Okay, well ladies and gentlemen it is my distant pleasure to welcome you here today to this talk on whether or not ASEAN matters or how it matters. My name is Ann Marie Murphy, I'm a senior researcher scholar here at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and on behalf of the Institute and the New York Southeast Asian Network I am delighted to welcome you here today and it is my distinct honor to introduce you to Dr. Madhuri Dr. Nata Legawa, as many of you know, had an illustrious career in the field of diplomacy, culminating in his service as the Foreign Minister of Indonesia from 2009 to 2014. During his tenure as Foreign Minister, he guided Indonesia's 2011 chairmanship of ASEAN, in which capacity he oversaw the expansion of the East Asian Summit to include the U.S. in Russia. Earlier in his career, Dr. Nata-Lagawa served as Indonesia's permanent representative to the UN, during which time he also served as president of the UN Security Council. Earlier than that, he served as ambassador to Great Britain and Ireland. Dr. Nata-Lagawa received his PhD from the Australian National University.
Since retiring from the Ministry Office of the United Nations. Dr. Natalagawa has kept up a very busy and impressive schedule, serving on a number of high-level UN panels, as well as a member of the United Nations President of the General Assembly's team of expert advisors. He's currently a distinguished fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute and serves on the Board of Advisors for many prominent organizations, including the International Crisis Group and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Natalagawa is an old friend of...
Columbia. He spoke here a number of times during his tenure at the UN. He also gave a keynote address at a Columbia conference in Indonesia.
So we are delighted to welcome Dr. Nata Lugawa back to campus today as one of the things he's done in his retirement which is write this book, Does ASEAN Matter? A View from Within. So without further ado I'd like to turn the microphone over to Dr. Nalagawa. Well, thank you very much, Osamu Arifipo, for your kind introduction and thank you everyone for your interest for this occasion.
I'm extremely grateful to the Institute for making this event possible and I'm keen to be able to share with you some thoughts on ASEAN, but most of all to be able to exchange views and to interact and to discuss on issues. of common concerns to all of us. Indeed, as described, I have been reflecting on ASEAN in the recent past, reflecting essentially on the issue or the question, does ASEAN matter?
It may seem redundant because it seems quite self-evident that ASEAN has mattered, but in posing the question, I am more towards identifying what's left to be done, what ASEAN needs to do to continue to be of relevance. Because if one was to look back over the past five decades of ASEAN, at the risk of oversimplification, there have been a number of quite seminal and quite fundamental contributions that ASEAN has made over the decades. One cluster or one area through which or by which ASEAN has been able to do this.
ASEAN has been of significance has been in transforming the relationship between countries of Southeast Asia. Because one needs to recall that prior to 1967, countries of Southeast Asia were either in open conflict with one another, but actually as well there were at least a sense of animosity and tensions and distrust among them. A trust deficit is a term that I had used to describe the the situation prevailing then.
But through our sense of five decades long, we have seen transformation in the relationship among Southeast Asian countries. Trust deficit has been replaced by strategic trust in such a way that nowadays it's almost become unthinkable for countries of the region of Southeast Asia to come to a... open conflict among themselves.
I'm not saying that the problems are all entirely resolved or solved, but at least there is now a greater sense of community, a greater sense of trust. prevalent among them. And this attainment of transformation in intra-South-East Asian relationship did not come just out of the blue, but it needed to be, they needed to be...
deliberate and purposeful attempt by Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN to change the dynamics. I will simply illustrate some by way of examples for instance the decision in 1976 to promulgate or to achieve the so-called Treaty of Amity and cooperation among Southeast Asian countries. This is a seminal agreement where upon countries of Southeast Asia agree that they will henceforth resolve problems. amongst themselves or difficult differences among them through the non use of force through peaceful settlement of disputes at a time when problems was really prevalent and the use of force was very much the norm this commitment in 1976 was quite game-changing in transforming the dynamics in Southeast Asia as well since then then we have had agreement between, amongst the ASEAN countries to expand ASEAN from the original five to include all the ASEAN, so-called ASEAN 10. This has also been a seminal and transformational development.
Because prior to ASEAN 10 we had two Southeast Asia, one involving the original ASEAN five countries and then the so-called CLMV countries, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam. That type of dualism within Southeast Asia was addressed by having an ASEAN tent, again transformative in nature. And not least of all the decision to begin the ASEAN community in 2005-2003 which was attained in 2015 was also important and transformational to raise the level of ASEAN cooperation from an association to become becoming a community. In short, ASEAN transformative in changing the dynamics in relations among Southeast Asian countries, from animosity to trust, from trust deficit to strategic trust.
The second cluster where I think ASEAN has been of impact is in the broader region, broader scheme of things, because prior to ASEAN, countries of Southeast Asia were very much born. in major power rivalries. We had then of course the so-called East-West rivalry, Cold War conflict, the United States, Soviet Union, of course with a very prominent role and a special role of China, where countries of Southeast Asia had their own problems magnified by the projection of major power interests direct or proxy to the environment.
