complete list of the features of a specific person to one marked by only a few key features that are seen as descriptive of the person. Thus, when categoriz-ing, this view proposes that exemplars are brought to mind, and if the current person matches or fits the exemplars from a given category, that category is used to describe the new person (e.g., Lingle et al., 1984). Murphy and Medin (1985) argue that the exemplar view better represents category structure because it can go beyond the prototype view in explaining how categories function. They argue that variability within a category is not captured well by prototypes. For example, variability is easily captured by a mental representation that stores examples of restaurants one has encoun-tered, but not by one that has an abstracted list of typical features of restaurants (which discards such specifics). Smith and Zarate (1992) proposed that which exemplars are retrieved and used is determined by many contextual factors, and the way in which a person is judged and treated, therefore, will be dependent on the exemplar to which that person is being compared. For example, a Black professor is offered as an example of someone who could be categorized according to relevant exemplars of Blacks or professors. The context (Black Lives Matter march versus keynote address) can determine which category is most likely to be triggered and which exemplars will impact processing. Once again, whether an exemplar or a prototype is triggered will determine how we interpret the behav-ior we are observing. Mindsets The concept of mindset was introduced by Klpe (1904) to explain the fact that asking people to solve a specific task created a related cognitive orientation (i.e., a set) which facilitated the task at hand (as well as related tasks), but hampered solving unrelated tasks. Relevant cognitive procedures become activated when working on a task, and these procedures themselves, rather than any spe-cific semantic content, facilitate the respective task and are thus functional to task completion (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990). Higgins and Chaires (1980) provided a first test of the idea that rather than specific semantic content, mindsets or general cognitive orientations can be used as the guide through which infor-mation is filtered and processed. The general cognitive orientation they made accessible was the use of what they called interrelational constructs, meaning the type of relationship between objects/ people that exists when we use terms such as or versus and. In one experiment, an object and its container was described with either the conjunction and or the preposition of ; half of the participants saw a list with such phrases as carton of eggs and the other half saw such phrases as > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 44 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten carton and eggs. After priming the orientations, participants were asked to perform an ostensibly unrelated task the Duncker candle problem. The priming of the different mindsets facilitated task performance differently. People primed with and as a grammatical connective were more likely to solve the problem than those primed with of, because it created a mindset promoting thinking about objects as separate entities, which is an insight needed in order to solve the problem. Similarly, Sassenberg and Moskowitz (2005) induced a creativity mindset by asking participants to remember three situations in which they had behaved creatively. This reduced peoples reliance on typical associations (e.g., fire was less likely to be associated with flame; social stereotypes were less likely to be associated with Black men). Typical associates were not merely suppressed, but remote and atypical associations were retrieved (Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Fetterman, & Kessler, 2017). Accessible mindsets shape how stimuli are interpreted and alter how they are used. Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller (1990) found that there are unique mindsets associated with how people go about pursuing goals, which shape how we see goal-relevant information and take action. A deliberative mind- set is a cognitive orientation in which people evaluate and select a goal among many alternatives that could possibly be pursued at a given point in time. In contrast, the implemental mind-set is concerned with specific planning on how to pursue or implement a chosen goal. In their experiment, participants were given either a deliberative or an implemental mindset as part of an initial task. The participants were then asked to perform a second experi-ment, in which they were presented half-finished fairy tales and asked to complete the stories. Were they described as being deliberate and lost in thought like Hamlet, or quick to act like James Bond? Deliberative mindset participants tended to ascribe deliberative actions to the main charac-ter, from contemplating courses of action to seeking advice. Implementation mindset participants had their characters plunge headfirst into action. Heuristics The term heuristic was imported to social psychology from the field of artificial intelligence. Chase and Simon (1973) asserted that algorithms that exhaustively worked on a problem until a correct solution was reached had the problem of running endlessly and at times being unable to come to a solution, and thus did not mimic the way in which the human mind functioned. Humans do not engage in a strategy of maximizing (seeking optimal solutions to problems), but instead use a strategy of satisficing (seeking adequate solutions). Adequate solutions could be reached by relying on shortcuts in processing called heuristics. Liberman (2001, p. 294) defined a heuristic as a moderately diagnostic way to generate a judgment, known to be suboptimal, but relatively easy to use compared with more optimal judgment strategies. By moderately diagnostic, it is meant that the use of a heuristic when making a judgment (such as judging whether a person whose behavior you have observed is an egalitarian person) provides a better basis for judgment than chance, but does not deliver the guarantee of a 100 percent correct judgment that an algorithmic strategy might be able to deliver. But for the most part, the heuristic is believed to produce accurate judgments most of the time. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) provide some concrete illustrations to help us through this abstract notion of cognitive shortcuts and that reveal how the use of such shortcuts can be sub-optimal. What we will see is that the rules people use to make decisions are fairly rational given ones limited information. But the rules are only useful if uncertainty exists or too much effort is required to arrive at a more complete and accurate judgment. When we could well engage in accu-rate analysis, and when uncertainty is reduced by the presence of useful data, reliance on heuristics leads to biased decisions. We will review three such heuristics here: representativeness, simulation, and availability. > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 45 The representativeness heuristic is a rule whereby people make decisions regarding the prob-abilities that govern relationships between entities (e.g., people and categories) based on the degree to which one is representative of the other. They follow a rule that seems to say, if it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck. One need not observe the creature for weeks or conduct an examination to conclude that it is. The entity has an appearance that is representative of the category. Representativeness is said to guide judgment when a rule is used that dictates the decision is based on such a resemblance. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) provide a good example. If you hear Bob is quiet, is shy, reads a lot, and has an obsession with detail and orderliness, and then you are asked to decide if Bob is a farmer or a librarian, you will base your probability estimate on how well the description of Bob matches your category for librarians or farmers and decide that Bob is a librarian. The problem with this strategy is that we tend to use it in isolation and ignore other relevant information. This creates bias by leading us to ignore base rates. A base rate is a prior probability, a factual description or statistical accounting that describes the situation you are in. For example, if I tell you that Bob lives in a community where 80 percent of the people are farmers, your decision should then be better served to guess that Bob is a farmer. However, people are notoriously bad at paying attention to base rate information and instead simply use heuristics and assume a similarity indicates a real relationship. There are times where we make decisions by running a simulation modelwe act like experi-menters and say to ourselves, what would happen if this happened, versus what would happen if that happened. In terms of categorizing people, we might want to simulate the different behaviors and features another person would possess and display in order to help us categorize. When we encounter Pat, a person whose gender we cant initially determine, a simulation could take the form of if that person was categorized as a woman we would expect to see features x, y, and z versus if that person was categorized as a man we would expect to see features a, b, and c. We simulate the outcomes of these experiments in our minds, and make decisions accordingly. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) named this consideration of alternative possible outcomes the simulation heu-ristic because complex questions are answered about both future and past events, including predic-tion, assessments of probabilities, and assessments of causality, through the running of a simulation model. Simulation may be done proactively, and by acts of conscious will, to help us evaluate pos-sibilities. They can also be engaged in after an event has occurred, especially when some alternative outcome (either better or worse) very nearly occurred or when antecedents to that event were exceptional in some way (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986). How does the use of the simulation heuristic impact the types of judgments people make? Kahneman and Tversky (1982) demonstrated that mental simulation and considering the coun-terfactual realities surrounding an event produces amplification of emotional reactions. Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) found both increased joy and increased regret depending on the salient counterfactual alternative among the reaction of Olympic athletes. Athletes who won silver medals were rated as appearing less joyful than athletes who won the bronze, despite the better objective finish for the silver medalists. Medvec et al. explained this effect by noting that for silver medalists, the salient counterfactual alternative is winning a gold medal, whereas the salient counterfactual alternative for bronze medalists is not receiving any medal. Wells and Gavanski (1989) illustrated that mental simulation can have a strong impact on how we form impressions and reach conclusions about people. They presented research participants with a story of a paraplegic couple who was denied a cab ride. The couple then decided to take their own car, and the car ended up plummeting off a bridge that had collapsed, killing them both. In two versions of the story, the outcome for the paraplegic couple is the same; however, in one version of the story, the outcome is highly mutable and in another it is not. The mutable version has the cab driver using the same bridge and making it across, the immutable version has the cab driver also plummeting off the bridge. Mutability is > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 46 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten essential to mental simulation. The cab driver is rated as more responsible and his decision to avoid the couple as more causal in their death when the cab driver successfully navigated the bridge than when he did not. Despite the same outcome for the couple and the same behavior on the part of the cab driver in the two versions of the story, the ease of simulating an alternative reality alters the way in which you categorize, interpret, and assign blame. As a final example of a heuristic there is availability when some information comes to mind quickly, this ease of retrieval is usually thought to signify something. People believe that things that are easily called to mind are things that they encounter frequently, that happen often, and that are likely to be true. When an example is easily made available in memory, and this availability in memory is then used as a proxy for something meaningful about the example, the individual is using a heuristic. That associative bonds are strengthened by repetition is perhaps the oldest law of memory known to man. The availability heuristic exploits the inverse form of this law, that is, it uses strength of association as a basis for the judgment of frequency. