Transcript for:
Framework for Sino-American Relations Conference

Thank you very much. It's my pleasure to welcome you here tonight to the public session of our conference entitled Beyond Geopolitics, It's my pleasure to welcome you here tonight to the public session of our conference entitled Beyond Geopolitics, Building a New Framework for Sino-American Relations that we've been holding at Tsinghua all day. Building a New Framework for Sino-American Relations that we've been holding for a long time. at Tsinghua all day. I want to thank Tsinghua University for hosting this conference and a special thanks to Yan-Shei Tong, I want to thank...

Tsinghua University for hosting this conference, and a special thanks to Yuan-Shi Tong, the director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua, the director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua, Sun-Shei Fang, Sun-Shai Fong, assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua. assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua, and and Xi Chi Jingquan, who is the secretary of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and professor and dean of the Department of International Relations, Jing-Huan, who is the secretary of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and professor and dean of the Department of International Relations also at Tsinghua. also at Tsinghua. I would also like to say a special thanks to the University of Chicago Beijing Center, I would also like to say a special thanks to the University of Chicago Beijing Center, especially to the director, especially to the director, Daoyang, Dali Yang, especially to the deputy director, especially to the deputy director, Ji Yuan, Ji Yuan, and to the associate director, and to the associate director, Xiumeng Liang. Shu-Mei Liang, who played a tremendous role in also making it possible to have who played a tremendous role in also making it possible to have our conference.

our conference. Tonight, Tonight I think you're in for a very special treat. I think you're in for a very special treat. Tonight, Tonight we're going to have a debate, we're going to have a debate, a discussion, a discussion about probably the central question in international politics today, about probably the central question in international politics today, which is, which is can can China rise peacefully?

China rise peacefully? There is no other question more important There is no other question more important for the future of international politics than the question where for the future of international politics than the question we're about to discuss tonight. about to discuss tonight and we have two of the most important people in the world to help us understand this question and I am not exaggerating when I say that we have professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago he And we have two of the most important people in the world to help us understand this question. And I am not exaggerating when I say that. We have Professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago.

He is a distinguished professor of political science, is a distinguished professor of political science the co-director of the program on international security policy at the University of Chicago professor Mearsheimer the co-director of the program on international security policy at the University of Chicago. Professor Mearsheimer has been at the university since 1982, has been at the university since 1982, and since then he's been the author of five books. and since then he's been the author of five books, Most notably, most notably The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and The Israel Lobby and U.S.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. And I should also add that John Mearsheimer is widely viewed as a great man. And I should also add that John Mearsheimer is widely viewed as the world's foremost living realist scholar of international politics.

as the world's foremost living realist scholar of international politics. Our second speaker is Professor Yang Shui-Tang. Our second speaker is Professor Young Shui-Tung.

As I just told you, As I just told you, he is the Dean of the Institute of he is the Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of the Chinese Journal of International Politics. Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the chief editor of the Chinese Journal of International Politics. Professor Yang has also authored five books, Professor Yang has also authored five books, most notably including the analysis most notably including the analysis of China's national interests and is one of the foremost scholars of international politics in China.

China's national interest and is one of the foremost scholars of international politics in China. I truly cannot think of two more distinguished people to debate this question than the two we have here before us. I truly cannot think of two more distinguished people to debate this question.

than the two we have here before us. Now as we go forward time management is going to be one of our challenges. Now as we go forward, time management is going to be one of our challenges. I'm going to ask Professor Mearsheimer to speak first and I'm going to ask Professor Mearsheimer to speak for about 20 minutes.

I'm going to ask Professor Mearsheimer to speak first and I'm going to ask Professor Mearsheimer to speak for about 20 minutes. Then I would like Professor Yang to speak also for approximately 20 minutes. Then I would like Professor Yang to speak also for approximately 20 minutes. Then I would like to also invite each of them to respond to the other for about 5 minutes each, Then I would like to also invite each of them to respond to the other for about five minutes.

minutes each which will then give us plenty of time to have questions from the audience when we get to the time when questions from the audience are to come I'm going to ask you to make which will then give us plenty of time to have questions from the audience. When we get to the time when questions from the audience are to come, I'm going to ask you to... make a question or a comment but no longer than one minute.

a question or a comment but no longer than one minute and I mean one minute because we want to have as many comments as possible from this audience And I mean one minute. Because we want to have as many comments as possible from this audience. You all fought so hard to get in here.

You all fought so hard to get in here. We want to give you your chance to ask your questions. We want to give you your chance to ask your questions.

So without any further ado, So without any further ado, Professor Gnusche. Professor Mearsham. It's a great pleasure to be here tonight and I deeply appreciate the fact that all of you came It's a great pleasure to be here tonight, and I deeply appreciate the fact that all of you came out to hear me speak. out to hear me speak. It's a very humbling experience to know that so many people are interested in hearing what I have to say.

It's a very humbling experience to know that so many people are interested in hearing what I have to say. the question on the table of course is whether or not China can rise peacefully and as I'm sure almost all of you know my argument is that China cannot rise peacefully I actually the question on the table of course is whether or not China can rise peacefully and as I'm sure almost all of you know my argument is that China cannot rise peacefully I say that with great regret, I say that with great regret, but I do think it is the case. but I do think it is the case.

My argument, My argument, of course, of course, is that you cannot think seriously about this issue without a theory. is that you cannot think seriously about this issue without a theory. It is a theoretical issue.

It is a theoretical... issue. And the reason it's a theoretical issue is because we have no facts about the future.

And the reason it's a theoretical issue is because we have no facts about the future. So when you talk about this question of whether China can rise peacefully, So when you talk about this question of whether China can rise peacefully, you have to have a theory, you have to have a theory, and that theory... and that theory has to be one that is true. It has to be one that you have confidence in.

and that you have confidence in. You have to believe that that theory is good at explaining the past and the present. You have to believe that that theory is good at explaining the past and the present.

And therefore... And therefore... Is that better like that?

Is that better like that? Yes. Yeah.

We don't get the feedback. We don't get the feedback. So my point is to understand or to think about the question of whether China can rise peacefully, So my point is to understand, think about the question whether China can rise peacefully, you need a theory. you need a theory, And you have to have confidence in that theory. and you have to have confidence in that theory, And you have to believe...

and you have to believe that that... that that theory can explain the past and the present, theory can explain the past and the present, and therefore will do a good job of explaining the future. and therefore will do a good job of explaining the future.

Now, Now my theory, my theory, as most of you know, as most of you know, is a structural theory. is a structural theory. So my argument is not that China can't rise So my argument is not that China can't rise peacefully. peacefully because of its culture or because of its domestic politics. peacefully because of its culture or because of its domestic politics.

It's the structure of the international system that forces China to behave in a particular way. It's the structure of the international system that forces China to behave in a particular way. And that system forces the United States to behave in the same way as well.

And that system forces the United States to behave in the same way as well. Now, what exactly is the theory? What exactly is the theory?

I basically believe that because states operate in an anarchic system, I basically believe that because states operate in an anarchic system, a system where there is no higher a system where there is no higher authority, authority, where there's no night watchman, where there's no night watchman, and where states cannot be certain about the intentions of other states, and where states cannot be certain about the intentions of other states, they have no choice but to maximize their relative power. they have no choice but to maximize their relative power. The best way to survive in a system where there's no night watchmen and where you can't be certain that another state at some point in time won't attack you is to be really powerful.

The best way to survive in a system where there's no night watchman, and where you can't be certain that another state at some point in time won't attack... you is to be really powerful because really powerful states have a very good chance of surviving just think of the United States how many Americans go to bed at night worrying about Canada or Mexico or Because really powerful states... Have a very good chance of surviving. Just think of the United States.

How many Americans go to bed at night worrying about Canada or Mexico or Guatemala attacking us? Guatemala attacking us the answer is partly anybody thinks that why because we're so powerful so what you want to do The answer is hardly anybody thinks that. Why?

Because we're so powerful. So what you want to do in international politics is you want to maximize your power. politics is you want to maximize your power and what that means in practical terms in my opinion is you want to be number one a regional hegemon and number two you want to make sure that no other state in the system is a regional hegemon in other words that you have no peer competitor if And what that means in practical terms, in my opinion, is you want to be, number one, a regional hegemon, and number two... you want to make sure that no other state in the system is a regional hegemon. In other words, that you have no peer competitor.

If you are a regional hegemon, you are a regional hegemon and of course the United States is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere if you're a regional hegemon and of course the United States is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, if you're a regional hegemon no other state in your region is capable of attacking you and threatening your survival. no other state in your region is capable of attacking you and threatening your survival. Now you're probably asking yourself, Now you're probably asking yourself, why is it that why is it that I argue that it is very important that you not have a peer competitor? I argue that it is very important that you not have a peer competitor? Why is it important, Why is it important, for example, for example, for the United States to make sure for the United States to make sure that Imperial Germany does not dominate Europe, that Imperial Germany does not dominate Europe, or that the Soviet Union does not dominate or that the Soviet Union does not dominate?