Through ASEAN we saw transformation where countries of Southeast Asia through ASEAN earn centrality in our region. Henceforth all the major regional architecture activities, regional architecture building in Southeast Asia has an ASEAN footprint, an ASEAN imprint. Whether it be the so-called ASEAN plus process, ASEAN with China, ASEAN with Korea, with India and the like.
partners, the ASEAN Plus Three process, ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, tremendous demonstration of at least ASEAN's convening power, their ability, this is especially pertinent when you recall this was in the immediate post-Cold War era where there were a great deal of uncertainty what post-Cold War architecture dynamics will be, and ASEAN provided the wherewithal for provided the home, so to speak, for countries of the region to come together in a win-win common security outlook. In other words, once Southeast Asian countries were pawns in major power rivalries, and through ASEAN, collectively, they have earned a centrality and a driving seal position. And last but not least, through ASEAN, ASEAN has mattered in the sense of driving home the... the message of a people's center.
colleagues would no doubt be aware that prior to not too long ago there was a time when Southeast Asian economies were in the most dire of state in terms of its economy under development that was prevalent, the high level of poverty that was prevalent. I'm not saying of course that all these challenges have been resolved, but through ASEAN we have seen transformation of the economies. Southeast Asia has become one of the most robust, one of the most dynamic in the world, where we have seen, for instance, some 30-fold increase in the GDP per capita collectively of ASEAN economies. ASEAN economies'role in the global economy is increasingly important and significant. Transformation in the economic domain, which after all is the most important of import and relevance.
to the peoples of ASEAN. But more than material benefits, especially since 2003 when Indonesia proposed the idea of an ASEAN political security community, we recognize that a people-centered ASEAN is not simply about material economic well-being. The idea of good governance, the idea of human rights, respectful, became to be introduced in ASEAN lexicon, and ASEAN discussed it.
course clearly very much work in progress we have seen in recent months for instance some regression in the democratic architecture in my view in Southeast Asia but at the very least there is an attempt to make ASEAN more people relevant people focus and even people driven all that's of the past but I'm more interested really to reflect off on the future whether the type of work positive trajectory that we've had over the past five decades can be sustained. It now can continue to be the trend for the future. And this is where I think upon reflection I came to the conclusion that while ASEAN has mattered, has been relevant, if we were to continue to be of relevance and to continue to matter, then more of the same would not suffice. I see an wooden...
really need to up its game, and would really need to continue to develop its transformative outlook to remain relevant. And let me, before I conclude and we have some discussion, just illustrate with some examples of what I mean. For instance, on the issue of intra-Southeast Asia relationship, relationship between Southeast Asian countries, I have mentioned just now how ASEAN has made possible the transformation in the relationship among Southeast Asian countries.
but there cannot be any sense of complacency here. Nowadays, ASEAN has almost a situation of a paradox of plenty. We have many institutions, many agreements and wherewithal that are supposed to govern and that are supposed to guide relationships among ASEAN countries, but in many instances when problems arise between Southeast Asian countries, those very same institutions and capabilities have not been developed.
not been involved, they have not been utilised, they have remained dormant, they have remained basically potentials rather than of actual relevance. So here the trust deficit that I speak of before is no longer between countries of Southeast Asia but increasingly trust deficit of all the very institutions that we have ourselves created. A lot of these institutions are there with tremendous potentials and possibilities. but a great hesitancy to actually employ them.
For instance, the TAC, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that I spoke of earlier, identified the possibility of having a council of Southeast Asian countries, of ASEAN countries, to mediate, to facilitate disputes among Southeast Asian countries. But on the whole, it has remained normal. It has never been invoked.
When disputes arise among Southeast Asian countries, in most cases, been taken elsewhere. Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia had a dispute over the islands of Sipadan Likitan. We take it to the International Court of Justice, ICJ.
Likewise, Singapore and Malaysia also took their disputes over some islands to the ICJ as well. This is perfectly fine and there is no one-size-fits-all that we don't have to force a regional solution on every issue. But what concerns me is that there is a rush to find solutions other than the islands. than the original solution.
The notable exception in recent years was the Thailand-Cambodia conflict in 2011, at which time Indonesia was sharing ASEAN. But even then, the ASEAN engagement required a great deal of prodding and a great deal of hand-holding on Indonesia's part. It would not have happened without Indonesia actually proactively pushing for an ASEAN relevance on the screen. Unfortunately, that kind of motivation, that kind of momentum and dynamics can quickly dissipate and can quickly grind to a halt without constant nurturing and prodding. Hence, for instance, now on the issue of Myanmar in terms of the developments in the state of Rakhine, for instance, we are seeing ASEAN, of course, speaking of it and expressing its opinion on the issue, but of hardly...
of hard minimum impact within globally. At the United Nations, for instance, ASEAN is perfectly divided on the Myanmar issue. We have, when the resolution was brought to the United Nations General Assembly, we have Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei supporting the resolution, Thailand and Singapore abstaining on the resolution, and the rest expressing opposition to the resolution. This kind of a perfect...
division disharmony by ASEAN doesn't reflect well on its relevance. So there is in other words now no longer institutional deficit within ASEAN because we have the wherewithal but there is potentially, potentially, seemingly a leadership deficit because countries are unwilling to actually utilize. The very instruments that they have themselves created, and there is hesitancy, and therefore there is a credibility gap.
I think this must be addressed properly. Secondly, on the issue of the second cluster, ASEAN and the wider region, no one has ever pretended that us Southeast Asian countries have a uniform foreign policy outlook. From the very beginning, we recognized that we bring together countries. varying sorts.