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, p. 164) A problem with this strategy is that the ease with which we can recall something, the extent to which something is accessible to us, is not always a reflection of its actual frequency in the world; accessibility may instead stem from familiarity or salience . When we are familiar with something it may come to mind quite readily, and we may think it is more probable than it really is. Additionally, something may be highly memorable because of its salience its extremity, vividness, or novelty and not because it is frequently encountered or likely to be true. If asked whether Americans are more likely to be killed by terrorism or in bathroom accidents, the typical person will answer ter-rorism, as it is easier to call to mind than a bathroom accident. It is a highly vivid event that garners media attention. People use the fact that it comes to mind to signify that it happens frequently, when all it signifies is that it is vivid and easily recalled. As a first empirical illustration of the availability heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) had participants memorize a list of names. The names contained famous persons of both genders; however, in some cases the names of the men were better known than the names of the women (e.g., Richard Nixon versus Lana Turner), and for other participants the list contained names with women relatively more well-known than men (e.g., Elizabeth Taylor versus William Fulbright). Some of the participants were asked to judge the frequency of men and women in each list. In actuality they were equivalent, and all that differed was the fame of one of the groups. Other par-ticipants were asked to simply recall as many names from the list as possible. The results revealed that the group that had the more famous names was judged to be the more frequent one in the list, and was more likely to have members of its group recalled. Schwarz et al. (1991) provide a clever illustration of the heuristic. People were asked to list assertive (or unassertive) behaviors from their own past, and then were asked to judge their own assertiveness. One might think that the more instances of assertive (unassertive) behavior one can list the higher the ratings of ones own assertiveness (unassertiveness). However, if people pay atten-tion to subjective experiences, such as ease of retrieval when making such judgments, the opposite would occur. If something is diffi cult to recall it might lower ratings (I might reason, if I have such trouble listing assertive behaviors, I must not be that assertive). Indeed, recalling many instances of assertive behavior (such as 12 examples from ones past) is hard for people to do, whereas recalling a handful of experiences (such as six examples from ones past) is not. Schwarz et al. found that in the easy condition we see the intuitive result. Participants rated the self as more assertive when they described six assertive versus six unassertive behaviors; people in the difficult condition showed a > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 47 reversal; those who described 12 unassertive behaviors saw themselves as more assertive than those who described 12 assertive behaviors. This suggests that people use an availability heuristic, even when judging the self, whereby ease of retrieval guides judgment. Implicit Cognitive Processes Much of everyday thinking about people occurs (a) despite the fact we lack conscious intention to initiate it, (b) beyond our control , in that it occurs even if we wish it was not initiated or want it to stop once started, (c) efficiently (i.e., with minimal use of cognitive resources), or (d) when we lack awareness of it. These four features specify if an aspect of person perception is automatic , yet do not comprise a discrete class that makes thought categorically automatic. Automaticity is a continuous variable best conceptualized as a matter of degree rather than kind, with the combination of fea-tures present specifying varieties of automaticity (Bargh, 1994). Much of our thinking about people is one of these varieties it has several (if not all four) features of an automatic process. Bruner (1957) described a series of mental events that happen prior to consciousness: (1) per-ceiving a set of stimuli, (2) differentially attending to one stimulus vs. another, (3) detecting the features that characterize the attended-to stimulus, (4) matching those features against stored rep-resentations in memory, (5) identifying or classifying the stimulus, and (6) making inferences about what other features (that have not yet been detected) are likely to appear in that stimulus. All these preconscious steps, as argued earlier, are social processes not only in that people are the target of ones cognitive processing, but also in that each of these processes is guided by norms, goals, atti-tudes, expectations, and values. Perception Despite the earliest work on social cognition being centered on how perceptual experience is impacted by needs, only a handful of social cognition studies have examined the social nature of perception. Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies (1948) conducted an experiment that nicely illus-trates the impact of values on perception. In the experiment, words were presented to people on a screen, with presentation speed starting subliminally and gradually slowed until a word could be consciously identified. The participants were asked to watch the screen and report when they could actually see something. The words were carefully selected so that they were values that one could embrace to varying degrees. The experimenters assessed the extent to which participants valued each of these constructs and its relationship to their speed of detection. They found that constructs that participants had listed as being important to them were perceived at a faster rate than those valued less. This suggests people are perceiving stimuli prior to conscious recognition differentially as a function of its value to them. Bruner and Goodman (1947) proposed that the need associated with a stimulus leads to the perception of the stimulus to be altered in line with the need-state. If the object is something we value, we will accentuate it in our perception, so that its perceived size grows as the value of the object grows. To demonstrate this, Bruner and Goodman asked participants to hold an object in their palm and draw it using a variable circular patch of light controlled by a knob. The object was either a coin or a disc the size of a coin. They found drawings of coins to be distorted relative to discs of the same size, so that money (something valued) was seen as larger than an object of the same size. Even more dramatically, this did not vary directly with the size of the coin, but with the value of the coin. A nickel is larger than a dime, but the relative distortion of size (of a nickel compared to a nickel-sized circle and a dime relative to a dime-sized circle) was greater for a dime than for a nickel (and was greatest for a quarter). This occurred despite the fact that the object they > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 48 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten were asked to perceive and draw was being held in the palm of their hand as they were drawing it. Moreover, distortions in drawings of coins were greater for poor participants (who presumably needed money more) relative to rich participants. Two recent experiments examining perceptual distortion are descendants of this task. Levin and Banaji (2006) had participants perceive the darkness of a persons skin tone after manipulat-ing whether he was believed to be Black or of mixed race. Labeling a face as that of a Black man changed perception of the darkness of his skin. This points to a perceptual bias rather than a response bias, because the task asked participants to match the color of a square to the darkness of the skin tone they saw as they looked at it. When the image (which was in fact a morphed compos-ite of a Black and White face) was labeled as an image of a Black man, the color of the square was adjusted to be darker. Eberhardt, Dasgupta, and Banaszynski (2003) similarly examined the effects of racial labels and implicit beliefs on face perception. Participants saw a racially ambiguous face labeled as either Black or White and were asked to reproduce the face by drawing it while looking at it. The results showed that the drawings produced were distorted so that the face was consistent with the racial label distorted to fit the stereotype. Moskowitz, Olcaysoy Okten, and Gooch (2015) illustrated that time perception is impacted by ones motivation to control prejudice. Two variables known to impact the perception of time are arousal and attentional focus (Church, 1984). Heightened arousal, for example, will slow time perception so that a given duration (30 seconds, for example) will be perceived to have arrived sooner (after only 20 seconds, for example), making the actual duration feel longer. Moskowitz et al. reasoned that cross-group interactions are known to be stressful, tense, and arousing, even among people who are motivated to be unbiased, because such interactions create a concern with appear-ing prejudiced in the eyes of others. The more one is concerned with the appearance of bias, the more stressful, taxing, anxiety provoking, and arousing interactions with members of stereotyped groups become. This led to their hypothesis that time perception should be impacted by race, but only among people concerned with the appearance of being biased. In their experiments, the dura-tion of an image of an African American man was perceived as longer than the same duration of an image of a White man. Finally, outside the domain of race, Balcetis, Dunning, and Granot (2012) show desires influence on ambiguity during early stages of visual processing using the phenomena of binocular rivalry. Ambiguity is created by exposing each of the perceivers eyes to separate images (e.g., a letter in one and a number in the other). In such cases of rivalry, the perceptual experience is of only one image. They found that the desires of the participants predicted which image was experienced when the images appeared for only 300 ms. They perceived images associated with rewards more often than those associated with costs. Selective Attention What behaviors from among all enacted in the environment enter consciousness and are further scrutinized? Cognitive psychologists have long known that decisions regarding what stimuli one attends to are made prior to consciousness. For example, without consciously trying, one detects ones own name leaping from what previously was an apparently undecipherable din of noise (the cocktail party effect). Social cognition offers many examples of motivated attention. The automatic nature of attention to self- relevant stimuli has been shown in a variety of ways. Bargh (1982) used a dichotic listening task, in which people were instructed to ignore the informa-tion coming into one ear through headphones while performing a task focused on the information presented in the other ear. Despite deliberately trying to ignore what was presented to the first ear, when it contained self-relevant information, performance at the focal task in the focal ear declined > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 49 because attention was being distracted. Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992) used a task in which six items arranged in a circular array were flashed at people quickly. When memory for these items was later tested, they found the objects that a given participant had strongest attitudes toward were more likely to get noticed. Attention was captured by that which we like, despite us not being aware. Moskowitz, Li, Ignarri, and Stone (2011) reasoned that people who afford opportunities to goal pursuit are self-relevant and should receive preferential attention. They presented participants with four images of people, and explicitly gave them the goal of focusing on the one with a bow tie. They found that attention was nonetheless distracted by the images of the people to be ignored (with a regular tie) if those images afforded an opportunity to help address an implicit goal of being egalitarian that was simultaneously induced in half the participants (see also Moskowitz, 2002). Selective attention is not only directed at items of personal value; threatening stimuli also receive preferential attention. Pratto and John (1991) showed heightened attention to negative stimuli. Negative items presented as distracters to a focal task caused a slow-down in the task relative to positive items, because these negative items were more likely to capture and keep attention. Simi-larly, Trawalter, Todd, Baird, and Richeson (2008) found that White participants directed attention towards Black faces, presented for only 30 ms, which they construed as threatening, more quickly than to White faces. This is a presentation duration too short for people to have consciously directed their attention to a particular face, given that it takes about 180200 ms for eyes to move from one fixation to another (Fischer & Ramsperger, 1984). However, if the threat posed by the Black faces was mitigated by presenting pictures with averted eye gaze, attention was no longer directed to the photographs of Black men. Feature Detection Just as perceiver-based factors lead to selective attention, features of the social stimuli that are being perceived similarly shape how limited attentional capacity is rationed. Fiske (1980) described stimulus information that is unusual for example, extremity in action and exhibiting negative qualitiesas being powerful at grabbing attention. Among the earliest research on implicit pro-cesses in person perception is that focused on features that make social stimuli likely to grab atten-tion without awareness (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Such features not only include negativity and extremity but, as with object perception, include those that are intense, changing, complex, novel, and unit- forming (McArthur, 1981, p. 202). Analyzing the features of social stimuli occurs so quickly not only because it helps ration atten-tion, but also because it is a precursor to, and necessary for, categorization. It allows one to identify what group a person falls into; one who is either harmful or beneficial to ones survival needs. Facial expressions are a form of nonverbal communication that Darwin (1872) believed transmitted information regarding the persons value to survival. As such, the processing of facial expressions should become habitual, routine, and happen automatically. Hansen and Hansen (1988) supported this notion that people discern whether another person is to be categorized as a threat through implicit evaluation of their facial features (such as frowns). Their experiments revealed asymmetry in how people detected positive versus negative faces. Indeed, a rich history of research on the perception