Europe, or that China does not dominate Asia? Europe or that China does not dominate Asia? The answer is that if The answer is that if China were to dominate Asia, China were to dominate Asia or Imperial Germany were to dominate Europe, or Imperial Germany were to dominate Europe, it would be free to roam.

it would be free to roam. And you're saying to yourself, And you're saying to yourself, what exactly does it mean to be free to roam? what exactly does it mean to be free to roam?

The United States, The United States, because it dominates the Western Hemisphere, because it dominates the Western Hemisphere, and therefore faces those security threats in the Western Hemisphere, and therefore faces those security threats in the Western Hemisphere is free to roam into every nook and cranny of the world. is free to roam into every nook and cranny of the world. You've noticed that the United States is omnipresent on the globe. You've noticed that the United States is omnipresent on the globe. We are everywhere.

We are everywhere. And the reason we are everywhere is because we are free to roam. And the reason we are everywhere is because we are free to roam.

From China's point of view, From China's point of view, this is not a good situation. this is not a good situation, Because the Chinese are not happy with the fact that the United States has military forces stationed on its doorsteps. because the Chinese are not happy with the fact that the United States is omnipresent.

has military forces stationed on its doorsteps. You don't like the fact that we run aircraft carriers into the Yellow Sea, You don't like the fact that we run aircraft carriers into the Yellow Sea, into the Taiwan Strait. into the Taiwan Strait. that we have airplanes right off your coast, Do we have airplanes right off your coast? that we have ground forces right off your coast.

Do we have ground forces right off your coast? You would prefer for us to have to worry more about what's going on in the Western Hemisphere so we would have less time to pay attention to what's going on in Asia. you would prefer for us to have to worry more about what's going on in the Western Hemisphere, so we would have less time to pay attention to what's going on in Asia.

Well, Well, from an American point of view, from an American point of view, we think the same way. we think... the same way.

From an American point of view, From an American point of view, we do not want China to be free to roam. we do not want China to be free to roam. We do not want China to be free to roam into the Western Hemisphere.

We do not want China to be free to roam into the Western Hemisphere. We don't want China to be free to roam into the Persian Gulf. We don't want China to be free to roam into the Persian Gulf.

We want China to focus on its own region. We want China to focus on its own region. That means we want other great powers, That means we want other great powers, other powerful states to be present in Asia so that China has to concentrate on them and is not free to wander into our backyard.

other powerful states to be present in Asia so that China has to concentrate on them and is not free to wander into our backyard. And of course, And of course, from China's point of view, from China's point of view, you're unhappy with the situation where we're free to roam because when we, you're unhappy with a situation where we're free to roam because when we, the United States, the United States, are free to roam, are free to roam, we roam into your backyard. we roam into your backyard, Which is what we have been doing for quite a while now, which is what we have been doing for quite a while now. and we intend to do for a long time to come. and we intend to do for a long time to come.

So to go back to square one, So to go back to square one, my argument is that in a world where there's no higher authority... my argument is that in a world where there's no higher authority, you can turn to if you get into trouble, you can turn to if you get into trouble and where you can never be certain that another state won't come after you at some point, and where you can never be certain that another state won't come after you at some point, the best way to ensure your survival is to maximize your relative power. the best way to ensure your survival is to maximize your relative power, To be, to be...

as we used to say in New York when I was a boy, as we used to say in New York when I was a boy, the biggest and baddest dude on the block. the biggest and baddest dude on the block. Because if you're the biggest and baddest dude on the block, Because if you're the biggest and baddest dude on the block, nobody fools around with you. nobody fools around with you.

And of course, And of course, in more specific terms, in more specific terms, this means you want to be number one, this means you want to be, number one, a regional hegemon, a regional hegemon, and number two, and number two, you want to make sure that you are the only regional hegemon on the planet that you want to make sure that you are the only regional hegemon on the planet that no other country does. no other country dominates its region the way you dominate yours. dominates its region the way you dominate yours. So that's my basic argument.

So that's my basic argument. Now, Now, what I'd like to do is give you a brief sketch of American history and try to make the case that the United States has behaved according to the dictates of my theory, what I'd like to do is give you a brief sketch of American history and try to make the... case that the United States has behaved according to the dictates of my theory, because I believe this will give you some confidence that my theory is correct.

because I believe this will give you some confidence that my theory is correct. And then when I'm done doing that, And then when I'm done doing that, what I'm going to do is argue that China will behave the way the United States behaved and behaves. what I'm going to do is argue that China will behave the way the United States behaved.

And behave. behaves, and that's consistent with my theory as well. And that's consistent with my theory as well.

If you look at American history over time, If you look at American history over time, the history of American foreign policy over time, the history of American foreign policy over time, going back to 1783 when we got our independence from Britain, going back to 1783 when we got our independence. from Britain. What you see is that the United States started out as 13 small colonies that ran up and down the Atlantic seaboard. what you see is that the United States started out as 13 small colonies that ran up and down the Atlantic seaboard.

Over the course of roughly the next 70 years the United States marched across the continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Over the course of roughly the next 70 years, the United States has been a very strong and strong country. the United States marched across the continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.

We murdered huge numbers of Native Americans. We murdered huge numbers of Native Americans. We stole their land.

We stole their land. We went to war against Mexico and we stole what is today the southwest of the United States from Mexico. We went to war against Mexico, and we stole what is today the southwest of the United States from Mexico.

We invaded Canada in 1812 for the purposes of incorporating it into the United States. We invaded Canada in 1812 for the purposes of incorporating it into the United States. We had our gun sites on Canada for much of the We had our gun sights on.

Canada for much of the 19th century. 19th century. We would have expanded into the Caribbean had it not been for the slavery issue. We would have expanded into the Caribbean had it not been for the slavery issue. The northern states did not want any more slave-holding states in the Union, The northern states did not want any more slave-holding states in the Union, and if we had incorporated areas in the Caribbean into the United States, and if we had incorporated areas in the Caribbean into the United States, they would have been slave-holding states.

they would have been slave-holding states. The United States had a voracious appetite for conquest. The United States had a voracious appetite for conquest. In modern history, In modern history, there is no country that comes as close to the United States in terms of successful conquest. there is no country that comes as close to the United States.

In terms of successful conquest, when Adolf Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, When Adolf Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, 1941, for the next few months, for the next few months, he talked frequently about how he was going to imitate what the United States did in North America in terms of carving out Lebensraum in the Soviet Union. he talked frequently about how he was going to imitate what the United States did in North America in terms of carving out Lebensraum in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Furthermore, not only did the United States go to great lengths to establish hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, not only did the United States go to great lengths to establish hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, over the course of the 20th century, over the course of the 20th century, we came up against four potential peer competitors. we came up against four potential peer competitors. Imperial Germany, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, Nazi Germany, and the former Soviet Union.

and the former Soviet Union. The United States played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history. The United States played a key role in putting all four of those countries on the scrap heap of history. The United States would not tolerate the idea. The United States would not tolerate the idea of a war.

that any of those four countries would be a peer competitor. that any of those four countries would be a peer competitor. And the United States has made it clear on numerous occasions since the Cold War ended that we will not tolerate a peer competitor. And the United States has made it clear on numerous occasions since the Cold War ended that we will not tolerate a peer competitor. We intend to remain the only regional hegemon in the international system.

We intend to... Maine, the only regional hegemon in the international system. So the argument I'm making here is that if you look at American behavior since 1783, So the argument I'm making here is that if you look at American behavior since 1783, it's consistent with my basic theory. it's consistent with my basic theory.

So this brings us to the... This brings us to the Chinese Chinese case. case. How is China likely to behave as it becomes much more powerful?

How is China likely to behave as it becomes much more powerful? And it's very important for you to understand I'm not talking about China today and I'm not talking about China tomorrow. And it's very important for you to understand, I'm not talking about China today, and I'm not talking about China tomorrow.

I'm talking about China 10, I'm talking about China 10, 20, 20, 30 years down the road when it becomes very powerful, 30 years down the road, when it becomes very powerful, when it's much more powerful than it is today. when it's much more powerful than it is today. And the question you want to ask yourself is, And the question you want to ask yourself is how is China likely to behave then?

how is China likely to behave then? And my argument is as China grows more powerful And my argument is, as China grows more powerful, it will go to great lengths to establish regional hegemony. it will go to great lengths to establish regional hegemony.

Why? Why? Because from China's point of view, Because from China's point of view, it makes eminently good sense to be the most powerful state in Asia. it makes eminently good sense to be the most powerful state in Asia. All the Chinese in the audience surely remember what happened in the past when China was weak.

All of the Chinese in the audience surely remember what happened in the past when China was weak. When China was weak, When China was weak, it was victimized. it was victimized. It was victimized by the other great powers. It was victimized by the other great powers.

It would have been much better for China if from 1850 forward it was by far the most powerful state on the planet. It would have been much better for China if from 1850 forward it was by far the most powerful state on the planet, instead of being one of the weakest states on the planet, Instead of being one of the weakest states on the planet. Because when you were weak, because when you were weak, you were victimized.

you were victimized. You want to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. You want to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block.