Some are very closely aligned to the United States, some are very closely aligned to China, some are choosing to be independent or to be non-aligned in this type of dynamics. But in the past we have been able to live with such a variation and actually make the variation as a source of our strength. Because we are so varied in our foreign policy outlook, we can engender...
Comfort level from all parties. We have been able, as I said before, to have a convening power. We have been able to set the rules and norms for our region. Probably because all the major powers feel we are, you know, there is a, by default almost, that we have comfort level towards ASEAN.
But now I'm seeing a situation where ASEAN countries are losing the finesse. To be able to manage this sort of differences, I don't want to use the word differences, but more variation, losing the finesse in being able to reach equilibrium between the different interests, and as if we either have to be with one or with the other. Some people use the term hedging, but I'm not really comfortable with the term hedging because it suggests a very opportunistic and short-term outlook. But ASEAN's business has been the business of striking equilibrium.
Making sure that all these different dynamics, not only US-China, but also China-India, China-Japan, Korea-Japan, somehow it works to ASEAN's advantage. The more problems there are out there, the more likely it is that ASEAN will be the least objectionable party by all parties concerned, and we can get things done. But for that to be of consequence, we need to deliver on the substance.
We need to be more than simply a convening event organizer. This is where I think we are now a little bit at at the moment. We are extremely efficient and effective in organizing events, but we need to deliver on the geopolitics, on the geopolitical outlooks, to be thought leaders in our region. And a case in point, the Indo-Pacific.
Up till 2013, 2014. ASEAN had a script on the Indo-Pacific countries in the Indian Ocean, in countries such as India, Australia, that already reflects. An Indo-Pacific outlook. But then ASEAN, for reasons only known to itself, chose in 2014 onwards to have a pause, to stop thinking outside the region, essentially, and to stop, to have a pause in the conversation. Until President Trump went to the region in October 2017 and started speaking of the Indo-Pacific, until Australia started to speak of Indo-Pacific.
And now thankfully it's very late than never, ASEAN begin to resume where they left off. They begin to think again, once again, what the Indo-Pacific means. So again, the point that I'm trying to make to illustrate is that as in intra-South East Asia relationship, in the relationship with the wider region, more of the same or standing on the same spot. Standing still is not an option.
Standing still means you are going backward because the world is changing, it's moving on, and ASEAN must be proactive, must be transformative, must be relevant, to be of relevance. I have suggested in the book that we have to have a very clear definition of what are the nature of the problems and opportunities in our region so that we have a... The right type of response, not to have the other way around where we have a response looking for a problem.
We have policies looking for a problem, looking for opportunities to try to correlate the two. I think we are still missing in Southeast Asia a proper brainstorming of what actually makes the region tick. What are the problems in our area? In the past, in the book that I've written, I have identified simply at the risk of oversimplification at least two.
One is trust deficit. We have, notwithstanding the proliferation of all kinds of processes, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN itself, ASEAN Plus, and despite notwithstanding within Southeast Asia we have strategic trust. Beyond Southeast Asia, we are seeing trust deficit among the major players, North Korea, in Korean Peninsula.
US, China, China, India, China, Japan, how do you address these trust deficits? How do you prevent the trust deficit to become more serious and feed negatively to the dynamics of the region? I believe that one way, in the same way that Southeast Asia's trust deficit was resolved in the past, we need to have some kind of a commitment, irrespective of our differences, we need to solve these problems peacefully.
Non-use of force, putting forth dialogue, non-use of force as the only solution to all these problems. You know, I mean, Southeast Asia in 1976 was also similarly divided, and yet the leaders at the time were able to have the courage to set a new tone. That's why I've spoken in the past of having a treaty of amity and cooperation-like commitment for the wider region, for East Asia Summit. Imagine if countries such as India and China can say, look, we have so many problems among us, but one thing for sure, we are not going to use force to resolve disputes among us.
United States and China, China and Japan, immediate decompressing effect, immediate confidence-building impact, in the same way that Southeast Asia. In other words, to globalize or to widen the ASEAN experience on the THC. And the second point, and I will be very quick to come to a conclusion, is on the idea of having a crisis management capacity. Things happen in our part of the world at such a speed, whether it be positive or negative.
ASEAN cannot rely on the routine calendar of meetings, January, retreat. May, April a summit, July a foreign ministers meeting, and November another summit. Things happen between these meetings that needs to be responded, that needs to be anticipated, that needs to be shaped and molded in a positive way. But we have a lacunae, we have a void of any crisis management capacity. When things happen, you have to wait an entire three or four months before leaders meet or ministers meet in one of the ASEAN capitals for them to pronounce themselves, whether they are happy or they are unhappy.
But we need more than simply a running commentary to developments that have already taken place. To be of relevance, we need, in my view, to have a peace and security council of the East Asia Summit. A council of the type that meets permanently in Jakarta with all the ambassadors, ASEAN ambassadors. ASEAN already has ambassadors to the ASEAN Secretariat. The East Asian Summit countries also have ambassadors to the ASEAN Secretariat.
they should meet on a regular basis every week with a permanent agenda review of international and regional developments. So there's no one will be put on the spot as if this is your problem, so they can discuss any developments quickly in a timely way and even elevate it to the foreign ministers level or to the leaders level as the situation is required. Otherwise, like over the past until recently when the Korean Peninsula development was in the most negative dynamics, we didn't have any ASEAN proper timely ASEAN voice. Things were just happening. We do have declarations adopted in a very administrative manner but without impact in terms of solution.