of nonverbal cues, thin slices of behavior, and emotional displays reveals the power of the processing of features quickly, automatically, in shaping subsequent action, and evaluation. It is true that many nonverbal behaviors are initiated with the conscious intent of communicating a particular feeling or piece of information. However, these same emotions and beliefs can leak out without such intent through nonverbal behavior. Ekman (1992) described a nonverbal sign, a smile of true joy, which involves moving muscles around the eye that are difficult to control and that could not be duplicated with a fake smile. It happens > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 50 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten naturally and communicates ones happiness regardless of what one consciously wishes to com-municate. Automatic features in ones nonverbal display reveal underlying emotions and beliefs, at times having the undesired effect of undermining and opposing what is being verbally communi-cated (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Mehrabian & Wiener, 1967). For example, facial micro-expressions reveal when one is lying (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). Just as with producing nonverbal cues, being attuned to detecting them is often automatic. Though we can consciously scan for facial features and body language that betrays the persons underlying intent, more often perceivers use rules of inference that they do not even consciously report knowing, let alone using. For example, Chawla and Krauss (1994) had research participants try to determine whether a speech they watched was spontaneous or rehearsed. Without realizing, their attention was focused on features unrelated to the content of what was being said and related instead to how it was being saidhow fluent the speech was, the hand gestures used, the timing between the gestures and the words, and the relationship gestures had with the persons problems with lexical access. Recent research on feature detection has focused on the question of how people perceive faces (e.g., Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008), such as what facial features imply traits (e.g., Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004; Livingston & Brewer, 2002), how alterations in those features change the perceptual experience (such as the degradation of a facial stimulus and its impact on the perception of the category to which the person belongs, e.g., Martin & Macrae, 2007), and which brain regions are used uniquely to process facial stimuli (e.g., Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002; Kanwisher, 2000; Mitchell, Macrae, & Gilchrest, 2002) and allow faces to be processed more easily than other types of visual information (Yin, 1969). For example, Todorov, Said, Engell, and Oosterhof (2008) illustrated the facial cues perceivers rely on as a perceptual basis of judgment. They identified trait dimensions people use to charac-terize faces by analyzing ratings of neutral faces. This revealed two broad dimensions perceived in facesdominance (power) and valence (trustworthiness). This corresponds well with research suggesting that the dimensions of status/competence and warmth/valence dominate interpersonal judgments (Asch, 1946; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Osgood et al., 1957). Using computer models, they next generated digitized images of faces that varied according to these two dimensions and systematically examined how the evaluation of a person changes with these slight alterations in the persons facial features. This shows precisely how cues detected in the face are perceived and signal information to the perceiver about the qualities of the person, allowing for the person to be categorized and inferences drawn. Categorization The nonconscious processing of features impacts how a person is identified and categorized. The features detected in faces flashed at extremely fast exposures (e.g., 100 ms) lead to identifying those faces with categories such as competence (and threat ; Todorov et al., 2008). The categories implicitly drawn from memory to identify people range from group memberships, such as sexual orientation (Rule & Ambady, 2008) and race (e.g., Livingston & Brewer, 2002) and their associated stereotypes, to labeling a person with personality characteristics. These include both personality categories that are harmful to a perceiver, such as aggression (Bar, Neta, & Linz; 2006) and threat, and those beneficial to the perceiver, such as trustworthiness (Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009) and competence. Brewer (1988) asserted there are a limited number of social categories that are used consistently e.g., age, ethnicity, race, and sexand automatically while identifying a person. Exactly which from among these several potential categories becomes the immediate identity inferred and serves as a superordinate category that organizes later conscious processing depends on features of the context, the perceiver, and the target. Fiske and Neuberg (1990, p. 10) state that qualities which possess > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 51 temporal primacy, have physical manifestations, are contextually novel, are chronically or acutely accessible in memory, or are related in particular ways to the perceivers mood will tend to serve the role of category label. Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995) found that once a person is catego-rized according to one group, inhibition of competing categories ensues. Thus, reacting to a person in terms of race inhibits categories such as gender (and vice versa). Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1996) also found that once a stereotypic category was activated, incompatible content was inhibited. Trope (1986) similarly argued that how a person is categorized is shaped by more than the stimulus features detected, and he suggested three types of influences on identification. The first is the features detected in the stimulus, such as the behavior the person has enacted (from overt action to facial expressions). The second is the situation or context in which the observed features occur. For example, funerals and parties may lead the same facial features/expressions to be categorized differently (sadness vs. joy). Casper, Rothermund, and Wentura (2010) showed that in one context a stereotype was, unconsciously, used to categorize a person, yet in a different context it was not. The third is prior information about the stimulus target (e.g., stereotypes about the groups the per-son belongs to and expectancies built up through past interactions with the person). For example, past knowledge of a person will help you categorize the persons action, because knowing that the person often cries, or having a stereotype that members of this persons group are prone to cry-ing, will determine if the persons behavior is identified as crying (e.g., Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Trope & Liberman, 1993). Once having either categorized a person to a social group or identified the persons behavior as being of a certain type, the perceiver is now armed with information, all delivered without impli-cating consciousness, that serves several further functions. First, the person is prepared to make a preconscious decision as to whether further processing is necessary by assessing the relevance of this identified person to current goals and purposes (Brewer, 1988). If no relevance is determined, no conscious thought needs to be engaged. Second, the person is able to access associated information in memory that is linked to the category in question, and this allows the perceiver to form infer-ences about what is likely to be encountered, beyond that which has been seen. Third, impressions of other people are not fully formed at the moment they have been categorized. The implicit inputs that categorization provides serve as an anchor for subsequent conscious processing (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Jones, 1979; Trope, 1986). Inference Categories are nested in a mental network of associated concepts, goals, and emotions, all of which can be triggered in memory, thus providing perceivers with knowledge about the category that is useful for making predictions about the social world (Bruner, 1957). For example, McArthur and Apatow (1983) found that a facial appearance with features characteristic of infants (big head and eyes) leads to being perceived as having a baby face. This category then triggers in perceivers these specific impressions (inferred personality traits): nonthreatening, kind, loveable, flexible, weak, and naive. The entire literature on implicit stereotyping is predicated on the idea that associated with social categories are socially learned/shared beliefs about a member of a given category, the stereotype. Stereotypes have been shown to be pulled from memory for most perceivers, even those who denounce the stereotype associated with the category (e.g., Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Sherman, 2001). This occurs even if the category is not recognized as being encountered (e.g., when subliminally presented). The association between the category and the stereotype is dominant, and the percep-tion of the person is imbued with inferences that the associated knowledge affords. Stereotypes (and other inferences associated with a category) allow one to go beyond the information given, to make > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 52 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten predictions about what is likely to occur and how to act accordingly. As such, an inference that an individuals category membership is linked to a set of beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes is ubiquitous in person perception (Allport, 1954). To illustrate that an inference has been made outside of consciousness, researchers have drawn from methods developed in cognitive psychology. For example, it is common to illustrate a ste-reotype has been retrieved from memory by using a lexical decision task (Neely, 1977). Stimuli representing the category are presented, and reaction times to stereotypes associated with the cat-egory are assessed, with facilitated responses indicating the category triggered the stereotype (e.g., Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dovidio et al., 1986; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Duinn, 1998). The precise way in which category priming facilitates inference is a topic of ongoing research. For example, priming can be explained using Ratcliff and McKoons (1988) retrieval theory of priming, which assumes that the items in working memory and the targets of the lexical deci-sion form a compound cue. The familiarity of this cue determines the response time. Individuals accumulate evidence until the set criterion for familiarity is reached before they categorize a target as word (Ratcliff, Smith, & McKoon, 2015). Alternatively, priming effects can be explained using a spreading activation logic, whereby knowledge is linked in memory to other knowledge with which it is associated. When a particular piece of knowledge is triggered, or when one has catego-rized a stimulus, the activation of that knowledge travels along an associative network to trigger associated knowledge, even that not currently detected. There is spreading activation such that related concepts are triggered as well. The stronger the association, the faster and the more likely that the activation will spread (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Not all unconscious inferences are about stereotypes. The foundational work in this area was done on the topic of trait inference more generally (e.g., Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). A spontane-ous trait inference (STI) is said to occur when perceivers explain another persons behavior with traits without being aware that such an inference has been formed and with the inference occurring in the absence of an explicit intention to infer traits or form an impression. In illustrating that people infer trait categories outside of conscious awareness, research has used methods such as implicit learning and memory tests (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), cued recall tests (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), misattribution of recognition (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), and a recognition probe reac-tion time task (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). This body of work on STIs supports Aschs (1946, p. 258) assertion that we look at a person and immediately a certain impression of his character forms . . . with remarkable rapidity and great ease. Part and parcel of categorizing behavior is an inference about what might have caused the behavior, with the implicit answer often being a trait. More recently, other forms of inference were shown to be routinely used to make sense of behaviorgoal inference (Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005) and evaluative inference (Schneid, Carlston, & Skowronski, 2015). A spontaneous goal inference is implicit in the same ways as trait inference, but rather than the inference being to ones invariant personality, the inference is to variant goals and intentions that are tethered to specific situations or individuals (Malle, 2008; Moskowitz & Olcaysoy Okten, 2016). Recent research has grappled with the question of whether goal inference is primary and used to construct a sense of a persons personality, or whether trait inference is more immediate, with a sense of a persons goals only being derived from knowledge of the type of person they are (e.g., Malle & Holbrook, 2012; Read, Jones, & Miller, 1990; van der Cruyssen, van Duynslaeger, Cortoos, & van Overwalle, 2009; van Overwalle, van Duynslaeger, Coomans, & Timmermans, 2012). Inferences about others do not require having detailed information. It occurs with brief obser-vations of even nonverbal behavior ranging from 1 to 30 seconds in length (what Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999 called thin slices of behavior ), and even in the absence of any information > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 53 about a person more than a still image (what Kenny, 1994, called zero acquaintance ). Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) found perceivers make judgments of others, based on the features they detect in these brief exposures similarly as those who observe these others over extended periods. Perhaps the most pervasive type of inference perceivers make outside of awareness is about the broad traits of warmth and competence. In a series of studies where people were asked to form impressions of others from a list of traits, Asch (1946) found the power of the dimension warmth to dramatically alter the emerging impression. Using a very different approach, Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968) gave participants a list of 64 traits to sort. Multidimensional scaling was used to examine the themes emerging in the sorts. A sociability and intellectual dimension emerged that mirrors what others have called, respectively, warmth and competence. Peeters (1993), again using different language, described national stereotypes with two dimensions that parallel warmth (e.g., conciliatory, tolerant, trustworthy) and competence (e.g., confident, ambitious, intelligent). Most recently, Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002) have pointed out that ethnic and gender stereotypes often fit into the four categories resulting from crossing these dimen-sions. Fiske et al. (2007) find these four quadrants from crossing these two dimensions result in distinct emotions associated with each quadrantpity (warmth and incompetence), envy (low warmth and high competence), admiration (higher warmth and high competence), and contempt (low warmth and incompetence). Judgment When one wants to start a lawnmower or paint a room, there is an initial step of preparedness taken, a readiness for action called priming . The human mind also gets primed prior to judgment. There is a mental preparedness, a perceptual readiness, which precedes responding. This occurs when a category and its associated knowledge is pulled from long-term memory and momentarily resides in working memory, even though the perceiver is unaware of this chain of events. Importantly, it does not matter what caused the priming. Once a concept is primed, it has the power to shape how people who are next encountered are judged, such as leading that persons behavior to be seen as consistent with the prime (e.g., Higgins, 1996). Bruner (1957) identified several aspects of priming that serve as a guide for social cognition: The greater the accessibility of a category, (a) the less the input necessary for a categoriza-tion to occur in terms of this category, (b) the wider the range of characteristics that will be accepted as fitting the category in question, (c) the more likely that categories that provide a better or equally good fit for the input will be masked. (pp. 129130) More concretely, if the concept or quality hostile had been made accessible, a behavior that is ambig-uous as to whether it is hostile will be seen as hostile, a behavior that is at best remotely hostile will be labeled hostile, and a competing explanation such as playful shove will be inhibited. Accessible categories allow perceivers to go beyond the information given (Bruner, 1957) and to construct a reality more full than what the stimulus may have suggested by itself. Assimilation Higgins et al. (1977) were the first to show that priming impacts person perception. They introduced what is now a standard procedure for illustrating a primes biasing influence: two ostensibly separate experiments in which the first one actually primes a concept, and the second one actually measures > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 54 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten the primes impact on judgment. One type of impact is assimilation. Assimilation is when an impres-sion of a person, and the interpretation of his/her behavior, is seen as consistent with the prime. Hundreds of experiments have by now highlighted some important issues that determine when assimilation occurs, how long a primes influence lasts, and what features of the prime are important to consider for understanding whether assimilation will occur (for a review, see Moskowitz, 2005). Accessibility can exist in various degrees of strength, with assimilation getting stronger with acces-sibility strength. Accessibility strength is dependent on how recently and how frequently the prime has been encountered, and how strongly the prime is associated with the concept in question. To illus-trate the relationship between recency of accessibility, accessibility strength, and impact on judgment, experiments have manipulated the amount of time (delay) between when the prime is encountered and when the judgment is made (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). The finding is that assimilation is weaker the longer the delay. To illustrate the relationship between frequency of accessibility, accessibility strength, and impact on judg-ment, experiments have manipulated the number of times participants are exposed to a prime (e.g., Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). Such experiments reveal that more frequent exposure to a prime leads to a stronger impact on judgment. Concepts frequently and consistently encountered repeatedly over time represent another manner with which accessibility arises. Rather than these concepts awaiting a priming stimulus from the envi-ronment for a momentary charge, they have a state of permanent charge or chronic accessibility , making them relatively more accessible than other concepts and, therefore, pervasive tools in guiding how one sees the world (e.g., Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Markus, 1977; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000). Assimilation is not merely a question of coloring behavior with affect. It is that a specifi c quality alters the perception of the behavior and the manner with which it is interpreted (e.g., Moskowitz & Roman, 1992). Further, we do not attempt to foist whatever concept is accessible upon every person we see. The impact depends on there being perceived relevance between the behavior being observed and the accessible concept. Behavior related to the qualities reckless and adventurous will not be interpreted as intelligent, because intelligence is primed (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977, 1982). Not all behavior is seen in the light of what is primed, only behavior that is ambiguous enough to be impacted. Behavior highly diagnostic (clearly indicative) of one quality is not perceived as a manifestation of a primed quality. For example, having an accessible stereotype that a member of a group will be passive and timid does not lead one to see behavior that is obviously assertive as timidity (e.g., Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980). However, few behaviors are so diagnostic and clear that they cannot be open to multiple interpretations. Darley and Gross (1983) suggest that when a construct is well defined and highly accessible (such as a stereotype), only the slimmest of behavioral evidence is required for assimilation to take place. Participants in their experiment had the stereotype of poor people made accessible. They then rated the aptitude of a child on a variety of intellectual tasks. Providing them with a video of the child answering ques-tions in a classroom was enough to release the impact of the stereotype. The child was perceived as a below average student, even though the video did not suggest this. Importantly, this ambiguous behavior was required for the effect to appear. Participants who did not see a video (and thus lacked any evidence) did not have biased views of the childs aptitude. Primes as Standards Primes are not always used as interpretive frames into which new information is assimilated. Primes can also serve as a standard against which the new information is viewed. When primes operate not as a lens through which behavior is filtered, but as a mirror against which that behavior is reflected, the opposite of assimilation can occur a contrast effect . > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 55 Contrast effects occur when primes serve as standards for two very distinct reasons. The first way contrast emerges is when one becomes aware of an influence on ones judgment from a prime. That is, perceivers want to be unbiased and see the prime as a potential biasing influence that they wish to control. To do so, they apply theories about how the prime is biasing them in an attempt to cor-rect or counteract that bias. Ironically, this attempt also alters/biases how they perceive and respond to the person (Martin, 1986; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Strack & Hannover, 1996; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). It will often result in a contrast effect in that it can lead one to go too far in the attempt to not see the primed quality in the person, and thus see the person in the opposite manner. Trying not to be influenced by a primed notion of hostility will lead one to judge the person as less hostile than reality dictates. A second reason contrast effects can emerge when primes are used as comparison standards is that such standards set extreme examples against which a new behavior pales in comparison. For example, if primed with hostility, one may imagine a genocidal dictator, against which everyday acts of hostility seem decidedly non-hostile. Rather than assimilation and seeing increased hostility, the standard produces contrast via comparison pro-cesses. Thus, contrast effects can occur instead of assimilation either due to a correction process or a comparison process (Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). What properties of a prime determine if it will be used to assimilate information or promote con-trast? One factor promoting contrast is extremity. However, extremity does not always increase contrast. What must also be considered is whether the prime is an exemplar or a trait (Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999). Exemplars are specific examples of concepts, such as Gandhi (hero) and Hitler (evil). Traits such as hero and evil are abstract qualities representing general types. Exemplars are, in this sense, narrower, more exclusive, and distinct and tend to promote comparison goals. An extreme exemplar like Hitler will increase contrast because it serves as distant standard of comparison, sharing few features with the person being judged, making that person seem dissimilar, less evil (Herr, 1986). A moderate exemplar leads to assimilation because the person is seen as similar to (rather than paling in contrast to) the exem-plar. Traits, being more abstract, are less likely to call to mind such comparison standards. Assimilation or contrast following a primed trait will be determined by whether one is suspicious of the primes influ-ence on ones judgment. Extreme traits (evil) are not usually used to describe people, so we might not be suspicious that such qualities could influence us, and thus not try to correct for the influence. Extreme traits, unlike extreme exemplars, would lead to assimilation, not contrast. Moderate traits are often used to describe people, so we might be more likely to become suspicious of their ability to bias how we perceive others. Moderate traits, unlike extreme traits, would be likely to be seen as a potential influence on us and initiate correction attempts, and cause contrast (Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999). Inhibition Kunda and Thagard (1996) assert that not everything in the lexicon associated with a category is triggered when we encounter a member of the category, or a behavior that falls within a category. In fact, priming can sometimes occur in a negative direction, whereby rather than information becoming more accessible when a stimulus is encountered, it becomes less accessible (e.g., Fox, 1995). The parallel- constraint-satisfaction model states that the activation of some information simulta-neously (in parallel) constrains the activation of other information. For example, aggressive may activate both punch and argue . The context in which aggressive is activated may serve to narrow its meaning. Thus, courtroom may activate argue while deactivating punch . . . a given trait may have a rich and diverse network of associates; only a subset of these is acti-vated on any occasion. (Kunda, Sinclair, & Griffin, 1997, p. 721, emphasis original) > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 56 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten As another example, a stereotype is one of many associations to a category, and if context or goals make the stereotype irrelevant or incompatible with current responding, stereotypic associations to the category are inhibited (see Moskowitz & Li, 2011, for an example with stereotypes of Black men being inhibited; Moskowitz et al., 1999, for gender stereotypes being inhibited). A final exam-ple is in the case of perceiving people who belong to multiple social categories (such as Jewish and senator), where categorizing a person to one group inhibits the accessibility of the other (e.g., Macrae et al., 1995). Examples of inhibition are also seen in research on implicit goals. Kruglanski et al. (2002) argued that because goals are embedded within a system or network of many competing goal represen-tations, a selected goal needs to be regulated by goal- shielding operations that facilitate compat-ible goals and inhibit incompatible goals in an implicit, horizontal communication and triggering among goals. For example, Aarts, Custers, and Holland (2007) primed half the participants with the goal of socializing with other students. The remaining participants did not have this goal. A second, incompatible goal, studying for exams, was introduced to all participants