If I gave you a choice, If I gave you a choice. You can be you can be 50 times more powerful than Japan, 50 times more powerful than Japan, or Japan can be 50 times more powerful to you than you. or Japan can be 50 times more powerful than you. Do you think it makes any difference? Do you think it makes any difference?

Of course it makes difference. Of course it makes a difference. It makes a huge amount of difference.

It makes a huge amount of difference. There's no Chinese person in his or her right mind who doesn't want to be 50 times more powerful than Japan. There's no Chinese person in his or her right.

mind who doesn't want to be 50 times more powerful than Japan. If you're Chinese, If you're Chinese, you want to be 50 times more powerful than Russia, you want to be 50 times more powerful than Russia, India, India, and Japan. and Japan.

You want to be the most powerful state in your region. You want to be the most powerful state in your region. Is that because you're evil? Is that because you're evil? Is that because you're obsessed with conquest?

Is that because... You're obsessed with conquest? No! No, It's because the best way to survive in an anarchic system where you cannot know the intentions of other states and some of those states may come at you at some point is to be very, it's because the best way to survive in an anarchic system where you cannot know the intentions of other states, and some of those states may come at you at some point, is to be very, very powerful. very powerful.

Again, Again, to go back to the United States of America, to go back to the United States of America, we are not so powerful on accident. we are not so powerful on accident. The founding fathers and their successors went to great lengths to build a remarkably powerful state.

The family fathers and their successors went to great lengths to build a system. to build a remarkably powerful state, because that's the best way to maximize your security. because that's the best way to maximize your security.

And the Chinese will surely figure this out if they haven't already figured it out. And the Chinese will surely figure this out if they haven't already figured it out. You want to be really powerful. You want to be really powerful.

You want to be a regional hegemon. You want to be a regional hegemon. Now, Now, the second thing that the Chinese are going to do is they're going to try and push the Americans out of Asia. the second thing that the Chinese are going to do is they're going to try and push the Americans out of Asia.

They'd be fools not to. They'd be fools not to. If I was a national security advisor in Beijing and the president asked me how we should think about the Americans, If I was a national security advisor in Beijing and the president asked me how we should think about the Americans, I'd say I'd say the farther we can get the Americans away from Asia, I'd say the farther we can get the Americans away from Asia...

the better. the better. I don't want them on our doorstep. I don't want them on our doorstep.

I'm an American. I'm an American. We have this thing called the Monroe Doctrine.

We have this thing called the Monroe Doctrine. You've all heard of the Monroe Doctrine. You've all heard of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1823 old President James Monroe told the European great powers, In 1823, old President James Monroe told the European great powers, we are not now powerful enough to throw you out of this hemisphere, we are not now powerful enough to throw you out of this hemisphere, but we're eventually going to reach the point where we are powerful enough to throw you out.

but we're eventually going to reach the point where we are powerful enough to throw you out. And we're going to throw you out and we want you to know you're not welcome back in the Western Hemisphere. And we're going to throw you out, and we want you to know you're not welcome back in the Western... hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine is still operative today.

The Monroe Doctrine is still operating. If China gets really powerful and it tries to project power into the Western Hemisphere, If China gets really powerful and tries to project power into the western hemisphere, we will not be happy at all. we will not be happy at all. Should we expect China to have its own Monroe Doctrine? Should we expect China to have its own Monroe Doctrine?

Of course we should. Of course we should. My mother taught me when I was a little boy, My mother taught me when I was a little boy, what's good for the goose is good for the gander. what's good for the goose is good for the gander. If it's good for us, If it's good for us, why isn't it good for China?

why isn't it good for China? We don't like it when the Soviets come into the Western Hemisphere and try to put nuclear weapons and naval forces and ground forces in Cuba during the Cold War. We don't like it when the Soviets come into the western hemisphere in front of nuclear weapons and naval forces and ground forces in Cuba during the Cold War. We didn't like that at all.

We didn't like that at all. Why should you like it when the Americans are sitting on your doorstep and projecting power into your backyard? Why should you like it when the Americans are sitting on your doorstep and projecting power into your backyard?

My point is if you have a choice My point is, if you have a choice, And you think you can push us beyond the first island chain you think you can push us beyond the second island chain? and you think you can push us beyond the first island chain, you think you can push us beyond the second island chain, you will do it. you will do it. And you will do it because you're good strategists.

And you will do it because you're a good strategist. You understand. understand, The goal here is to establish regional hegemony.

the goal here is to establish regional hegemony. And that means, And that means number one being the most powerful state in your region and number two it means that you don't want the United States or any other distant great power in your backyard. number one, being the most powerful state in your region, and number two, it means that you don't want the United States or any other distant great power in your backyard.

So this is what I think is going to happen. So this is what I think is going to happen. And this brings us to the question what is the United States going to do? And this brings us to the question, what is the United States going to do? As China tries to establish regional hegemony.

As China tries to establish regional hegemony. The theory is quite clear, The theory is quite clear, and the empirical record is quite clear. and the empirical record is quite clear. The United States of America does not tolerate peer competitors. The United States of America does not tolerate peer competitors.

We will go to enormous lengths to contain Chinese power. We will go to enormous lengths to contain Chinese power. We will go to enormous... We will go to enormous...

slants to make sure that China does not dominate Asia, slates to make sure that China does not dominate Asia, the same way we went to Great Lakes to make sure Imperial Germany, the same way we went to Great Lakes to make sure Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, Nazi Germany, and the former Soviet Union didn't dominate either Europe or Asia. and the former Soviet Union didn't dominate either Europe or Asia. You can already see evidence of it. You can already see evidence of it. What do you What do you do you think the pivot to Asia is all about?

What do you think the pivot to Asia is all about? You don't believe the Americans when they say it has nothing to do with containing China? You don't believe the Americans when they say it has nothing to do with containing China? This is typical American hypocrisy. This is typical American hypocrisy.

Nobody in their right mind believes that. Nobody in their right mind believes that. The pivot to Asia is all about containing China. The pivot to Asia is all about containing China. And the more power And the more power China accrues, China accrues, the more the United States will pivot to Asia, the more the United States will pivot to Asia.

because we intend to contain Europe. Because we intend to contain you. The theory is clear and the history is clear. The theory is clear and the history is clear.

And you of course will not be happy about that because you'll be interested in getting this out of Asia for good strategic reasons. And you, of course, will not be happy about that, because you'll be interested in getting us out of Asia, for good strategic reasons. The end result of all this is we're going to have, The end result of all this is we're going to have, if China continues to rise, if China continues to rise, an intense security competition.

an intense security competition. Is war inevitable? Is war inevitable? No. No.

Is war possible? Is war possible? Yes. Yes.

We could posit all sorts of scenarios where the Americans and the Chinese end up shooting at each other. We could posit all sorts of scenarios where the Americans and the Chinese end up shooting at each other. It could be over Taiwan, Could be over Taiwan, it could be over Korea, could be over Korea, it could be over the South. could be over the South.

China Sea, China Sea, could be over the Diaoyu Islands, could be over the Diaoyu Islands. Who knows? who knows? But there are potential flashpoints there and when you marry those potential flashpoints with the fact that you're going to have an intense security competition, There are potential flashpoints there and when you marry those potential flashpoints with the fact that you're going to have an intense security competition, the potential for trouble is very great.

the potential for trouble is very great. Let me end by making one quasi-optimistic argument. Let me end by making one quasi-optimistic argument.

My case is that the Chinese government is not going My case... is based on a theory, is based on a theory, as I said early on. as I said early on.

And as almost all of you know, And as almost all of you know, there's no social science theory that gets it right all the time. there's no social science theory that gets it right all the time. Social science theories are actually crude instruments. Social science theories are actually crude instruments. We have no choice but to employ theories to make sense of the world.

We have no choice but to employ theories to make sense of the world. The world is enormously complicated. The world is enormously complicated.

We need theories to make sense of it. We need theories to make sense of it. And as I said early on, And as I said early on, if you're going to try and predict what happens as China rises, if you're going to try and predict what happens as China rises, There's no way he could do that without a theory. There's no way you can do that without a theory. But theories, But theories, because they're simplifications of reality, because they're simplifications of reality, leave out all sorts of factors that sometimes matter greatly.

leave out all sorts of factors that sometimes matter greatly. For a realist like me who focuses on power and structure, For a realist like me who focuses on power and structure, domestic politics is a very important part of our lives. domestic politics doesn't matter in my story.

doesn't matter in my story. But in reality, But in reality, domestic politics occasionally matters. domestic politics occasionally matters. And that's one of the reasons that my theory is sometimes proved wrong.

And that's one of the reasons that my theory is sometimes proved wrong. wrong. No theory, No theory, again, again, is perfect.

is perfect. My best guess, My best guess, and this is purely intuitive, and this is purely intuitive, is that the best theories get it right 75% of the time. is that the best theories get it right 75% of the time.