And lastly, in terms of the people-centred ASEAN, I think this is where one of the most difficult challenge will be for ASEAN. Not in the economic domain, economic domain is not a very good place to As I mentioned before, there has been fundamental transformation, positive transformation in ASEAN's economy. In a way, when we speak of the economies and commerce, there is the law or the dynamics of the market forces.
Whatever the government say, things will happen because economic actors and commerce will have its own logic and momentum. But I'm speaking here of the people-centred ASEAN in the more... governance and human rights dimension.
I thought to be honest in 2003 and 2015 when we finally have the ASEAN political security community, ASEAN has already have a good script. We managed to dispel the notion as if the internal and the external domain are separated as if we can you know there is a fundamental division between internal development and external environment as if we cannot have a conversation with one another on developments in one another's country's situation. But through the ASEAN political security community we develop capacities, we develop outlook, caring and sharing ASEAN whereby we deem it normal for ASEAN member states to express concern, to express interest.
interests, in one another's development, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, all these capacities and possibilities are all out there. But again, as I said before, these are all mere potentials, it requires handholding, it requires leadership, it requires prodding by the countries concerned to utilize them. But now, what I'm seeing, we are almost back to where we were before. as if there is a night and day, either or, zero-sum relationship between internal and external.
A very strict interpretation of how one can manifest one's interest in internal developments of another neighbouring country. And therefore, we are not using the potential that we already have. And the cause of such an outlook is very clear.
If you look at regions like in the Middle East, in North Africa, the original optimism brought forth by the so-called Arab Spring, local developments quickly becoming national, regional, and then eventually even global problems. ASEAN has been fortunate so far in being able to maintain the peace and stability in our region to facilitate change in Indonesia, in the Philippines, democratic change without geopolitical repercussions. But unless we get...
our script right unless we address the nexus between internal and external domain in a proper way then we will find ourselves you know trying to fix a problem that we could have avoided in the first place but all in all does ASEAN matter indeed yes it has definitely matter because that has been objectively and clearly the case but to continue to matter complacency is not a problem the threat. The ASEAN member states must continue to be unified, must continue to be transformative in their outlook. But what gives me optimism, however, is that the obituary on ASEAN has been written on many, many times. I remember many, many moments in the past, post-Cambodia, after the South China Sea issue, etc., when people are saying, well, ASEAN is done. It's divided, it's irrelevant, but somehow we managed to reinvent ourselves.
But it has, what I can assure the colleagues here is that it has come about not by accident. It has required leaders exercising leadership, leaders demonstrating courage to think outside the box. But we have a situation where policy makers are principally concerned with their own internal domestic setting.
I can assure you that very quickly the external domain, the regional domain, the ASEAN setting can quickly grind to a halt. Those are what I wanted to share with our colleagues and friends and I hope I haven't taken up too much of your time. Thank you. Thank you. Can you all hear me okay?
So I think that what you've just seen is that in contrast to many of the books on ASEAN that were published in the last year or so to coincide with ASEAN's 50th anniversary that only extolled the virtues of ASEAN. This book is different. This book is a call to action by the leaders of the countries from somebody extremely involved.
in demonstrating and promoting the leadership that you indicated is so sorely missing. And so I would recommend the book to all of you. I'd like to maybe follow up on a few things that you mention in the book, because clearly a key issue facing the broader region is the South China Sea issue, which you call a litmus test for ASEAN. And in the book, Dr. Nuttall...
states that ASEAN's failure to mention collectively the victory for the Philippines, the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague over the Philippines claims against China was, and I use your term, deafening. And you state that the formal and public rejection of the award by China combined with ASEAN silence creates the perception of acquiesce. on the part of Southeast Asian states to China's position. So we've been seeing facts change on the ground with building of artificial islands. We've also seen a lot of diplomatic activity on the code of conduct, but that seems to be taking a lot longer than many people would expect.
Can I ask you what you would like to see more on the South China Sea issue? Yeah. Well, there was a time, when we raised the issue of the South China Sea in ASEAN, which was back in the early 90s. I remember as a junior diplomat traveling with my bosses in the region, trying to alert countries of Southeast Asia of the need to manage the potential for conflict in the South China Sea. We were accused of being busybody, of...
trying to find some other pursuit for ASEAN after the Cambodian conflict. And of course, henceforth, we have been proven correct in the sense that actually this was a clear case of preventative diplomacy effort that was very much needed, that we have an overall horizon, a long-term perspective, trying to identify a potential for problem before. they become even more serious.
But from the very beginning, ASEAN, but thanks to those type of very early efforts in the 90s, ASEAN actually has managed to develop a common perspective on the issue with China, to be underscored. The DOC in 2002 wasn't an ASEAN-only instrument. It was ASEAN and China.