through a priming procedure. Inhibition was assessed in a sequential priming task: Primes either related to the goal of studying or irrelevant to studying were presented and were followed by targets related to socializing goals. When the goal to study was first primed, response times to the targets relating to socializing was slowed, indicating inhibition. This inhibition occurred only among people who had the goal to socializeno inhibition occurred in the absence of a competing goal. Thus, in cases of goal incompatibility, implicit processes of inhibition are triggered. Explicit Cognitive Processes When implicit processes of attention, categorization, and inference result in the perceiver achieving a conceptualization of some act performed by the target (e.g., mean , nice , nervous , flirtatious , bold ), the perceiver often proceeds to ask, Why did this person do this act? There is strong reason to believe that these causal analyses happen spontaneously (e.g., Gopnik, 2000; Weiner, 1985), and a great deal of theoretical and empirical effort has gone into understanding how lay perceivers select a behavior explanation (see Gilbert, 1998; Malle, 2004). Perceivers often devote effort and utilize logic and reasoning (biased or not) as they strive to arrive at a proper explanation. As stated earlier, it was Fritz Heider who first conceived of social perception as a type of causal analysis and who elucidated the basic conceptual framework underlying the laypersons answers to questions of behavior causality. Specifically, he described the common-sense view that other people are affected by their personal and impersonal environment, [and that] they cause changes in the environment, [which] they are able to ( can ) and try to cause (p. 17; emphasis original). This dis-tinction between being affected by versus causing is seen in the attribution theory distinction between external ( situational ) causes , which involve personal and impersonal forces that surround an actor and shape her acts or outcomes, and internal (dispositional ) causes , which involve personal abili-ties ( can ) and motives ( try ) that are internal to the actor. Heiders emphasis on try which points to mental phenomena such as intentions and desiresis emphasized in both Jones and Davis (1965) model, as well as Malles (2004) work on how perceivers deduce others reasons, desires, and other mental states. Rational- Effortful Models of Behavior Explanation Two early, important theoretical contributions inspired by Heider come from Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1973). They offered descriptions of inferential rules that perceivers should employ when reasoning about the cause of an act or outcome. Jones and Davis suggested that > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 57 perceivers first diagnose the intention of an actor. At times, if prompted by evidence, they go further to make a correspondent inference that the actors intention corresponds to an underlying, distin-guishing character trait. To illustrate, imagine a colleague who combatively argues a policy position at a meeting, creating disharmony and irritation. The question of intention is, What was he trying to accomplish? The question of correspondent inference is, Does this intention suggest a character trait? Jones and Davis (1965) proposed that both these inferences depend on the perceivers analysis of the effects of both the chosen act (combativeness) and alternative acts (e.g., remaining quiet). The perceiver first considers non- common effects , or effects produced by the chosen act that would not have been produced by the unchosen act. Only non-common effects are informative, because effects common to both acts cannot logically explain why one act was chosen over the other. In our example, combativeness (compared to remaining quiet) might be seen as having the non-common effects of keeping alive a policy position that ones colleagues had dismissed and also of irritating others. If a perceiver thought only of a single non-common effect, then that non-common effect would be used to infer the actors intention (i.e., it must be what the actor was aiming for). But, surely, the existence of a single non- common effect is rare. In our example, we have (at least) two non-common effects, and hence ambiguity about intent. Jones and Davis suggested that perceivers resolve ambiguity in intent by considering the desirability of the various effects. Specifically, perceivers assume the actors intention was to produce the effect that would be sought by most people. Thus, if a perceiver believes keeping alive a personally valued policy position is what most people would desire (and irritating others is not), then they will infer that keeping alive the policy position was the intention. If a perceiver believes that irritating others is something most people desire, they will infer the colleagues intention was to disrupt. For Jones and Davis (1965), perceivers are interested in more than just the actors momentary intentions. Perceivers are also motivatedby their desire for prediction and controlto consider whether an inferred intention points to a potent, distinguishing character trait of the actor. Is the effect that the actor ostensibly intended to bring about an effect that most people would attempt to bring about? If not, then the actor possesses a distinguishing character trait. So, for example, the perceiver who inferred the intention of keeping the policy proposal alive might also believe that most people would fi ght for their beliefs and thus conclude that the observed behavior is uninformative about traits. In contrast, a different perceiver might think that most actors would not consider it desirable to fight for a position in a manner that creates irritation in others. Such a perceiver would reason that the actor has a distinguishing character trait of being a difficult person (see Gilbert, 1998). Kelley (1973) developed another theoretical approach to describe how perceivers reason about the causes of actions. His covariation model addresses the situation in which one has made multiple observations of the actor across time and contexts. Keeping the combative colleague example, Kel-leys model suggests that to understand the cause of his act, the perceiver considers three questions regarding covariation of the act with time, contexts, and other actors. First is a question about con-sistency, Is he typically disagreeable in faculty meetings? Second is a question about distinctiveness, Is he disagreeable in other contexts? And third is a question about consensus, Are others disagreeable in faculty meetings? If the answers to these questions are yes (disagreeable in prior meetings), yes (disagreeable in a variety of contexts), and no (others are not disagreeable in faculty meetings), then the perceiver reasons that the act reflects a trait of the actor (a difficult person). If the answers are yes (disagreeable in prior meetings), no (not disagreeable in other contexts), and yes (others are also disagreeable in faculty meetings), then the perceiver reasons the situation is strong enough to drive most people to act as such (an external attribution). Finally, if the answers are no (not disagreeable in prior meet-ings), no (not disagreeable in other contexts), and no (others are not disagreeable in faculty meet-ings), then the perceiver infers that this is a unique occurrence determined by a temporary factor > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 58 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten such as bad news or a situation-determined goal. (Other combinations of answers are possible, but are more ambiguous in terms of the inferences that should be drawn from them.) Kelley (1973) also addressed the situation in which the perceiver makes only a single observation of behavior and has little prior knowledge with which to assess covariation. Imagine, for example, that a visiting scholar witnessed the combative colleague. Although she has no knowledge of his prior behavior, surely it would occur to her that he might simply be a difficult person. On the other hand, she might also have a general sense that tensions rise during group decision making. Thus, two potential causes, one internal (a personality trait) and one external (the context of a group decision- making task), occur to her. If she construes these as multiple sufficient causes (i.e., either cause alone is sufficient to produce the effect; Kelley, 1972), she will employ the discounting principle ,experiencing uncertainty about the true cause. In contrast, if her operative causal schema were one of multiple necessary causes (i.e., both causes must be present to produce the effect; Kelley, 1972), then she would not discount but would attribute the act to the combination of the group decision-making task and the disagreeable personality of the colleague (i.e., group decision-making is tense, but only certain personalities respond to the tension by becoming combative). Finally, Kelley (1973) also describes the augmentation principle, in which a causal inference is strengthened by the fact that other causes are present that should prevent an act from occurring. For example, the visiting scholar might think, These people will want to make a good impression on their visitor and thus will strive to be pleasant during the meeting. Because the act of the combative colleague occurred in spite of a perceived cause that should suppress unpleasant behavior, the visiting scholar will aug-ment her inference and conclude that the combative colleague is an extremely disagreeable person. Lay Theories More recent perspectives on the attribution process exist. One important perspective focuses on the guiding role of lay theories general assumptions held by laypersons about the nature and causes of human characteristics in shaping the process of explanation. Research on lay theories focuses on theories of stability vs. malleability (see Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009, for a review), behavior causal-ity or social explanatory styles (see Gill & Andreychik, 2009, for a review), and the role of culture (see Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999, for a review). The most well-established approach involving lay theories comes from Dweck and her col-leagues (see Plaks et al., 2009, for a review). Their work on implicit theories of personality suggests that lay perceivers can be classified either as entity theorists , who believe that the characteristics of human beings are static (Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that), or incremental theorists , who believe that the characteristics of human beings are malleable and dynamic (All people can change even their most basic qualities). Research suggests that these theories have effects that reverberate throughout the processes of self- and other-directed social cognition. Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1997) showed that entity theorists were more likely than incremental theorists to believe that an actors behavior in one context would be predictive of that actors behavior in a different context (suggesting an internal explanation) and that even a single instance of behavior is relatively indicative of a general disposition of the actor. Other work (Hong, 1994) has suggested, in contrast, that incremental theorists tend to explain behavior in terms of dynamic processes within the actor (e.g., temporary feeling, need, or goal states). Interestingly, these divergences between entity and incremental theorists do not map onto the internal vs. external distinction emphasized above, but map more closely onto Weiners (1985) internal- stable (fixed trait) vs. internal- unstable (temporary state) distinction. Gill and Andreychik (2009) offered an alternative conceptual approachthe concept of social explanatory style , which refers to a perceivers characteristic theory-driven style of assigning causality > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 59 across diverse actors, behaviors, and contexts. This approach is most clearly distinguished from that of Dweck and colleagues by its emphasis on externality , or the extent to which a perceiver chroni-cally views acts and outcomes as caused by factors outside the actor. In a number of studies, Gill and his colleagues have either measured social explanatory style using a social explanatory style questionnaire (SESQ) or manipulated it. This research has linked external social explanatory style to phenomena as diverse as an increased tendency to cite external forces when explaining why a student is struggling with his work and a decreased tendency to conclude the perpetrators of a terrorist atrocity are inherently evil (Andreychik, 2009). Finally, scholars have also examined the role of culture in shaping lay theories/behavior explana-tions (see Choi et al., 1999). Miller (1984) pioneered the cross-cultural study of social explanation. Participants in India and the United States generated examples of prosocial and anti-social behav-iors and explanations of the acts. Explanations were coded in terms of reference to internal and external causes. American adults offered a greater proportion of internal explanations (especially personality traits) than did Indians. This was more evident for the anti-social acts. With regard to external explanations, cultural differences were again found among adults, with Indians making greater reference to situational causes than American adults, and this difference was somewhat more evident for prosocial behaviors. Relatedly, Morris and Peng (1994) explored lay dispositionism , the tendency for lay perceivers to explain behavior in terms of internal traits. They argued that members of individualistic cultures (such as the United States) are saturated with messages that encourage a dispositional view of the person. In contrast, members of collectivistic cultures are saturated with messages that tend to encourage a less dispositional view of the person. Morris and Peng presented three studies of rel-evance to this possibility. In Study 1, participants watched