That means they're wrong 25% of the time. That means they're wrong 25% of the time. Let's assume, Let's assume, just for argument's sake, just for argument's sake, that my theory is one of the best theories out there. that my theory is one of the best theories out there.

It gets me a slot in the Hall of Fame. It gets me a slot in the Hall of Fame. Just assume that.

Just assume that. Even if that's true, Even if that's true, I'm still wrong 25% of the time. I'm still wrong 25% of the time. of the time.

Now, Given the bleak picture that I've just described, given the bleak picture that I've just... described, let's hope that with regard to the rise of China, let's hope that with regard to the rise of China, that will turn out to be one of the instances in which my theory is proved wrong. that will turn out to be one of the instances in which my theory is proved wrong. Thank you.

Thank you. Well, Well, Professor Professor Amir Shema gave a very eloquent presentation. Mishamer gave a very eloquent presentation. And before I came, And before I came, some people questioned me, some people questioned me. and what you can debate between two realists. And what you can debate between two realists?

Yes. We are almost the same. are almost the same.

You don't have a difference. You don't have difference. How can you debate against each other? How can you debate against each other?

Well, Well, I have to admit that for realists, I have to admit that for realists, and we do share a lot of things, we do share a lot of things. And especially we share the assumptions. and especially we share the assumptions that the five assumptions suggested that The five assumptions suggested that...

by Professor Hamer, by Professor Hammer, every state has to protect himself in the anarchical system. every state has to protect himself in an anarchical system. All states and only the military capability is a miracle and you can never trust others'motivation.

All states and only the military capability is a marrow and you can never trust others'motivation. And all states run the survival as the most important goal. And all states rank the survival as the most important goal.

All states want to maximize their security. All states want to maximize their security. That's why the security dilemma cannot be avoided between the competition between countries. That's why the security dilemma cannot be avoided between the competition between China and the US.

China and the US. And all theories have to base their facts in the history rather than based on the facts of the future because we don't know, And all theories have to be based on facts in the history, rather than based on the facts of the future, because we don't know, right? right?

So I think we have no difference on these assumptions. So I think we have no difference on this sentence. That's why we can share, That's why we can share, or we can have a... we can have a really serious and meaningful discussion because we never debate about assumptions, really serious and meaningful discussion because we never debate about assumptions, we just debate about the logic.

we just debate about the logic and the result or the conclusion. and the result or the conclusion, right? Okay, I also agree with the some arguments made by I also agree with some arguments made by Professor Professor Mish Hamer.

Professor Mitch Hamer. And he... And I think China, I think both China and the US want to be the leading power in the world.

both China and the US want to be the leading power in the world. And China wants to resume its national rejuvenation. And China want to resume its national rejuvenation.

And that means And that means China wants to be the number one in the world. China want to be the number one in the world. And And Obama has said, Obama has already told the Congress, already told the Congress, the US will never accept being the second in the world.

the US never accept being the second in the world. And from my understanding it means they never accept any guy. And from my understanding, it means they never accept any guy equal with the US.

equal with the US, not only being the second, Not a whole. being the second, even the Dong-Wan have two number ones. even if they don't want to have the two number ones.

And also the sequence, And also the sequence. certainly all the great powers have to be the regional leading power before they become the leading power of the world. Certainly all the great powers have to be the regional leading power before they become the leading power of the world. So that's inevitable. So that's inevitable.

This is a sequence, This is a sequence, it's not a theory. it's not a theory. That's a law of nature. That's a law of nature.

And then the last point is that there's several strategies for both China and the U.S. And then the last point is that there's several strategies for both China and the US. to maintain that to increase or maintain their positions and you have the strategy containment and containment engagement and continuing engagement rollback and the offshore balance the certainly there's several strategy to increase or maintain their positions.

And the U.S. has the strategy of containment, engagement, rollback, and offshore balance. Certainly there's several strategies. So the same for China. so the same for China and we can keep in low profile and we become more responsible for the world and we can go to war so there's also several And we can keep a low profile.

And we become more responsible for the world and we can go to war. And so there are also several strategies for China to establish its leading position. strategies for China to establish its leading position.

Well, Well, except these common things we share with each other, except these common things we share with each other, and we certainly have some differences, we certainly have some differences. So we'll emphasize the differences between us. so we'll emphasize the differences between us. And first, And first, We have a different view about the strategy selections for being a great power. we have a different view about the strategy selections for being a great power.

And just now Mr. And just now Mr. Hammer has told us that how the US become a superpower and only superpower and through all the Hammer has told us that how the U.S. become a superpower and almost only superpower and through all these major violent operations. all this metro violent operation. Well, Well, so that imply that it's inevitable. so that is inevitable. China, China, you have no other choice.

you have no other choice. You have to follow American suit. You have to follow American suit. I don't think you can make, I don't think you can find something different from this. you can find something different from this.

Actually, Actually, I have a different view from this. I have different view from these and since America has more alternative strategies to contain China and prevent China from being the number one and that certainly we have a different, And since America has more alternative strategies to contain China and prevent China from being the number one, and that certainly we have a different, we have there's a more strategies available for China to become a leading power and for instance and the June there's a more. more strategies available for China to become the leading power. And for instance, during the American and June competition between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War and the US mainly rely on the containment strategy which is American competition between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the US mainly relied on the containment strategy, which is very different from the strategy adopted by the UK during the colonial period. is very different from the strategy adopted by the UK during the colonial period.

And when the And when the UK competed against France, UK competed against France, they competed to see who had more colonies. they competed to see who had more colonies. But for the US, they were more focused on the containment strategy.

But the US said, The US said, no, no, no, no, no, no, I don't need to occupy these colonies, I don't need to occupy these colonies, I just want to make more allies. I just want to make more allies. So finally, So finally America made more allies, America made more allies, have a powerful alliance, had a powerful alliance, and then won the game.

and then win the game. So the same for China, So the same for China. now we move to the new age for minor sending.

Now we move to the new aid from Myanmar, we certainly are looking for some new strategy. We certainly can look for some new strategy and I think later on I will dwell on that and what Xi Jinping has already suggested for us. And I think later on we will dwell on that and what Xi Jinping has already suggested for us. Definitely different from keeping low profile.

Definitely different from keeping low profile. And so And the... So...

I would suggest that the strategy illustrated by I will suggest that the strategy and the strategies illustrated by Xi Jinping on the 24th reported on the 26th of the People's Daily. Xi Jinping on the 24th, reported on the 26th of the People's Day, I just suggested to I just suggested to Professor... Professor Nielsen to get the English version. to get the English version. And he's talking about what we should do.

And he's talking about what we should do. Actually, Actually the new strategy has the goal is to create a favorable environment for national rejuvenation. the new strategy has the goal of creating a favorable environment for national rejuvenation. This is very different from the This is very different from the very goal to create a peaceful environment for economic construction. the early goal to create a peaceful environment for economic construction.

And the tenet of the strategy is to make the neighbors more friendly to China, And the tenet of the strategy is to make the neighbors more friendly to China, more friendly to China's goal of efforts to rejuvenate the nation. more friendly to China's goal of efforts to rejuvenate the nation. And rather than, And rather than... this is also different.

This is also different. From the From the previous strategy to give the first priority to the United States. Premier's strategy to give the first priority to the United States.

Giving the first priority to the better relationship with the United States means and if the U.S. Giving the first priority to the bank relationship with the United States means and if the U.S. has conflicts with our neighbors, has a conflict... with our neighbors, we definitely take abstinence.

we definitely take a abstain nature. Nature. We won't stand at the side against US.

We won't stand at the side against US and if possible we will stand at American side. And if possible, we will stand at American side. That means that you can never have a good neighborhood because Americans do not have a good friendship with all of our neighbors. That means that you can never have a good neighborhood, because the Americans do not have a good friendship. with all of our neighbors.

And the third, the general layout, The general layout is to establish three sub-regional economic communities and deepen security cooperation with neighbors. is to establish some regional economic community and deepen security cooperation with neighbors. This is very different from before. This is very different from before.

And now we try to establish the Silk Road in the Middle East and the And now we try to establish the Silk Road in the Middle East and the Sea Silk Road in Sea Silk Road in Southeast China and also build this economic corridor with the Indian, Southeast China and also build up these economic... corridor with the Indian Myanmar and Bangladesh. Myanmar and Bangladesh. And besides that, And he said that, Xi Jinping suggested that we should deepen our security cooperation with our neighbors.

Xi Jinping suggests that we should deepen our security cooperation with our neighbors. And usually we are only concerned with economic security with neighbors, And usually we only concern the economic security with neighbors, but we are very reluctant talking about security cooperation with them. but we're very reluctant talking about security cooperation with them. And the working approach, And the working approach, there's so many.

there are so many. And the working approach, And the working approach of first-class citizens is very difficult. first to...

to see the circle for sharing notice rather looking for the mutual trust well I think you know that there's a debate between me and some others are advocating for the mutual trust between China and US and for me I think that we can we do not need you to trust between China and US because we never trust each other like the minister camera guy I fully agree with that I don't think we can trust each other but we have a sharing interest and we have a complementary increase and searching for shared interests rather than looking for the mutual trust. I think you know that there's a debate between me and some others advocating for the mutual trust between China and the US. And for me, I think we do not need mutual trust between China and the US because we never trust each other. Like Mr. Hammer said, I fully agree with that. I don't think we can trust each other, but we have shared interests.