And on the whole, we have been able to manage the dynamic as a common challenge for us and a common... the need for the two of us, the two sides, to find a common solution as well. But in recent years, we have seen changing dynamics. I think China itself has become more assertive for reasons that's obviously quite complex, but certainly you can demonstrate and you can define the architecture, China's more assertive role.
And ASEAN itself has become more assertive. become a little bit more fragile in terms of its unity, a sense of unity of purpose. And when the Philippines began its own national efforts through the arbitration, to be honest within ASEAN there was a sense of ambivalence.
Some ASEAN, quite a few ASEAN countries were rather unhappy actually to the Philippines that they had taken the issue out of ASEAN and taken, go off on their own. But then... Then for the sake of ASEAN solidarity we emphasized, well, this is the Philippines sovereign right to take the matter up with the tribunal, but we will continue to maintain ASEAN cohesion.
But it wasn't without cost to ASEAN's dynamic unity within. But then once the arbitration was, ruling was issued, situation changed in the Philippines. Having situations like this and the Philippines government itself changes outlook.
Now for the rest of, I know the inclination is that for the rest of ASEAN, if the primary promulgator, the primary driver itself has changed its view in terms of its outlook, then what are the rest of ASEAN to say? There cannot be more the Philippines than the Philippines itself. But then once the issue is already out there, the G20 genie is outside out of the bottle you know we have no to in my view this is more than simply the Philippines portfolio it is now already out there and for us and not to be able to speak collectively on it even to to say speak collectively and expressively on it to me is this quite a quite damaging but it is what it is it's a political reality but now we all focus on the code of conduct the code of conduct on the South China Sea recently it's been celebrated it has been it has been a marked improvement suggested in terms of the consolidated draft code of conduct on the South China Sea but I'm more concerned or I have a footnote more in terms of the way the code of conduct as I am informed through reading through report is that the draft code of conduct at the moment manifests in official form the different position of Southeast Asian countries. You have China and then you have square brackets, country A, country B, country C of ASEAN, which is very efficient and very illuminating in terms of a piece of paper, but it's not very thoughtful in terms of strategy, in terms of ASEAN unity, because we have always been behaving. being a certain vis-a-vis China but now we have a situation where ASEAN countries position have been dissected but in the end in a way the diplomatic pathway is can become irrelevant in a way because things are happening at sea you know things are installations are being built not just by China but features are being altered by by many sides I know of course China is the most well reported one and then there's been potential for incidents.
When a few days ago I think there was a US and Chinese, China's naval vessels coming so proximate to one another. So the diplomats don't have all the time in the world to peruse through this document because things are happening at sea. Otherwise they will have a wonderfully crafted document endorsed with consensus but of the most minimum of relevance.
Because the The code of conduct is meant to be actionable. It's no longer reiteration of all the good things that we promised one another, but it's how naval officers, shipping vessels and navies are to behave out there at sea. And from what I'm told, the current draft may not pass that standard. No reiteration of... we promise to be good with one another.
But the devil is in the detail, is how are you going to guide and govern behavior at sea? How are you going to manage crisis when it does occur, when they do occur? So this is where we are.
But ASEAN definitely needs to be even more united on this issue. Why don't we, I have a lot more questions but I know that there are quite a number of people. Why don't I call on you, can you just introduce yourself please? One and then two.
in the greater community. Can you speak up, please? I'm Sam from the greater community. Just interested in the talk. I was wondering if you could all speak to maybe a way that Opsian could kind of...
I guess renew itself in the accession of new members such as East Timor. I was wondering if you could speak to that. Yes, you have actually really highlighted one point that I also highlighted in the book.
That there was a time when we achieved ASEAN 10. We felt that that was it. That was the end of the project. Because that's what the constituent elements of Southeast Asia were in terms of states. But then of course East Timor, that was then at one time... province of Indonesia chose to go its own way and we have the independent state of Timor.
...last as of 2002, if I'm not mistaken, and that's a new dynamics, a new equation. And Indonesia have been pushing hard for East Timor-Leste's admission. Asia, especially ever since 2011 when Timor-Leste itself formally, because obviously everything depends on the country concerned, if they wish or not, then they actually formally submitted their application for membership.
Indonesia immediately seized on it. We said we need to have Timor-Leste joining ASEAN to become an ASEAN 11, not ASEAN 10. But the consensus among ASEAN is still not there, because this decision, such a decision would need consensus by all. But in our talking points, or in our argument, we say that, look, is Timor geographically, Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste geographically is in Southeast Asia, which is one of the first requirements for membership of the western part of the island of Timor-Leste. But more than simply geography, the geopolitics and the geoeconomics, one cannot imagine a community in Southeast Asia, which is South ASEAN, whether it be economic, whether it be political, that deliberately...
preclude a society, a state in this case, outside this scheme of things. It just doesn't work that way. I mean, how can you have a community that is of that character? And not least of all, you may be aware that in the past, Indonesia and Timor-Leste has had a very difficult history. And here we are, two former protagonists, now asking ASEAN to...
Can you please codify, can you please bless the transformation in our bilateral relationship? In other words, to lock in the positive process that we already have. Unfortunately, some of our colleagues in ASEAN were more preoccupied with the mechanics, especially in terms of what would be more or less admission to ASEAN, the impact on the ASEAN economy community. say the more or less economy is at a different stage of development, it will have repercussions on ASEAN's own economic community.
