People of Bhopal, capital town of the Indian
state Madhya Pradesh, were sleeping through a cold, intervening night on 2nd and 3rd December
1984. Nothing was out of ordinary and the night
seemed like any other silent, shivering, winter night of the region. But that was only superficial. Somewhere, in the eastern part of the city,
something nightmarish was happening inside a pesticide plant of the Union Carbide India
Limited (UCIL). An industrial disaster of incomparable magnitude
was about to happen. The Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) plant
was established in 1969. 51% was owned by Union Carbide Corporation
(UCC) and 49% by Indian authorities. The factory used to produce a pesticide which
UCIL had branded as Sevin. A chemical called Methyl isocyanate (MIC)
was used for producing this pesticide. Therefore, the factory stored a large amount
of MIC inside its premises. On December 2, 1984, it was a routine day
at the UCIL factory. MIC was stored in an underground tank. The pipeline washing started at 9:30 p.m.
as a routine maintenance operation. Between 10:30 - 11:00 p.m, workers engaged
in pipeline washing became aware of a leak. However, nothing was done considering it a
normal leak. By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were
feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m. and reported to
the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. A decision was made to address the problem
after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees were instructed to continue looking
for leaks. In the five minutes after the tea break ended
at 12:40 a.m., the pressure in the MIC tank rocketed up to 55 Psi,
water had begun to leak into tank E610 containing 42 tonnes of MIC. The resulting exothermic reaction increased
the temperature inside the tank to over 200°C (392 °F). One worker witnessed a concrete slab above
tank E610 crack. About 12: 50 a.m., the emergency relief valve
burst open and large quantities of MIC gas leaked into the atmosphere. The workers at the factory realized the risk
of a massive disaster. They tried to activate the safety systems
available at the factory at about 12:50 a.m. There were 3 safety systems: first, was the
vent gas scrubber, which was considered the mainline of defence. The scrubber was supposed to spray caustic
soda on escaping vapours to neutralize the MIC. However, It was not in an operational condition. Then, the workers tried Turning on the flare
tower to burn off toxic gas. This system was also not in working condition
as a piece of the pipeline leading to the tower had been corroded and had not been replaced. The workers then tried Transferring the MIC
from the tank into a nearby spare tank. The gauge of the spare tank indicated that
the tank already contained something. This gauge indicator was found defective,
later on. After the failure in all the three safety
systems, the workers attempted to douse the leaking gas with water spray. The water spray reached a height of 100 ft.
from the ground, while the leak was at 120 ft. above the ground. At 1.00 a.m., the workers realized that nothing
could be done to stop the leak. Most residents of Bhopal were sleeping when
the gas began to leak. Many woke up only because they heard their
children coughing or found themselves choking on the fumes. As people jumped up from their beds, they
felt their eyes and throat burning. Some choked on their own bile. Others fell to the ground in contortions of
pain. As on three sides, the UCIL plant was-surrounded
by slums and other poor settlements, the people living in these colonies were the worst sufferers. There was no warning or guidance to the general
public around this time. There were two types of alarms in the factory,
one mild siren for workers and one loud public siren. The two siren systems had been decoupled from
one another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while
turning off the public one, and this is exactly what was done: the public siren briefly sounded
at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming
the public around the factory over tiny leaks. The public siren was started only at about
2:30 a.m. Since the gas leaked out from a 30-meter chimney,
it was not high enough for the people to escape the effects. It was not long before that the entire city
was enveloped by an invisible but extremely toxic gas. People who were cosily lying inside their
home a few minutes ago; they now began to feel suffocation, cough, burning eyes and
vomiting. Streets became crowded with people running
here and there for help. The chaos went on throughout the night. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with
the patients, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas
was involved and what its effects were. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered
with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. About 3,000 people died immediately on that
night and another 6,000 died in the next one week. Yet another 15-20,000 people died over a longer
period of time due to effects of the poisonous gas. Still, about 500,000 people were directly
or indirectly affected with 38,000 temporary partial and roughly 3,900 permanently disabling
injuries. Investigations into the tragedy showed that
there were many shortcomings at all levels. The UCIL factory used three tanks to store
68,000 litres of liquid MIC and it was to be kept under pressure using inert nitrogen
which helped the pumping of MIC when needed and also kept impurities at bay. The safety regulations specified that a maximum
50% of the tank should be used for storage and the MIC was to be stored at 0 degree Celsius
at all times to keep it inert. But the storage tanks at the UCIL were filled
much over the specified limit of 50% and moreover the refrigeration system used to maintain
the temperature of liquid MIC was not in working condition since January 1982, due to cost-cutting