And we have complementary interests. And we even have conflicting interests. we even have conflicting interests.

All these interests are based for the cooperation. All these interests are based for the cooperation. And the common interests and the complementary interests will help us to build up the positive cooperation and then based on the conflicting interests we can develop preventative cooperation. And the common interests and the complementary interests will help us to build up the positive cooperation, and then based on the conflicting interests, we can develop preventative cooperation.

And also this working approach also concerns that sticking to the value of the justice and the benefits, And also this working approach also concerns that sticking to the value of the justice and the benefits and that means the cherished friendship and the rightness. and that means the temperature friendship and the rightness. This is so important. This is so different from before. so different from before.

Usually we do not want to make the distinction between friends and enemies. Usually we do not want to make the distinction between friends and enemies. Some argue that because we moved into the age of globalization, Someone argued that because we moved to the age of globalization, we no longer need to make the distinction between friends and enemies. we no longer need to make the distinction between friends and enemies.

So once I make a joke that if you are equally friends with every woman, So once I make a joke that if you are equally friends with every woman, then you have no wife. then you have no wife, right? So now the same thing, So now the same thing, for China we have to value the friendship.

for China we have to. And here we have to value the friendship. That means also we do not value those who are confronting against China. That means also we do not value those who are not friends with us.

are very confronting against China. So we make the distinction between friends and enemies. So we make the distinction between friends and enemies.

And the last, And so, the last, not the last, not the last, the other working approach is that try to make our neighbors economically benefit from China. the other working approach is that try to make our neighbors economically benefit from China. Make them benefit economically from China. Make them benefit economically from China.

It's not we try to make both sides. It's not we try to make both sides mutually benefit each other equally economically. mutually benefit each other equally economically. Not economically mutually benefit each other. Not economically mutually benefit each other.

We are willing to give the more favorable treatment. We are willing to... to give the most favorable treatment. So from my understanding it is So from my understanding, it is very possible you can make friends if you make friends benefit from your money and your security protection.

is very possible you can make friends if you make friends benefit from your money and your security protection. That's it. That is it. And certainly from my understanding this strategy will concern the term is the fate community, And certainly, from my understanding, this strategy will concern the term is the fate community, the. the fate community from my understanding it doesn't mean refer to the free trade zone.

The fate community, from my understanding, it doesn't mean refer to the free trade zone. It's not the common market. It's not the common market.

No, No, it refers to for me, it's a good first for me. It's an even more deeper relationship than mutual allies. it's even more deeper relationship than mutual allies.

It's a combination of the integration of economy and security. It's a combination of the integration of economy and security. So this is something very new, So this is something very neat.

and from my understanding this in some way is like the term I argued, And from my understanding, this in some way is like the term I argue, human authority. human authority. Human authority concern that to let the others to benefit from his leadership, Human authority concerns that to let the others to benefit from his leadership, rather than let others to suffer from his leadership. rather than let others to suffer from his leadership.

Why? Why? They are not so stupid.

They're not so stupid. They are not giving money away for nothing. They are not giving the money away for nothing. They want to get political support and they need political support.

They want to get political support. And they need political support. If China wants to achieve the national rejuvenation, If China wants to achieve the national rejuvenation, we have to.

we have to. We have to pay for it and you don't have free lunch. We have to pay for it.

And you don't have to relax. Okay, The other different view between moral realism and the offensive is about the importance of the other different view between moral realism and the offensive realism is about the political system. the importance of ...the morality.

the morality and from my standing offensive realism concerns the value of morality doesn't mean anything but for moral realism we consider it really important the reason because And from my understanding, offensive realism concerns the value of morality, it doesn't mean anything. But for moral realism, we can say it's really important. The reason is because...

the visa up okay and not that page and I have to speak from my memory. I have to speak to you from memory and from outstanding for more release more we got morality is the resources are up the capability From my understanding, for moral realism we regard morality as the resources of the tribability. And because the morality can help you to strengthen your friendship with neighbors, morality to help you to strengthen your friendship with neighbors and can strengthen and improve your capability of mobilizing and the international support and strengthen your domestic political and can strengthen and improve your capability in mobilizing international support, and strengthen your domestic political will. will and also because the different morality and the will have the impact of the selection of the strategy.

And also because the different morality and will have the impact of the selection of the strategy. That means, That means that and you find that and the junior board will adopt a different strategy from the Clinton. and you find that, and Junior Bush will adopt a different strategy.

different strategy from Clinton. And then you find And then you find that Deng Xiaoping adopted a different strategy from Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping adopted a different strategy from Mao Zedong.

And now I think Xi Jinping is to adopt a different policy from Hu Jintao. And now I think Xi Jinping is to adopt a different policy from Hu Jintao. And so the value really have impact on the morality. And so the different values really have an impact on the morality.

For offensive realism, For offensive realism, concern that the military is the base of the capability, concern that the military is the base of the capability, or the national comprehensive power. or the national comprehensive power. For me, For me, I think the political leadership, I think the political leadership, or the moral realism regarding the military, or the moral realism regarding the political leadership is the base.

political leadership is the base and certainly for economic realist we regarded the economy as the base for the national comprehensive power. And certainly for economic realists, we regard the economy as the base for the national comprehensive power. Why is it so important? Why is it so important?

The important thing is that if the leadership is the different leadership will adopt a different strategy. The important thing is that if the leadership is the leadership the different leadership will adopt a different strategy. For instance, For instance when China was so weak in when China was so weak in 1950s and 1950s and 1960s, 1960s we went to a lot of wars. we went to a lot of wars. That's Mao Zedong's preference.

That's Mao Zedong's preference. And in some way like the Junior Bush, And in some way, like the universe, and their preference is for the military solution. under their preference, and his... for the military solution.

But then come to Hu Jintao and But then come to Hu Jintao and Clinton, you find that they are reluctant to go to war. Clinton, you find that they are reluctant to go to war. And they have different values.

And they have different values. And they have different beliefs. and they have different beliefs.

And that's why when China was weak, And that's why when China was weak, we went to more wars. we went to war wars. And when we got stronger after 1984, And when we are getting strong after 1984, we are getting stronger and stronger.

we are getting stronger and stronger. We become less and less involved in any war. We become less and less involved in any war. That's strange. That's strange.

And China is now the most peaceful country among all of the major powers. And China is now the most peaceful country among all of the major powers. And and Japan, including Japan, Japan, including Japan, all major powers are involved in the war after all major powers involved in the war after 1991. But not China. 1991. But not China.

China involved in no war. China, you won't be knowing. and that's really strange.

And that's really strange. I don't think it's normal. I don't think it's normal.

Well, Well, finally I will come to this point, finally I will come to this point, what we debated. what we debated. Whether China can rise peacefully? Whether China can rise peacefully? Well, Well, as a realist, as a realist, I will argue that I do not rule out the possibility for China being dragged into war.

I will argue that I do not know the possibility for China to be in a war. dragged into war and no one can guarantee that and so that's why And no one can guarantee that. And so that's why Xi Jinping said that we need to have the bottom line preparation. Xi Jinping said that we have we need to have the bottom line preparation and so here is that but I do not so pessimistic like the professor Mr. And so here is that. not so pessimistic like the Professor Mr. Hamer concerning the danger of the war between China and the US.

Hammer and concerning the danger of the war between China and the US I think it is very unlikely there's two reasons first is nuclear weapons nuclear weapons can be won by the I think it is very unlikely. There's two reasons. First is nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons can prevent the US and the Soviet Union to fight against each other directly. US and the So the union to fight against each other directly, they only carry out the proxy war. They only carry out the proxy war and so that means it's very possible for China and the US to not fight against each other because of the escalation of war to nuclear weapons And so that means it's very possible for China and the US to not fight against each other, because the escalation of war to nuclear weapons means the destruction of human beings. means to destroy the human being.

It meaning is to go to the war. It immediately leads to go to the war. The second is globalization.

The second is globalization. I know people for a long time we argue that integration from the I know people for a long time, we argue that integration from the Chinese wars and we argue that economic integration cannot prevent Chinese wars, and we argue that economic integration cannot bring a one- Germany and France from falling into war. Germany and France fall into war, well, Well, they didn't realize that globalization is different from economic interdependence.

they didn't realize that globalization is different from the economic interdependence. Economic interdependence only means they increase the sensibility as well as the vulnerability of the two sides. Economic interdependence only means the increase of sensibility as well as the vulnerability of the two sides. But globalization is different.

But globalization is different. Globalization on the one hand increases the sensitivity of the interdependence, Globalization on the one hand increases the sensitivity of the interdependence, makes both sides cautious, makes both sides cautious, concerned whether they should go to war against each other, concerned whether they should go to war against each other, and also reduces the vulnerability of the interdependence. and also will we... reduce the vulnerability of interdependence. What it means to reduce the vulnerability of interdependence is that there is an alternative market.