But in the past, when we expanded to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, their economy was also substantially different to ASEAN. We make that as a clarion call, as a rallying call for us to have greater integration, not as an excuse to exclude. But given where we are now in terms of at the moment there is a great deal of concern within ASEAN, they say even the ASEAN 10, some, there is a school of thought in ASEAN that says we made a mistake, not my view, some people say we made a mistake by expanding ASEAN because now it's difficult, far more difficult to reach decisions on consensus.
So given that atmosphere I am speculating it will be even more difficult for the... more or less to join now compared to say four or five years ago because there's a hesitancy to take risk in opening up like a Pandora's box and having one more country make it more difficult to reach consensus but you are right this is an issue that is still out there that needs a definite addressing yeah okay you please I'm now for Kamada and I'm also visiting from Southeast Asia, the Pesra Genet for international studies. I have a question about the trade war between the US and China. I think that's one of the crises that's brewing right now, and something that can affect ASEAN.
Is there any discussion within ASEAN? I think actually that ASEAN may be in a position to be able to benefit from the crisis, but is there a... discussion regarding this issue or you said earlier that I think the countries are quite divided some more pro-China some are more pro-USO well yes the repercussions of US-China trade I think it's a subject matter that's been discussed in many, many quarters now, not just in the United States itself, in China, in Southeast Asia, and even beyond elsewhere. Given the size of the two economies... when this situation was to worsen, all of us will no doubt be impacted.
I used to think, well, I used to be focused on the potential negative effects of the pandemic. impact because I thought that well the economies of United States the economies of China may be impacted by main course there could be a slowdown and therefore that would have indirect impact direct and indirect impact on the economies ASEAN but then again some since then I've met some actual business leaders commerce who says actually there's also opportunity actually along the line someone was telling me that that actually a lot of businesses that had been invested in China having doing most of their business with nurses are now relocating elsewhere to the Philippines Vietnam to Indonesia. So there's also potential gain. But I think on the whole whether it's positive or negative, it can never be good to have two such huge economies be in such a dispute, right?
I mean, so we need to see this as a problem, as a challenge to be addressed. Now, I am not privy because I've been out of government for the past four years and I'm not privy, I'm not informed of how the issue is being discussed actually in ASEAN. circles but going by formal formal statements from me emanating from meetings oral as well as in written form what I'm concerned about is that most of the expressions of views have been like a commentary they express concern about the trade war the potential impact what I'm missing is given that what are you doing about it. This is in contrast to what happened before.
In 2008 there was a prospect of financial crisis. 1998 obviously the so-called Asian financial crisis, we learned a tremendous lot from it. But when 2008 happened or about to happen, Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN to the ASEAN itself, ASEAN Plus 3, East Asia Summit, G20 eventually, we were proactive.
We made sure that we were doing everything we could to make sure that we were doing everything that these countries concerned, they are there with us. You know, when you have the ASEAN Plus Three, you have China, we have the East Asia Summit, China and United States are in the room. APEC, of course, is not as ASEAN proper, but also another forum.
In the past, those forums were utilized, to be honest. We weren't simply lamenting, we weren't simply feeling sorry for ourselves, or these things are happening. and therefore what can we do? So we actually did something. This is called economic diplomacy.
And nowadays, economic diplomacy is being interpreted more as a mercantilist export-import. You go try to have more sales for your products. But actually, multilateral economic diplomacy was in motion at the time.
But I'm not sure to what extent now ASEAN leaders and beyond ASEAN has that same degree of ambition. Just one final point. All of us are now impacted by the going back and forth of the federal risk of the exchange rate, the impact on our currencies, etc.
But yet many of our economies are taking steps that are national in nature. Like you are drawing the line in the sand, but in the most immediate, right in front of your very home, so to speak. so that we already write down if you have a policy menu from A to Z, A to C, 1 to 10, we are already with a level of gradation, 10 being the most direct to you.
We jump from immediately to 10. There is not... There is actually a level of steps, remedial steps, that we can take at the regional level. And I'm missing it.
So everyone is doing like a mercantilist, beggar, die neighbor, almost a 1930s spree, you know, during the depression era. Everyone taking care of themselves, not realizing that you're simply magnifying and worsening a generation. And sometimes you can make for a rather odd situation where one country, you know, go to another country, say, complaining how come you're raising tariffs against our products, and then you're using the same instrument at home.
their product. So there is sometimes this like a inconsistency in our outlook championing free trade when it suits us but then raising all kind of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for our own national security. situation. So in short, I'm not privy to the national and the most recent ASEAN discussions but I'm hopeful and I hope they will because for instance now in Indonesia in Bali there is going to be a World Bank IMF conference.
I gather ASEAN leaders are going to be there at the sideline of the World Bank IMF meetings. What a precious opportunity for ASEAN leaders to speak out loud collectively. We cannot go down this route. of mercantilists, beggar-de-neighbor, trade tariff imposition. Let's fix this problem before it becomes more serious.
But it requires policy outlook of that time. Marty, Dan Moss, good to see you. Just to pick up on that, didn't the regional response in 98, I was in KL at the time, not Jakarta, didn't that require the IMF and its larger shareholders to be midwife to that?