cartoon displays of fish engaged in social behaviors (e.g., one fish enters and then a group of fish exits). Cultural differences in explanations were found. High school students from the United States were more likely to view the individual fish as the cause of what had happened, whereas high school students from China were more likely to view the group as the cause. Studies 2 and 3 examined explanations for homicide. Study 2 coded explanations given in the newspapers and revealed a tendency for American writers to emphasize dispositions more than Chinese writers do. In Study 3, graduate students rated the importance of various dispositional and external causes for two homicides. Those from the United States rated dispositional factors as more important than did Chinese participants for one of the two murders, and Chinese participants rated external factors as more important than did Americans for both murders. Dual- Process Models Dual-process models (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) describe when people will engage explicit cognition and utilize effort for reasoning. Dual-process models reconcile the literatures on implicit and explicit social cognition (that seemingly describe two very different organismsone engaging heuristics, the other thinking deeply) by integrating the two different modes of thought into one model. They describe people as having a default strategy to form judgments and attitudes using heuristics, sche-mas, stereotypes, and expectancies, yet having the capacity to engage in more complex and effort-ful analyses to produce a more consciously reasoned judgment or attitude. The models describe humans as needing to manage the complexity of the environment using a cognitive system that has limited resources or capacity (Allport, 1954). However, even with limitless time and capacity for effort and analysis, people may never come to truly understand the character of a stimulus. Thus, to manage the resource dilemma, and to meet their goal of satisficing, they over-rely on a strategy > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 60 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten of using cognitive shortcuts because such heuristics typically yield a sufficiently good judgment or evaluation. Yet, there are many instances in which a perceiver will adopt a closer look at the stimulus information despite the costs in time and cognitive effort required. The important ques-tions addressed by dual process models concern when, why, and how we are willing and able to pay such costs (Chaiken, Giner- Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). The shift from effortless or mindless processing to more effortful or mindful processing of a stimulus target is described as being a function of both ability and desire. More systematic evalua-tion of the detailed qualities of a stimulus requires having the cognitive capacity to engage in such fi ne-tuned distinctions among the stimulus qualities. The importance of capacity is demonstrated in research that shows that systematic processing is reduced or eliminated when limits to processing capacity (such as cognitive load or time pressure) exist (e.g., Kruglanski, 1990). When capacity for processing is available, the use of schema- driven and heuristic processing yields to more systematic processing, but is dependent on the goals of the perceiver (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). When accuracy is not as important as expedience, or when accountability relating to the reason for ones attitude is low, heuristic processing will typically suffice despite one having the capacity to work harder (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). However, when one has a vested interest in a topic or is otherwise motivated to justify ones reaction to accompany having the capacity to exert effort, then processing style shifts to be more reasoned and effortful. The literature on the type of goals that promote systematic processing is extensive (see Moskowitz, 2005). A goal for greater confi-dence (such as wanting to avoid bias) will motivate more effortful processing, as will sharing out-comes with the target of judgment, having accountability to others for the judgments one makes, and a desire for greater certainty (concern with being accurate). Biases Capable of Infusing All Stages of Social Cognition Both the Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1972) models construe the perceiver as open- minded in the sense of being without any bias for or against internal or external explanations. Also, they construe the process of explanation as being driven by case-specific information, such as whether this particular actor has engaged in that particular behavior before or whether this particular behavior has produced desirable effects that would not be produced by alternative behaviors. A major discovery that energized research for decades is that perceivers are often not logical and open-minded. Heider (1944) and Ichheiser (1949) foreshadowed this discovery. Ichheiser spoke of how perceivers fail to see the (external) invisible jail surrounding others, preferring to interpret others in terms of (internal) specific personality characteristics (p. 47); Heider described perceivers as intropuni-tive. Importantly, this highlights that implicit processing is not synonymous with bias and effort with accuracy. Using effort to think about stimulus information does not guarantee unbiased judg-ments, and indeed it is often the case that effort is exerted for the precise purpose of producing a specific outcome or a biased (such as a self-serving or a stereotype-affirming) result (e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2006; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). And at times the elimination of effort creates an efficiency that reduces the possibility of bias (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006; Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005). Bias is independent of processing style. Theories of Bias and Correction Ironically, one prominent way bias is introduced is by efforts to be unbiased. A set of models of self- regulation share the assumption that people are sensitive to and nervous about biases that may be impacting their judgments and impressions of others (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Monteith, 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). One desires to believe one > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 61 is fair and accurate, regardless of whether this is actually the case. When one becomes suspicious of an unwanted bias impacting ones thoughts, it triggers an attempt to correct ones judgment and remove this unwanted influence. Debiasing ones responses so that they are corrected for unwanted influences, depends on one possessing (1) awareness of bias, (2) motivation to remove this influence, (3) theories about what that influence is and how it shapes judgment, and (4) cognitive resources for carrying out the correction to counteract the identifi ed bias. Because of these contingencies, one may be imperfect in correcting and may actually introduce bias if ones theory of bias is faulty or imperfectly implemented. Wegner (1994) showed that attempts to explicitly suppress an unwanted thought, such as a stereotype that might be biasing ones responses, has an ironic and undesired effect of increasing implicit stereotyping. The correction strategy of trying to suppress a thought can yield success at initially reducing the conscious occurrence of the unwanted. However, the cognitive steps that allow for control require that at the implicit level the unwanted thought is being monitored to be suppressed from consciousness. This means that at the implicit level the thought is being constantly activated, thus heightening the degree to which the stereotype is primed. The control attempt cre-ates a different bias the hyperaccessibility of stereotypes, a greater degree of accessibility than if suppression had not been initiated. Ones theory of bias is implemented as intended (one has the capacity and motivation), but it heightens bias. A second example of the contingencies in correction models at work is when one is aware of a bias and has the capacity to correct, but is unmotivated to do so. Devine (1989) and Monteith (1993) examined people who were either low or high in prejudice to examine how they responded to being made aware of their own prejudice. Devine had them create a list of racist slurs; Monteith pointed out a discrepancy between how they should and would act when interacting with a mem-ber of a stereotypes group. In both cases, low-prejudice people respond to discrepancies from their egalitarian standards by compensating for their unwanted behavior. Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, and Czopp (2002) showed that the counteracting or corrective force is initiated by first associating cues in the environment with ones bias and planning to prevent exhibition of the same bias when those cues are next encountered. Thus, the cues trigger the behavioral inhibition system, responding is slowed, and the implicit reactions of bias can be corrected and overridden. But high-prejudice people are not motivated to take such steps to control bias despite being aware of and having the capacity and knowledge to remove/correct the bias. As a final example, the mere concern that others will see one as biased can motivate one to regulate behavior and to consciously avoid bias that, ironically, can itself create a bias in which one silently communicates (through nonverbal behavior) anxiety and discomfort that others interpret as prejudice against them (e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2007). Such anxiety also may make one avoidant and neglectful of a person one might otherwise embrace (e.g., Bean et al., 2012; Plant & Devine, 2003). The Fundamental Attribution Error The contingencies for debiasing noted above are in clear display when describing the causes for one of the more examined biases in social psychologycorrespondence bias, later named the fundamental attribution error (FAE). Jones and Harris (1967) were the first to experimentally demonstrate the bias, and in their classic study, a target person delivered a speech either pro or anti Fidel Castros communist regime in Cuba. A crucial manipulation was whether the target person had a choice regarding the speech topic. Participants task was to infer the true attitude of the target person. According to both Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1972), observers should not attribute an act (giving a speech) to an internal quality of the actor (his true attitude) when there is > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 62 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten a plausible external cause of the act (he was doing what he was told to do). Jones and Davis found that perceivers were quite sensitive enough to the choice manipulation. While true that they rated the targets true attitude as more in line with the content of his speech in the choice condition than in the no-choice condition, they still rated the target as more pro-Castro when he read the pro-Castro speech when he had no choice about the content of his speech. Social psychologists have since demonstrated the same phenomenon in different experimental paradigms. For example, Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) randomly assigned participants to the role of Quizmaster or Contestant. The Quizmaster was instructedclearly within earshot of the Contestantto generate trivia questions that relied on esoteric knowledge (e.g., Who was the guitarist on David Bowies album Station to Station? ). Next, the Quizmaster asked 10 self-generated questions of the Contestant and, naturally, the Contestant got very few correct. The Contestant should know that the Quizmaster was given a substantial role-conferred advantage (i.e., the abil-ity to draw on his/her idiosyncratic knowledge) and thus Contestants should not infer that the Quizmaster is an exceptionally knowledgeable person. Yet, Contestants rated the Quizmaster as exceedingly knowledgeable. What these studiesand many moresuggest is that lay perceivers tend to interpret acts and outcomes as reflecting inner properties of the target person and are relatively insensitive to the influence of external factors. Decades of research have been devoted to understanding why this bias happens. Gilbert and Malone (1995) distill from the literature several distinct causes, the first of which is Heiders classic statement that behavior engulfs the fi eld. Accordingly, perceivers can fail to notice external forces that guide behavior because they are invisible from their vantage point ( a problem of awareness of ones bias ). Second, perceivers might notice the external force, but misconstrue its power ( a problem with ones theory of bias ). Another cause of the FAE occurs when knowledge of the actors situation exaggerates the view of the extremity of her behavior ( inflated categorization ; e.g., Snyder & Frankel, 1976; Trope, 1986). For example, knowing that a person is in a job interview might lead one to expect anxiety, and this expectation can make mildly anxious behavior appear very anxious. One final cause involves the idea that attributions to internal disposi-tions are cognitively easier to make than are attributions to external forces (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984). Because of the ease with which trait inferences are made (Moskowitz, 1993), people are prone to make spontaneous traits inferences (STIs). Considering the situation and adjusting those initial inferences is harder especially when capacity is low ( a problem of ones ability to correct for bias ). For example, Gilbert et al. (1988) had participants watch a video of an anxious-behaving woman who was discussing either mundane or anxiety-provoking topics. Results indicated that partici-pants under cognitive load failed to consider the conversation topicsdespite being fully aware of them and thus rated the woman as dispositionally anxious