What I mean by reduce the vulnerability of interdependence is that there is an alternative market. For instance, For instance, when we have a problem with Japan, when we have a problem with Japan, the sound was that, some would say, hey, hey, we should have a sanction on Japan and make Japan lose their economic benefits. we should have a sanction on Japan and make Japan lose their economic benefits. Then what?

Then what? Japan said, Japan says, okay, okay, fine. fine. They shifted their capital to the They shift their capital to the Indians, to the Indian, to the Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia.

Well, they can survive. Well, They are not so vulnerable. they are not so vulnerable, They do not need to use a metaphor to protect their market.

they do not need to use a metaphor to protect their market. So from understanding that this theory can also apply to the relationship between China and the US. So from my understanding, this theory can also apply to the relationship between China and the US.

Even we have left any sanctions on each other, any sanctions on each other and I think that each side because so curious okay fine I find some market or the resources from others so from my understanding it's a very hard to believe and I think each side becomes so curious. OK, fine, I find some market or the resources from others. So from my understanding, it's very hard to believe China and the US will fight against each other the right China and the US will fight against each other. Do you like it? How about the war between China and the other neighbors?

How about the war between China and the other neighbors? That depends on how you define the term, That depends on how you define the term, peaceful rise. peaceful rights.

For me, For me, peaceful rise means that China does not initiate war. peaceful rights means that China does not initiate war. And I don't mean that when others attack China we say, And I don't mean that when others attack China, we say, OK, OK, fine, fine, because this is our principle, because this is our principle, peaceful rise, peaceful rights, we will tolerate no matter how you beat me. we will tolerate it no matter how you beat me. We also, We also, we certainly fight back.

we certainly fight back. So So I never regarded fighting back as not peaceful, I never regarded fighting back as not peaceful, I think, I think, because we are forced to. because we are forced to. do that. to do that.

And the final thing is the difference between the moral realism and the offensive realism is the time time span or time limit for forecast or prediction. And the final thing is the difference between the moral realism and the offensive realism is the time limit for forecast or prediction. My book, My book, the ancient thought more than Chinese, Ancient Chinese Thought, ancient Chinese thought more than Chinese power and concern that the leadership is important so my forecast have to base up the leadership.

Modern Chinese Power, concerns that leadership is important, so my forecast has to base up the leadership. So my very, So my very big... very latest book, latest book, The Inertia of History, The Initial of History, China and the World in the Next China and the World in the Next Ten Years, Ten Years, and I predict that in the next ten years, and I predict that in the next ten years, it's hard to believe China will initiate a war. it's hard to believe China will initiate a war. I think China did not have that trip, I think China did not have that, especially after reading Xi Jinping's speech on the 24th, especially after reading the...

and it strengthened my... my confidence in my forecast about the next 10 years. My confidence in my focus about the next 10 years, I guess I guess China will become the superpower by 2023. China will become the superpower by 2023, maybe a little bit earlier than Maybe a little bit earlier than Mr. Mr. Hammer predicted. Heimer. predicted.

Mr. Mr. Hammer's argument is considered about 20 or 30 years. Hammer's argument consider about 20 or 30 years, And my theory will be tested by the history within 10 years. and my theory will be tested by the history within 10 years. So I have a more dangerous situation to face with and my theory will possibly be disproved by history.

So I have a more dangerous situation to face with, and my theory will possibly be disproved by... history and so Mr. And so Mr. Hammer is the series most safe he can wait for 30 years okay thank you thank you Hammer's theory is more safe. He can wait for 30 years.

Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. I I just wanted to make, just wanted to make you up.

can people, Good people. yeah, hang on, Thank you. modern technology. modern technology. I want to make three quick points in response to Professor Yang's excellent presentation.

I wanted to make three quick points in response to Professor Yan's excellent presentation. First of all, First of all, he made the argument that President Xi, he made the argument that President Xi and the Chinese government is now going to go to considerable lengths to have good relations with neighbors, and the Chinese government is now going to go to considerable lengths to have good relations with neighbors, to incorporate... to incorporate... China's neighbors into economic and security arrangements that enhance cooperation and make conflict less likely.

China's neighbors into economic and security arrangements that enhance cooperation and make conflict less likely. I think this is a smart strategy for China to try, I think this is a smart strategy for China to try, but I do believe it's going to fail. but I do believe it's going to fail. And I believe it's going to fail for three reasons. And I believe it's going to fail for three reasons.

First of all, First of all... What is really scaring What is really scaring China's neighbors and the United States is Chinese capabilities. China's neighbors and the United States is Chinese capabilities.

As I said in my presentation, As I said in my presentation, nobody can know another state's intentions. nobody can know another state's intentions. And that's especially true when it comes to future intentions. true when it comes to future intentions.

So given that difficulty of figuring out what intentions are, So given that difficulty of figuring out what intentions are, you concentrate on capabilities. you concentrate on capabilities. And anytime you see a country that has the And any time you see a country that has... It has the kind of potential that China has. of potential that China has and you see it realizing that potential it's just going to scare you greatly so all China's neighbors are going to be scared no matter what you say just because you're getting so big the And you see it realizing that potential.

It's just going to scare you greatly. So all of China's neighbors are going to be scared no matter what you say. Just because you're getting so big. The second reason that there's going to be trouble is your neighbors have an incentive to cause trouble now and to settle disputes with you, second reason that there's going to be trouble is your neighbors have an incentive to cause trouble now and to settle disputes with you China before China, before you. You get really powerful.

You get really powerful. What's very interesting is if you look at all the disputes that China has been involved in over the past 10 years, What's very interesting is if you look at all the disputes that China has been involved in over the past 10 years, China initiated virtually none of those disputes. China initiated virtually none of those disputes. It's the Philippines, It's the Philippines, it's Vietnam.

it's Vietnam. It's Japan that have initiated the disputes. It's Japan that initiated the disputes.

I think the Chinese have overreacted in response. I think the Chinese have overreacted in response. But the fact is, But the fact is the Chinese have a vested interest in staying cool because time is on your side. the Chinese have a vested interest in staying cool, because time is on your side. You get more powerful as time goes by.

You get more powerful as time goes by. You become Godzilla. you become Godzilla and when you become Godzilla you get to dictate the rules of the system so if you're Chinese the name of the game is just to sit back and wait and continue to grow but your neighbors have exactly the opposite set of incentives they And when you become Godzilla, you get to dictate the rules of the system. So if you're Chinese, the name of the game is just to sit back and wait and continue to grow. But your neighbors have exactly the opposite set of incentives.

They have a vested interest in settling disputes now, have a vested interest in settling disputes now when China is not so powerful in the United States is very powerful so your neighbors are going to have an incentive to cause trouble the third reason when China's not so powerful, and the United States is very powerful. So your neighbors are going to have an incentive to cause trouble. The third reason...

that being nice won't work is that everybody knows that you, that being nice won't work is that everybody knows that you, China, China, are a revisionist power. are a revisionist power. You are unhappy with the status quo regarding Taiwan.

You are unhappy with the status quo regarding Taiwan. You are unhappy with the status quo regarding the Diaoyu Islands. You are unhappy with the status quo regarding the Diaoyu Islands.

You are unhappy with the status quo regarding your border with India. You are unhappy with the status quo regarding your border with India. You are unhappy with the status quo. You are unhappy with the status quo regarding the South China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea, you're unhappy with the way the rules have been written in international institutions.

You are unhappy with the way... The rules have been written in international institutions. There's all sorts of evidence that you're unhappy. There's all sorts of evidence that you're unhappy. And when you get more and more powerful, And when you get more and more powerful, you're going to change the rules.

you're going to change the rules. So for those three reasons, So for those three reasons, being nice won't work. being nice won't work. Your neighbors are going to be increasingly scared of you, Your neighbors are going to be increasingly scared of you, and the United States is going to be increasingly scared of you. and the United States is going to be increasingly scared of you.

Second point is, Second point is... Professor Yan talked about the importance of morality and moral realism. Professor Yan talked about the importance of morality and moral... realism and the argument here of course is that the Chinese place a higher premium on morality that is dangerous the United States of America it places a high premium on morality it And the argument here, of course, is that the Chinese place a high premium on morality. That is dangerous.

I come from a country, the United States of America, that places a high premium on morality. It gets us into all sorts of trouble. gets us into all sorts of trouble it makes us more aggressive liberals in the United States believe that we are an exceptional country It makes us more aggressive. Liberals in the United States believe that we are an exceptional country. We are the city on the hill.

We are the city on the hill. We are a light on two nations. We are a light on two nations.

Morality is on our side. Morality is on our side. We have a right and a responsibility to run the world. We have a right and a responsibility to run the world. We should teach you Chinese the basic facts of life about moral virtue.

We should teach you Chinese the basic facts of life about morality. moral virtue. Anytime you go down that road, Any time you go down that road, the imperative to intervene here, the imperative to intervene here, there, there, and everywhere goes through the roof. and everywhere goes through the roof.