Whereas right now you don't have that. Whereas if you had an EU type structure with common regulatory framework, common central bank, etc. Is that what's really needed to get...
get a regional response, you need someone acting as midwife or a regional economic structure, not just diplomatic, to do that. Well, I think the 1998 episode was a wake-up call to all of us in many different ways and forms. Within ASEAN, it was a wake-up call in terms of it's not all about the economy. When we speak of ASEAN community, three-filler ASEAN community, social, cultural, political security, because you can have economic material progress, but that may not suffice.
We need to have resilience in the political economic domain, hence we've had this three-pillar ASEAN project. But even in the economic domain, actually from 1998 onwards, we have developed some degree of ASEAN regional capacities. The Chiang Mai initiative, all the various efforts that we took on food security, in the food security domain, on the currency swap. capacities as well but these are capacities which at our outlook or recourse that are unlike the EU is less institutionalized it seems to me is more moment specific generation leadership specific I thought to be honest ASEAN community and all that is sufficiently robust sufficiently already in motion that come what may whoever come and goes we already have the wherewithal but apparently not because we are actually seeing real impact of how the coming and goings of leadership of leaders can impact on how to what extent the regional solution is being invoked but yes the so I wouldn't say there is a total lacunae that there is a total vacuum of regional level response instruments. We learned our lessons, we draw our lessons learned from 1998, we have it, but then the point that I'm trying to say, like in the political domain, are we invoking it?
Are we sufficiently mindful of the fact that we have capacities here at the regional level that we need to invoke because otherwise we will be going back and forth. I remember for instance Thailand and Indonesia and Vietnam. Vietnam, I think recently, because they have to comply with certain ASEAN economic community requirement, had to lower their automotive tariff, importation of automotive.
And then, because the tariff went down, they immediately introduced non-tariff barriers about safety, regulation, this. And Indonesia protested on that. They said, oh, this will impact on our automotive export to Vietnam. And yet, such... such recourse to non-tariff efforts is not the monopoly of Vietnam.
All of us are not entirely guilt-free from that kind of efforts. My name is Niwa, I'm second year here at SIPA and also board member of Southeast Asia Student Initiative where we actually hosted Prof. Kishore Mabubani, talking about ASEAN last semester. After reading some part of your books and listening to your remark earlier, I come with two questions for you.
The first one would be about part of the book that you wrote mentioning about the business working of ASEAN, the three notion of business working as in the two speed. the ASEAN member states and CLM fee, the compartmentalization of that, and the three-tiered work, the three pillars of ASEAN, and thirdly about the ICN minus X. So my question is about this notion of ASEAN working process if we compare the way how it works back in your tenure and then right now given the fact that there are new dynamics in the Pacific and then the US administration and Trump and what not.
How do you think this notion will be perceived by the ASEAN members in terms of the way how things work? Maybe most of the things that happened back in the day was about economy, but the most intractable issues in ASEAN is also about political security. Have you seen anything in regards to that?
And my second question is about the fact that you said championship is not the same with leadership, right? But that is the reason why. the chairman system the rotating chairman system in asean is there and one of your the part of your book also mentioned about how you at a time was also extremely involved in the way how talent company and mediation good offices mechanism work and right now the system of regional mechanism is also already there but it is not being involved in dealing with a number of issues but how if comparing the that period to now, why do you think right now ASEAN member states has that confidence to actually invoke that regional mechanism while at the time it didn't work?
Thank you. Well, thank you very much. I guess your first question relates to essentially modalities, ASEAN modalities, especially its decision-making modalities. Recently it has become quite fashionable and quite invoked to lament on the the ASEAN consensus decision-making modality.
Basically saying, well, this is a recipe for non-decision and ASEAN in drift, because, and essentially you give every member state of ASEAN a power of veto, because if one member state express reservation, then the whole project can grind to a halt. And hence, there was, there is one school of thought that suggests, well, maybe we should proceed. it to an ASEAN minus X principle, for instance, where we can have a situation where sufficient you can have a situation where we don't need to have consensus on every decision making situation. But I think we in making this kind of suggestion, one should not fail to recognize that even in the past, ASEAN divisions or variations within the ASEAN within ASEAN was a fact of life. It's not as if now we are in a totally new environment where we are especially difficult with one another, that we are so problematic with one another that it's impossible to have decision.
I can assure you that has always been the case. Pa Alatas, my predecessor as foreign minister when he was dealing with the Cambodian conflict in the 80s and Pa Hasan Wirayuda, Pa Arwi Shihab and many others. others and then of course you wouldn't know it now we we have to take divisions or variation in our outlook as a given there is a fact of life you can't wish these things away but then it is depends then on the diplomacy on the quality of the diplomacy to try to overcome this the power of one's persuasion you can't simply give up and say oh this this whole thing is too difficult it's impossible to this decision, let's change the way we take decisions. Because I think it is incumbent on the ASEAN leaders, ASEAN diplomats, to work harder. And this is the point that I am a little bit concerned about now, is that while the divisions or the variation among ASEAN countries is a longstanding one, it's a longstanding one, what is new now is the tendency to accept this reality as a reality.
to accept This is reality. In other words, to take division, lack of consensus, as the new normal. There is no longer a sense of agitation when we see an obvious division to want to fix it.