regardless of what she was discussing. Positive Illusions Arising From Self- Esteem Needs Taylor and Brown (1988) argue that positive illusions , or unrealistic positive views of the self, are an important ingredient to mental health and maintaining a positive sense of self. They classify these illusions into three general types of undetected influences over person perception: unrealistically positive views of self (and others with whom one shares an important identity), unrealistic opti-mism about the future, and exaggerated perceptions of personal control. Unrealistic positive views of the self are maintained by selectively weighting and preferentially evaluating information with favorable implications for the self and avoiding information with neg-ative implications. This results, at times, in self- serving attributions , where people attribute their own negative outcomes and actions to the situation but positive behaviors to dispositional and stable causes (e.g., Miller, 1976; Sicoly & Ross, 1977; Stevens & Jones, 1976). Also, ambiguous feedback > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 63 is interpreted in the most positive light, whereas negative feedback tends to be ignored. And, if not ignored, negative feedback is seen as illegitimate, or its source is denigrated. Kunda (1987) referred to these strategies for how people handle negative feedback as motivated reasoning a tendency to be skeptical and critically examine information one does not want to receive, yet readily accept information that boosts self views with little critical examination. Kunda asked research participants to read a supposed New York Times article about the negative effects of caffeine consumption and its (fictitious) link in women to fibrocystic disease. When asked to evaluate the evidence in the article, a pattern of defensive processing emerged. People to whom the article was most relevant, yet its conclusions posed a threat (women who were caffeine drinkers), evaluated the evidence the article provided as less convincing compared to people who were not personally impacted by the evidence (men, and women who do not consume caffeine). A biased strategy was used to ward off negative thoughts, ironically placing the self in greater physical danger and health risk in the service of motivated person perception. Ditto and Lopez (1992) showed a similar critical eye turned toward negative feedback in the health domain, with participants being skeptical and rejecting information that suggested they lacked an enzyme that made them at risk for pancreatic disorders later in life (yet easily accepting the feedback of the same test when it sug-gested they possessed the enzyme). Misattribution of Fluency Not all influences on person perception are consciously motivated. For example, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) subliminally showed faces to their participants, manipulating whether the facial expressions depicted positive or negative emotions. Participants did not consciously see the faces, so they could not intend to detect the expression nor intend to have a mood triggered in them by virtue of being exposed to these faces. Further, they could not intend to be influenced in their judgments of some new and unrelated picture by having seen these faces. Nonetheless, having these positive and negative states available in memory was shown to influence the judgment of an ambiguous (neutral) stimulus (a Chinese ideograph). The stimulus was liked more when it was preceded by the subliminal presentation of a positive face. The effect of priming in social judg-ment was already reviewed, illustrating that primes represent a source of influence or implicit bias in social cognition. Often it is the case that in perceiving people we use whatever information is most readily available in the mind. We conclude here with a brief summary of the role of primed stereotypes as a source of bias in social cognition. Because of the implicit nature of priming, a stereotype can be primed without awareness. Just as with any accessible prime, judgments of perceivers then can be influenced by this information, despite their denial of having, and their conscious goal not to have, any biases (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Rud-man & Glick, 2001; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). One manner this is illustrated in is experiments where the primes that make a stereotype accessible are presented subliminally (e.g., Devine, 1989). Here, the influencing agent is never consciously seen, yet judgments are assimilated to these primes. Another way the influence of stereotypes is observed is in examinations of memory and judg-ments for traces of bias. For example, if a stereotype is primed, it should influence not only what we believe we have seen, but what we expect to see. Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost (1998) found that people make predictions about the behavior of a person based on the categories to which the person belongs (e.g., race, age, gender, profession). Sherman and Bessenoff (1999) found that perceivers rely on the predictions suggested by their stereotypes rather than what they actually had seen. Participants saw lists of unfriendly and friendly behaviors that had been performed by either a skinhead or a priest. Crucially, the lists had exactly the same number of friendly and unfriendly > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 64 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten behaviors being performed by the skinhead and the priest. Subsequently participants were shown each of the behaviors from the lists, without specifying who performed which behavior, and were asked to try to remember who performed each behavior. They tended to misremember unfriendly, but not friendly, behaviors as having been performed by a skinhead, and also to misremember friendly, but not unfriendly, behaviors as having been performed by the priest. In summary, there is a bias for perceivers to rely on what is most fluent as an explanation. That is, behavior is often judged to be of a certain type, and the person to be of a certain character, not because we have done an exhaustive analysis of that persons character and context, but because some explanations are readily available in the mind. This occurs even if the reason that a thought achieves fluency is unrelated to the person being perceived. One can decide that a person is aggres-sive and hostile not because his behavior is objectively threatening, but because notions of hostility and aggressiveness were in working memory before seeing the behavior, even for reasons that have nothing to do with the person. Framing The discussion of how social cognition can be biased has thus far focused on how specific content a schema, a stereotype, an accessible trait, an exemplar, an attitude, a goal, a specific view of the self can alter how new information is interpreted and the type of inferences one forms. However, as reviewed above when discussing mindsets, it is not only accessible content that shapes cognition, but the framing of the information- processing task. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that framing a decision in terms of loss versus gain would reverse the type of behavior people choose to perform, making them risky or cautious as a reaction to the exact same context. As another example, any given goal can be expressed in a range of ways that vary, hierarchically, in terms of their specificity from low levels (concrete) to high levels (abstract). Abstract goals can afford one the possibility of many means to goal attainment whereby one route is easily substituted for by another, yet can also leave one less able to take advantage of any given opportunity to initiate goal pursuit or to seize on evidence of adequate success at achieving the abstract state. Concrete goals constrain the number of possible means to pursuing the desired state, yet afford a better chance for detecting and seizing on opportunities. Higgins (2009) summarized a large body of work on one type of framing determined by ones regulatory focus , defined as the representation of a goal through one of two possible self-regulatory systems. One system frames the goal in terms of self-realization and focuses the individual on the ideals associated with the goal and its positive reward. This results in the goal having a promotion focus. The other system frames the goal in terms of the need for security and safety, focusing the individual on minimizing losses and engaging in activities that allow them to fulfill responsibili-ties and duties. This frame results in the goal having a prevention focus . Thus, a goal such as to be accepted by others can be framed as approaching a positive outcome (e.g., spend time with others) versus avoiding a negative outcome (e.g., avoid being lonely). This shift in the framing of ones processing dramatically alters the emotional experience and the performance consequences. Goals are also framed in terms of time. Proximal goals relate to what one does in the present or near future, and distal goals to a point far into the future. Recently, psychological distance not merely in terms of time, but social distance and distance in space, has been shown to impact goal pursuit by determining how information that is relevant to a goal is framed (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003). Accordingly, thinking about time (e.g., thinking about a goal being close or distant in time or decisions that are delayed versus immediate) alters the construal level with which information is considered. Greater psychological distance (longer time periods) create high-level construals, which result in information being considered in a more abstract fashion. Smaller distance (a more > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 65 immediate period) promotes low-level construals, which result in a focus on specific, low-level, concrete features of information. Kruglanski and Freund (1983) argued that need for structure, or approaching a processing task with a desire for early closure and fast solutions, alters the outcomes when compared to framing the task through the lens of concern with accuracy. This latter concern will lead to a more elaborate and conscious processing style, yielding different outputs than the former concern with getting an answer, any answer. For example, when need for structure is induced, people rely on stereotypes to a greater degree in formulating a judgment, stay more strongly anchored to initial impressions, show stronger priming effects, and are more likely to form STIs (see Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001). Another framing effect surrounds whether one has the goal of interpreting a stimulus or com-paring a stimulus to a standard. Comparison occurs when a perceiver is forming an impression of a person (consciously or not) by making an assessment of the degree to which that person exhibits a given trait or behavior relative to a standard of comparison (Stapel & Tesser, 2001). One way comparison against a standard can lead to bias was already discussed above when defining contrast effects. Another arises when different standards are used to evaluate the same behavior performed by two different people. If one is surprised at the high quality of the behavior when it is performed by one person, but not surprised when that same behavior is performed by another person, it is clear that the behavior of the former person was judged against a standard that was set relatively low. This could reflect a bias to preference the person by using a lower standard, or, counterintuitively, reflect a bias against the person because one expects poor performance. Such shifting standards dur-ing comparison can occur as a function of stereotypes, and thus result in unintentional bias in how a person is judged (e.g., Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991). Clinging to First Impressions and Spontaneous Inferences (Snap Judgments) Asch (1946) illustrated that perceivers manipulate their interpretation of the pieces of information they learn about a person so they fit together as a unit. This seminal work in social cognition was focused on illustrating the Gestalt perspective, that perceivers form a coherent view of a stimulus, creating a consistent narrative about a person. For example, Asch asked research participants to form impressions of a person from a list of personal qualities, positing that the emerging impres-sions would be more than just a sum of the items on the list, but would form in a coherent way, with an overall meaning imposed on the information that unified the emerging narrative about the person being described. He found, for example, that (1) altering a focal quality in the set of items leads one to see the remaining information in a totally different waythe meaning of each item in the set of information changes and a new narrative emerges, (2) switching the order of the items changes the emergent meaning, and (3) information presented earlier carries greater weight in shaping the impression. Consistently, participants imposed a unified narrative that cohered around their initial impression. Perhaps an even more powerful illustration of Aschs (1946) point is made in experiments by Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer (1980), in which participants read the exact same sentences about a per-son, but half the participants were asked to do so with the goal of forming an impression and the other half did so with a goal of memorizing the information. At the end of the experiment, there was a memory test that for the impression-formation participants was a surprise. Nonetheless, their memory was superior to that of the people trying to remember the information. This suggests that the two groups were organizing the information differently as it was being received (encoded), with impression formation yielding a more complex and interconnected (coherent) mental representa-tion of the information that benefitted recall. > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 66 