Realists, Realists, on the other hand, on the other hand, good good realists, realists, realists who do not put that word moral in front of realism, realists who do not put that word moral in front of realism, are much less likely to get involved here, are much less likely to get involved here, there, there, and everywhere. and everywhere. Why?

Why? Because we understand the tragic nature of international politics. Because we understand the tragic nature of international politics.

We understand, We understand, like Clausewitz, like Clausewitz, you know, you know Clausewitz was a great realist, Clausewitz was a great realist, just how complicated and how dangerous war is. just how complicated and how dangerous war is. It is no accident, It is no accident, ladies and gentlemen, that we are in a world where we are in a world ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, that virtually every realist of any... that virtually every realist of any note opposed the Vietnam War.

any note oppose the Vietnam War. Virtually all the realists oppose the Iraq War. Virtually all the realists opposed the Iraq War. And most of the realists I know oppose And most of the realists I know oppose America's interventionist foreign policy.

America's interventionist foreign policy. And it's liberals with their sense of moral superiority who want to run all over God's little green acre fighting wars to improve the virtue of foreign countries. And it's liberals, with their sense of moral superiority, who want to run all over God's little green acre, fighting wars to improve the virtue of foreign countries.

So the fact that I hear that China is more interested in moral realism makes me very scared. So the fact that I hear that China is more than a country of the rich is a lie. more interested in moral realism makes me very scared.

This brings me to my final response to Professor Yan's presentation. This brings me to my final response to Professor Yan's presentation. He said that he was not as pessimistic as me for mainly two reasons.

He said that he was not as pessimistic as me for mainly two reasons. One are nuclear weapons, One, nuclear weapons, and two is globalization. and two, his globalization, which is the standard economic independence argument, which is the standard economic independence argument, does he make clear? as he made clear. I think...

I think that those are the two most powerful arguments against me. I think that those are the two most powerful arguments against me. And I think to the extent that I may be proved wrong, And I think to the extent that I may be proved wrong, wrong, he's correct. he's correct.

But I want to say a few words about each of those arguments. But I want to say a few words about each of those arguments. First of all, First of all, with regard to nuclear weapons, with regard to nuclear weapons.

you want to remember that the United States and the Soviet Union both had nuclear weapons, You want to remember that the United States and the Soviet Union both had nuclear weapons. and we had an intense security competition. And we had an intense security competition. We did not have a war that We did not have a war.

Thank God, but we had an intense security competition. But we had an intense security competition. India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons, and they have had a very intense security competition, and they have had a very intense security competition, despite the fact that they have nuclear weapons. despite the fact that they have nuclear weapons. If you believe that a war involves a thousand battle deaths, If you believe that a war involves a thousand battle deaths, what happened in Kargil would be an example of a war between two nuclear-armed states.

what happened in Kabul would be an example of a war between two nuclear-armed states. Now I'm not saying that a war is likely, Now, I'm not saying that a war is likely. I'm very clear, I'm very clear.

I'm arguing an intense security issue. I'm arguing an intense security competition is likely, competition is likely but I'm not saying the war is and I think that he's correct when he points out the nuclear weapons cut against my argument but I'm not saying a war is. And I think that he's correct when he points out that nuclear weapons cut against my argument. I'm conceding that point. I'm conceding that point But I'm just saying you'll still get an intense security competition.

I'm just saying you'll still get an intense security competition my second point here is that if you look at the geography of Asia in a future My second point here is that if you look at the geography of Asia in a future US-China competition and you compare it to the geography of the Cold War, US China competition and you compare it to the geography of the Cold War there is good reason there is good reason to think that the prospects for war in the decades ahead are not small. to think that the prospects for war in the decades ahead are not small. They're not large, They're not large, but they're not small. but they're not small. And the reason is you can imagine plausible scenarios where the United States and China get dragged into a war over Taiwan, And the reason is, you can imagine plausible scenarios where the United States and China get dragged into a war over Taiwan, over the Diaoyu Islands, over the Diaoyu Islands, over Korea, over Korea, over the South China Sea.

over the South China Sea, Because those areas, because those areas, those flashpoints. those flash... points are not like the central front in the Cold War. are not like the central front in the Cold War.

If we had had a war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, If we had had a war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it would have been World War III with nuclear weapons over Germany. it would have been World War III with nuclear weapons over Germany. That was such a horrible possibility that there was no way you could get a war going between the superpowers in the Cold War.

That was such a horrible possibility that there was no way you could get a war going between the superpowers in the Cold War. The geography in Asia, The geography in Asia, where limited wars are possible, where limited wars are possible, really cuts against the nuclear argument. really cuts against the nuclear argument. That's not to say there's not a lot of power.

That's not to say there's not a lot of power. power in Professor Yan's point about nuclear weapons. power in Professor Yan's point about nuclear weapons.

There is a lot of power in his argument, There is a lot of power in his argument, but we do not want to be overconfident on this one. but we do not want to be overconfident on this one. With regard to economic interdependence, With regard to economic independence, and this is my final point, and this is my final point, first of all, first of all, what that argument is really all about is the relationship between economics and politics. what that argument is really all about is the relationship between economics and politics. And if you believe that globalization or economics or economic interdependence And if you believe that globalization or economics or economic independence causes peace, causes peace, you're basically saying that in the pull and tug between economic considerations and political considerations, you're basically saying that in the pull and tug between economic considerations and political considerations, economic considerations dominate.

economic consideration is dominant. And I don't believe that. And I don't believe that. And just take Taiwan. And just take Taiwan.

The Chinese government has made it clear that if Taiwan were to declare its independence, The Chinese government has made it clear that if Taiwan were to declare its independence, China would go to war against Taiwan, China would go to war against Taiwan, despite the fact that China would pay significant, despite the fact that China would pay significant, if not huge, if not huge, economic costs. economic costs. China would still go to war over Taiwan.

China would still go to war over Taiwan. Why is that? Why is that? Because the Chinese government is saying politics is more important than economics. Because the Chinese government is saying politics is more important than economics.

Is it impossible that China and Japan will end up fighting over the Diaoyu Islands at some point in the next ten years? Is it impossible that China and Japan will end up fighting over the Diaoyu Islands at some point in the next ten years? It is not impossible.

It is not impossible. Why? Why?

Because politics is often times much more important than economic considerations. Because politics is often times much more important than economic considerations. This is not to say that economic considerations are not important.

This is not to say that economic considerations are not important. won't sometimes serve as a damper on conflict. won't sometimes serve as a damper on conflict. And in that sense, And in that sense, again, again, Professor Yon has a powerful argument.

Professor Yan has a powerful argument. I'm not saying economic interdependence doesn't matter at all, I'm not saying economic independence doesn't matter at all. but you never want to underestimate the importance of politics, If you never want to underestimate the importance of politics, the importance of geopolitics, the importance of geopolitics, and how geopolitics sometimes trumps economics.

and how geopolitics sometimes trumps economics. Just to give you one good example, Just to give you one good example, World War I. World War I. Everybody agrees that there was substantial economic Everybody agrees that there was substantial... economic interdependence in Europe before World War I.

economic interdependence in Europe before World War I. But we had World War I anyway. But we had World War I anyway. So I would not bet a lot of money that economic independence will be our saving grace any more than I would bet that nuclear weapons will be our saving grace.

So I would not bet a lot of money that economic interdependence will be our saving grace any more than I would bet that nuclear weapons will be our saving grace. Although I concede in both cases that although those two factors do not dampen the security competition, Although I concede in both cases that although those two factors do not dampen the security competition, they do lessen the possibility that that security competition will turn into war. they do lessen the possibility of a nuclear war. possibility that that security competition will turn into war.

Professor Mitzhammer gave a very clear logical illustration about his argument and the response to my ideas. Professor Mitzheimer gave a very clear, logical illustration about his argument and response to my ideas. Okay, Okay, I think there's five points. I think there's five points. I tried to use one minute for I tried to use one minute.

...each point. And recently I read some books about ecology and I realized why ...each one. And recently I read some book of ecology, and I realized why the hunting thing is wrong.

Huntington's Rock is wrong. And from the human nature... And human nature. and the competition within the space is the most severe, And the competition within the space is the most severe, not the competition between different species. not the competition between different species.

So you see the debate between the realists is more severe than the debate between the realists with labor and labor. So you see the debate between the realists is more severe than the debate between realists with labor or the constructivism, or the constructivism because we think we are so dominating, because we think we are so dominating, we are so powerful, we are so powerful, we can ignore them. we can ignore them.

We know they can never win a debate with a realist. We know they can never win a debate with a realist. But then within the realist, But then within the realist we fight for our influence. we fight for what? We fight for our influence.

Well, the hunting thing is wrong, Huntington is wrong because he believes the competition between the different civilized countries is not the same. because he believes the competition between the different civilized countries civilization is what dominates the world, civilization is what dominated the world after the Cold War. the Abul Qul war.