measure. The Mic was kept at 15-20 degree celsius
instead of the recommended 0 degree Celsius. In the last days, October 1984, the tank E610
lost its ability to maintain the nitrogen pressure which halted the production of MIC
in the plant. The production was soon started again despite
a failed attempt of the reestablishment of the system. Moreover, the UCIL factory did not
have much information about the safe storage of these highly toxic gases. The medical fraternity did not have the requisite
know how to deal with such kind of contamination and at this scale. There was a lack of coordination between the
factory and emergency services. There were also not many trained professionals
in that factory. Cost-cutting had also had its impact on the
safety of the plant, its employees and the people living around the plant. The plant was also in a densely populated
area of the city which went against most known norms. There have been several theories on the reason
for the entry of water into the tank. The workers claim that because of the bad
maintenance of leaking valves, it was possible for the water to climb from the point
where the pipeline washing was performed to tank E610. While the Union Carbide said that this was not possible
and that it was an act of sabotage by a "disgruntled worker" who introduced water directly into
the tank, although there has never been any proof of this. The most important factors leading to the
mega-gas leak were plant design, the economic pressure, and cutting back on. Though, there were early warning signs of
trouble ahead, signs that were ignored. On December 25, 1981, a leak of phosgene killed
one worker at the plant and severely injured two others. On January 9, 1982, twenty-five workers were
hospitalized as a result of another leak at the plant. During the "safety week" proposed by management
to address worker grievances about the Bhopal facility, repeated incidents of such toxic
leakage took place and workers took the opportunity to complain directly to the American management
officials present. The Union Carbide sent a team of US experts
to conduct a routine safety audit at the Bhopal plant. The report, which was sent to Carbide’s
US management, stated leaking valves; “potential for the release of toxic materials;” 61
hazards, 30 of which were major and 11 of which were in the MIC/phosgene units. However, nothing was done to address the report’s
suggestions; instead remedial measures were then taken at Union Carbide’s identical
MIC plant in West Virginia, USA, but not in Bhopal. In August 1982, a chemical engineer suffered
30% burns over his body on coming in contact with liquid MIC. Several leaks occurred between 1982-1984 which
were largely ignored. In the wake of these incidents, workers at
the plant demanded hazardous duty pay scales commensurate with the fact that they were
required to handle hazardous substances. All of the requests were denied as a result it
leads to the worst industrial disaster of all time. On December 7, 1984, Warren Anderson, the
CEO of Union Carbide, was arrested in Bhopal but later released on bail upon a promise
to return. In December 1987, the Central Bureau of Investigation
filed a charge sheet against Anderson and other accused. In 2003, the ministry of external affairs
sent a request to the United States for Anderson’s extradition. However, this and further requests were turned
down. Warren Anderson never returned to India and
lived a comfortable life in the Hamptons until his death in 2014. In June 2010, seven ex-employees, including
the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and
sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each. An eighth former employee was also convicted
but died before judgment was passed. A compensation of nearly 470 million USD was
paid by the union carbide to the government of India but legal delays including identifying
the victims slowed the payout rate to a crawl. The only memorial ever built in Bhopal was
privately funded, designed by a daughter of Holocaust victim. In bold letters, the inscription reads, “No
Hiroshima, No Bhopal, We Want To Live.” Many years down the road after the Bhopal
disaster in 1984, some basic clean-up efforts had taken place but a lot of the contamination
is still there. The local people have to live with this environmental
pollution every single day. More than 100 thousand people are still suffering
from the debilitating effects of the gas which includes respiratory problems, cancer, congenital
birth defects, blindness and many other diseases. Every year since then, scores more are still
dying in Bhopal from the various after-effects. It has resulted in many children being born
with genetic defects and mutations and mental retardation. It has also had a long term impact on the
reproductive cycle of affected women and the quality of their breast milk. Besides the effects on people, the impact it has on the environment of that area is also far-reaching. There are still hundreds of tonnes of toxic
waste alone, which could lead to a continuous poisoning of the soil as well as groundwater. Some areas in and around the factory are still
so polluted that someone entering that area is likely to lose consciousness in less than
ten minutes. In November 1999, International environment
watchdog Greenpeace tested soil, groundwater and wells in and around the Union Carbide
factory and found 12 volatile organic chemicals and mercury in quantities up to six million
times higher than expected. While the Bhopal disaster has certainly received
a lot of international attention, not much progress has been achieved to improve people's
lives in the area. The tragedy is a burning example of one of
the deadliest disaster caused by human negligence in the maintenance. I hope I've shed some light on the event and
the aftermath of the disaster.