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten Attempts to make information cohere when forming an impression also impact how people process information that is inconsistent with the first impression. Hastie and Kumar (1979) found that seeking coherence leads inconsistent items to be processed more deeply, as these items need to make sense in the overall picture. To maintain a coherent narrative requires effort to fit inconsist-ent items (such as behavior that violates a stereotype) with the narrative. If they cannot fit with the narrative, one needs to rationalize why they can be omitted from ones impression (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Sherman et al., 1998) or dismissed as atypical of the narrative and thus worthy of being subtyped or fenced off as an unusual case (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995). Ironically, because both integrating and rationalizing away these inconsistent items is so effortful, it produces processing dif-ferences relative to consistent items (and relative to when one does not pursue coherence); inconsist-ent items become highly memorable. This occurs even if the pursuit of coherence is unconscious (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). This extra effort (exerted in the name of coherence) toward processing inconsistent information, ironically, can create a foundation for eventually overturning the coher-ent narrative (e.g., Sherman, 2001). The weight given to such inconsistent information may not impact how one judges a person in the short term, but because it is more memorable it may have greater weight in shaping what we think once memory for the consistent information fades, per-haps undermining the coherent narrative at that later time. The resistance to, and rationalizing of, inconsistent information in order to maintain a coherent impression implies perceivers are unlikely to update impressions when new information is per-ceived. What does the social cognition literature suggest can shake people from such a bias to cling to first impressions? The tendency to update impressions has been observed to depend on perceiv-ers motivation and capacity of processing expectancy-violating information. In order to fully pro-cess new information about a person and incorporate it into the previously formed memory of that person, one needs to be motivated and have necessary resources to attend to the new information in the first place (Nordstrom, Hall, & Bartels, 1998). Park (1989) argues that expectancy-violating information can turn a positive impression into a negative one and a negative impression into a positive one over time. Yet, the former type of change (from positive to negative) is more prevalent and robust; negative (especially immoral) behaviors are perceived to be more genuine and diagnos-tic of others true characteristics (negativity bias; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Importantly, implicit evaluations and impressions may be even more robust to change than explicit ones (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Ma et al., 2012; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Change in implicit associations requires a change in the structures of memory , which is different from changing explicit judgments in light of new information. Petty and his colleagues (Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & Jarvis, 2006) PAST model (past attitudes are still there) conceptualized that change in terms of an addition of a false tag into the memory of old evaluation. That means one needs to store a validity tag in memory in addition to the informa-tion received about a person in order to reject the initially formed evaluation where necessary. In their Representational Theory, Gawronski and colleagues (Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, & De Houwer, 2010) claimed that initial implicit evaluations are difficult to change because later evalu-ations depend on a new, contextualized representation of the same object. Accordingly, as people learn about behaviors of others that are inconsistent with the initially encountered behavior, they tend to attend more to the contextual information related to those new behaviors, and this renders expectancy- violating actions as exceptional and conditional in the eye of the perceiver. Implicit evaluations can be revised under certain circumstances. For example, when new infor-mation is extreme and perceived to be diagnostic of ones characteristic (e.g., it includes an immoral behavior) or when the new information directly targeted implicit associations in the perceivers mind (e.g., through priming), old implicit impressions are revisited (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Peters & Gaw-ronski, 2011; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Wyer, 2016). Additionally, using Gawronskis > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 67 model, decontextualizing new information and adding it into the memory of an old evaluation should allow for updating of the evaluation. Recent studies conducted by Mann and Ferguson (2015) also showed that implicit evaluations get updated when old information is reinterpreted in the light of new information. For example, a negative implicit impression formed about a man who is known to have broken into a house and destroyed property is reversed when perceivers were later told that the man broke into the house to rescue a child from fire. Such reversal was observed to be possible even when the new information was received after a two-day delay (Mann & Ferguson, 2017). Finally, recent research on memory shows that memories can be altered and reconsolidated even after a long time of being encoded and consolidated (Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007; Hupbach, Hardt, Gomez, & Nadel, 2008). According to this view, reactivating the trace of an old (consolidated) memory puts it in a labile state, in which new information can interfere into that old memory and change it (for a review, see Nadel, Hupbach, Gomez, & Newman-Smith, 2012). Reconsolidation of the memory of an initial behavior may have a critical role in revising implicit impressions. Process Dissociation This chapter has reviewed implicit processing, explicit processing, and error. It concludes with a section on recent work that attempts to show how all of these forces are entangled in social cogni-tion, and discerns their respective contributions to social cognition. Examples include the associative-propositional evaluation model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) and the quadruple process (Quad) model (Sherman, 2006), which addresses to what degree implicit and explicit components can be dissociated and how we can assess the contribution of each. The purpose of this approach is to provide a model that accounts for the interaction of automatic and controlled processes in shaping decision- making and behavior (see Sherman et al., 2008). Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) identify a conflict between implicit and explicit evalu-ations. The model distinguishes between the implicit activation of associations and the explicit validation of the propositional information implied by the primed associations as a way to resolve the conflicting findings revealed by studies on attitude change guided by implicit versus explicit processing. The Quad model in turn defines mathematical parameters to estimate how implicit and explicit processes interactively shape decisions and related behaviors. In the areas of stereotyp-ing and prejudice in particular, it is often important to highlight the discrepancy between ones reported level of negative affect for a group and the implicit evaluation of the group (as examined by Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), as these different forms of assessing negative reactions can differentially predict verbal versus nonverbal responding. Such dissociations yield interesting pre-dictions regarding interpersonal interactions, such as police responses to suspects, medical decision-making, and judge and jury decisions. How does implicit cognition impact a decision? Correll et al. (2002) noted that behavior often must be enacted within seconds, with race shaping critical decisions at such fast (and faster) speeds. In their research, they examine if ethnicity of a target affects a participants decision to shoot or not shoot when playing the role of a police offi cer in a video game, in which they are instructed to fire a weapon at someone holding a gun. Triggering of an implicit responses associated with race led to bias. Participants fi red at an armed African American target more quickly than if he were White. They were faster to decide to not fire at an unarmed White target compared to an unarmed African American target. Importantly, the bias was not related to personally endorsed stereotypes or prejudicethere was a dissociation between the implicit response and explicit attitudes. However, Shermans (2006) Quad model allows for a more fine-grained examination of processes that can be dissociated in this complex (yet fast) response. > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. 68 Gordon B. Moskowitz and Irmak Olcaysoy Okten The Quad model argues that performance on implicit tasks can be influenced by either auto-matic processes or controlled processes and, thus, implicit measures alone cannot tell us if bias is strong because of either association strength or ability to engage in cognitive control or both. Unlike previous process dissociation models, which assume one automatic and one controlled pro-cess, the Quad model proposes four distinct processes; two of which tap the qualities of automatic processes and two of which tap the qualities of controlled processes. Automatic processes include the factors of association activation (AC; the degree to which a stimulus spontaneously activates attributes) and guessing (G; the likelihood of response bias). One example of AC is the activa-tion of biased associations between Black men and anger/threat while engaging in a shooter task, which may lead people to incorrectly decide to shoot an unarmed Black man. One example of the G component is a general systematic response bias of the perceiver other than the bias driven by the stimulus itself (e.g., right-hand bias, yes-saying bias). In a shooter task, this component captures peoples bias to shoot or not to shoot an unarmed Black man, for reasons other than the stimulus-driven associations activated in mind during decision-making. The controlled processes include detection (D) and overcoming bias (OB, regulation/correction). Detection captures the ability to notice and differentiate between correct versus incorrect responses. For example, in the shooter task, D indicates the ability to correctly identify a gun by making a shoot decision or to correctly identify a tool by making a no shoot decision. OB, on the other hand, illustrates the ability to overcome biased associations once they are activated. In the shooter task, this would be related to overcoming the biased automatic associations between Black targets and aggression and thus correctly making no shoot decisions for unarmed Black men. As detailed earlier, the Quad model also notes that automatic processing is not equated with error. Neither guessing (G) nor the activation of biased associations (AC) necessarily leads to incorrect judgments. In encountering an unarmed Black man, even if people cannot correctly identify the tool in his hand, they can still cor-rectly guess and refrain from shooting him unless they have biased associations activated in mind. If biased associations are activated, response bias can be corrected through controlled processes. Conclusion Understanding and reacting to other people is one of the most frequent and important pursuits of humans. It incorporates detecting their presence, to focusing attention on them, to labeling them, to the triggering of either positive or negative affect toward them (or their behavior), to making infer-ences about what they are like and likely to do (and why), to remembering them. These processes are ubiquitous, since they occur in circumstances ranging from those in which our judgments of others are highly consequential to the other person (such as when we are witnesses or jurors in a trial), to those that are highly consequential to the self (such as when we attempt to figure out why a friend has failed to return a call or why an object of our unrequited affection seems to be acting friendly), to those that seem to have no consequences whatsoever (such as when we try to ascertain why the cashier at the market said hello). Humans engage in an unending pursuit of answers to the why question, with each new moment bringing new stimuli to us that we need to examine, comprehend, and understand. Despite its ubiquity, social cognition is fraught with error, but the system is sensitive to error when aware of it, and of course new socially driven cognition is initiated to compensate for the error produced by our social cognition. References Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Holland, R. W. (2007). The nonconscious cessation of goal pursuit: When goals and negative affect are coactivated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 92 (2), 165178. > Getting Grounded in Social Psychology : The Essential Literature for Beginning Researchers, edited by Todd D. Nelson, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4906331. Created from asulib-ebooks on 2025-04-01 00:10:35. Copyright 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Social Cognition 69 Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin , 93 (2), 203231. Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice . Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley. Ambady, N., Hallahan, M., & Conner, B. (1999). Accuracy of judgments of sexual orientation from thin slices of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 77 (3), 538547. Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1993). 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