In 2012, remember, as I tried to explain in the book, in Cambodia, terrible one, one of the worst experiences that I've had as a diplomat, when ASEAN failed for the first time to issue a statement. And then within 48 hours we were off again trying to fix it. And then somehow we managed to fix it. We managed to restore ASEAN unity. But what I'm seeing now, and I hope I'm correct, there is a readiness to live with the divisions.
As if when divisions occur, no one is picking up the mantle and saying, look, we have to restore this. As if there is a denial. move on to new issues this is what worries me a sense of complacency a sense of things things being let be this is what but I don't think it's a mechanical issue I don't think it's a procedural issue because there is a school of ASEAN we love they love to to go on drafting exercises you know I mean you could just send these officials to the oh can you have a guideline on how I see them make this it can spend the next two three years sitting down over a piece of paper but the problem is not in the mechanics I think the challenge is in in the efforts that we have to put in and exasperation is not policy emotion is not policy you you can you can get upset by by the impossibility of the situation we have to go on and on and on persevere until you get it but your second point is very much related on the rotating presidency.
It has been very important actually, the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN, very important in developing a sense of ownership in ASEAN project. You could well imagine if we do not have a rotating presidency or chairmanship, there is less sense of participation, a sense of ownership. Many countries don't realize that some of the most recent ASEAN members like Myanmar and Cambodia, they are actually quite recent.
ASEAN members but they've been so efficiently absorbed in ASEAN ways, not with sending some notable footnotes, that actually there is a great deal of ownership in the process. So the rotating chairmanship is very important. This is probably not too efficient but politically it's important to build a sense of ownership and participation in ASEAN project. What that leads to however is the need to have continuity because sometimes Whenever you have a new chair, you have your own projects, you want to have your own deliverables. When you have an ASEAN summit, ASEAN foreign ministers, you want to count how many declarations you issue.
Or our presidency issued 27 declarations. Oh, your one is only 21. So that becomes like an index of how proactive you've been, how busy you've been, how successful you've been. In our one, when Indonesia was chairing ASEAN, they said, look, don't go by numbers. I think you can just have one. one at least meaningful impact.
And thankfully in Indonesia's case, though I'm not impartial, most of our chairmanship, the impact has been beyond our year. You know, when you look, 1976, the TAC, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, in Bali's first ASEAN summit, the impact is felt even until now, beyond our chairmanship year. 2002, 2003, ASEAN community.
We launched the process, the three pillar ASEAN community. The impact is still being felt now. 2011 we began the ASEAN community in a global community of nation.
ASEAN having common voice on global issues. Still aspirational in nature, but again beyond the year. So in other words, we need to ensure that each chairmanship is impactful, but also continued. But thankfully now ASEAN is so efficient.
We have so many plans of actions multi-year. multi-year plans of actions, multi-year visions. So if they go by the script on the whole we should get to where we want to go. But then again we have these intervening chairmen who will have their own priorities and concerns but it will be for the ASEAN Secretariat in particular as the institutional memory holder to be able to advise of the elements of continuity in our endeavour. I just I want to make a comment.
Minister Nader-Lagawa mentioned how ASEAN diplomats could spend months and years drafting documents and everything. And yet one of the key things that came through in your book was that in... the task of negotiating some of the critical issues, whether it be forging a conflict resolution between Thailand and Cambodia over the border temple in 2011, for coming to an ASEAN consensus after the Cambodian debacle in 2012 was that you did not put things on paper. You engaged in shuttle diplomacy. You got agreement from one country.
You shared your views. You managed consensus and then put a few words on paper on which parties could then agree because had you put words on paper, That would be the end of it, yeah. Yeah, so I thought... Because that's actually an experience I learned here at the UN, at the Security Council, when we twice in Indonesia as a member of the Security Council, when every word matters, how you present your views, and especially as President of the Security Council, when you start putting your thoughts onto paper, everyone wants to go into a drafting exercise. Likewise in ASEAN as well in 2012 because we went through a good number of drafts.
In the end we were just going back and forth in circles. So in the end when I did go around the ASEAN capitals I said look the first thing I'm going to do, I'm not going to have any paper. Just I'm going to simply listen to what they have to say. I don't want to say too much, I just want to listen, absorb and then at the end of it all I have my impressions. The term I use is impressions.
this is my impressions unless they violently disagree then hopefully they can just leave and let it go through. So that was just that, just impressions and perfection can be the enemy of the good if you put everything onto paper people become even more agitated to want to improve things and one other thing about drafting is that in ASEAN especially for Indonesia, I'm not sure Indonesia as a country but certainly for me as a person, sometimes it's best. not to sit perfection in everything that you do in terms of outcome. Every document, every effort must have sufficient degree of room for improvement by others so that there is a sense of ownership in the project. You don't want to come with such a perfectly crafted document that all they can say is, well, okay, you've done it all, but then they don't feel ownership in the process.
It's best to have not 100% document. Countries can still tip in. in with their ideas, with their thoughts, so then you have everyone on board. And this is where sometimes our Indonesians don't realize, to be honest, I'm talking more to within, the type of leadership Indonesia has to exercise within ASEAN, given its size, often less is more.
We have to be a bit more nuanced, a little bit more calibrated to know when to step in, when to step back. Thank you.