Actually, Actually, the case in Syria illustrates that is totally wrong. the case in Syria, if you read that, is totally wrong. And you find that the war between the different schools of the And you find that the war between the different schools of the Muslims is more bad than the war between Muslims is more badly than the war between Israel and the Israel and the Arab states.

United States. Okay, OK, come to the debate between me and come to the debate between me and Professor Ms. Professor Ms. Hamer. Hammer. Let's see how severe this Let's see how silly it is. interest within the space, interest within the space, a spacious competition.

a spacious conversation. And first, And first, the neighbors definitely fear about China's growing. the neighbors definitely fear about China's growing. There's no doubt.

There's no doubt. That's our assumption. That's our assumption.

And the question is that, And the question is that, why the younger brother do not have a fear about his elder brother, why the younger brother do not have a fear about his elder brother no matter how his elder brother armed? no matter how his elder brother armed? Because of relationship. Because of division. And if China turn all our neighbors into If China turns to our neighbors, these weak small neighbors into our younger brothers and then they won't fear us.

There's weak, small neighbors into our younger brothers, and then they won't fear us. The reason our neighbors fear China is because we tell them I'm not your brother. The reason our neighbors fear China, because we tell them, I'm not your brother. China insists on non-alliance principle. China insists on non-alliance principle.

I'm not protecting you. I'm not protecting you. If you're bullied or being attacked by others, If you are bullied or being attacked by others, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, that's your own business. that's your business. Don't rely on me.

Don't rely on me. So when China tells them, So when China tell them, OK, OK, come to me. come to me. I'm going to help you.

I'm going to help you. OK, OK, I'm your brother. I'm your elder brother. OK, OK, I protect you. I protect you.

I need big arms. I need big arms. And so these guys were like, And so these guys were like, okay, OK, China should have a large military expenditure. China should have a large military expenditure.

And our neighbors, And our neighbors, certainly because we are not their elder brothers, certainly because we are not their elder brothers, they certainly, they certainly that's why I'm talking about what's the idea behind Xi Jinping's argument about the faith community. that's why I'm talking about what's the idea behind Xi Jinping's argument about the fate community. And then the second point is that neighbors will purposely initiate a dispute. And the second point is that neighbors will purposely initiate a dispute. Definitely.

Definitely. I think that's very rational. I think that's very rational. If they initiate a dispute with China, If they initiate a dispute with China, can get more money from China. can get more money from China.

why not? why not? And if I give the advice to the Philippines, Even I give advice to the Philippines.

I say, I say, hey, hey, you poke China and China will give you more money. you pull China, and China will give you more money, And then they will do more. and then they will do well. Last time they caused the trouble and we gave them a 7 billion trade agreement. Last time, they caused the trouble, and we gave them a seven billion trade agreement, So they're not satisfied.

so they're not satisfied, And they want more. and they want more. We said, We say, sorry, sorry, no more. no, that's it. That's it.

If you want more, If you want more, okay, okay, then you get punished. then you get punished. Okay, Okay, so how can we do?

so how can we do? To those countries who never be satisfied, To those countries who never be satisfied, and it's so greedy, and it is so greedy, you have to punish them. you have to punish them. You have no other choice. You have no other choice.

And so what I do not mean that you use the metro falls to paint them and you can isolate them and you can contain them just like what the US did against the Soviet Union, And so I do not mean that you use the micro force to punish them, and you can isolate them, and you can contain them, just like what the U.S. did against the Soviet Union, right? right? So the same thing America adopted the engagement policy against China in early in So the same thing, America adopted engagement policy against China in early 1990s and we can follow in this in this perspective we can follow American suit and dealing with those guys who purposely take up confronting policy against China. 1990s. And we can follow, in this perspective, we can follow American suit, dealing with those guys who purposely take a confronting policy against China.

And the second a third and And the second, the third, and... And benign means work. And benign won't work.

Well, Well, that depends on benign to whom. that depends on benign to who. The benign never works with your enemy, Benign never works with your enemy, but it works with your friends and your supporters. but it works with your friends and your supporters.

And from my understanding, And from my understanding, the human beings are so selfish, human beings are so selfish, and if you give them economic benefits and security protection, and if you give them economic benefits and security protection, no matter if you are benign or not, no matter you're benign or not, and then they will take you as their friends. then they will take you as their friend. So I think the policy is very clear, So I think the policy is very clear, and if our Chinese people are benign, and it's our Chinese policy.

words that let the neighbors benefit from us we will not economically benefit from you. words that let the neighbors benefit from us, we will not economically benefit from you. So I think these economic benefits can turn their attitude towards China. So I think these economic benefits can turn their attitude towards China. And the last one about the difference between values and morality.

And the last one about the difference between values and morality. When we talk about morality, When we're talking about morality, from my understanding, from my understanding, the Americans have a different definition of morality and the Chinese have a different definition of morality. Americans have different definitions for morality and the Chinese definition for morality.

We have a different morality. We have a different amount of... For instance, For instance, for Chinese we are concerned because the American morality is based on the Christian. for Chinese we concern, because Americans morality is based on the Christian, So they are concerned, so they concern, okay, okay, I'm right, I'm right, so you should follow me. so you should follow me.

For For Chinese morality, Chinese, morality is opposite. it's not like that. opposite.

I'm more civilized, I'm more civilized so so I don't think you should follow me. I don't think you should follow me and you want to learn from me okay, And you want to learn from me? Okay, if you do want to, if you do want to keep your right word position okay. Keep your bite work position.

I do not care. I do not care and so Confucius said that And so Confucius said that, and and we never reject those who want to learn from us, we never reject those who want to learn from us, but but I never go to you to teach you how to behave yourself. I never go to you to teach you how to behave yourself. So this kind of a different philosophy, So this kind of different philosophy, a different culture, different culture, a different base for the morality will make China adopt a different strategy from the US. different base of morality would make China adopt a different strategy from the US.

The final thing is about the function of the nuclear weapons and the globalization. The final thing is about the function of the nuclear weapons and the globalization. And first I should say that nuclear weapons itself cannot prevent war between the US and China. And first I should say that nuclear weapon itself cannot prevent war between the US the US and the and the Soviet Union. Soviet Union.

And certainly it won't prevent the war between China and the US. And certainly it won't prevent the war between China and the US. And the US must plus with men the mutual assured destruction strategy. And the US must plus with MED, the Mutual Assured Destruction Strategy.

Without that strategy, Without that strategy, it won't work. it won't work. That's why the Schelling got the Nobel Prize. That's why the sharing gets the Nobel Prize. The only AR scholar got the Nobel Prize for that strategy.

The only IR scholar got the Nobel Prize for what? For this strategy. And from my understanding, And from my understanding, like at the beginning we argued that all realists have the same assumption. at the beginning we argued that all realists have the same assumption.

All the same assumption. all the theories should be based on facts in the history in the last theories should be based on facts in the history in the last 60 years since 1945. 60 years since 1935. The facts tell us that nuclear weapons plus manned are reliable. The facts tell us that nuclear weapons plus MED are reliable.

And we hope the Nobel this time didn't issue the wrong prize to Shelley. We hope that the Nobel this time didn't issue the wrong price to Schelling. And certainly they issued a wrong price to Obama.

And certainly they issued a wrong prize to the Obama. And the final thing... About the economy, the economy, whether the economy, whether the economy, the globalization can prevent China to go to war over the Taiwan issue and the other issues with neighbors.

globalization can prevent China to go to war over the Taiwan issue and the other issues with neighbors. I'm 100% agree with Professor Hammer. I 100% agree with Professor Hammer. Economic interests can never prevent great power from going to war.

Economic interests can never prevent real power from going to war. That's the imagination. That's the imagination. People believe that great power will be so selfish, People believe that real power will be so selfish, so they lack money, so they like money so much. so they can't do anything.

so much then they won't go to war. then they won't go to war. No, No, never.

never. But then the political concern is very important. But then the political concern is very important. Political concern is the motivation of going to war.

Political concern is the motivation of going to war. And then the question is that if China does not prepare to go to war, And then the question is that, if China does not prepare to go to war, and these neighbors, and these neighbors, they will become, they will become, they have more guts to poke you, they have more guts to poke it, to cause, to cause, to initiate more disputes with you. to initiate more disputes with it. But you're right to go to war, But you are right to go to war, and then you'll. and then you make it.

you make your deterrence strategy reliable, your deterrence strategy is reliable, I think there will less such kind of disputes will occur. I think there will be less such kind of distrust will occur. So that's why I issue the, So that's why I published a paper on the New York Times arguing that China should be as assertive as possible. I published a paper on the New York Times arguing that China should be as assertive as possible. And if China, And if the world expects China, if the world expect China, if our neighbor expect China to undertake a more international responsibility, if our neighbors expect China to undertake more international responsibility, especially in terms of security, especially in terms of security, China should be.

China should be very, Very, very very assertive. very assertive. And if a power is not assertive, And if a power is not assertive, how can you trust that God?

how can you trust that guy? That is not reliable. That guy is not reliable.

Okay, Okay, thank you. thank you.